

**A Century of The Russian Ministry of War
1802-1902**

**General Staff Historical Department
The Reign of Emperor Alexander I
1801 - 1805**

[translated into English from the original Russian by Peter G.A. Phillips]



*Illustration: Pyotr Kornilovich Sukhtelen or Jan Pieter
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10. 'Reasoning' and 'Scenarios' by the engineer and Quartermaster General Sukhtelen and an evaluation of 'Scenarios.'

Let us now turn to a consideration of the reasoning and scenarios presented by the engineer and Quartermaster General Sukhtelen to the Military Commission on 15 [27] June, 1802. Reasoning and scenarios cover:

1. 'The present distribution of the army according to organisation by Inspection.'
2. 'The application of this invaluable material in order to generate armies from it.'

Reasoning:

General Sukhtelen's reasoning on these matters is summarised in the following paper:

To the Military Commission.¹ In order to facilitate the work of the Military Commission, regarding the first paragraph of the instruction, which His Imperial Majesty was pleased to supply to them, and is expressed in these words:

Determining the strength of the forces and their general deployment. The establishment of Military Forces across the entire State is based on the need for external defence and the preservation of internal peace; and therefore, in determining the number of troops, one must take into account the situation on the frontiers, the strength of other powers, and the extent of the Empire.

In the beginning, I felt it my duty to present various schedules, one on the strength and the present distribution of the army, according to organisation by Inspection, and another on the application of this invaluable material in order to generate armies from it on the various frontiers, in relation to wars in which the Empire may become involved at short notice with one or with multiple Powers at once.

I have restricted the strength of each army considering, as far as possible, which of the various states might oppose them.

It will be seen from these scenarios that where great distances make some inspections useless for mutual support, in contrast, those adjacent to each other are in direct liaison and could assist one another; each inspection of the second line would be on hand to support those in the first; finally, a central inspection can in a fairly short time hasten to any sector of the circle, if Asian countries are excluded from this.

Thus, the St Petersburg Inspection is to reinforce those of Finland and Livonia; the Smolensk Inspection is to support those of Lithuania and Brest-Litovsk, while the Brest, Ukraine, Dniester and even Crimea inspections could call upon the Kiev Inspection for support.² Also, multiple inspections might often be combined. For example, in the event of a war with the Swedes, the inspections of Finland, St Petersburg and Livonia, assisted by Moscow, direct their support to a single objective; or those of Livonia, Lithuania and Brest, supported by Smolensk and Moscow in the event of a war with Prussia; likewise, Brest, Ukraine and Dniester, assisted by Smolensk, Kiev and Moscow during a war with Austria; finally, in a war with the Turks, the Dniester and Crimea inspections would be supported by those of Kiev and Moscow. But the main purpose of these scenarios is to show how to generate forces in the event of war being declared.

1 Archive of the Chancellery of the War Ministry Secret Department 1802, minute No. 2a. The original note by engineer and Quartermaster General Sukhtelen.

2 See [Diagram1 – Disposition of troops in 1801](#)

Inasmuch as it seems to me that the Asian³ Inspections no longer have excessive military forces, and, in the event of an unforeseen occurrence, the department would forbid the speedy return to them of those detached from them for war in Europe, to that end I considered it proper not to mention them at all.

Meanwhile, these scenarios themselves (if I am not mistaken) also show that if a war were to break out with three different powers simultaneously, then it would be difficult to repel the third unanticipated war with real force, except by exhausting all else, and would also strip the interior of the State bare.

Truly, although it is inconceivable that three wars might unexpectedly break out at once, since war against a strong power usually gives rise to an alliance with another, but it seems to me that prudence, however, does not permit one to rely on this entirely, sound reserves should be held for unforeseen events *in extremis*. This very subject leads to the conclusion that one should not go into the field with small armies, since it is better to deliver a swift and decisive blow than to be exhausted through inadequate and piecemeal efforts; the former remedy would resolve the conflict before the enemy has time to take appropriate counter-measures; the latter, on the contrary, gives them time to increase their forces and induces other powers to participate in the conflict. Nevertheless, the costs in the former case would be less than in the latter. But are the armies, which we assume on this subject itself, extremely numerous? The influence of fortified locations on military operations is evidenced by the history of all known to us,⁴ and if there were any doubt about this subject, then it would be worthwhile to delve into it in order to make sure that this question stems solely from the improper use of fortresses by field commanders, or due to their poor condition. One should not be blinded by wishful thinking. Many of our borders do not have fortified locations at all, and on others there are still many defences to complete; such disadvantages can only be rectified by numerous armies. Which is why the subject of this in-depth study is worthwhile, but no matter what happens, and even if the construction of several new fortresses is begun and the old ones repaired, then this work is very time-consuming; which is why, in the meantime, one must base one's measures not on what one could eventually have, but on what one has currently. Undoubtedly, Russia does not need such a profusion of fortresses as some other States. The principles of warfare should be applied in this Empire, curtailing them severely. But it is no less obvious that the army needs extensive depots, that these depots must at least be secure from raiders, that the more remote these depots are, the more remote the line of military operations becomes, and then a lot of time would be spent in transportation, and therefore this would come at great expense, and, perhaps, to such an extent that the excess sums spent on this alone on campaign would be sufficient to build a suitable fortress close to the theatre of war; so that escorting convoys does not become onerous and exhaust the army. Woe betide them then having to deal with an active and intelligent enemy! A complete lack of fortresses would subject us to incessant raiding by an enemy, while those in poor condition would be a source of problems. So, it seems that this deserves particular attention. In the meantime, I have made it my duty to submit this to the commission for consideration, whether it would be pleasing, in respect of the above reasons, to present most humbly to His Imperial Majesty the need to increase His Army, in the present situation, by at least 12 regiments, that is, ten of infantry and two of jägers.

Finally, I consider myself obligated to ask the commission to share with me their thoughts regarding the current deployments by inspection. It is evident from the very swift concentration of troops on each frontier required by this question, that this distribution must be satisfactorily thought through. Yet as soon as the army has been expanded, it will be necessary to amend the distribution of quarters; but otherwise, no major changes are

³ Eastern.

⁴ In the original, this is unclear, and probably should read: 'the history of all wars known to us.'

foreseen. In both, it should be noted: firstly, to avoid increasing the number of inspections unnecessarily. Secondly, to assign quarters in accordance with the type of service of each army, and that the region where they are to be located has the resources to deliver proper subsistence to them, with suitable communications for the swiftest possible transfer to designated assembly areas, as may be required.⁵

Engineer and Quartermaster General Sukhtelen, 15 [27] June 1802.

Schedule of the Army by Inspection, 1802.⁶

INSPECTIONS	Squadrons					Infantry Battalions			Artillery				Pioneer Company	Garrison Battalions	
									Bns		Coys				
	Cuirassier	Dragoon	Hussar	Light Horse	Tatar & Cossack	Grenadier	Musketeer	Jäger	Siege	Field	Horse	Garrison		Field	Territorial
1. Finland							9	6		0.4		6		10	
2. St Petersburg	5					6	15		1	0.6	1		2	5	3
3. Livonia		10				6	18	3	1	1	1		1	10	
4. Lithuania		5	10		3	3	18	12		1	1				
5. Brest	5	10	10	10			15	3		1					
6. Ukraine		5	10			6	6								
7. Dniester	5	5	20			6	21	15		1	1	2	3	3	
8. Crimea		5					12	6		1		3		3	
9. Caucasus		20				3	12	6							11
10. Smolensk		15				6	15						1	3	
11. Kiev	5	20	30		7		21		1	1	1		2	2	

⁵ Note: The quartering conditions are almost the same as in the 'Piece' by General Rusanov, but the expressions are more specific.

⁶ Archive of the Chancellery of the War Ministry Secret Department 1802, minute No. 2a.

⁷ The Chuguev Cossack regiment, which consisted of ten squadrons, for some reason was not included in the original.

INSPECTIONS	Squadrons					Infantry Battalions			Artillery				Pioneer Company	Garrison Battalions	
									Bns		Coys				
	Cuirassier	Dragoon	Hussar	Light Horse	Tatar & Cossack	Grenadier	Musketeer	Jäger	Siege	Field	Horse	Garrison		Field	Territorial
12. Moscow	10					3	27			1			1	7	6
13. Orenburg		5					9			1				9	1
14. Siberia		10					9	6		1				14	
Total:	30	110	80	10	3	39	207	57	3	10	5	11	10	66	21 ⁸

Signed in original by Engineer and Quartermaster General Sukhtelen.

First Hypothetical Scenario:

To demonstrate the generation of two armies at once; in Finland and on the Dniester, not counting the 288 man war increment in each grenadier and musketeer regiment, and assuming that the field force may include garrison battalions on field establishment.

From Each Inspection	Squadrons			Battalions		Manpower		Overall	
	Cuirassier	Dragoon	Hussar	Infantry	Garrison	Cavalry	Infantry	All Ranks	Combatants
Army of Finland of 58,000 men									
Finland				15	10		18,308	18,308	
St Petersburg	5			21		925	15,120	16,045	

⁸ There is a mistake in the original; 20 battalions were shown when there were 21. Note: for the Schedule of Garrison Troops by Inspection see Part 19.

From Each Inspection	Squadrons			Battalions		Manpower		Overall	
	Cuirassier	Dragoon	Hussar	Infantry	Garrison	Cavalry	Infantry	All Ranks	Combatants
Livonia				15			10,800	10,800	
Smolensk				9			6,480	6,480	
Moscow				6			4,320	4,320	
Total:	5			66⁹	10	925	55,028	55,953	50,127
Five Cossack regiments								2,505	2,505
Army of the Dniester of 105,000 men									
Dniester		5	20	33	2	}			
Tauride or Crimea ¹⁰				9	3	}4,447	31,690	36,137	
Volhynia of Brest			20	18	2 ¹¹	2,907	14,116	17,023	
Ukraine		5		12		969	8,640	9,609	
Malorussia or Kiev		20	30	21		9,093	15,120	24,213	
Smolensk				9			6,480	6,480	
Total:		30	70	102¹²	7	17,416	76,046	93,462	87,952
25 Cossack regiments								12,525	12,525

Following the generation of these two armies, field troops and garrisons on field establishment will remain, not including territorial ones, as follows: five battalions in the St Petersburg Inspection, ten squadrons and 22 battalions in the Livonia, 18 squadrons and 36 battalions in the Lithuania,¹³ 15 squadrons in the Volhynia or Brest Inspection, ten squadrons in the Ukraine, five squadrons in the Dniester, 15 squadrons and two battalions in the

⁹ Including six of jägers.

¹¹ Note: There is an error; according to the schedules, there were no garrison battalions in the Brest Inspectorate, but two are shown.

¹⁰ From the Crimea or Tauride Inspection, only those troops who were outside the peninsula and the Kuban line at the time.

¹² Including 18 of jägers.

¹³ There were 33 battalions in the Lithuania Inspection, not 36.

Malorussia or Kiev Inspection, ten squadrons and three battalions in the Smolensk,¹⁴ 15 squadrons and 28 battalions in the Moscow Inspection.¹⁵ Yet this total was achieved without touching troops from the Caucasus, Orenburg and Siberia inspections, nor those from the Taurida or Crimea Inspection who are actually in the peninsula or on the Kuban Line, also, not including the Lifeguard, 98 squadrons and 96 battalions, including 24 garrison battalions on field establishment, all of whom remain in reserve.

In the event of the mobilisation of these two armies, the border in Volhynia would be defended by troops from the Lithuania Inspection, while regiments from the Moscow Inspection would take the places of those from Smolensk and Malorussia, of which the former would deliver reinforcements to the Army of Finland, while the latter supports the Army of the Dniester, while at the same time, it may be appropriate to form another independent army in Lithuania or Volhynia with the remainder of their strength, as circumstances may dictate.

Engineer General Sukhtelen.

Second Hypothetical Scenario:

To demonstrate the simultaneous generation of two armies; in Finland and Lithuania, not including the 288 man war increment in each grenadier and musketeer regiment, and assuming that the field force may include garrison battalions on field establishment.

From Each Inspection ¹⁶	Squadrons			Battalions		Manpower		Overall	
	Cuirassier	Dragoon	Hussar	Infantry	Garrison	Cavalry	Infantry	All Ranks	Combatants
Army of Finland of 58,000 men									
Finland				15	10		18,308	18,308	
St Petersburg	5			21		925	15,120	16,045	
Livonia				15			10,800	10,800	
Smolensk				9			6,480	6,480	
Moscow				6			4,320	4,320	
Total:	5			66¹⁷	10	925	55,028	55,953	50,127

¹⁴ Three garrison battalions on field establishment have been omitted from the Smolensk Inspection.

¹⁵ In the Moscow Inspection there were only ten squadrons, not 15. Of the 37 battalions, six were assigned to the Army of Finland, leaving 31 battalions and not 28.

¹⁶ The errors in the First Hypothetical Scenario, with regard to the Moscow and Brest inspections, are also repeated in the Second.

¹⁷ Including six of jägers.

From Each Inspection	Squadrons			Battalions		Manpower		Overall	
	Cuirassier	Dragoon	Hussar	Infantry	Garrison	Cavalry	Infantry	All Ranks	Combatants
Five Cossack regiments								2,505	2,505
Army of Lithuania of 113,000 men									
Lithuania		5	13	33	3	3,320	24,054	27,374	
Volhynia or Brest	5	10	20	18	2	5,770	14,116	19,886	
Ukraine		5	10	12		2,708	8,640	11,348	
Smolensk		10		12		1,938	8,640	10,578	
Dniester	5			15		925	9,648	10,573	
Malorussia or Kiev	5	20	10	21		6,540	15,120	21,660	
Livonia		10				1,938		1,938	
Total:	15	60	53	111¹⁸	5	23,139	80,218	103,357	92,055
20 Cossack regiments								10,020	10,020

Following the generation of these two armies, field troops and garrisons on field establishment will remain, not including territorial ones, as follows: five battalions in the St Petersburg Inspection, 22 battalions in the Livonia, 25 squadrons and 20 battalions in the Dniester, 30 squadrons and two battalions in the Malorussia or Kiev, 15 squadrons and 28 battalions in the Moscow, and 12 battalions in the Tauride or Crimea. Yet this total was achieved without touching troops from the Caucasus, Orenburg and Siberia inspections, nor those from the Taurida or Crimea Inspection who are actually in the peninsula or on the Kuban Line, also, not including the Lifeguard, 70 squadrons and 89 battalions, including 26 garrison battalions on field establishment, all of whom remain in reserve.

Troops from the Dniester Inspectorate would then occupy the necessary posts on the border in Volhynia, while elements from the Crimea or Tauride Inspection would solely come from outside the peninsula, those from Smolensk would be replaced with elements from the Moscow Inspection, so that both Active Armies could be reinforced from there, according to the needs of the situation, and the remaining troops from the Moscow Inspection would go to the Malorussia or Kiev, in order to maintain reserves there and in Smolensk to secure the Dniester or Volhynia, in case of need.

¹⁸ Including 21 of jägers.

Quartermaster General Sukhtelen.

Third Hypothetical Scenario:

To demonstrate the simultaneous generation of two armies; in Lithuania and on the Dniester, not including the 288 man war increment in each grenadier and musketeer regiment, and assuming that the field force may include garrison battalions on field establishment.

From Each Inspection	Squadrons			Battalions		Manpower		Overall	
	Cuirassier	Dragoon	Hussar	Infantry	Garrison	Cavalry	Infantry	All Ranks	Combatants
Army of Lithuania of 104,000 men									
Lithuania		5	13	33	3	3,320	24,054	27,374	
Volhynia or Brest	5	10	20	18	2	5,770	14,116	19,886	
Ukraine		5	10	12		2,708	8,640	11,348	
Livonia				18			12,384	12,348	
Smolensk		10		21		1,938	15,120	17,058	
Moscow				9			6,480	6,480	
Malorussia or Kiev	5					925		925	
Dniester	5					925		925	
St Petersburg	5					925		925	
Total:	20	30	43	111¹⁹	5	16,511	80,794	97,305	86,595
15 Cossack regiments								7,515	7,515
Army of the Dniester of 96,000 men									
Dniester		5	20	33	2	}			
Tauride or Crimea ²⁰				9	3	}4,447	31,690	36,137	

¹⁹ Including 18 of jägers.

²⁰ From the Crimea or Tauride Inspection, only those troops who were outside the peninsula and the Kuban line at the time.

From Each Inspection	Squadrons			Battalions		Manpower		Overall	
	Cuirassier	Dragoon	Hussar	Infantry	Garrison	Cavalry	Infantry	All Ranks	Combatants
Malorussia or Kiev		20	40	21		10,434	15,120	25,554	
Moscow		5		21		969	15,120	16,089	
Livonia				9			6,480	6,480	
Total:		30	60	93²¹	5	15,850	68,410	84,260	75,183
25 Cossack regiments								12,525	12,525

Following the generation of these two armies, field troops and garrisons on field establishment will remain, not including territorial ones, as follows: 26 battalions in the St Petersburg Inspection, 25 battalions in the Finland, ten squadrons and ten battalions in the Livonia, two battalions in the Malorussia or Kiev, ten squadrons and four battalions in the Moscow.

Yet this total was achieved without touching troops from the Caucasus, Orenburg and Siberia inspections, nor those from the Taurida or Crimea Inspection who are actually in the peninsula or on the Kuban Line, also, not including the Lifeguard, 20 squadrons and 76 battalions, including 31 garrison battalions on field establishment, all of whom remain in reserve.

The St Petersburg and Livonia inspections, comprising together ten squadrons of cavalry and 30 infantry battalions, in addition to 16 garrison battalions on field establishment, could support the Army of Lithuania or, as the situation may dictate, be sent in order to secure of Finland.²²

Quartermaster General Sukhtelen.

Fourth Hypothetical Scenario:

To demonstrate the simultaneous generation of two armies; from Brest-Litovsk to the Black Sea, not including the 288 man war increment in each grenadier and musketeer regiment, and assuming that the field force may include garrison battalions on field establishment.

²¹ Including 15 of jägers.

²² Note: the errors with regard to the Moscow and Brest inspections have been repeated.

From Each Inspection	Squadrons			Battalions		Manpower		Overall	
	Cuirassier	Dragoon	Hussar	Infantry	Garrison	Cavalry	Infantry	All Ranks	Combatants
Army of Volhynia of 96,000 men									
Volhynia or Brest	5	10	20	18	2	5,770	14,116	19,886	
Ukraine		5	10	12		2,708	8,640	11,348	
Lithuania		5	13	33	3	3,320	24,054	27,374	
Smolensk		10		21		1,938	15,120	17,058	
Malorussia or Kiev	5	5		3		1,894	2,160	4,054	
Dniester	5					925		925	
Moscow				9			6,480	6,480	
St Petersburg	5					925		925	
Total:	20	40	43	96²³	4	18,449	70,570	89,570	79,452
15 Cossack regiments								7,515	7,515
Army of the Dniester of 88,000 men									
Dniester		5	20	33	2	}			
Tauride or Crimea ²⁴				9	3	}4,447	31,690	36,137	
Malorussia or Kiev		15	40	21		9,465	15,120	24,585	
Moscow				21			15,120	15,120	
Total:		20	60	84²⁵	5	13,912	61,930	75,842	67,750
25 Cossack regiments								12,525	12,525

²³ Including 15 of jägers.

²⁴ From the Crimea or Tauride Inspection, only those troops who were outside the peninsula and the Kuban line at the time.

²⁵ Including 15 of jägers.

Following the generation of these two armies, field troops and garrisons on field establishment will remain, not including territorial ones, as follows: 26 battalions in the St Petersburg Inspection, 25 battalions in the Finland, ten squadrons and 37 battalions in the Livonia, two battalions in the Malorussia or Kiev, ten squadrons and four battalions in the Moscow.²⁶

Yet this total was achieved without touching troops from the Caucasus, Orenburg and Siberia inspections, nor those from the Taurida or Crimea Inspection who are actually in the peninsula or on the Kuban Line, also, not including the Lifeguard, 20 squadrons and 94 battalions, including 31 garrison battalions on field establishment, all of whom remain in reserve.

Some of the troops may be detached from the Livonia Inspection in order to hold the necessary posts on the Lithuanian border, which, together with the St. Petersburg Inspection, might equally be used either in Lithuania or in Finland, depending on the circumstances.

Quartermaster General Sukhtelen.

Fifth Hypothetical Scenario:

To demonstrate the simultaneous generation of three armies; in Finland, Lithuania and on the Dniester, not including the 288 man war increment in each grenadier and musketeer regiment, and assuming that the field force may include garrison battalions on field establishment.

From Each Inspection	Squadrons			Battalions		Manpower		Overall	
	Cuirassier	Dragoon	Hussar	Infantry	Garrison	Cavalry	Infantry	All Ranks	Combatants
Army of Finland of 47,000 men									
Finland				15	10		18,308	18,308	
St Petersburg	5			21		925	15,120	16,045	
Livonia				9			6,480	6,480	
Smolensk				6			4,320	4,320	
Total:	5			51²⁷	10	925	44,220	45,153	40,487

²⁶ Note: the errors regarding the Moscow and Brest inspections remain extant, while the Smolensk Inspection is shown as having three garrison battalions on field establishment.

²⁷ Including six of jägers.

From Each Inspection	Squadrons			Battalions		Manpower		Overall	
	Cuirassier	Dragoon	Hussar	Infantry	Garrison	Cavalry	Infantry	All Ranks	Combatants
Five Cossack regiments								2,505	2,505
Army of Lithuania of 100,000 men									
Lithuania		5	13	33	3	3,320	24,054	27,374	
Livonia				15			10,224	10,224	
Volhynia or Brest	5	10	20	18	2	5,770	14,116	19,886	
Ukraine		5	10	12		2,708	8,640	11,348	
Smolensk		10		15		1,938	10,800	12,738	
Moscow	5	5		9		1,894	6,480	8,374	
Malorussia or Kiev	5					925		925	
Dniester	5					925		925	
Total:	20	35	43	102²⁸	5	17,480	74,314	91,794	81,938
20 Cossack regiments								10,020	10,020
Army of the Dniester of 90,000 men									
Dniester		5	20	33	2	}			
Tauride or Crimea				9	3	}4,447	31,690	36,137	
Malorussia or Kiev		20	40	21		10,434	15,120	25,554	
Moscow		5		21		969	15,120	16,089	
Total:		30	60	84²⁹	5	15,850	61,930	77,780	69,404

28 Including 18 of jägers.

29 Including 15 of jägers.

From Each Inspection	Squadrons			Battalions		Manpower		Overall	
	Cuirassier	Dragoon	Hussar	Infantry	Garrison	Cavalry	Infantry	All Ranks	Combatants
25 Cossack regiments								12,525	12,525

Following the generation of these three armies, more than 11 garrison battalions would remain to secure the coasts of Estland, Livonia and Courland, in the following locations there would remain: four battalions in the St Petersburg Inspection, ten squadrons and three battalions in the Livonia, two battalions in the Malorussia or Kiev, ten squadrons and four battalions in the Moscow.³⁰

Yet this total was achieved without touching troops from the Caucasus, Orenburg and Siberia inspections, nor those from the Taurida or Crimea Inspection who are actually in the peninsula or on the Kuban Line, also, not including the Lifeguard, 10 squadrons and 24 battalions, including 21 garrison battalions on field establishment, all of whom remain in reserve.

The strength of forces included in the composition of these armies is considered sufficient for offensive operations, but if one of them were to remain in a defensive posture, then it would still be appropriate to detach some of its troops to reinforce either of the offensive armies.

Quartermaster General Sukhtelen.

Evaluation of the Scenarios:

In evaluating the scenarios by General Sukhtelen, we note: firstly, no mention is made of artillery or engineering troops at all, and secondly, no assumptions are made about the division of the mass of armies numbering 100,000 men into smaller formations.

With regard to artillery, it must be remembered that at that time detachments of artillery were distributed by regiment in such a way that as soon as a regiment or battalion was assigned to move, the artillery proceeded to their location at the same time, and marched alongside the battalions. Artillery was assigned on a ratio of three guns per battalion, of which two guns were dedicated to each battalion, and the third to batteries held at army level.³¹ Taking this assumption into account, it becomes clear that it was not difficult to calculate the number of guns for the various armies, and therefore, in all probability, it was not considered necessary to mention field artillery. Engineer troops, as well as horse artillery, are not mentioned in the scenarios, probably because their small numbers (ten pioneer companies, two sapper companies and one horse artillery battalion) and scattered locations did not require special consideration, such companies could be assigned directly.³² In addition, as we have already seen when considering an army, activated in

³⁰ Note: the errors regarding the Moscow Inspection (showing five dragoon squadrons that did not exist) and regarding the Brest Inspection remain extant.

³¹ Archive of the Artillery Historical Museum, Inspection Business, minute 246, from General-of-Artillery Korsakov's most humble report dated 21 February [5 March] 1802, No. 18.

³² See [Appendix 2 to Part 2](#)

the event of a breach in relations with Britain, the engineer troops and horse artillery were sometimes not assigned.³³

Let us also note that the garrison battalions on field establishment are considered to be part of the field force and are included in the armies and reserves.

In his reasoning, General Sukhtelen stated that the main aim of the scenarios was to show how to generate forces in the event of a declared war, and therefore only the compilation of the army and reserves for unforeseen events are shown, i.e. the assembly of the army is made immediately by the regiments, battalions and companies. The interesting conclusion is drawn that one should not go into the field with small armies, since it is better to make a quick and decisive blow than to be exhausted by inadequate and piecemeal efforts.

If we summarise all the scenarios into a common table, we get:

Scenario	Army	Squadrons	Battalions	Manpower				Cossack Regts	Total All Ranks	Total in Round Numbers
				Cavalry	Infantry	Total	Combatants			
First	1 st	5	76	925	55,028	55,953	50,127	5	2,505	58,000
	2 nd	100	109	17,416	76,046	93,462	87,952	25	12,525	105,000
Second	1 st	5	76	925	55,028	55,953	50,127	5	2,505	58,000
	2 nd	128	116	23,139	80,218	103,357	92,055	20	10,020	113,000
Third	1 st	93	116	16,511	80,794	97,305	86,895	15	7,515	104,000
	2 nd	90	98	15,850	68,410	84,260	75,188	25	12,525	96,000
Fourth	1 st	103	100	18,449	70,570	89,018	79,452	15	7,515	96,000
	2 nd	80	89	13,912	61,930	75,842	67,750	25	12,525	88,000
Fifth	1 st	5	61	925	44,228	45,153	40,487	5	2,505	47,000
	2 nd	98	107	17,480	74,314	91,794	81,938	20	10,020	100,000
	3 rd	90	89	15,850	61,930	77,780	69,404	25	12,525	90,000

³³ Supreme Commands on Daily Orders, dated 30 August [11 September], 14 [26] August, 13 [25] November and 14 [26] December 1800.

First of all, it should be noted that the regular cavalry is intended to be supplemented with Cossacks, moreover, the Cossacks in various armies make up about one third (Fourth Scenario, 1st Army), almost half (Fifth Scenario, 3rd Army) or even two thirds (First, Second and Fifth Scenarios, 1st Armies) of the cavalry total.

Turning to the ratio of cavalry to infantry in the composition of the armies, we notice that it ranges from one thirtieth to almost one nineteenth; the former ratio refers to the army intended to operate in Finland while the latter refers to the army intended for operations in Lithuania, i.e. the cavalry was assigned depending on the nature of the ground in the theatre of operations.

The ratio of artillery has been stated at about three guns for 1,000 men, calculated at six guns per regiment, as mentioned above; furthermore, guns were to be dedicated to compiling batteries at army level, one gun per battalion, i.e. between 61 to 116 guns per army.

Note also that service support troops make up from one ninth to one fifteenth of the total number of regular troops.