

**A Century of The Russian Ministry of War
1802-1902
General Staff Historical Department
The Reign of Emperor Alexander I
1801 - 1805**

[translated into English from the original Russian by Peter G.A. Phillips]

28i. Regarding The Russian Corps In The Ionian Islands.

In the 'brief summary of the operational plan' set out in the instructions for General-of-Cavalry Mikhelson, as well as in the instructions issued to General-of-Infantry Golenishchev-Kutuzov, it was mentioned that 'a corps of 25,000 men were to go from Corfu to Naples at the outbreak of war' (in 1805).¹

The formation of this corps took place over several years. According to available data, we can say that its gradual evolution began in 1802.

In a note from *Zahlmeister* [treasury officer] Frolov dated 14 [26] December 1802 we find the initial instructions:² 'currently in Corfu there are two grenadier [flank] companies each from the Astrakhan Grenadiers, Yaroslavl Musketeers, Vyborg Musketeers and Nasheburg Musketeers for a total of eight companies, from which two grenadier battalions have been formed (under Colonel Nazimov from the former two regiments and under Lieutenant Colonel Zagel from the latter two regiments),³ each of these companies arrived in Corfu, from Naples.

By way of a decree from the State Military Collegium dated 29 December 1802 [10 January 1803],⁴ these eight companies joined the newly formed Kura Musketeer Regiment⁵ and made up the first and second battalions of this regiment; the third battalion was formed in Ryazan from three companies detached from musketeer regiments, with 'the addition of a sufficient number of recruits.'⁶

On 3 [15] December 1803,⁷ 'Colonel Papadopoulos' was assigned to join these two battalions 'with his battalion and an artillery sub-unit.'

The origins of this battalion and sub-unit are as follows: in 1803, one of the battalions of the Akhtiar Garrison Regiment was ordered to 'bring one battalion up to field establishment garrison strength from the other battalion' by extracting the best men from the latter. Thereafter, 200 men were selected from three garrison artillery companies together with 'a suitable number of subalterns and non-commissioned officers.' The fully manned battalion and those selected from the garrison artillery were assigned to the command of Colonel Papadopoulos, moreover it was ordered 'to refer to the battalion under his name.' In addition, they were also to be 'armed' with 12 guns, three-pounder cannon or eight-pounder Licorns, with all their ancillaries. Having received his 'orders' from Admiral Marquis de Traversay, Colonel Papadopoulos was to carry them out 'precisely' and upon arrival in Corfu, 'he was to present himself and come under the command' of Major General Nazimov.⁸

1 A.C.W.M. classified department, despatch No. 39, book No. 2, in General-of-Cavalry Mikhelson's inspection.

2 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1802, minute No. 42, serial 3.

3 These battalions had gone abroad in 1799. A.C.W.M. classified department, 1804, minute No. 2, General von Anrep's report No. 1062, dated 20 June [2 July] 1805.

4 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1804, minute No. 2, serial 8.

5 C.C.L. Vol. XXVII, No. 20569.

6 In the listing given Supreme approval on 20 July [1 August] 1803, the Kura Regiment was shown in the Moscow Inspection, its quartering was in Ryazan. No mention was made of the two battalions in Corfu (A.C.W.M. log of Supreme decrees and so on, book No. 148).

7 A.C.W.M. Log of Supreme decrees submitted for signature by the War Minister for Land Forces in 1803, No. 197, decree for General-of-Infantry Rosenberg.

8 A.C.W.M. Log of Supreme decrees submitted for signature by the War Minister for Land Forces in 1803, Supreme decree to General-of-Infantry Rosenberg dated 3 [15] December 1803.

Colonel Papadopoulos had arrived in Corfu by 24 March [6 April] 1804, and at this time, under General Nazimov's command there were:⁹ two battalions of Kura Musketeers, a garrison battalion on field establishment (Colonel Papadopoulos' Battalion) and 200 men of the garrison artillery, for a total of 2,440 men.¹⁰ By way of Supreme orders dated 31 March [12 April] 1804,¹¹ the following were assigned for service abroad: the Siberia Grenadiers, Vitebsk Musketeers, 13th Jägers and 14th Jägers and two companies from 6th Artillery Regiment, which increased the total strength of the corps to 7,844 men, as shown in the 'note on the troops located or recently assigned to Corfu.'¹²

The transport of this force was entrusted to the flag officer in chief of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral Marquis de Traversay, and was carried out on three 'detachments of ships.'¹³

On 15 [27] August 1804, Admiral Marquis de Traversay reported to the War Minister for Land Forces, that a total of 6,546 men were to be sent to 'the Corfu force.' The regiments and companies were to take with them 'from their trains': cartridge, tent, pharmacy and treasury box-carts, as well as treasury and tool wagons; the remainder of the trains were to be left for safekeeping at the places of 'embarkation' or wherever Admiral Marquis de Traversay identified 'as best.'¹⁴

As a result, the regiments left 122 carts behind,¹⁵ the number of draught horses was reduced by 284 horses... the artillery was sent with the first detachment, 12 guns (four 12-pounder Licorns and eight six-pounder cannon) and 12 ammunition caissons in total.¹⁶

The dispatched regiments had 'not yet been brought up to strength with the recruits assigned to them' and therefore Supreme orders were issued to select 'men capable of service' from the garrisons of the Crimea Inspection and 'even from field regiments from this same inspection' in order to send 'as many privates as had been deficient upon departure.'¹⁷

On 2 [14] November 1804, 1,000 of these men were sent,¹⁸ but the total deficiency according to the reports for 1 [13] September and 1 [13] August were calculated to be 1,128 rank and file.¹⁹

As a result, the strength of the corps by this point had reached 10,200 men with 24 field guns.

A Supreme Decree dated 25 May [6 June] 1804 ordered Major General Nazimov and the force entrusted to his control to come under the command of Major General von Anrep' who had been sent to Corfu 'with special instructions.'²⁰

In reports, General von Anrep referred to himself as 'the commander of forces located in the Septinsular Union [Republic]' but in correspondence he was also given the following title: 'Commander-in-Chief of Russian forces in the Ionian Islands.'²¹

9 Formerly Colonel Nazimov.

10 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1804, minute No. 2, returns under serial 3.

11 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1804, minute No. 2, serial 12, serial 13 and Count Lieven's despatch dated 8 [20] May 1804.

12 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1804, minute No. 2, returns under serial 3 and original log in the classified department of the War Ministry for Land Forces, 1804, despatches No. 24 and No. 15.

13 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1804, minute No. 2, Admiral Marquis de Traversay's reports No. 740 dated 24 May [5 June], No. 902 dated 30 June [12 July], and No. 1166 dated 15 [27] August 1804.

14 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1804, minute No. 2, secret Supreme decree to Admiral Marquis de Traversay, dated 12 [24] March 1804.

15 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1804, minute No. 2, returns attached to Admiral Marquis de Traversay's report No. 1231, dated 25 August [6 September] 1804, ration carts, infirmary carts and so on, were left behind.

16 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1804, minute No. 2, Admiral Marquis de Traversay's report No. 740, dated 24 May [5 June] 1804.

17 Supreme decree to General-of-Infantry Rosenberg dated 8 [20] August 1804.

18 Marquis de Traversay's report No. 1681, dated 7 [19] November 1804.

19 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1804, minute No. 2, serial 199.

20 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1804, minute No. 2, Count Lieven's despatch No. 1151 dated 30 May [11 June] 1804 (copied with the decree).

21 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1804, minute No. 2, for example, Major General von Anrep's report No. 8 dated 18 [30] September 1804 and Count Lieven's despatch No. 1183 dated 4 [16] June 1804. The corps under Major General Anrep was named accordingly.

It was only 2½ months later that 1,000 men sent to bring the force stationed in Corfu up to strength arrived, since ‘a (four-day) storm in the Black Sea’ had ‘caused great damage’ to their ship and it was forced to remain ‘in Büyükdere for repairs.’ However, by 18 February [2 March] 1805, Italinsky, our minister plenipotentiary in Constantinople, had sent 151 men on to Corfu on a brigantine²² out of the 881 detained by ‘the storm and ship repairs.’²³

The standard of reinforcements that arrived may be judged by the complaints from General von Anrep, set out in several reports: of those 150 men who had arrived - ‘some of them were vagabonds, 34 men had been punished for crimes on several occasions, and others were unfit for service.’ ‘It was necessary to bring’ several ‘before a court-martial immediately upon their arrival here.’ ‘There are a great many of such (vicious) types of men yet orders issued in accordance with His Imperial Majesty’s Supreme decree, were not only not to send such men abroad, but also not to assign them to regiments in quarters near the borders.’²⁴

In summary, General von Anrep reported that he did ‘not have much hope either for the others who remained in Constantinople, assigned here for the same purpose (as replacements).’ That he feared that the bad behaviour of the men delivered might ‘corrupt the exemplary behaviour of the troops located here and the prevailing discipline.’²⁵

But even before the reports from General von Anrep had been received, more ‘combat sub-units’ had been put aboard ships on 24 February [8 March] 1805 in order to bring the force up to strength, their total number being 995 men.²⁶

With the arrival of the latter contingent, the regiments located in Corfu were at ‘wartime establishment’²⁷ and the total strength of the corps exceeded 11,000 men.

In addition, General von Anrep was permitted to recruit ‘Greek and Albanian volunteers’ into the regiments, ‘at local discretion, so long as there were no disadvantages in this matter.’²⁸ These ‘volunteers’ could be promised the following incentives: ‘after serving for eight years, they could be granted dismissal from service, and anyone serving for 12 years and wishing to settle in Russia, would receive 25 *desyatina* [around 25 hectares] of land as personal property in the meridian governorates.’²⁹

It was soon announced to Admiral Marquis de Traversay, by way of Supreme Decree dated 17 [29] May 1805,³⁰ that ‘circumstances require a strengthening of forces on the Ionian islands.’

‘In balancing the means of execution against current requirements’ four regiments had been assigned as reinforcements: the Kolyvan Musketeers, Kozlov Musketeers, Alexopol Musketeers and Nizhegorod Musketeers,³¹ ‘also, one company with light guns and integral ammunition from 6th Artillery Regiment.’³²

Some of these reinforcements were sent ‘in three detachments’: in the first were the Kozlov Musketeers with the artillery company, for a total of 2,184 men; in the second were the Kolyvan Musketeers at 1,049 men; and in the third were some of the Kolyvan Musketeers, one battalion of

22 The Marquis de Traversay reported that 1,000 men had been sent.

23 Major General von Anrep’s report No. 198 dated 18 February [2 March] 1805 (received on 20 April [2 May]).

24 Major General von Anrep’s reports No. 263 and No. 265, both dated 7 [19] March 1805 (received on 17 [29] May).

25 Major General von Anrep’s reports No. 263 and No. 265, both dated 7 [19] March 1805 (received on 17 [29] May).

26 Marquis de Traversay’s report No. 348 dated 27 February [11 March] 1805.

27 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1805, minute No. 1, serial 2.

28 Prince Adam Czartoryski’s despatch to General-of-Infantry Vyazmitinov, dated 28 January [9 February] 1805.

29 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1804, minute No. 2, serial 2 and serial 3, General-of-Infantry Vyazmitinov’s memorandum No. 33 to General von Anrep, dated 2 [14] February 1805.

30 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1805, minute No. 1, a copy of the decree was forwarded with Admiral Chichagov’s despatch dated 17 [29] May 1805.

31 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1805, minute No. 1, Supreme orders, dated 8 [20] May 1805, to the colonels-in-chief of these regiments.

32 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1805, minute No. 1, Supreme decree to Major General Anrep dated 11 [23] May 1805.

Alexopol Musketeers and some convalescent lower ranks, for a total of 1,719 men, for a total of 4,952 men sent out.³³

The regiments took only part of their trains with them, as had been the case during the previous shipment in 1804.

The first two detachments had already arrived in Corfu by 8 [20] September 1805,³⁴ while the third detachment, in all probability, had arrived by late September [early October].³⁵ Thus, by this time, the corps had reached a strength of 15,000 to 16,000 men, this figure representing the highest strength of the corps.

The lack of cavalry in the corps prompted the assignment on 15 [27] August 1805, of the Smolensk Dragoons and two Don Cossack regiments as reinforcements.³⁶

On 21 August [2 September] 1805, the cancellation of these orders was promulgated, - by way of Supreme orders³⁷ - 'that some of the troops of the said force that have not yet been embarked,³⁸ are not to be sent and are to be left in their current quarters. If some sub-units have been sent from the battalions from the infantry regiments remaining, then in this case the rest should not be separated such that complete battalions remain.'³⁹ 'It is intended to give a different mission' to these troops and therefore 'they are ordered to prepare for a move at short notice.'

On 29 September [11 October] 1805, 'the immediate commencement of the departure of the cavalry and, preferably, the Cossacks, and then the rest of the infantry' was ordered once more.⁴⁰

After 2½ months (on 13 [25] December), orders were issued that 'the sending of troops to Corfu is to be halted and however many of whom might have been embarked upon receipt of this, should be brought ashore immediately, placing them for the time being in the same locations where they were assembled for embarkation.'⁴¹ This instruction was somewhat belated; on 24 November [6 December] 1805, 'a cavalry detachment consisting of 130 Cossacks with 133 horses had been dispatched under the command of *Yesaul* [captain] Yevsikov.'⁴² The dispatch of the remaining troops had been delayed 'due to the non-arrival of British and other expected transports.'⁴³ It is interesting to trace the fate of these 130 Cossacks who made up this 'cavalry detachment.' They had departed on 24 November [6 December], yet on 25 November [7 December], 'this detachment returned to Odessa due to strong contrary winds' whereupon 'one ship ran aground in the fog and darkness of the night near the island of Tendra.'⁴⁴ Of those on board, 22 Cossacks and one officer 'escaped to the shore with the horses.' Having waited for 'favourable winds' the remaining 107 men 'set off again on their assigned voyage' on 13 [25] December.⁴⁵ This detachment arrived in Constantinople and 'set sail' onward but 'encountered strong adverse winds and was turned back into the straits there.'⁴⁶ 'Our resident minister in Constantinople' having received word from

33 The Marquis de Traversay's reports No. 91 dated 12 [24] July, No. 114 dated 24 July [5 August] and No. 179 dated 30 August [11 September] 1805.

34 Major General von Anrep's report No. 1551 dated 8 [20] September 1805.

35 No report of the arrival of the third detachment could be found.

36 Supreme orders for the Marquis de Traversay dated 15 [27] August 1805.

37 Count Lieven's despatch to Marquis de Traversay dated 21 August [2 September] 1805.

38 Four musketeer regiments, one artillery company, one regiment of dragoons and two of Cossacks.

39 Order No. 239 for the Intendant General of the army dated 25 August [6 September] 1805 and Count Lieven's despatch dated 21 August [2 September].

40 Supreme orders for the Marquis de Traversay dated 29 September [11 October] 1805.

41 War Minister for Land Forces' despatch No. 528 to Marquis de Traversay dated 13 [25] December, including notice of the Supreme orders.

42 Marquis de Traversay's report No. 290 dated 25 November [7 December] 1805.

43 Marquis de Traversay's report No. 327 dated 23 December 1805 [4 January 1806]. The Nizhegorod Musketeers, two battalions of Alexopol Musketeers and all the cavalry remained ashore.

44 Marquis de Traversay's report No. 321 dated 15 [27] December 1805.

45 Marquis de Traversay's report No. 321 dated 15 [27] December 1805.

46 Marquis de Traversay's report No. 480 dated 11 [23] March 1806. The detachment proceeded more than 30 [nautical?] miles, but were forced to return.

Admiral Marquis de Traversay 'regarding the cancellation of the departure of troops into the Mediterranean' decided 'to sell the Cossack horses in order to avoid excessive costs, and return the Cossacks to their ports.'⁴⁷ This order 'was approved in full measure'⁴⁸ and the Cossacks were dispatched 'on two ships.'⁴⁹ 'Due to a storm at sea, the merchant brig was driven onto the coast of Rumelia and foundered there, and of those aboard, 60 Cossacks and an officer were saved, being then transported to Büyükdere and sent on to Odessa aboard other merchant ships.'⁵⁰ The naval vessel arrived safely in Sevastopol 'with the remaining 46 Cossacks.'⁵¹

Thus ended that experience of transporting cavalry by sea...

We have already mentioned that General von Anrep was granted the freedom to recruit 'volunteers from the Greeks and Albanians.' Orders were given for them to be armed with 4,000 antiquated muskets with bayonets.⁵² The formation of this force from the local natives was entrusted to General Papadopoulos.⁵³ There was a general intent to recruit 5,000 men 'of various nationalities who were loyal to Russia, such as: Montenegrins, Berdyans and such like'⁵⁴ or at least stocks for this amount of 'gunpowder and ball' were laid in.⁵⁵

On 6 [18] October 1805, General von Anrep, on General-of-Infantry Lacy's orders, had embarked and was 'to sail for the coast of Sicily' where he 'should await further instructions on this matter.'⁵⁶ Their precise numbers at this time can be established as: 13,290 men embarked;⁵⁷ 1,210 'sick and those unable to proceed' were left behind; two companies of Kozlov Musketeers remained on Corfu 'unable to fit on board ship'; two battalions of Kura Musketeers, Major General Papadopoulos' Battalion and a company of garrison artillery remained deployed on other islands; the total for the corps being some 17,300 men.⁵⁸

This total also included the 'Greek Legion of volunteer marksmen' of 1,629 men.

By 5 [17] April 1806, elements of the Siberia Grenadiers, a battalion of Alexopol Musketeers and 1½ companies of artillery had already arrived 'safely in Odessa' and some were on the way,⁵⁹ while the rest formed 'a garrison on the islands of the Ionian Republic.'⁶⁰

Major General Maksheev 'took over command' of this 'garrison' from Major General von Anrep, while Vice Admiral Senyavin took on overall command of the entire force.⁶¹

Overall, by February 1806, the corps of 'Russian forces on the Ionian Islands' consisted of the following: two battalions of Kura Musketeers, Major General Papadopoulos' Battalion, three battalions each of Vitebsk Musketeers, Kozlov Musketeers, Kolyvan Musketeers, 13th Jägers, 14th Jägers, 1½ companies of field artillery and one garrison artillery sub-unit, for a total of 18 infantry battalions and 1½ artillery companies.⁶²

47 Marquis de Traversay's report No. 480 dated 11 [23] March 1806.

48 Prince Adam Czartoryski's despatch to General-of-Infantry Vyazmitinov dated 22 March [3 April] 1806.

49 The troop transport *Tsar Konstantin* and merchant brig *Merkury*.

50 Marquis de Traversay's report No. 683 dated 13 [25] April 1806.

51 Marquis de Traversay's report No. 683 dated 13 [25] April 1806.

52 Prince Adam Czartoryski's despatch dated 23 July [4 August] 1805 and order No. 146, for the Intendant General of the army, dated 25 July [6 August].

53 Report under serial 227.

54 Prince Adam Czartoryski's despatch dated 25 January [6 February] 1806.

55 Inventory of stores of 'gunpowder and lead' under serial 306.

56 Major General von Anrep's report No. 1909 dated 6 [18] October 1805.

57 M.S.A. department II, No. 1549, embarkation return of regiments and sub-units.

58 M.S.A. department II, No. 1549, embarkation return of regiments and sub-units. This report shows the companies had a total of 360 men, and from this figure 2,440 men had been left deployed on the islands.

59 General-of-Infantry Lacy's report No. 6 to His Imperial Majesty dated 5 [17] April 1806.

60 General-of-Infantry Lacy's report No. 2 to His Imperial Majesty dated 2 [14] January 1806.

61 Reports No. 109 dated 14 [26] February and No. 23 dated 18 February [2 March] 1806.

62 There were a total of 24 guns: two eight-pounder Licorns, 12 12-pounder cannon and 10 three-pounder cannon.

According to a reported listing of these troops,⁶³ their composition was as follows: 37 field officers, 305 subalterns, 763 non-commissioned officers, 9,015 privates, 286 musicians and 700 support personnel, for a total of 11,106 men.⁶⁴ In addition, there was also the Greek Legion of volunteer marksmen, which consisted of Souliotes, Epirotes, Himariotes and Peloponnesians,⁶⁵ whose listed strength was: three field officers, 98 subalterns, 198 non-commissioned officers, eight musicians and 1,766 privates, numbering 2,073 men.

Yet in total, despite an establishment strength of 13,179 men, those present were: 29 field officers, 297 subalterns, 760 non-commissioned officers, 227 musicians, 7,854 privates and 490 support personnel, numbering 9,167 men.⁶⁶

Thus, the corps of 'Russian forces on the Ionian Islands' having been incrementally formed over almost three years, presents a classic example of an ad hoc formation, which, in order to be assembled, led to a whole series of hasty decisions,⁶⁷ often difficult to implement.⁶⁸ The lack of a permanent [higher level] organisation greatly complicated the transportation of troops, since it was necessary to deal both with elements of individual regiments, battalions and companies, or even with groups of sub-units. The above chronological listing of assignments and dispatches of troops shows that the composition of the corps was highly dependent on the success of their voyages, and therefore there is no need to talk about the internal organisation of this corps. The corps was a composite amalgam of several regiments, a number of elements of regiments and some sub-units, brought together under 'a single command' at random...⁶⁹

28j. Regarding Mobile Artillery Parks.

The issue of parks was raised in 1803, as mentioned above, but, following the cancellation of 'campaign preparations' all orders for their formation were also rescinded.

Only in 1805, right at the start of the war and also during the period of hostilities, was the 'establishment of parks' begun. The initial orders were distributed on 24 August [5 September], the following orders were issued to General-of-Infantry Count Buxhoeveden and General-of-Cavalry Baron Bennigsen:⁷⁰ 'His Imperial Majesty, having commanded that during operations the armies are always to have the necessary quantities for ammunition resupply, has seen fit to order the Inspector of Artillery, Count Arakcheev, to establish mobile artillery parks for this purpose. And as for the immediate execution of the Monarch's expressed will, the two parks located on our borders, in Nesvizh and Vilna,⁷¹ currently do not have the required number of horses and carts, therefore, the Sovereign Emperor, assuming that this deficiency can be made good by purchasing such from regimental *artels*, which cannot be taken with them when they move abroad as a result of the Supreme orders announced to the troops, instructs Your Excellency to requisition both horses and carts from the infantry regiments of the army entrusted to you, should they declare their own willingness for this sale, permitting, moreover, that the price for a horse be set between 50 to 60 roubles depending on its suitability and age but no more, for which the resulting amount will be paid immediately from the treasury. Once your orders have been issued on this subject, His Majesty desires the purchase for the army under your command of 260 *artel* carts, in perfect working order, and for each of them, three horses with complete horse furniture, for a total of 780 horses, on the prescribed basis, and such that they have one driver for each cart (assign these in equal numbers from the regimental support personnel) to be sent to Nesvizh such that, upon arrival at this location,

63 Major General Maksheev's report No. 109 dated 14 [26] February 1806.

64 There were 1,408 men 'deficient' from the listed strength.

65 The legion was divided into six unequal units each of between 340 to 420 men.

66 The other 2,541 men were on detached duty, in hospital and so on.

67 We have paid particular attention to the continuous changes to the deployment, for example, of cavalry.

68 For example, due to the lack of transport ships.

69 Having the period of peak strength for the corps in mind.

70 M.S.A. department II, No. 1551, log of Count Lieven's despatches and A.C.W.M. classified department, 1805, minute No. 7, serials 1, 2, 3, Count Lieven's despatch dated 24 August [5 September].

71 Only artillery consumables were held there.

all this could be handed over to Colonel Bastian of the artillery located there or whomever might be entrusted with it, whatever measures might be taken for this are to be forwarded to His Imperial Majesty.’⁷² On 28 August [9 September], Lieutenant General Essen 1st was commanded ‘to issue orders for the establishment of a mobile artillery park in the army entrusted to him on the same basis as General-of-Infantry Count Buxhoeveden had been commanded on a similar occasion on the 24th of the same month.’⁷³

These orders were promulgated ‘in accordance with the decisions of the Committee, convened in the presence of the Sovereign Emperor.’⁷⁴ Despite this seemingly simple solution for the issue of parks for ‘the purchase of 780 horses and 260 carts for each park’⁷⁵ in reality necessitated the experience of more than one serious problem. Therefore, we consider it necessary to dwell in some detail on the organisation of the parks, since these difficulties are also compelling evidence in the meantime of the negative effect of ad hoc armies and corps sent out on campaign with an insufficient quantity of combat supplies.

And so, initially, generals Count Buxhoeveden and Bennigsen were instructed to misappropriate the horses and carts from regimental *artel*.

This measure did not live up to expectations; Bennigsen’s army procured ‘199 horses and 113 artel carts’ while Count Buxhoeveden’s army obtained ‘20 horses and 181 artel carts.’⁷⁶

Which is why, ‘on 17 [29] September 1805, General Essen conveyed the Sovereign will to the governors of Minsk and Smolensk, that suitable horses with complete horse harness and carts in perfect working order should be purchased for the artillery parks in the provinces entrusted to them.’

In October, in accordance with a most humble report by the Inspector of All Artillery, Supreme orders were announced to the Minsk Civil Governor and the Volhynia Vice-Governor via General Count Lieven, such that they were immediately to order one healthy, good-riding horse, etcetera from every 500 households, for a price of 15 to 18 *chervonets* [gold coins] depending upon their suitability, from the provinces entrusted to them.

Similarly, General Bennigsen received approval for his proposal to collect horses from households in the Grodno and Vilna governorates.⁷⁷

This rounding-up of horses and carts from five provinces made it possible to arrange the transportation of ammunition resupply to the armies under Count Buxhoeveden and Baron Bennigsen. Be that as it may, there is reason to assume that the collection of horses and carts went rather slowly and they arrived in very limited numbers, for example, in Count Arakcheev’s report dated 24 January [5 February] 1805 [*sic*],⁷⁸ we discover that: ‘140 horses and 38 carts’ were deficient from Smolensk Governorate;⁷⁹ ‘36 horses and 47 carts’ were received from the Minsk Governorate. ‘Ten horses and 25 carts were purchased’ in Grodno... Finally, in the Volhynia Governorate it had been possible to collect 236 horses by January 1805 [*sic*]...⁸⁰ Those ‘ordered

72 A similar message was sent on this date to General-of-Cavalry Baron Bennigsen, with the only change being that the horses and carts were to be sent to Vilna (log of Count Lieven’s despatches).

73 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1805, minute No. 7, Count Lieven’s despatch to General-of-Infantry Vyazmitinov, dated 2 [14] September.

74 Count Arakcheev’s report No. 208 dated 24 January [5 February] 1806, in which this is mentioned.

75 This was for the armies under Count Buxhoeveden and Bennigsen, how much was needed for the army under Essen 1st could not be established.

76 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1805, minute No. 7, Count Arakcheev’s report No. 208 dated 24 January [5 February] 1806.

77 Most humble report by the War Ministry of January 1808.

78 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1805, minute No. 7, Count Arakcheev’s report No. 208 dated 24 January [5 February] 1806.

79 Out of 270 horses and 90 carts.

80 Count Arakcheev’s report No. 410 dated 19 February [3 March] 1806.

from households' produced the most favourable results... In any case, on 15 [27] January 1806,⁸¹ Count Arakcheev reported 'that the reserve parks for General Count Buxhoeveden's and General Bennigsen's former corps for service abroad, which contained a second replenishment of charges according to reports received, were returning to our borders and were to collect horses from the Vilna, Grodno and Minsk governorates, requisitioned by the governors of Vilna, Grodno, Minsk and Smolensk, and were also to receive government owned horses from army regiments.'⁸² In total, 722 horses were 'rounded-up and purchased' according to the report by the War Minister in January 1808, not counting the Vilna Governorate, 'information from which had not yet been received' two years later! Yet this preparation with carts and so on had cost 65,726 roubles 4½ kopecks, which amount was allocated in 1808 'to the satisfaction of the population' two years later.⁸³

The army under General Golenishchev-Kutuzov set out on campaign, but no orders were issued for a park for it. The unpleasant situation in which the commander-in-chief found himself may be judged from a report to His Imperial Majesty in September 1805, which is given almost verbatim:⁸⁴

'The contents of the note from the Austrian Ministry, in which it states that the supply of live ammunition to Your Majesty's army would take place, their own needs permitting, has given me extreme cause for concern, because the quantity of charges I have is insufficient, such that in the event of a significant engagement with the enemy, two-thirds might easily be consumed. I hope, however, that the Viennese court will get to the heart of the matter and, mindful of the difficulties associated with the rapid resupply of ammunition from Russia, will show the desired flexibility to the demands of Your Majesty's ambassador, especially since this court's own interests are linked to this. Moreover, having learned from artillery officers that there is a quantity of reserve ammunition in Polonnoye, I most humbly dare to beg for your consideration whether it might be beneficial to order them to be sent to the Austrian border and placed in such locations as might be designated as our depots, in order to thereby be available to Your Imperial Majesty's army for any contingency. With this in mind, I would like to convey that the Jäger battalions, of which there are six in the army, should each have two three-pounder Licorns, but they have none at all. There are 72 light guns with the battalions belonging to six companies. Using the ratio of two per battalion, these are deficient for 54 infantry battalions.'⁸⁵

And so, for guns also 'these are deficient'⁸⁶ and 'live ammunition' was insufficient...'

As a result, Count Arakcheev received Supreme orders to use the 'most effective measures to assemble this park and dispatch it as quickly as possible, due to the current requirement for reserve ammunition, scheduling their delivery in instalments at least...'⁸⁷ Count Arakcheev soon reported to the War Minister for Land Forces⁸⁸ that 'in fulfilment of the Supreme will, I was ordered that ammunition and other artillery stores required for the mentioned army, relevant to the number of artillery pieces, should be prepared with all possible haste in Kiev and sent to the army in Prague, paying in advance for half the resupply, while thereafter, for the remaining half-supply of charges relevant to the number required for these artillery pieces, this has been assigned to the Military Advisor to the St. Petersburg artillery depot, Zavorotkov, who is to be sent to Kiev specifically for this purpose, while command of the first park has been assigned to *Stallmeister* Petrov of the 5th Artillery Regiment, who has been ordered to send a messenger before reaching Prague with the park from this officer's command with a report for the commander-in-chief of the army, asking him for instructions for halting in Prague with the park, or in another location.'

81 Count Arakcheev's report No. 138 dated 15 [27] January 1806.

82 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1805, minute No. 7, Count Arakcheev's report No. 208 dated 24 January [5 February] 1806.

83 Proposal No. 47 by the Artillery Department, dated 18 [30] January 1808.

84 The date was not indicated on this copy.

85 Archive of the Artillery Historical Museum [A.H.M.], inspection business, bundle 544, minute No. 331.

86 The addition to the army of the corps under Count Buxhoeveden and the Lifeguard under the command of His Highness supplemented the shortage of artillery to some extent.

87 A.H.M. inspection business, bundle 544, minute No. 331, Count Lieven's despatch dated 4 [16] October 1805.

88 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1805, minute No. 7, report No. 3763 dated 15 [27] October 1805.

In touching on some details of the organisation of the park for the army under General-of-Infantry Golenishchev-Kutuzov, we highlight the following:⁸⁹

1. It was planned 'for a total of three (foot) battalions and two horse artillery companies (168 guns)' to send '110,080 projectiles and other stores (bagged charges, tubes, gunpowder, saltpetre, sulphur) for a half resupply' weighing 4,162 *Pud* 22¼ pounds [150,358 pounds avoirdupois].
2. For its transportation, 'proceed with hiring freelance hauliers without the slightest delay.'
3. 'The dispatch of this park should be split into three or four convoys, whichever is more convenient...'
4. 'As many officers, *Feuerwerker* and privates as are needed in order to supervise and transport this park are to be sent from the Kiev Garrison Artillery.'
5. 'The allocated projectiles (were intended) to be sent in such a way that the case-shot was to be prepared complete in canisters and with sabots, *Brandskugel* loaded for every calibre, bombs and shells caulked and unfilled, while gunpowder, saltpetre and sulphur were to be in barrels. Other spare projectiles and stores, as well as all of the above, were to be loaded on the carts in such a way that no damage or wastage could result.'
6. The commander of the park was to report to the commander-in-chief regarding 'everything that had been sent with it' and thereafter how much 'was being sent with the first convoy, what reports were to be sent and regarding the departure of each convoy, how many of them would be sent for this park.'
7. 'In order to give training in all the processes for the administration of the park as quickly as possible' it was permitted 'to employ government-owned carts (numbering 73 carts) from Kiev' while 'the hiring of hauliers from Kiev was only to be as far as the border at Radziwiłłów, while it is ordered that hauliers be hired in the vicinity of this town or in Galicia itself from there to Biała, or if possible, as far as the army itself.'

Overall, the park turned out to be highly dependent on the hauliers; it was even stipulated that 'if none were found in the vicinity of the town, then *Stallmeister* Petrov was to halt there and place everything in a secure location requested from the local government. He was to write to the commander-in-chief regarding the issuing of orders to deliver the park to the army, and at the same time to keep both Kiev and the Inspector of All Artillery informed.'

Count Arakcheev actively issued orders, but here too he had to face difficulties, including the unexpected... In order to show their nature, we cite the reports of Military Counsellor Zavorotkov,⁹⁰ who had been sent to Kiev in order to hasten the preparation of the park... On 12 [24] October he reported that 'The passage of this park will be through the Kiev and Volhynia governorates to Radziwiłłów in three or four convoys, and from there through Galicia via Lemberg and Tarnov to Biała. For this route, carts have been hired at five roubles 50 kopecks per *Pud*, here (Kiev) for tomorrow (13 [25] October), and for 17 [29] October in Polonnoye, due to the fact that some projectiles were not ready in Kiev. The commander of this park, Petrov, is currently in Polonnoye in order to double-check the quality of everything that has been sent.' In addition, he reported that 'the snow that had fallen there had proved to be impassable for the hired summer carts, and therefore there was no hope that the suppliers of the carts would be able to fulfil the legally binding contracts concluded with them on time; no hauliers have been found for the onward delivery of this park from Biała to the army at any price after all this time, due to the fact that the route is abroad.'

Finally, on 21 October [2 November], he reported that the projectiles and stores missing from Kiev 'for the half-resupply park departing for the Army of Podolia are being put on carts here (in

89 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1805, minute No. 7, report No. 5818 by the Artillery Department, September 1805.

90 A.H.M. inspection business, bundle 544, minute No. 331, Zavorotkov's reports dated 12 and 21 October [24 October and 2 November] 1805.

Polonnoye) and they shall certainly set off this day (22 October [3 November]) en route for Biala; this park, commanded by *Stallmeister* Petrov, will travel in three convoys on hired carts with a deadline for arrival in Biala of 17 [29] November... The transportation of this half-resupply of ammunition to Biala will cost 24,000 roubles.’

The events of 20 November [2 December] (Austerlitz), and then the armistice (23 November [5 December]) and the return march to Russia,⁹¹ also resolved the issue of the park, which also returned to our borders.⁹²

Despite all the difficulties experienced in organising the parks and the proposal from Count Arakcheev ‘that one park (with the corps under General Bennigsen) should be brought into service and be ready to go on campaign upon the first command’⁹³ General Vyazmitinov conveyed Supreme orders: such that ‘of the horses in the reserve parks which are now returning to the borders, including the park with General Bennigsen’s corps, the sound ones were to be given to the artillery regiments, and the unfit ones were to be sold; the ammunition and carts of those mobile parks are to be added to the standing reserve.’⁹⁴ This order was probably driven by economic considerations, since the parks, according to the figures given above, had resulted in an expenditure of about 90,000 roubles.

In fulfilling this order, Count Arakcheev reported the following:⁹⁵

‘The parks are to be located on my and the Artillery Department’s orders in the existing standing reserve artillery parks, in Vilna, in Nesvizh, Brest-Litovsk and Polonnoye, also in Kiev with the local Garrison Artillery Command, while now I might redistribute however much of this ammunition and other stores that are in the mentioned standing parks, because some of it is to go to resupply the artillery and army regiments that have been in action against the enemy to replace that fired or lost during the fighting; I shall not fail to convey at the same time that any remaining resupply will remain in each of the parks and in Kiev.’

However, this experience of organising parks was not lost without trace, Count Arakcheev stated:⁹⁶

‘Upon the reformation of our forces, splitting them into divisions, my proposal, as announced by me to the former committee under the honourable Quartermaster General van Sukhtelen in the presence of Your Highness, is to establish one reserve company without guns per division, the sole purpose of these companies is to have reserve parks with artillery ammunition and stores in their charge for a complete resupply in proportion to the number of guns and army regiments that are in each division.’

Thus, the issue of artillery parks should have been resolved in the immediate aftermath, but the war of 1806 to 1807 delayed the implementation of these plans somewhat, and it was only in November 1807 that the provision of reserve artillery parks received Supreme approval.

28k. Conclusions.

And so, the absence of permanent higher formations led to the situation that at the moment of need, in order to draw up temporary ad hoc formations, it was necessary not only to issue a great many orders, but also to give detailed clarification in order to correct this or that apparent defect. Therefore, extensive correspondence and all orders regarding preparations for a campaign and setting off on the march went through the Adjutant General, the Tsar’s assistant for the War Department in its entirety.

91 M.S.A. department I, No. 1565, From the legend to the Overall Map Of Part Of Moravia, Showing Offensive Operations By The Russian Imperial Army Combined With Austrian Forces Against The French Army In 1805.

92 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1805, minute No. 2, Count Arakcheev’s report No. 138 dated 15 [27] January 1806.

93 Count Arakcheev’s report No. 189 dated 20 January [1 February] 1806.

94 General-of-Infantry Vyazmitinov’s despatch No. 83 to Count Arakcheev, dated 4 [16] February 1806.

95 Count Arakcheev’s report No. 321 dated 12 [24] February 1806.

96 Count Arakcheev’s report No. 321 dated 12 [24] February 1806.

Urgent orders proceeded one after another and armies and corps were formed from regiments and sub-units, while these temporary formations then underwent ever more reorganisation. The best example in this regard is the case of General-of-Cavalry Mikhelson, who went from being commander of several armies gradually turning into the commander of the corps facing Galicia, as military circumstances and political considerations forced constant changes to be introduced into the original improvised organisation.

Each commander improvised the internal organisation of the formations entrusted to them in their own way, which perchance bore the designation of an army or a corps, but overall, essentially there was no noticeable distinction. Examples of organisations created on personal initiative are the following formations: groups, detachments, divisions, which we discussed when considering the organisation of forces returning from campaign.

The army under General-of-Infantry Golenishchev-Kutuzov with its columns was an imperfectly created organism that would prove to be dysfunctional.

We repeat that which no less an authority than General Leer found that at Austerlitz ‘the main reason for the demise of the army may be explained by nothing other than major blunders against the fundamental principles of organisation.’

The Austerlitz columns, at the great cost of 19,884 men killed or missing and the loss of 131 guns,⁹⁷ proved the inconsistency of ad hoc formations prior to the division of the army ‘into independent and manageable, firmly cohesive formations...’⁹⁸

Contemporaries realised that the entire reason for the events of 20 November [2 December] cannot be attributed ‘to our treacherous allies and their obvious negligence.’⁹⁹ In one of the notes submitted for Supreme insightful discretion, the anonymous voice of truth spoke of the reform necessary in the army, among which he found the following: ‘Distribute the troops into divisions, detachments and brigades rather than inspections, there are no disadvantages in this, while the benefit is that there would be greater oversight, and these same generals would be among the troops constantly and have complete knowledge of their state in every unit, therefore, being able to see not only all the shortcomings, but also to be able to discover the capabilities of every man... If Your Imperial Majesty’s army is divided into divisions, detachments and brigades, then, depending on the region and circumstances, each division should have a park of artillery with all its accoutrements as well as the various appointments relevant to the force, such as: from the quartermaster’s, engineering, provisioning, commissariat and medical departments, in which case, even if a planned movement does not follow, then the entire division could set off in its entirety, or at will; but the generals would know the troops, and the officers and soldiers them (the generals)...’

In the improvised formations of 1805, it was just the opposite - individual regiments, sub-units and various appointments had been assembled and the result was Austerlitz, which, at the same time, also saved General-of-Infantry Golenishchev-Kutuzov’s army from anxious moments of waiting for the mobile artillery park, while the number of rounds, as the commander-in-chief had reported, ‘is insufficient, such that in the event of a significant engagement with the enemy, two-thirds might easily be consumed.’¹⁰⁰

Thus, the bloody experience marked the end of the existence of improvised higher formations and the issue of introducing permanent organisations finally arose, which happened in 1806.

97 A.C.W.M. classified department, 1805, minute No. 2, copy of General-of-Infantry Golenishchev-Kutuzov’s report to His Imperial Majesty, dated 25 December 1805 [6 January 1806]. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky put the total at 21,000, he was tacitly referring to the combat reports where the number of guns was shown to be two more, that is, 133.

98 Leer, *Applied Tactics*, p. 46.

99 See Note One to Appendix 1 to Part 27.

100 See Note One to Appendix 1 to Part 27.