

**A Century of The Russian Ministry of War
1802-1902
General Staff Historical Department
The Reign of Emperor Alexander I
1801 - 1805**

[translated into English from the original Russian by Peter G.A. Phillips]

28f. The Reorganisation Of General-Of-Infantry Golenishchev-Kutuzov's Army In November 1805 And The Formation Of A Reserve Corps Facing Galicia.

The war of 1805, thanks to Napoleon's ingenious strategic operation (the Ulm march-manoeuvre), took an unfavourable turn for the Austrians; on 20 October [new style], *Generalquartiermeister* Mack laid down his arms. This event forced the army under General-of-Infantry Golenishchev-Kutuzov to halt their advance (the objective of which had been to link up with *Generalquartiermeister* Mack) and to begin a retreat, which ended with the classic march-manoeuvre from Krems to Znaim. At Wischau, this army successfully linked up with the corps under General-of-Infantry Buxhoeveden, who, in accordance with 'the turn of events' in Prussia,¹ came 'under the overall command of General-of-Infantry Golenishchev-Kutuzov.'

Thereafter, 'the entire army retreated to the Olmütz fortress, where it deployed into an encampment and waited for the Lifeguard Corps under the command of His Imperial Highness, Tsarevich and Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich to join them; this unification took place on 13 [25] November.'²

On 15 [27] November, in accordance with the decisions of a council of war, 'the Russian Imperial Army, united with the Holy Roman Imperial force'³ broke camp and 'before the battle of Austerlitz and the retreat to Holitsch underwent the following reorganisation':⁴

Vanguard commanded by Lieutenant General Prince Bagration:

Major General Prince Dolgoruky: Malakhov's Cossack Regiment, 5th Jägers, Pavlograd Hussars, Prince Iashvili's horse artillery company, Arkhangelogorod Musketeers, Staro-Ingermanland Musketeers, Pskov Musketeers, Mariupol Hussars, Tver Dragoons.

First Column commanded by Lieutenant General Baron Wimpfen:

Major General Miller: 2½ squadrons of Denisov's Cossacks, Vyrubev's pioneer company, 7th Jägers.

Major General Selekhov: Azov Musketeers, Narva Musketeers, Podolsk Musketeers.

Major General Strich: Butyrsk Musketeers, Galits Musketeers.

Second Column commanded by Lieutenant General comte de Langeron:

Major General Count Kamensky: 2½ squadrons of Denisov's Cossacks, Kutsevich's pioneer company, 8th Jägers, Fanagoria Grenadiers, Ryazhsk Musketeers.

Major General Olsufiev: Kursk Musketeers, Perm Musketeers, Vyborg Musketeers.

Third Column:

1 In accordance with the instructions issued to General-of-Infantry Count Buxhoeveden.

2 From the legend to the Overall Map Of Part Of Moravia, Showing Offensive Operations By The Russian Imperial Army Combined With Austrian Forces Against The French Army In 1805 (M.S.A. department I, No. 1565). The map was drafted and produced by Major and Chevalier Toll of His Imperial Majesty's suite of the Quartermaster's Department.

3 From the legend to the Overall Map Of Part Of Moravia, Showing Offensive Operations By The Russian Imperial Army Combined With Austrian Forces Against The French Army In 1805 (M.S.A. department I, No. 1565).

4 We have extracted the 'shown strength' of both armies, which is given with the same map by Major Toll. The commander-in-chief of the combined armies was General-of-Infantry Golenishchev-Kutuzov, while 'under him' were General-of-Infantry Buxhoeveden and Lieutenant General Prinz Liechtenstein, the 'commander of the Austrian contingent.'

Division commanded by Lieutenant General Dokhturov:

Major General Prince Urusov: 6th Jägers, Kiev Grenadiers, Moscow Musketeers, Vyatka Musketeers.

Division commanded by Major General Przybyszewski:

Major General Lieders: Bryansk Musketeers, Yaroslavl Musketeers.

Major General Löwis: Vladimir Musketeers, Novo Ingermanland Musketeers.

Sievers' heavy artillery, Dreyer's pioneer company.

Fourth Column commanded by Prinz Hohenlohe:

Division commanded by Major General Kienmeyer:

Major General Nostitz: Kiselev's Cossacks, Khanzhonkov's Cossacks, Szekler Hussars, Ignatiev's horse artillery, Hessen-Homburg Hussars.

Division commanded by Lieutenant General Essen 2nd:

Major General Shepelev: St Petersburg Dragoons, Her Majesty's Leib Cuirassiers, His Highness' Ulans, two Cossack regiments.⁵

Division commanded by Miloradovich:

Major General Repnin: Berch's pioneer company, Smolensk Musketeers, Kudryavtsev's heavy artillery company, Apsheron Musketeers, Novgorod Musketeers, Malorussia Grenadiers.

Division commanded by Lieutenant General Kolowrat:

Rottermund: Vienna Jägers, Salzburg, Kaunitz.

Major General Jurczek: Lindenau, Kerpen, Bolie, Wintenberg, Weisskreutz, Czartoryski, Kaiser.

Major General Carneville: 1st Szekler, two Austrian artillery batteries, 2nd Szekler, Broder, pioneers with two 'flying' bridges.

Fifth Column commanded by Lieutenant General Prinz Schwarzenberg:

Major General Stutterheim: Sysoev's Cossacks, Melentiev's Cossacks, Cheveauleger O'Reilly, Merveldt Ulans, Austrian horse artillery.

Major General Weber: Kaiser Cuirassiers.

Major General Caramelli: Karl-Löhringen Cuirassiers, Nassau Dragoons.

Major General Gizhitski [Giżycki]: Yermolov's (Russian) horse artillery, Kharkov Dragoons, Chernigov Dragoons, Yelisavetgrad Hussars.

Reserves of the army consisting of the Lifeguard Corps commanded by His Highness Konstantin Pavlovich:⁶

Chevalier Garde, Lifeguard Horse, Lifeguard Hussars, Lifeguard Jäger Battalion, two battalions each of the Preobrazhensky, Semenovskiy and Izmailovskiy regiments, Leib Grenadiers, a company each of horse artillery and heavy artillery, two squadrons of Lifeguard Cossacks.

In considering this 'statement' from Major Toll, we shall pay exclusive attention to the organisation of the Russian force, which may be summarised as follows:

⁵ Gordeev's Cossacks. The name of the other regiment was illegible.

⁶ Let us recall that there were component commanders assigned for the infantry, cavalry and artillery within the Guards Corps.

1. The entire army was divided into seven formations of varying composition: the vanguard, five columns and the reserve.
2. The columns were sub-divided either simply into various battle-groups (First, Second and Fifth columns), or into divisions (Third and Fourth columns), which in turn were sub-divided into battle-groups (Major General Przybyszewski's in the Third Column).
3. The battle-groups of each column present the following compositions:
 - a. Consisting solely of two or three infantry regiments (First and Second columns).
 - b. Consisting of two cavalry regiments, one of infantry and one horse artillery company (Fifth Column).
 - c. Consisting of 2½ squadrons of cavalry, a pioneer company and an infantry regiment (First Column).

It should be noted that artillery is not mentioned, probably because each regiment had an organic half company (six guns) based on the regulations that existed at that time.⁷ It is possible that these battle-groups within a column were referred to as brigades,⁸ but their very composition shows that they consisted either of infantry with artillery, or of all combat arms, and therefore they are rather smaller detachments, not brigades, which Tsar Peter the Great defined as follows: 'A brigade attached to an army is so called when two or three or more regiments are placed under a single commander... Such brigades may be mounted or on foot...'⁹

4. Divisions¹⁰ within the columns were of two types:
 - a. Infantry - (Third Column), either of four regiments, sometimes 'under the command' of two generals (Third Column), or of four regiments with attached companies of pioneers and heavy artillery.
 - b. Cavalry - of five regiments (Fourth Column)...¹¹
5. The vanguard and reserve had dedicated commanders, but the incompleteness of the statement does not make it possible to assess their internal organisation.

In general, we see that although the columns consisted of every combat arm (except for the Second Column, where there was no cavalry), the internal organisation suffered from serious disadvantages, namely: battle-groups were formed from arbitrarily composed columns, either solely from infantry with regimental artillery,¹² or solely from cavalry, where the differing number of regiments was quite significant¹³ or from regiments assigned to a coalition force brought together by chance 'under a single commander.' In addition, the actual composition of the columns was so anomalous that in the Third Column, for example, there was no cavalry, while in the First and Second Columns there was half a Cossack regiment each,¹⁴ despite the fact that a significant number of cavalry regiments were grouped in the Fourth Column, while the Fifth Column consisted solely of cavalry.

On 18 [30] November, prior to the advance on Austerlitz, a 'reassignment of regiments to columns' was made;¹⁵ this reorganisation was also in effect during the Battle of Austerlitz.

The army was still divided into a vanguard, a reserve and five columns.

⁷ See also the listing of the army under General-Of-Infantry Count Buxhoeveden in five columns in Part 28e.

⁸ We find a similar description in Supreme orders to General-of-Cavalry Baron Bennigsen dated 3 [15] August 1805.

⁹ Military Charter of 1716 (1826 edition), according to the listing in chapter 5.

¹⁰ Divisional generals are mentioned for the columns.

¹¹ There were also five regiments (Russian and Austrian with the addition of horse artillery).

¹² Some battle-groups also included a pioneer or heavy artillery company.

¹³ From one regiment (Fifth Column) to between five and seven regiments (Fourth Column).

¹⁴ The basic organisation of the regiment was being disrupted.

¹⁵ Mikhailovsky Danilevsky... p. 93.

The composition of the reorganised groupings was as follows:¹⁶

	Battalions	Squadrons	Sotnia	Artillery		Pioneer Companies
				Heavy Companies	Horse Companies	
Army Vanguard (Prince Bagration)	12	35	8	1	2	-
First Column Vanguard (Kienmeyer) ¹⁷	5	22	10	-	-	-
First Column (Dokhturov) ¹⁸	25	-	2½	2	-	1
Second Column (Langeron) ¹⁹	18	-	2½	-	-	1
Third Column (Przybyszewski) ²⁰	17	-	-	-	-	1
Fourth Column (Kolowrat) ²¹	27	-	-	1	-	1
Fifth Column (Prinz Liechtenstein) ²²	-	62	-	-	2	-
Reserve (Tsarevich Konstantin Pavlovich) ²³	17	10	-	2	1	-

Our honourable scholar, Professor General Leer, in considering this reorganisation from the point of view of a rational subordination, came to the following compelling conclusions:²⁴

1. 'The division of the army into independent and manageable tactical formations at the higher level, was applied operationally in a most unsatisfactory manner.'
2. 'The ad hoc formations at the higher level (the aforementioned columns), were linked as a whole not by strong, organic communications between their component parts, but by extremely inadequate control links; in short, they were administrative groupings rather than tactical...'
3. These were 'far from being independent fighting formations; for example, in the Third Column there was no cavalry; the Fifth Column consisted only of cavalry and horse artillery.'

To this it must also be added that instead of one commander-in-chief leading the army, we encounter three: 'Kutuzov was only nominally in command of the army. Emperor Alexander I commanded it in practice, but did not assume the title of commander-in-chief officially, and finally,

16 Mikhailovsky Danilevsky... p. 93-95; the table was compiled from this source. Leer, Applied Tactics, p. 44 (the data from Leer differs somewhat from that shown).

17 Croat infantry battalions and understrength Austrian squadrons.

18 One battalion of 7th Jägers [three battalions of 6th Jägers were detached to Prince Bagration before the start of the battle].

19 In Leer, 2½ Sotnia are not shown with the Second Column, which is confirmed by Lieutenant General Count Langeron, who later reported that his column consisted of a brigade under Major General Count Kamensky (Fanagoria Grenadiers, Ryazhsk Musketeers and 8th Jägers) and a brigade under Major General Olsufiev (Kursk Musketeers, Perm Musketeers and Vyborg Musketeers, with one pioneer company). M.S.A. department II, No. 1549, report No. 867, dated 25 November [7 December] 1805.

20 Including two battalions of 7th Jägers. In Leer the Third Column is shown as having 18 battalions - attributing all three battalions of 7th Jägers to this column.

21 Including 15 understrength Austrian battalions.

22 Of which, 32 squadrons were Austrian. Analogous with the previous listing, this column included an Austrian horse artillery company as well as Yermolov's company. In Leer the number of squadrons is given as 82 (Russian and Austrian).

23 We have included the Lifeguard light artillery companies with the regiments. In Leer, 18 squadrons are shown rather than 17 (three regiments each of five squadrons, plus two squadrons of Lifeguard Cossacks).

24 Leer, Applied Tactics, p. 45-46.

there was General Weyrother of the Austrian general staff, the drafter of the plan for the offensive on Austerlitz and for the battle itself; in short, instead of one commander, we see three, that is, instead of a concentration of authority, it was dispersed.'

In summary, 'a poorly constituted organisation is destined to be dysfunctional.' Indeed, 'the incoherence of all operations by the Coalition, their lack of all important unity (the battle broke down into an entire series of completely isolated, albeit valiant, episodes, with no common link between them),²⁵ was the main distinguishing feature of the Battle of Austerlitz - in addition, the lack of a unifying mind and will from the head of the army is explained, among other things, by the fact that almost all of the cavalry was crammed into a single column (Liechtenstein's), which could have been so fundamentally useful in establishing liaison between the individual columns during the battle (all the more so, in that having set themselves a double envelopment, the Coalition had scattered their forces over a considerable area.), while some columns had none at all,²⁶ in other words, the main reason for the demise of the army can be entirely explained by none other than the major blunder of going against a fundamental principle of organisation.'

These are the authoritative conclusions of General Leer with regard to these improvised formations, thanks to which the Russian army was forced to endure the horrors of 20 November [2 December] 1805.

Let us now move on to the formation of the 'reserve corps facing Galicia...'

By way of Supreme decree dated 8 [20] November 1805, addressed to General-of-Cavalry Mikhelson, a reserve corps was ordered to be formed.²⁷

The decree stated: 'Due to the circumstances known to you, the corps under General Kutuzov, pursued by the enemy in superior strength, almost constantly in combat and having already retreated to Olmütz, has had to be reinforced by the corps under Count Buxhoeveden and command over them given to Kutuzov, as was designated in accordance with the original operational plan. If despite this unification I must yield to the enemy's numbers, then the retreat will not only become difficult, but will also leave Galicia vulnerable, which has prompted me to form a reserve army on our borders between Brest-Litovsk and Brody.

Since your presence with the columns of General Bennigsen's corps is not most important, because they are still very distant from operations against the enemy, I am assigning you to be the commander of this newly formed reserve corps facing Galicia, where I know well that your diligence and outstanding energy will be vital for the precise execution of My intentions at such an important location, hence I am instructing you to go to Brest-Litovsk immediately and, having taken command of your forces indicated in the return forwarded herewith,²⁸ I leave it to your discretion to deploy the reserve corps facing the designated border line.

I entrust their training as quickly as possible to your particular care, as well as bringing them into a situation such that they can be used on operations as soon as they are needed.

After your departure, the troops belonging to the corps under General Bennigsen will remain under his command, and you are to inform him of all orders issued by you regarding this corps, as well as all the information that you consider necessary to give him; entrust the leading columns to the command of Lieutenant General Essen 1st until receipt of further orders from General Bennigsen, while General Steinheil is to be sent immediately to General-of-Infantry Kutuzov; inform

25 General Leer characterised these episodes as follows: 'A glittering charge by the Lifeguard Ulans; later, equally glorious charges by the Lifeguard Horse and Chevalier Garde; obstinate resistance from the First, Second and Third columns, all this represented a series of individual efforts which, due to the incoherence of the operation and the absence of any direction from above, could only lead to a disastrous outcome...'

26 For example, none in the Second and Third columns, while the First Column had just 2½ Sotnia (half a regiment).

27 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1805, minute No. 16, a copy of the decree was forwarded to Count Lieven by the War Minister for Land Forces from Olmütz with despatches dated 8 [20] November 1805; marked as received on 21 November [3 December]. Almost the entire Decree is shown here.

28 The composition of the corps according to this return follows below.

Quartermaster General van Sukhtelen that he is to go to Olmütz.’

In addition, at the end of the decree, in His Imperial Majesty’s handwriting: ‘we need to bring the regiments closer together so that they can move abroad as soon as possible; Lieutenant General Mäder has been ordered to come to you, nevertheless, in placing them at your complete disposal, you are to employ those officers from the reserve army in the Quartermaster General’s Department as you please. Notify Me often about the progress of your mission.’

The reserve corps, made up of ‘regiments and sub-units’ from the reserve army commanded by General-of-Infantry Rimsky-Korsakov, represented an improvised higher formation of every combat arm, assembled ‘as quickly as possible.’

General-of-Infantry Rimsky-Korsakov was tasked:²⁹ firstly, ‘to order these troops³⁰ to come under the command’ of General-of-Cavalry Mikhelson. Secondly, ‘with the rapid formation of the remaining elements of the reserve army’ to hasten ‘the current intake of recruits, to equip the troops under his command as quickly as possible and to bring them into proper order in every respect.’

The composition of the corps was as follows:³¹

Units	Squadrons	<i>Sotnia</i>	Battalions	Companies
One cuirassier regiment	5			
Four dragoon regiments	20			
Poland Horse	10			
Tatar Horse	5			
Chuguev Cossacks	5			
Eight Cossack regiments		40		
11 musketeer regiments			33	
10 th Jägers			2	
Foot artillery				10
Horse artillery				3
Total:	45	40	35	13

The Reserve Corps was divided into battle-groups:³²

First Battle-Group, commanded by Lieutenant General Prince Romodanovsky-Lodyzhensky:

Units	Squadrons	<i>Sotnia</i>	Battalions	Companies
One cuirassier regiment	5			

29 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1805, minute No. 16, Supreme decree to General-of-Infantry Korsakov dated 8 [20] November 1805.

30 Indicated in the return.

31 According to the return attached to the Supreme decree to General Michelson dated 8 [20] November 1805. In terms of its composition, the corps is very close to that of the projected army, differing only in designation and in that the former were divided into corps, while there was no provision for dividing the reserve corps into smaller groupings.

32 According to a schedule presented by the War Minister for Land Forces to the General-Proviantmeister in report No. 900, dated 5 [17] December 1805, and in General-of-Cavalry Mikhelson’s despatch No. 476, dated 5 [17] December 1805 (both in A.C.W.M. classified department, 1805, minute No. 16).

Units	Squadrons	<i>Sotnia</i>	Battalions	Companies
Two dragoon regiments	10			
Tatar Horse	5			
Chuguev Cossacks	5			
Four Cossack regiments		20		
Six musketeer regiments			18	
Foot artillery				5
Horse artillery				2
Total:	25	20	18	7

Second Battle-Group, commanded by Lieutenant General Sacken 1st:

Units	Squadrons	<i>Sotnia</i>	Battalions	Companies
Two dragoon regiments	10			
Poland Horse	10			
Five musketeer regiments			15	
10 th Jägers			2	
Foot artillery				5
Horse artillery				1
Total:	20	-	17	6

The regiments that joined the corps were seriously ‘under prepared’ in many respects, namely:

1. They were 10,760 men short,³³ but in addition it emerged that unfit men remained in the regiments, whom the regiments were obliged to evacuate, there were 1,028 of these in just seven regiments (between 19 and 590 men each),³⁴ overall, there was a shortfall of 11,794 men in the infantry and cavalry. If the absent and unfit from the artillery are added, the total figure exceeded 12,000 men. This had occurred for the following reasons:
 - a. Newly formed regiments had been assigned to the corps, calculated to have 5,500 men (these regiments were undermanned to the tune of between 1,047 to 1,627 men). These regiments were to be brought up to wartime establishment.³⁵
 - b. Regiments had arrived with a shortfall of between 359 to 989 men.
 - c. The huge number of 590 unfit men in the Voronezh Musketeer Regiment caught the attention of His Imperial Majesty, and *Flügel-Adjutant* Kikin was sent to investigate. The explanation by the colonel-in-chief of the regiment gives a very good idea of the typical state of the regiments that had made up the Reserve Army before being

³³ General-of-Cavalry Mikhelson's despatch No. 476, dated 5 [17] December 1805 (A.C.W.M. classified department, 1805, minute No. 16).

³⁴ No data was received from the other regiments.

³⁵ General-of-Cavalry Mikhelson's returns attached to report No. 625.

reassigned to the corps. 'This large number of unfit men in the regiment was due to other regiments 'having been brought up to strength with fit men from this regiment, had exchanged them for all those who were either physically incapable or were otherwise absent, most of whom have not yet arrived in this regiment.'³⁶ Among these 'non-arrivals' were 'some still in foreign hospitals from the previous campaigns of 1799 and 1800.'

2. There was 'a shortage of weapons and munitions items in the regiments, not to mention the petty or immediate deficiencies, which are of their own order.' The return attached to the above-mentioned report by General-of-Cavalry Mikhelson, stated:³⁷
 - a. Nine of the musketeer regiments were deficient a total of 8,113 muskets (for example, three regiments were missing 1,992, 1,565 or 1,256 muskets respectively).
 - b. There were 9,677 large and small cartridge pouches or bandoleers deficient.
 - c. One dragoon regiment was deficient 727 'military saddles.'
3. 'Moreover, the regiments are constantly talking about regimental deficiencies in infirmary trains and items that, during the foreign campaign preparations, were physically taken from them, imagining that there might be funds to replace them at standard prices.'³⁸
4. In some newly formed regiments, 'difficulties' were encountered filling non-commissioned officer, musician, drummer and craftsmen appointments; there was no-one 'qualified.'³⁹
5. Regiments 'complain about problems with the delivery of rations to them.'⁴⁰

This was the organic state of the Reserve Corps, assembled 'as quickly as possible.'

'A slew of orders had to be issued' in order to bring the corps into a battle-worthy state 'such that it could be sent into action at the first request': for an 'allocation of recruits' of 10,760 men, about which, incidentally, correspondence was conducted from 22 November [4 December] 1805⁴¹ to 8 [20] March 1806⁴² - and yet from all this activity it is difficult to conclude that the regiments received the recruits; the allotment for the issue of various 'items' that, 'for the most part' were not sent to 'those commissariat locations' before the beginning of 1806,⁴³ and therefore the regiments would not receive them until much later; concerns about 'putting an end to all obstacles' regarding rations, and so on.⁴⁴

By 11 [23] March 1806, this corps had ceased to exist, and in correspondence it is referred to as 'the former reserve corps...'⁴⁵

28g. The Reorganisation Of The Forces Returning From Campaign.⁴⁶

'On 26 November [8 December], in accordance with the truce concluded with the French on the 23rd [5 December], the Russian army set out on the return march to Russia in five columns, with the exception of the Lifeguard Corps, which proceeded through the cities of Krakow and Lublin

36 General-of-Cavalry Mikhelson's report No. 22 to His Imperial Majesty, dated 9 [21] February 1806.

37 Second return from report No. 625 to His Imperial Majesty, dated 22 December 1805 [3 January 1806].

38 Second return from report No. 625 to His Imperial Majesty, dated 22 December 1805 [3 January 1806].

39 Count Lieven's despatch No. 627 to the War Minister for Land Forces, dated 8 [20] March 1806.

40 Count Lieven's despatch No. 627 to the War Minister for Land Forces, dated 8 [20] March 1806. This was due to crop failure and extreme shortages in that region (Volhynia Governorate, specifically the Vladimir *Povet*).

41 Mentioned in General-of-Cavalry Mikhelson's report No. 625.

42 Count Lieven's despatch No. 627.

43 Report No. 2515 by the Intendant General of the army, dated 31 December 1805 [12 January 1806].

44 War Minister for Land Forces' orders for the Intendant General of the army, No. 152, dated 11 [23] March 1806.

45 Seen both in General-of-Cavalry Mikhelson's report No. 519, dated 11 [23] March 1806 and in the War Minister for Land Forces' despatch No. 153 to Count Lieven, dated 11 [23] March 1806.

46 We shall show the organisation of the army under General-of-Infantry Golenishchev-Kutuzov as well as the corps under General-of-Cavalry Baron Bennigsen and Lieutenant General Count Tolstoy.

towards Brest.⁴⁷

The orders for the division into five columns should be considered only as an intended order of march, since in reality, according to the report by General-of-Infantry Golenishchev-Kutuzov to His Imperial Majesty dated 21 December 1805 [2 January 1806],⁴⁸ the order of march for the army through Hungary and Galicia to the Russian border was as follows:

Columns with designated commanders	Squadrons	Sotnia	Battalions	Companies		
				Heavy Artillery	Horse Artillery	Pioneer
First Cavalry, Major General Gizhitsky	20	15				
Second Cavalry, Major General Prince Dolgoruky 4 th	20	20				
Third Cavalry, Major General Voinov	25	10				
First Infantry, Lieutenant General Miloradovich		3	21		1	
Second Infantry, Lieutenant General Dokhturov		2	24			2
Third Infantry, Lieutenant General comte Langeron		3	18	1	2	
Fourth Infantry, Major General Markov	5		21	1		
Fifth Infantry, Lieutenant General Essen ⁴⁹	5	2	9	2	2	

The cavalry columns set off from Kerem [*sic*] on 20, 22 and 24 December [1, 3 and 5 January 1806] and arrived in Brody on 21, 23 and 25 January [2, 4 and 6 February].

The infantry columns set off from Kaschau from 20 to 26 December [1 to 7 January 1806] and arrived in Brody on 14, 16, 17, 18 and 20 January [26, 28, 29 and 30 January, and 1 February].

We shall not go into a detailed assessment of this division into eight columns in view of the fact that, from 29 December [10 January 1806], a new schedule was put into effect,⁵⁰ about which General Golenishchev-Kutuzov had been forewarned on 22 December [3 January 1806],⁵¹ drawing attention to the fact that the lessons of Austerlitz had not gone unnoticed - there was now cavalry in every 'infantry column.'⁵²

The corps forming General-of-Cavalry Baron Bennigsen's force, 'following orders from His Majesty the King of Prussia, on 30 January [11 February] 1806 began to move from winter quarters towards the Russian borders.'⁵³

The corps was divided into two formations, of which the first had two columns, while the second had three, for a total of five columns, each column being sub-divided into two detachments.

47 From the legend to the General Map Of Moravia, Showing Offensive Operations By The Russian Imperial Army Combined With Austrian Forces Against The French In 1805 (M.S.A. department I, No. 1565); the map was drafted and annotated by Major and Chevalier Toll of His Imperial Majesty's Suite of the Quartermaster's Department.

48 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1805, minute No. 2.

49 In the original document three Sotnia are shown in the Fifth Column, but this is an error, since three Sotnia from a five Sotnia regiment were detached to the Third Column, therefore two remained, which are shown in the table.

50 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1805, minute No. 2, serial 505.

51 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1805, minute No. 2, serial 505. In a despatch dated 22 December [3 January 1806] Count Lieven informed General Golenishchev-Kutuzov that: 'I find it necessary to notify you that by the time the troops under your command approach our borders, you will have received a schedule from me for their deployment into quarters...'

52 Let us recall that there was no cavalry in two of the columns at Austerlitz.

53 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1805, minute No. 2, General-of-Cavalry Baron Bennigsen's report to His Imperial Majesty, dated 30 January [11 February] 1806.

The composition of ‘formations’ columns and detachments is shown in the following table:⁵⁴

				Companies			
	Squadrons	Sotnia	Battalions	Regimental Artillery	Heavy Artillery	Pioneer	Pontoon
Formation I, ⁵⁵ First Column, 1 st Detachment ⁵⁶		5	3			½	
Formation I, First Column, 2 nd Detachment	5		3	½	½		
Total for First Column:	5	5	6	½	½	½	
Formation I, Second Column, 1 st Detachment	5		3	½		½	
Formation I, Second Column, 2 nd Detachment		2	3	½	1		
Total for Second Column:	5	2	6	1	1	½	
Total for Formation I:	10	7	12	1½	1½	1	
Formation II, ⁵⁷ Third Column, 1 st Detachment	15						
Formation II, Third Column, 2 nd Detachment		5	3	½	½		
Total for Third Column:	15	5	3	½	½		
Formation II, Fourth Column, 1 st Detachment			3	½		½	1
Formation II, Fourth Column, 2 nd Detachment			3	½	½		
Total for Fourth Column:			6	1	½	½	1
Formation II, Fifth Column, 1 st Detachment ⁵⁸		5	5	½		½	
Formation II, Fifth Column, 2 nd Detachment ⁵⁹			4		½		
Total for Fifth Column:		5	9	½	½	½	
Total for Formation II:	15	10	18	2	1½	1	1

Comparing this table with the previous one, we come to the conclusion that ‘formations’ from this corps are fairly similar in composition to the columns already mentioned in the army under General-of-Infantry Golenishchev-Kutuzov.⁶⁰

The corps’ columns and detachments represent an example of the internal organisation of columns (formations), from which the following cannot be ignored:

⁵⁴ The columns are numbered starting at IV, but in the table are shown starting with First.

⁵⁵ Formation I (First and Second columns) crossed the ‘Russian border’ by detachment via Grodek on 29, 31, 25 and 27 March (new style) respectively.

⁵⁶ Each of the 1st detachments had a staff with a variety of appointments.

⁵⁷ Formation II arrived at Grodno on 26, 28, 22, 24 and 19 March (new style) respectively.

⁵⁸ Including two battalions of Sevsk Musketeers.

⁵⁹ Including one battalion of Sevsk Musketeers.

⁶⁰ The ‘formations’ have slightly more cavalry and artillery, and generally less infantry, but it should be remembered that the army had three cavalry columns and that 131 guns had been lost at Austerlitz, the latter influencing the number of artillery companies, some were stripped out to make good the others. In support of this assertion, we give the following example: at Schöngrabern, in the *Heldenschaar* under Prince Bagration, the ‘vacant’ light company from 4th Artillery Regiment had suffered heavy casualties: losing eight guns, seven ammunition caissons, two spare carriages, about half their horses and one sixth of their personnel. This company was disbanded in order to make good the others, and was then re-formed a few months later (Russky Invalid 1902, No. 91 in an article ‘what was the designation of the artillery company at the battle of Schöngrabern and who was the artillery hero Tushin, depicted in Count Tolstoy’s novel War And Peace?’ The article provided the information from archival sources).

1. The corps' columns consisted of all combat arms, with the exception of the Fourth Column, where there was no cavalry.
2. The detachments were composed either of all combat arms (Fifth Column), or of cavalry alone (Third Column), or of infantry and artillery (Fourth Column).
3. When distributed into the detachments, not only were artillery and pioneer companies split up (for example in the Second Column), one regiment was as well (Fifth Column).

Overall, it should be recognised that the internal organisation of the corps under General-of-Cavalry Baron Bennigsen, created on his own initiative, was mainly to satisfy administrative convenience and in this respect it differs sharply from the other formations considered, but the ad hoc composition of the detachments and columns introduced the disadvantages inherent in improvised formations into this organisation.

Count Tolstoy's corps also received a unique organisation:⁶¹ it was split into two divisions, and each division consisted of three brigades.

The composition of the divisions and brigades was as follows:

	Squadrons	Cossacks	Battalions	Guns
1 st Division under Major General Osterman				
Major General Dorokhov's Brigade	10			
Major General Neverovsky's Brigade ⁶²		325	5	14
Major General Verderevsky's Brigade			6	12
Total for 1st Division:	10	325	11	26
2 nd Division under Major General Sedmoratsky				
Major General Kozhin's Brigade	5	100		4
Major General Mazovsky's Brigade			6	14
Major General Alexeev's Brigade		150	6	12
Total for 2nd Division:	5	250	12	30

If we compare the composition of the division in the columns of the army under General-of-Infantry Golenishchev-Kutuzov, we will see that the Fifth Column has almost the same composition as the divisions,⁶³ therefore the difference is only in nomenclature. In a similar fashion, the brigades in their composition are completely comparable with the above mentioned detachments.

And so, based on the analysis of these examples of ad hoc organisations, we have come to the following conclusions: such formations as army corps received an internal organisation that was completely arbitrary due to the personal whims of the commanders; typically, at the higher level, a formation (army or corps) was divided either into two 'battle-groups' or 'divisions' which were divided into 'corps columns'⁶⁴ or brigades, while each 'corps column' was made up of two

61 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1805, minute No. 2 Count Lieven's despatch No. 877 dated 27 March [8 April] 1806, with an 'extract of how many and what type of troops' were in Count Tolstoy's corps.

62 Of the Cossacks, 250 were mounted and 75 were on foot. The 3rd Marine Regiment fielded only two battalions.

63 The number of battalions was somewhat less, but the artillery was more than 1½ to twice as large.

64 We refer to these as 'corps columns' in order to differentiate between the columns under General-of-Cavalry Baron Bennigsen, and the columns in the army under General-of-Infantry Golenishchev-Kutuzov.

detachments, or an army could be divided into columns directly, which had their own brigades.⁶⁵

Thus, these ad hoc organisations inevitably led to confusion as to the concept behind the formations, which, although given a variety of designations, were similar formations as far as composition went, namely: army and corps, corps and ‘battle-group’ ‘column’ and ‘division’ brigade and ‘detachment...’

28h. The Generation Of Ad Hoc Formations In The Caucasus.

The Caucasus Inspection, due to its geography, was in an exceptional situation, thanks to which even the quartering of troops was decided by the ‘commanding general, respecting local circumstances and needs.’⁶⁶ With this in mind, the troops were also distributed in small units extensively scattered, for example, by company or squadron.⁶⁷ Continuous raids by the highland peoples forced punitive expeditions in which the closest troop units took part, and therefore ‘local circumstances’ had a serious influence on this or that formation structure. Without going into a detailed study of this issue, we shall give several examples that may serve in support of what has been stated above.

On 9 [21] May 1804, 350 Cossacks were sent from a camp on the Aksana river against the emergence of a party of ‘rebellious Kabardians’ of about 1,500 men.⁶⁸ The Kabardians began a firefight, another 200 Cossacks were sent (from a different regiment) ‘to help’ who were also dragged into the ‘skirmish’ whereupon three squadrons of Nizhegorod Dragoons, another squadron of Taganrog Dragoons, and one company of Kazan Musketeers with two guns were sent ‘to assist with all speed.’ ‘But the Kabardians, once they saw our military coming up in support, fled, the skirmishing lasting about 90 minutes...’

From this example we see that a detachment was formed from ‘penny packets’ from all combat arms, with small sub-units from five regiments taking part as well as fractions of *Sotnia* from the Cossack regiments.

In December 1804,⁶⁹ two detachments were formed at Nevinnomyssk and the Batal-Pashinsky crossing ‘for the pacification of the restive Trans-Kuban and to secure the region from banditry’ namely:

1. Six companies of Suzdal Musketeers, three companies of 16th Jägers, 200 dismounted Borisoglebsk Dragoons, one mounted squadron of Vladimir Dragoons, plus 100 dismounted men from this same regiment, 500 Cossacks from the Khopersk and Volga regiments, 660 Don Cossacks, six field artillery pieces and six more from the Don horse artillery.
2. Five companies of 16th Jägers, six companies of Troitsk Musketeers, 1,000 Don Cossacks, 300 Kuban Cossacks, six field guns and six Don horse artillery pieces.

Handy sub-units from between four and seven regiments were detached in order to form these two detachments, and the Cossacks again came from fractions of *Sotnia*.

Another ‘expedition across the Kuban river was also launched’ in December 1804.⁷⁰ In this expedition, which lasted 36 days, the detachments were, of course, formed according to ‘the circumstances’; here are the most typical:

1. On 6 [18] December, a detachment of six infantry companies, 500 Cossacks and six guns was formed at the wagon-lines on the left bank of the river Urupa.

⁶⁵ As in the column under comte Langeron.

⁶⁶ See Appendix 1 to [Part 12](#)

⁶⁷ Detailed quartering is shown in the Appendix to [Part 2](#) .

⁶⁸ A.C.W.M. classified department, 1804, minute No. 4, extract from Lieutenant General Glazenap’s report No. 167 to General-of-Infantry Tsitsianov, dated 10 [22] May 1804.

⁶⁹ A.C.W.M. classified department, 1804, minute No. 4, Lieutenant General Glazenap’s report to His Imperial Majesty, (dated December 1804).

⁷⁰ A.C.W.M. classified department, 1804, minute No. 4, Lieutenant General Glazenap’s report dated 22 January [3 February] 1805 with Count Lieven’s despatch No. 540, dated 2 [14] March 1805.

2. On 8 [20] December, a cavalry detachment of 500 Cossacks with two guns and a squadron of dragoons was formed.
3. On 29 December [10 January 1805], a detachment of two jäger companies, three companies of Suzdal Musketeers, three companies of Troitsk Musketeers, four field guns, 400 Cossacks and 'in addition, Major General Sultan Mengli-Girey with 350 Nogai' was formed.

Overall, the examples given show that the fundamental organisation of regiments, battalions, squadrons and companies was shattered, that detachments were made up of individual sub-units, that the infantry company alone remained an indivisible unit. We repeat that such improvised formations in the Caucasus were caused by 'exceptional local circumstances.' That is, the conditions for quartering troops, the nature of the theatre of war and the nature of the enemy...