

A CENTURY OF THE MINISTRY OF WAR 1802-1902

BY THE GENERAL STAFF

**AN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF
THE GENERAL STAFF IN RUSSIA**

FROM 1801 TO 1814

DURING THE REIGN EMPEROR ALEXANDER I.

[Translated into English from the original Russian by Peter G.A. Phillips]

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Summary.

When Emperor Alexander I ascended the throne, he believed that the state administrative system was in a condition of some disorder. Ardently desiring to 'raise Russia to the heights of glory and to bring constant blessings' to all his loyal subjects, he naturally set about transforming and improving the aforementioned system, and in so doing he sought to put legislation and justice in their proper place. There were many talented people among the statesmen who surrounded him, but not one of them could rise to the level of a full understanding of the actual condition of Russia at that time, or of the entirety and scope of its actual needs and interests, which further complicated and increased the difficulty of the tasks that fell to the lot of the Tsar.

Emperor Alexander at first gave preference to the programmes of his grandmother, supplemented and disseminated in the spirit of the concepts he received from his tutor La Harpe, who now considered it necessary to warn him against obsessions in this direction. Without in the least deceiving himself about the ease of implementing the draft plan of state activity and fully understanding the talents and faults of his various employees, the Emperor considered it possible to direct the course of all state affairs through their appropriate selection and coordination of their activities, in accordance with the planned program, for the good of the nation entrusted to him by God.

Reforms followed one another in quick succession: the social classes and groups were given back their lost rights; a 'Standing Council' was established to replace the previous council; the work of dividing the governmental functions of the Procurator General among individual ministers continued; ministries were established for those branches of government that were not under the jurisdiction of the Procurator General; the Senate was given, to a certain extent, the character of a guardian institution, supervising all judicial and administrative authorities and controlling their activities, and so on.

However, the new ministries still represented an agglomeration of individual institutions, each of which operated independently, while the first three colleges of state had been left 'conducting state business based on the existing form;' ministers were not integral to the institutions they governed and stood, as it were, external to them; the limits and level of power of ministers, their mutual relationships, as well as their relationships to higher authorities, had not yet been determined with sufficient completeness, clarity or precision; the reporting by ministers to the Senate was transformed into a mere formal ritual and was even neglected entirely; the Senate was the primary supreme judicial authority only for certain cases; the Committee of Ministers, into which business from every part of the ministerial administration flowed, became dominant.

It was natural for the reforms to continue. Firstly, the disbandment of the colleges began by converting them into ministerial departments. An inherent plan for the transformation of the structure of the Imperial state was soon created (by October 1809) and then received ongoing development, based on the concept of separating the main state authorities: legislative, executive and judicial.

In pursuance of this plan, the Council of State was established (at the beginning of 1810) as 'the centre for the general discussion of state business' set up 'to establish and spread uniformity and order in state administration;' the general establishment for ministries was issued on 25 June [7 July] 1811, and so on; but, in view of the impending struggle with Napoleonic France, given the difficult economic situation of the state and other unfavourable conditions, it was necessary to suspend further implementation of the aforementioned plan, and then completely abandon it in the interests of maintaining the welfare of the state and the people (as had existed previously).

The Patriotic War pushed everything into the background and absorbed all of Emperor Alexander's

strength; thereafter, the campaigns of 1813 and 1814 and sessions at the Congress of Vienna were reasons for the prolonged absence of the Tsar. The role of the institution with 'particular authority over all matters of state administration in general' fell to the lot of the Committee of Ministers once more; on occasion, this Committee also had to form opinions on strategic and disciplinary issues, not to mention army personnel and their resupply with every necessity, while in 1812 a dedicated committee of the highest state dignitaries had been entrusted with discussing the issue of selecting a new commander-in-chief. Overall, the Committee of Ministers overshadowed the activities of both the Council of State and the Senate and significantly diminished the authority of individual Ministers.

Even in the first half of his reign, Emperor Alexander did not give preference to all of his grandmother's concepts or programmes, indeed, in some respects, mainly with regard to 'the organisation and direction of the activities of the armed forces' he followed the precepts of his father. Over time, becoming disillusioned with much that he had idealised in his younger years, the Tsar became more and more convinced that changes in the state programme he had adopted, in the sense of bringing them closer to Emperor Paul's programme, seemed urgently necessary. Experiencing a most intense inner struggle within himself, he sacrificed his personal idealism and made the required changes as far as this was possible for him.

Under these new conditions, Count Arakcheev became the Tsar's only permanent confidant on matters of state administration, who overshadowed not only all the Council of Ministers but also every individual minister.

In accordance with the general course of reform carried out in the first years of the reign of Emperor Alexander I, the formation of the Ministry of Land Armed Forces was limited, in 1802, to the establishment of the appointment of the minister; in every other respect, military administration remained in its existing form. In 1803, a special department was established under the Minister, in which all initial considerations on military administrative matters were to be made; further changes that took place in the composition of the upper military administration in the first decade after the establishment of the ministries tended mainly to focus on the assimilation of those departments of military administration that had not yet managed to be brought under the remit of the ministry, and thereafter, to a more correct distribution and demarcation between the Military College 'expeditions' management and the various elements of the War Department; only the 'permanent council on military schools' remained independent of the Minister of Land Armed Forces.

Having been appointed to the post of Minister of War at the beginning of 1808, Count Arakcheev was required to use the power given to him to maintain 'good order, discipline and subordination' in the department entrusted to him. It must be acknowledged that he contributed a great deal to the implementation of the above-mentioned improvements in the sphere of higher military administration, especially in relation to the reorganising of almost everything that had been in a more or less disordered or haphazard state before his appointment. But, it was apparent, in the opinion of the Tsar, that he did not possess either sufficiently broad vision or a sufficiently broad and deep understanding of military matters. Meanwhile, Russia was facing a decisive clash with one of the greatest military geniuses of all time and a nation that had an enormous superiority in strength, which required a rapid and proportionate improvement of our entire military system and, in particular, our readiness for the impending war.

In view of this, by the will of the Emperor, Count Arakcheev ceded the post of Minister of War to a military man who combined, so it seemed, undoubted military-administrative abilities and knowledge of military life in peacetime, with combat experience, with knowledge and understanding of war and everything that was considered necessary in order to bring the army's preparations for combat to the level of development that was required by the situation.

Appointed Minister of War at the beginning of 1810, General Barclay de Tolly immediately began

to demonstrate increased activity in the directions that seemed appropriate to him, but, due to factors described in detail below, he was not in complete control of the department entrusted to him.

During his management of this department, the actual organisation of the central military administration was determined by a dedicated 'Manual Of The Ministry Of War' on 27 January [8 February] 1812, on the principles laid down as the basis for the general manual for ministries. According to the organisation of 1812, the Ministry of War concentrated almost all branches of administration of the military department in itself, while its internal organisation corresponded to the diversity of matters under its jurisdiction; but, at the same time, the precise delineation of spheres of interest and distribution between departments of items under respective jurisdictions had yet to be carried out; the most important duties of what is now the General Staff were assigned to the Military Topographic Depot, which thus acquired a very important significance in the matter of preparing the state for war, not to mention that this same Depot was required to be engaged in the recording of the military history of the fatherland, for example; the actual military doctrine element (and some military-training) was one of a number of subjects assigned under the jurisdiction of the Military Science Committee, while the 'changes' and 'reforms' carried out at unit level were promulgated by the Department of Inspections.

Under these conditions, the Quartermasters Department had only rather narrow terms of reference in peacetime, which could not but affect its efficiency in wartime.

This department, at the time of Emperor Alexander's accession to the throne, did not have a dedicated commander, had no distinctive uniform or its own line of seniority for promotions, had lost its recruitment pool, did not have a specific establishment or precedence and consisted of the assembly of a small number of good draftsmen, occupied from time to time with various missions on orders from above, or on orders from the Mapping Depot, and sometimes carrying out government surveys.

Appointed Quartermaster General in 1801, General van Suchtelen attracted men outstanding in their education and abilities to the Quartermasters Department, opened up a broad field of activity for officers of the Suite, established our cartography on solid principles and laid the foundations for our geodetic survey and, in this regard, the training of several remarkable personalities of the subsequent era. Yet the prevalence of such activities distracted officers of the Suite from regimental service and in general from the performance of the primary duties of the general staff (as we understand them today [1902]), which was not slow to be reflected in practice during the war of 1805 and also led to an exaggeration of the magnitude and impact of the errors and shortcomings of the Quartermasters Department.

The campaigns of 1806 and 1807, the Turkish War of 1806-1812, and especially the Swedish War of 1808-1809, to a certain extent eliminated the capability gap that was apparent in 1805, brought the Quartermasters Department closer to the units, and contributed to the restoration of confidence in them on the part of the troops and their commanders, but still to an insufficient degree.

In view of this, Emperor Alexander came to the conclusion that a corresponding reorganisation of all our staff institutions in general was needed, and therefore, even before the appointment of Count Arakcheev as Minister of War, in 1807, he sent Adjutant General Prince Pëtr Mikhailovich Volkonsky to France (who enjoyed the complete confidence of the Tsar), whose set mission was a comparative study of all French military institutions in general, the advantages of which had been clear through combat experience that had cost us dearly.

The lengthy and conscientious study of the French military system in general, the French military-administrative system in particular, as well as the French support agencies of the higher military command and control especially, made a strong impression on Prince Volkonsky, which was reflected in the report he submitted. The Tsar was most satisfied with the intelligence he had

collected and appointed Volkonsky to be the director of his Suite in the Quartermasters Department in 1810.

In the first two years of his administration, Prince Volkonsky did everything in his power to improve and promote the Quartermasters Department in every respect. It was neither his fault nor the fault of the Suite itself that its organisation, output and preparation suffered from the shortcomings mentioned below at the time of his appointment as director of this department; it was impossible to eliminate all these deficiencies in such a short period of time; in any case, they were noticeably reduced or mitigated. However, not everyone in our highest military circles of that time agreed with Prince Volkonsky's views on the purpose, organisation and scope of activities of the Quartermasters Department. Combat experience was necessary to answer the contested issues. This experience fell to the lot of Russia, the Russian army and the Quartermasters Department in the Patriotic War of 1812.

Shortly before the outbreak of this war, at the same time as the 'Institution Of The Ministry Of War' on 27 January [8 February] 1812, a manual was published 'For The Administration Of A Large Operational Army' which, 'from the very first planning for it, to the final flourishes of each of its chapters, was compiled, processed and amended under the direct leadership and according to the comments' of the Tsar himself, who personally directed the activities of the dedicated commission formed for this work; the following sat on this commission: General Barclay de Tolly as chairman and Prince Volkonsky as a member.

The Manual For The Administration Of A Large Operational Army, although it represented a compromise between imitating the French and German directions,¹ was nevertheless a change to the Institution Of The Ministry Of War in 1812; it established the unified authority of the Commander-in-Chief as the head of the army operating in a single theatre of war; a well-organised system for well-appointed headquarters and logistics, with the assistance of which the Commander-in-Chief and the senior military commanders subordinate to him could conveniently control the units entrusted to them, and finally, the support agencies from the higher military command and control, which had been set up quite correctly, at least in theory, and which had now received the opportunity to serve the army in accordance with the demands of the situation. It is true that their preparation for this matter (through no fault of their own) was far from complete, to say the least; it remained to be perfected in the best of schools, in combat. It was here that the discrepancy was revealed between the peacetime organisation of our army and the direction of its preparation for war in times of peace on the one hand, and the demands of the situation in wartime on the other.

To the credit of our Quartermasters Department of that era, it must be acknowledged that, during the Patriotic War and during the decisive struggle with Napoleon in general, despite its aforementioned weaknesses and the unfavourable conditions mentioned below, it proved capable of relatively rapid self-improvements; it was thanks to this that it proved itself equal to its mission and by the end of the 1812 campaign it already occupied an honoured and influential position in our army such as it had never occupied before, and in 1813 it actually took prime place in the ranking of the general staffs of the Coalition armies, despite the apparent predominance of foreign army commanders.

At the end of 1812, with Emperor Alexander's arrival in the army, the Tsar's headquarters was formed, as the head of which, Prince Volkonsky was appointed as Chief of the General Staff. Both the man himself and his closest chosen assistants and collaborators, and our entire Suite in the Quartermaster Department in general, performed their duties brilliantly during this struggle with Napoleon.

Naturally, following the end of the Napoleonic wars, the organisation at the head of our army and the supporting agencies from the high command and military administration, under which we won

1 Overall, the advantage still lay with the French direction.

and achieved such great successes and results, was consolidated for times of peace.

The supreme direction of every department of the military administration was entrusted to His Imperial Majesty's Chief of the General Staff, Prince Volkonsky, to whom, with respect to correspondence, the Minister of War, Adjutant General Konovnitsyn, who retained the budgetary element at his disposal, was also subordinate. At the same time, Prince Volkonsky remained the director of the Quartermasters Department, which, nevertheless, had its own immediate commander, in the person of the Quartermaster General of His Majesty's General Staff.

Our force comprised two armies and several independent corps; their command and control, as well as that of their units, was organised on the basis of the Manual For The Administration Of A Large Operational Army, with only a few, relatively insignificant, amendments.

The reform carried out was in line with Emperor Alexander's below-mentioned programme, which, at that time, he had not yet completely abandoned.

Prince Volkonsky continued his care for the Quartermasters Department, improved it and raised it to such a high level that one could hardly have wished for more, from the point of view of their usefulness to the service. It had an outstanding organisation,² had finally achieved the correct status, had the opportunity to prepare to fulfil its duties in the best possible way both in a narrow and in a broad sense, had enlightened and talented directors and, it seemed, would go unceasingly along the correct path of development and self-improvement. Yet it could not remain cut off from other elements of the state's armed forces, for the development of which conditions had been very unfavourable, leading it onto the path of imitation of already outdated models, which their foreign inventors had decided to abandon. The consequence of this, in connection with the corresponding general direction of development of educated Russia of that time, was a certain dislocation in the state military system, which was reflected in the Quartermasters Department, which was also favoured by some happenstances.

The amount of dislocation in His Imperial Majesty's Suite of the Quartermasters Department that became apparent at the end of the reign of Emperor Alexander may have seemed to contemporaries to be much more significant and important than it actually was; history must admit that its shortcomings were not yet very great and could have been easily corrected had it been dependent upon itself alone.

Here we find new evidence of the justice of the position that has already been substantiated above, and by virtue of which the greater or lesser imperfection of the support agencies of the higher military command and control demonstrates the existence of corresponding shortcomings in the entire so-called system and the need for appropriate improvement of this system, without which the most decisive resources, tending to improve the so-called support agencies alone, did not lead to the desired outcome, and thereafter these support agencies, being out-of-step with general trends, brought the inevitable risk of ever-increasing dislocation.

2 This was not a literal copy of the earlier French organisation (of Napoleonic times), but a reasoned application of the spirit of that organisation to the conditions of any given situation. The Prussians did the same.



Tsar Alexander I

CHAPTER 1.

The Russian system of government during the reign of Emperor Alexander I and Emperor Alexander's programme with its implementation:

By the time of the accession to the throne of Emperor Alexander I, the administrative system of the Russian homeland was in a widely-known state of disorder. The military-administrative system of Russia did not constitute an exception to this general rule, showing signs of disorder as early as the end of the reign of Empress Catherine II and was in even greater disarray under her successor.

The future emperor, according to Catherine II, was to continue the great deeds of her reign. With this in mind, she directed the matter of his upbringing and education herself, striving to detach him, if possible, from the influence of his father. Grand Duke Alexander Pavlovich was to fluctuate constantly between two opposite poles, the influences of his grandmother and of his father, which was reflected in his character, both in his world-view in general, and in his programme of state in detail, and in the implementation of this programme in life in particular.

A pupil of the Swiss La Harpe [Frédéric-César de La Harpe], imbued, as was his teacher, with the views of the philosophers of the 18th century, the Grand Duke, at the same time, not only mastered all the nuances of his father's Gatchina military school, but also became close to the famous representative of this school, Alexey Andreevich Arakcheev, who, over time, managed to take primary place among the statesmen of Russia in that period. Alexander Pavlovich initially gave preference to the ideas of La Harpe, the programme of his grandmother and the projects of his young friends and associates, who were partial to the same ideals that he himself was fond of; over time, however, more and more, life experience reinforced the doubts lurking in him about the expediency of the ideas and projects mooted; already his sense of justice prompted him to admit that his father's programme also had significant merit; moreover, if his starting point alone were correct, then, perhaps, this programme should be recognised as quite expedient. In Alexander Pavlovich himself, there was a struggle between the directions of this confusion of thoughts that is difficult to explain; this struggle mainly explains a characteristic of Alexander Pavlovich's, noted by the historian Nikolai Karlovich Schilder, 'to often fluctuate between two completely contrasting moods,' as well as the resulting 'changeability of opinions and abrupt transitions from one political system to another.'

At the beginning of his reign, Emperor Alexander I was deeply shocked by the death of his father and considered the supreme power he had assumed to be 'simply an onerous burden,' which he assumed only in the hope of being useful to Russia and 'preventing her from new disasters in the future.' Nevertheless, full of strength and confidence in the possibility of realising his beloved ideals, he tried to reconcile the irreconcilable, namely, the ideas that dominated in Russia before and after 1796; on the very first day of his reign, he quite sincerely declared that he considered himself obliged to rule his people 'in accordance with the laws and according to the heart in God of the late Grandmother... of Empress Catherine the Great... Proceeding in accordance with her wise intentions,' the young Sovereign ardently desired 'to elevate Russia to the peak of glory and deliver undisturbed bliss' to all his faithful subjects. Primarily, he revealed a desire to fix law and justice in their proper place. His first concerns were to reverse the changes made by Emperor Paul to his mother's institutions, and to restore the rights to the estates and society previously assigned to them.

Of course, the new Tsar had to renew the personnel of the main offices of state who had recently surrounded his father, but of the people he called to cooperate in governing the state, among whom there were quite a few talented and even honest figures, not one could master an understanding of the true state of Russia at that time, its real needs and interests, especially in relation to foreign policy; all of them were distinguished, if not as one-dimensional, then as insufficiently versatile, and therefore, with a significant change in the situation, with which they were not able to conform,

their cooperation had to be declined and resort made to those who might somehow replace them. The emperor, apparently, fully understood the capabilities and limitations of his various colleagues and for a long time considered it possible, through their appropriate selection and combination of their activities, constantly corrected through appropriate leadership on his part, to direct the course of all state affairs, in accordance with the above-mentioned programme, for the good of the people entrusted to him by God.

He did not delude himself at all about the ease of carrying out this plan, as can be seen from his letter to La Harpe dated 9 (21) May, 1801: 'That which gives me the most trouble and strife is to reconcile personal interests and hatreds and to compel others to contribute to the sole and exclusive cause, the common good.'

In the first months of the new reign, the predominant influence belonged to the so-called Livonian Grand Vizier, Count Pëtr Alekseevich von der Pahlen, but soon, in June 1801, he suffered well-deserved disgrace.

The ruling circles of Russia at that time were under the influence of two parties, of which one (according to I.I. Dmitriev's definition) 'was dominated by 'servants' from Catherine's century, experienced, cautious, accustomed to the old ways, the violation of which was regarded by them as heresy.' The other party 'consisted of young people with educated minds, who had absorbed a little understanding regarding the theories by the latest publicists and were imbued with the spirit of reform and progress.'

Moreover, a third party of 'technocrats' arose, for which the bureaucratic institutions of France and its '*tutelle administrative*' served as models.¹

A typical representative of Catherine's 'servants' was Troshchinsky [Dmitry Prokofievich Troshchinsky], whom Emperor Alexander I addressed in the first hours of his reign with the words: "Be my director!" But this intelligent, experienced man could not discard his principles, which were very much inconsistent with the direction of the new reign.

In addition, he and Procurator-General Bekleshov [Alexander Andreevich Bekleshov] were antagonistic towards each other and weakened the Tsar's confidence in them, who (according to Derzhavin) 'did not know in which of them to place his trust.'

Therefore, it is not surprising that he was soon 'shunted aside by four men, for one of whom the Tsar had a particular friendship even before his accession to the throne, and the others had been close to Alexander since childhood.' These were V.P. Kochubey, N.N. Novosiltsov, Prince A. Chartorizhsky [or Czartoryski] and Count P.A. Stroganov. 'They no longer put their faith in the past, rather in the future, which seemed to them so easy to create in accordance with the ideals formed in their receptive souls, and their ardent desire was to apply the new ways of life to Russia that were just developing across Europe.'²

These friends of the emperor formed a 'secret committee,' which, under the chairmanship of the Tsar himself, discussed the most important issues of state, mainly subjects related to the state administrative system, necessary and possible changes and improvements to it. Meanwhile, La Harpe, who had managed to change his views on the subject of higher government, under the influence of personal experience in governing the Helvetic Republic, began to warn his former pupil against the illusory liberty of public meetings and against liberal passions in general. He convinced the emperor to treasure his power, moderating it only little by little through wise and sustainable institutions.

1 Speransky [Mikhail Mikhailovich Speransky] was already numbered in their ranks and was destined to have the last word on the issue of reforming our central institutions, having been elevated by Emperor Alexander I.

2 Collection of the Russian Historical Society, St Petersburg, 1868, Vol. III; N.K. Shilder, Emperor Alexander the First, His Life and Works, St Petersburg, 1897, Vol. III.

The 'Standing Council' of 1801:

Among the first administrative reforms by Emperor Alexander I was the abolition of the council [*soviet*] that existed at the court (by decree dated 26 March [7 April], 1801), and in accordance with Troshchinsky's plan, a new 'standing council' was established in its place under dedicated terms of reference (independently of the above-mentioned secret committee) 'in order to consider important affairs of state' (by virtue of the decree of 30 March [11 April], 1801).³ The following were appointed members of this council: Field Marshal Count Saltykov, General-of-Infantry Prince Zubov and Count Zubov, Vice-Chancellor Prince Kurakin, generals-of-infantry, Vice-President of the Military Collegium Lamb and Procurator-General Bekleshov, State Treasurer Baron Vasiliev, General-of-Cavalry and Military Governor of St. Petersburg, Count von der Pahlen, Prince Lopukhin, Minister of Commerce, Prince Gagarin, Admiral and Vice-President of the Admiralty Collegium, Count Kushelev and Privy Councillor Troshchinsky. The latter was entrusted with overall command of the chancellery of the council. The original protocols of the council were submitted through him for Supreme scrutiny. The chancellery of the council was divided into four departments or 'expeditions':

1. On the foreign and commerce sectors.
2. Military affairs, on land and sea.
3. On the civil and ecclesiastical sectors.
4. State economy.

This council was supposed to be assisted in its work by a commission for drafting legislation, which, however, appeared to be inactive. The composition of the council itself and its internal structure did not fully ensure the desired productivity from its activities, and more importantly, this council, although it was referred to as 'standing' was, in essence, no less intermittent than the previous one, because the secret committee ran in parallel with it and, independently of the latter, there were other secret advisers to whom the emperor turned.

The first public announcement of the administrative reforms planned by the Tsar are acknowledge to be the decrees to the Senate of 5 [17] June, 1801:

1. 'Regarding the drafting of a special report to the Senate on their rights and obligations, to confirm them on an unshakable foundation with the force of law.'
2. On the appointment of a commission for drafting legislation, which was 'to remain under the personal authority' of the Tsar, under the immediate direction of Active Privy Councillor, Count Zavadovsky [Pëtr Vasilievich Zavadovsky], to whom dedicated instructions were issued at the same time.

The following was expressed in the first of these decrees:

'Always respecting the Governing Senate as the Supreme seat of justice and enforcement of laws, and being aware of all the many rights and privileges that have been delegated to it from My Ancestors the Tsars, it has undergone changes due to the passage of time and various circumstances, leading to the weakening of the power of the law itself, which is supposed to govern everything, I wish to restore it to its appropriate previous status and only as far as is necessary for the administration of those areas subject to it. And to that end I demand from the Senate that it gather and present to Me a report of everything that constitutes its essential functions, rights and duties, with the repeal of everything that has hitherto been introduced that has abolished or weakened them. I intend to place the rights and privileges of the Governing Senate on an unshakable foundation, as State Law, and with

3 Complete Collection of Laws (C.C.L.), XXVI, No. 19,805 and No. 19,806.

the power given to Me by God I shall strive to strengthen, preserve and make it unshakable in perpetuity.’⁴

In the dedicated Supreme rescript addressed to Count Zavadovsky attached to the second decree, it was stated:

‘Having established the beginning and source of national blessings in unified law and having been convinced of the truth that all other measures can bring happy days in the State, yet one law can establish this forever, in the very first days of My Reign and at the first review of government administration, I have acknowledged it as necessary to verify the present situation of this department. I have always known that from the first publication of the Code until the present day... laws, passed down from the Legislative Power in various and often contradictory ways, and being published more on impulse than for general reasons of state, they could have neither integrity with each other, nor unity of intent, nor consistency in their enforcement. Hence the general confusion of the rights and duties of all, the ambiguity that engulfs both the Judge and the defendant, the impotence in the enforcement of laws, and the ease with which they are amended at the first breath of whim or autocracy. I always knew that the Code of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich itself, having been published more for Muscovy than for Russia, and more appropriate to the Russians of that time than for Russians in general, it could not have a complete and unchangeable effect neither in Our times, nor even in eras closer to its publication. Following its publication, at every step cases were discovered that were not covered in its composition and had not been defined in it. The newly-decreed so-called articles, with their additions demonstrated its imperfection on the one hand, while contradicting it in many places on the other, and by undermining its authority, it was obscured even more and placed it in the unknown when applying it in action, producing many arbitrary interpretations more harmful than the ambiguity itself. Peter the Great, at the very beginning of his transformation of Russia, revealed all these shortcomings and decided to correct them with a new Code. From that time on, you are aware of the efforts that have been made to improve the law in almost every reign. The commissions on this subject, which existed under various guises... for more than 80 years of almost continuous activity... have drafted plans in various departments, enacted projects, composed the Statutes themselves, suggested important amendments to those previously made and prepared new branches of jurisprudence.

... I had reason to believe that the present Commission had only to put them into use, to give them a connection and mutual relationship, and, having collected together the scattered parts of the legislature, to bring them into existence. Yet having delved more deeply into the routines of this place, to my regret I found its position to be very far removed from my hopes... I am sure that they were engaged in their work with all zeal and diligence, and succeeded in it as much as opportunity allowed; but these opportunities was placed within such narrow limits that the work of this Commission had neither a permanent leader directing them, nor unity in its acts, nor attention to its success... But considering that the material collected for this... must be preserved in the acts of this Commission and made known, I have the consolation of thinking that, using these principles, it is possible to find the shortest route to achieving this great aim, that in this heterogeneous mass of hypotheses, having given it form and unity, it should be possible to hope that relatively solid foundations for a better legal framework will arise from this.

... I entrust the full scope of this matter to you... In issuing this assignment, I consider it necessary to give you a brief outline of the way in which I consider it most appropriate to achieve success in this matter.

4 C.C.L. XXVI, No. 19,908.

1. Firstly... it is essential to determine its present state with certainty, to find out the limit at which it halted and from which it must now move on...
2. To scrutinise all plans for legislation...
3. Based on these plans, choose one of them, or compile a general summary from many on this part and submit it to me together with this plan...
4. ...
5. All parts that have been processed and are capable of being included in the implementation of this plan, after scrutinising them, if they are found to be complete, bring them to me...
6. Those parts begun and unfinished, as well as those for which the foundations have not yet been laid, the Commission shall be instructed to prepare them in accordance with the proposed summary.
7. If in these preparations there are cases for which there is no clear regulation in our laws.. (and so on)... we can extract exemplary laws from other nations, either those neighbouring us, or those better known for their academism or renowned for their best practise...
8. I consider it almost unnecessary to note here that the assumptions placed in the Mandate of my Beloved Grandmother, Empress Catherine II, contain the most select facts of this kind, and can shed great light for the activities of the Commission...
9. ... in drafting laws, one of the most essential concerns of the Commission must be the precise and unwavering definition of words and objects with clarity, simplicity and brevity of style in general. How many absurd interpretations of the law, arbitrary and contrary to reason have occurred, solely from obscurity of expression; from perhaps one superfluous or contrived word, how many times entire families have been ruined...⁵

Thus the emperor wished to bring the law to the forefront, because he acknowledged ‘there was no just government on earth that did not flow from the law’ and he felt himself ‘obliged first of all to supervise its implementation’ furthermore ‘in cases where others might be lenient, he would only be just.’

The establishment of the ministries in 1802:

Under these conditions, the question of reforming the organisation of central government administration was brought to the fore. During the discussions on the question of the rights of the Senate in the secret committee, the concept arose to entrust certain parts of the administration to responsible persons, who would be nominated as ministers.

At this time, the ministerial system of government dominated in France, which led Western Europe. Formed historically as the significance of royal power developed and expanded, it was not abolished even by the most extreme revolutionary governments of republican France, and with the seizure of power by the First Consul, General Bonaparte, it began to take on a harmonious and simple form, which ensured the proper regularity, agility and speed of action in the mechanism of state administration. This same system prevailed in Britain, although it had developed there in a different manner than in France. Naturally, it soon triumphed throughout Western Europe in general.

In Russia, the term ‘minister’ had originally been used under Peter the Great, but throughout the 18th century, the collegial system of organising central government administration prevailed. Under

⁵ C.C.L. XXVI, No. 19,904.

Catherine the Great, the principle of individuality in government began to gradually strengthen; there are already central governing bodies, which lacked only a proper, that is, a sufficiently developed organisation, because the principle of ministerial governance was already embodied in the person of the Procurator-General, which only later received a more correct organisation according to the French model.

Emperor Paul restored the abolished colleges; nevertheless, the individual principle of governance not only did not weaken, but also on the contrary, grew in strength and intensity. Firstly, the abolished colleges were not restored on the old basis. The main directors placed as the heads of these colleges communicated proposals and announced Supreme orders to them without participating in their meetings and became completely extraneous to the colleges and, moreover, superior to them; exploiting their right to report to the Tsar in person, they acquired overwhelming influence over him, diminishing the very essence of the collegial principle. Moreover, business from the main directors flowed into the office of the Procurator-General, who, as a result, gained even greater importance than he had enjoyed up to that time. Thus, Emperor Paul swiftly and ultimately prepared the implementation of a ministerial system of government in our country and even took the first steps in this direction, by separating the finance department⁶ and water communications⁷ from the Procurator-General's sphere of jurisdiction and establishing the ministries of appanages (in 1797) and commerce (in 1800).

Emperor Alexander, having the objective of establishing principles of justice and legitimacy in Russia, strove to create a system of government that would place him in the closest relationship to the administration and would establish a direct link between him and the executive agencies directly subordinate to him and answerable to him. All that remained for him was to continue the work of dividing up the administrative functions of the Procurator-General between individual ministers, to establish ministries for those branches of government that were not under the jurisdiction of the Procurator-General, to reorganise and bring the overall distribution of administrative functions into a coherent system between all ministers in general, and, finally, to create instructions such that they would unite the administration, controlling the activities of all state institutions and appointments, the organisation and scope of competence for which were not precisely determined by existing legal provisions.

The establishment of the new council did not have the importance that Troschchinsky had attached to it, because, despite its legislative powers, this council differed little from the previous councils that existed during the reign of Peter III and his two immediate successors. The entire strength of this institution resided in the chancery, divided into departments, which were, if not the prototype of the departments of the future state council, then at least a model according to which these departments could be created.

The Councillor of State M.M. Speransky, a future collaborator with the emperor during the impending reforms, was appointed as the Expeditor for civil and spiritual affairs, in whose opinion 'this establishment had not achieved its intended objective.' Indeed, the weakness and insipidity of the new institution could not bring order to the disrupted state administration. It soon became quite obvious that it was vital to go further.

The party of old functionaries wanted to restore the Senate to the status it had under Peter I and Elizabeth Petrovna, and to make it a legislative and executive institution. Novosiltsev, who had been assigned to report on this matter to the secret committee, spoke out against this, and in his opinion, the Senate should only be granted judicial powers, but in the broadest sense. He found support from the Emperor's other secret advisors. Eventually, the Tsar himself, agreeing with

6 The Expedition on State Revenues embraced every aspect of financial administration, at the head of which the State Treasurer, Count Vasiliev, was placed.

7 The Department of Water Communications, with Count Sievers at its head.

Novosiltsov's opinion, expressed, however, that the Senate should have some functions of executive power, and that its main purpose was to be a conservative institution, overseeing all judicial and executive powers of the empire and directing their activities.

The decree on the rights and duties of the Senate was drawn up on these principles, approved by the Tsar and issued on 8 [20] September 1802, by virtue of which:

1. The Senate is the Supreme seat of the Empire.
2. All government offices are subordinate to it.
3. Its power is limited only by the sole Supreme Authority of the Tsar.
4. Decrees from the Senate are to be executed by all as if they were His Imperial Majesty's own decrees.
5. Only the Tsar or His Personal Decree can halt the Senate's orders.
6. All His Imperial Majesty's personal decrees, except those subject to particular secrecy, must be submitted to the Senate from where they will be issued to all places and persons, and so on.⁸

It appeared that a significant part of the hopes of the old functionaries party had been realised. Yet, at the same time, a manifesto was issued on the establishment of ministries which, from their very first appearance, undermined the executive significance of the Senate.

When the foundations for this reform were being worked out by the secret committee, it was initially proposed to establish a single ministry, with its division into departments subordinate to individual ministers, but then this was considered inconvenient, in all likelihood, due to the fear that the head of such a single ministry would succumb to the temptation to accumulate power to excess. One way or another, it was considered expedient to establish several separate and independent ministries.

The manifesto on the establishment of the ministries stated:

The well-being of the nation, entrusted to our Sceptre by Providence most wise, is the sacred and most important objective that we have set for ourselves, having accepted the burden of reigning over the vast Russian Empire... Enthused with a zealous desire to find and use all appropriate methods for the quickest and most successful achievement of this objective so precious to our hearts, we have directed our attention to all the factors and circumstances that contribute to or hinder it; and after strict testing and comparison of each with the other, firmly convinced that the well-being of the people is unshakable and can only be inviolably affirmed once the Government has the restorative resources not only to correct every evident evil revealed by harmful consequences; but most particularly to eradicate their very origins, to avert all causes that could give rise to a violation of general and personal peace, to reveal the needs of the people, to rectify them, and *to prudently, diligently and actively promote the observance and establishment of the necessary order in everything...*⁹

Examples from ancient and modern times confirm to all that the more advantageous the means used for this purpose, and the more appropriate the principles of State Government, the more harmonious, firm and perfect is the entire political body, the more contented and happy is each member serving in it. Following this principle and the promptings of our hearts, following the great spirit of the reformer of Russia, Peter the Great, who left us the path of his wise intentions, along which his worthy successors have tried to walk, we have decided to divide State affairs into various departments, in accordance with their natural

⁸ C.C.L. XXVII, No. 20,405.

⁹ Italics added.

links to each other, and for this course best to succeed, to entrust them to the direction of the ministers selected by us, restoring to them the first principles by which they should be guided in the fulfilment of all that the office will require of them, and the loyalty, activity and diligence for the common good which we expect from them. We assign the duty of scrutinising the actions of the ministers in all areas of their entrusted administration to the Governing Senate... as most important and most appropriate to this highest office, and, after due comparison and consideration of these with State decrees and with reports that have reached the Senate directly from all, to draw their conclusions and present them to us in a report. By establishing the ministry on such principles, we have the flattering hope that it will be successful for us... in bringing all parts of the State administration into a sound and appropriate structure according to our intentions...

1. The Administration of State Affairs shall be split into eight departments, each of which, containing all the elements essential to it, shall constitute an independent ministry and shall be under the direct control of a minister... These departments shall be as follows:
 - a. Military Land Forces.
 - b. Naval Forces.
 - c. Foreign Affairs, for which matters shall be handled by the first State Collegia.
 - d. Department of Justice.
 - e. Internal Affairs.
 - f. Finance.
 - g. Commerce.
 - h. Public Education.
2. The first three State Collegia, the Military, the Admiralty and Foreign Affairs, shall each be under the jurisdiction of its own Minister, who is also to administer all the offices and business dependent upon it.
9. Every minister must maintain continuous communications with all the offices under his direction and be informed of all business carried out therein. Therefore, each office is obliged to send weekly memoranda to its minister on all current affairs, and on difficult matters, or rather those requiring a solution, and special petitions. The minister, having considered every matter for the benefit and advantage of the entire department entrusted to him, should he find it necessary, is to make his comments, while giving decisive answers to petitions, and both the latter and the former are to be forwarded as proposals. Should these offices not concur with the minister's comments on their memoranda, then they are to present their relevant reasoning to him. Yet in the event the minister insists that matters be carried out according to his comments, despite their secondary submission, then the opinions of those present shall be recorded in the log, and the matter executed.
10. Should the power of a minister in any matter... not permit him to resolve the doubts of offices or officials under his jurisdiction, or to avoid any... disadvantage... to the area entrusted to him, or any consequences that block the path to bringing something to an improved condition; in these cases, the minister, having conceived a suitable solution for overcoming such difficulties, shall come to us with a report from which the composition of the method he proposes, the factors obliging him to propose it, and finally the benefits that should arise from it must be clear... should we acknowledge the solution proposed by him as viable... then we, having personally approved this, shall return our minister's report to him for implementation and announcement to the Governing Senate for scrutiny... Should the

method presented by him in the report manifest an associated repeal of existing law, or will require new legislation, then we shall order the minister... to draft a decree, which, with our signature and the countersignature of this, our minister, shall be announced to the Governing Senate, as established by this order.

11. Each minister, before submitting such a report to us, must first present it to the other ministers for proper consideration with every state department under their jurisdiction; in the event of a violation of this procedure, that we have given the force of law, any minister has the right to make the relevant representation to us.
12. Each of the ministers at the end of the year must submit a written report to us on the administration of every department entrusted to him, via the Governing Senate, excluding from them matters specifically subject to secrecy...
13. The Governing Senate, having examined this report in the presence of the minister himself, is to demand explanations from him whenever the need arises, is to compare his testimony with the reports directly from offices... delivered during that year, scrutinises every decree issued by us in that year regarding his department, as well as reports confirmed by us and announced by this minister to the Governing Senate; and finally... they are to come to us with a report and present said report by the minister together with their views on the administration and state of affairs entrusted to him.
14. Should the Senate see, even before the end of the year... that abuses have crept into any department, or that matters with which it is concerned are being conducted in a disorderly or unlawful manner: in such cases the Senate must... immediately demand an explanation from the minister of that department, and if his response is considered unsatisfactory, then they are to submit a report in this regard to us.
15. All ministers are members of the Council and are to be present in the Senate. This Council shall not proceed to consider cases except in the presence of at least five ministers, among whom must be the minister from whose department the case is to be handled. Routine matters shall be dealt with by a Committee composed solely of them; the other members of the Council shall meet once a week for matters of particular importance...
18. The ministers must begin to form their Chancelleries immediately, establish the order of proceedings that are to come before them, and compose staffing for them; and having completed all this within three months, submit it to us for approval.
19. However, in order that nothing should prevent the ministers from immediately assuming their positions, it is ordered that each of them is to form a temporary Chancellery for themselves from officials from the departments which are under his direct control.¹⁰

At the same time as the publication of this Manifesto, a 'directed' decree was issued to the Senate on leaving the first three State Collegia 'in the manner of conducting state affairs on the previous basis' and on the appointment of specially selected persons to ministerial appointments.¹¹

In addition to the eight departments of state affairs mentioned above, there were also the following independent departments: the department of religion for the Orthodox Church not mentioned in the manifesto; the department of the state treasurer and the department of educational institutions entrusted to the care of Empress Maria Feodorovna mentioned in it; however, the state treasurer, in some respects, was indirectly dependent on the Minister of Finance.

¹⁰ C.C.L. XXVII, No. 20,406.

¹¹ C.C.L. XXVII, No. 20,409.

The Committee of Ministers:

The new ministries differed little from the main directorate and the ministry of commerce that had existed during the reign of Emperor Paul. They represented an agglomeration of individual institutions, each of which operated independently. The ministers were not integral to the collegia or other institutions that they directed, which even retained their own clerical procedures, but stood, as it were, external to them, not directly administering their departments.

At the same time, the limits and extent of the ministers' authority, their inter-departmental relations, as well as their relations with embassies, were not defined with sufficient completeness, clarity or precision.

The above-mentioned duties of the Senate in relation to ministers soon became unenforceable, because there were no persons in the Senate familiar with the details of state administration in general or with its individual departments in particular. The reporting by ministers to the Senate soon turned into a mere formal ritual, mainly because the ministers acted, for the most part, in accordance with Supreme orders, which the Senate, of course, had no right to scrutinise. Moreover, after a few years this reporting was abolished completely, and with this the last vestiges of the Senate's controlling power over ministers were destroyed. At the same time, the Council could also not be a supervisory body over the ministers and did not unify the administration; little by little, it completely ceased to deal with administrative matters, and turned to the supreme judicial authority for litigation and, overall, quickly slid into decline. As a result of all this, a committee of ministers began to emerge, into which matters from every department of the ministerial administration flowed.¹²

According to the original plan, it had been intended to arrange for two types of report from ministers to the Tsar: individual and collective; and collective reports were to be issued from a general assembly of ministers, which was referred to as the Committee. Thus, the Committee of Ministers was not initially given the significance of a permanent institution; but since neither the Council nor the Senate could unite and direct the administration, many matters began to be sent to the general assembly of ministers, and the Committee accrued the significance of a permanent institution, which actually became superior to all other supreme state institutions.

This was facilitated by the Tsar's tours abroad between 1805 and 1808. In 1805, the Committee was entrusted with temporary governance of the state, and was given the right, in urgent matters, to implement its decisions, while in 1808, the Tsar granted the Committee the right to resolve, under its own responsibility (by all members), such matters that were reliant solely on a Supreme decision. Upon the Tsar's return from Erfurt, the scope of the Committee's activities was slightly reduced yet, in any case, its significance did not decline. Thus, the Committee acquired the character not only of a supreme executive institution, but also of a supreme legislative and even, in part, judicial institution, to which both the Council and the Senate deferred.

Overall, the reform of the central administration carried out in 1802 was a compromise between the old collegial system under Peter the Great and new French style bureaucratic procedures. The Council, as an institution, was too weak and undefined; the Senate was in fact merely judicial; the ministries had dual organisations, either collegial or bureaucratic of the European type; the Committee of Ministers had acquired *de facto* primary significance, but the law did not define it as a permanent institution, with a fixed organisation and a corresponding range of activities.

This partial reform, having been executed, satisfied no one. The concept of continuing the reforms was natural. Firstly, the abolition of the Collegia began by turning them into ministerial departments. As early as 1803, the Minister of Internal Affairs, Count Kochubey, presented the Tsar

12 Historical review of the activities of the Committee of Ministers, compiled by S.M. Seredonin, St. Petersburg, 1902, Volume 1.

with a report, in the drafting of which Speransky also participated, and in which all the disadvantages of 'the laborious collegial rites' were exposed, and the bureaucratic principle was put forward as an indispensable condition for good governance. In the light of the proposals from this report, the Ministry of Internal Affairs was immediately reformed: the collegial structures disappeared from it, and the former independent elements were merged with the department, forming its 'expeditions.' On a similar basis, two years later, partial changes were made in the structure of the Department of the Navy, and then less radical changes began in the other ministries.

At the same time, by October 1809, on the instructions of the Tsar, Speransky had drafted an organic plan for the reform of the structures of state for the empire, the basis of which were Montesquieu's teachings on the separation of the main powers of the state; legislative, executive and judicial, which should be entrusted to individual institutions operating independently of one another. According to this plan, which subsequently received further development, legislative power belonged to the sphere of activity of the lawyer-attorney class, who were to be in charge of the most important government affairs and received the designation Council of State; executive power was to belong to the ministers, under the control of the Governing Senate, while the ministries were to receive a more uniform organisation, imbued exclusively with the bureaucratic principle; finally, judicial affairs were intended to be entrusted to the Judicial Senate.

The highest state affairs had to flow into a dedicated secret institution called the Cabinet and 'received their supreme enactment' therein.¹³

The Council of State in 1810:

Speransky's plan was only partially implemented. On 1 [13] January 1810, Emperor Alexander solemnly opened the newly formed Council of State, set up 'to establish and spread uniformity and order in state administration' and since 'order and uniformity of state affairs require that there be one centre for their general consideration' the new Council was intended to form such a centre.¹⁴

On 25 July [6 August] 1810, a new division of affairs of state in the executive into five elements was promulgated, each of which was entrusted to one or several ministries, depending on its scope and the nature of the business:¹⁵

1. External relations - to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
2. Ensuring external security - to the War and Naval ministries.
3. State Economy - to the ministries of Internal Affairs, Public Education and Finance, the State Treasury, the Audit of State Accounts and the Main Directorate for Lines of Communications.
4. Courts - to the Ministry of Justice.
5. Internal security - to the Ministry of Police.

In addition, the Main Directorate of Religious Affairs for Various Confessions was attached to the ministries.

The general establishment of ministries in 1811:

Soon thereafter, together with the manifesto of 25 June [7 July] 1811 the government issued a General Manual for Ministries, consisting of two parts:

1. The General Formation of Ministries, which determined their direction, composition and

13 N.K. Shilder, Emperor Alexander I, his life and reign, St. Petersburg, 1897, Volume III; Collection of the Imperial Russian Historical Society, St. Petersburg, 1894, Volume XC.

14 C.C.L. XXXI, No. 24,064.

15 C.C.L. XXXI, No. 24,307, No. 24,326.

procedures for conducting business.

2. General Instructions for the Ministries, determining the degree and limits of the authority of ministers, their relationship to higher, equal and lower offices, and accountability.¹⁶

The ministries, as organs of executive authority ‘in procedures for the strength of the state, represent the institutions by which supreme executive power acts on all parts of the administration.’ Ministers were directly subordinate to the supreme authority. The essence of their power belonged exclusively ‘to the executive process.’ Legislative and judicial powers were completely removed from the competence of the ministries.

In the sphere described above, the ministries were obliged, ‘through continuous action and supervision, to ensure the speedy and precise implementation of laws and instructions’ and also ‘to compel all offices and persons subordinate to them to comply with laws and instructions.’ From this essence the following powers flowed:

1. The right to determine, dismiss, remove and bring to trial.
2. The duty to supervise the operation of subordinate rights and persons.
3. The right to resolve difficulties encountered in the implementation of laws.
4. Taking measures necessary for the enforcement of laws or instructions once they were approved and addressed to the minister for implementation.
5. In cases of emergency, the right to act by any means, without waiting for permission, when the consequence of inaction could be serious harm to the state.

The ministers were given the right to submit the need for new laws or instructions to the Council of State, or the repeal of previous ones (the legislative initiative); their relations with the Senate and the Committee of Ministers were characterised by the fact that the subject of these relations did not presuppose any new law or instruction, but simply required a single general process for the execution of adopted regulations or their uniform application to specific cases.

Therefore, all the real power of governance was concentrated in the minister; he also gave direction to every activity by his ministry, while a number of supporting agencies were established under him in order to execute the activities of governance, some of which were advisory in nature, while others had to prepare matters subject to the decision of the minister, and the execution of his orders. Because the arena of affairs of state under the jurisdiction of a ministry may be divided into several distinct types, then, for their directions and administration, completely independent and self-sufficient agencies were created within the ministry, the combined activities of which were united in the person of the minister himself. These independent elements of the ministry emerged as departments that were entrusted to directors responsible for the precise execution of everything established by laws, statutes and instructions. On the same basis, departments were divided into sections, and sections into desks (headed by section heads and desk heads).

The institutions directly under a minister included:

1. The Office of the Minister, which had the character of a general executive body.
2. The Minister’s Council, consisting of his colleagues and departmental directors, as well as specialist consultants, which had the status of an advisory body and could serve as a corrective to possible instinctive reactions or poorly thought through ministerial orders.

Similar advisory bodies were established under departmental directors from among the section heads and consultants invited at the discretion of the director, under the name of ‘general assemblies.’ The views of the council were not binding on the minister, but in cases where a matter

16 C.C.L. XXXI, No. 24,686.

considered by the council was submitted by the minister to higher authorities, he was obliged to set out the views of the council in his submission and then give his own opinion.

The establishment of ministerial councils, with the broad participation of experts, was a logical progression from that part of Speransky's plan which was not put into practice; in that part of it which was implemented, the beginnings of centralisation and bureaucracy were emerging, with all their positive and negative aspects, yet since perfection in life is impossible, then, when the circumstances that caused Speransky's fall arose, it became inevitable to move in a direction opposite to that which Speransky considered it vital to take.

According to Speransky's project, in conjunction with other reforms, the Committee of Ministers was to be abolished. Meanwhile, in the spring of 1812, Speransky was removed from his post and expelled from the capital, while in the summer of that same year, the Patriotic War began, in the face of which everything faded into the background and it absorbed all of Emperor Alexander's strength; the wars of 1813 and 1814 followed on and the sessions of the Congress of Vienna, which ended in 1815, which were the reasons for the absence of the Tsar. The role of the institution 'with specific authority over all matters of state administration' in general fell to the lot of the Committee of Ministers once more; the objects of the Committee's activities and its powers were defined in the same way as in the Regulation of 1808, but its organisation received even greater stability:

1. A dedicated chairman was appointed, Field Marshal Count Saltykov, in whom the Tsar at that time had particular trust.
2. In addition to ministers and directors of ministries, the Commander-in-Chief in the capital, Vyazmitinov and the chairmen of the departments of the Council of State, and such like, were appointed members of the Committee.

The Committee also occasionally had to exercise judgment on strategic and disciplinary matters. Thus, back in 1808, Count Arakcheev had authorised the publication of reports on military operations in Finland and submitted them to the Committee; when Count Buxhoeveden concluded a truce with the enemy, the Committee, in the name of the Tsar, ordered him to break the truce and move Tuchkov up immediately in order to sever the line of retreat of the remnants of Klingspor's army. In 1812, following the occupation of Mitau [Jelgava] by the French, the Committee, in the name of the Tsar, assigned command of all forces that were to assemble in St. Petersburg 'in the event of an urgent need to defend the capital' to Count Golenishchev-Kutuzov.

The Committee of Ministers organised individual meetings or specific committees as necessary 'in order to consider matters requiring dedicated time.' Since the Patriotic War demanded enormous resources, the Finance Committee, which considered matters that required 'the greatest secrecy' and received similar rights to those granted to the Committee of Ministers, was of particular importance. Nevertheless, the Committee of Ministers was not exempt from the duty of locating funding for unanticipated military expenses, which was associated with incredible difficulties. In the sphere of military affairs proper, the main work of the Committee of Ministers was focused on reconstituting army manpower and resupplying them with every necessity, and from 1812 to 1814 it was also necessary to administer the delivery of provisions to the active army.

The Tsar was dissatisfied with the actions for the provision of rations to the army during the war of 1812. Prince A.I. Gorchakov, who headed the Ministry of War, and Secretary of State Molchanov, who directed the agenda for the Committee of Ministers, were put on trial. Count Arakcheev, who had been appointed 'to report and supervise the affairs of the Committee whenever Prince N.I. Saltykov's health prevented him from appearing in person' had to restore order to the clerical procedures.

The changing nature of Russia's system of government following the Napoleonic Wars:

The Tsar was only present at the Committee of Ministers himself in the first years after its formation (before 1806), as a result of which the verbal reports by ministers evolved, over time, into written reports. Following the end of the Napoleonic wars, this procedure was preserved in peacetime, that is, it became the norm; moreover, apart from the chairmen, only one member of the committee, Count Arakcheev, who held a completely exclusive post, reported to the Tsar on the affairs of the Committee. The Tsar would read brief extracts from the Committee's logs; Arakcheev's views served as a confirmation of the Committee's positions.

Thus, Arakcheev became the sole permanent rapporteur for the Tsar on matters of state administration and retained this position until the end of the reign of Emperor Alexander. Before he took up this post, the Committee, which had overshadowed the activities of both the Council of State and the Senate, significantly diminished the power of individual ministers, not only by the fact that the Supreme orders they requested were discussed by the Collegia, but also because, thanks to them, the personal reports by ministers to the Tsar were greatly reduced; from the time Count Arakcheev assumed the said post, he overshadowed the Committee of Ministers, not to mention individual ministers.



Sergey Kuzmich Vyazmitinov

CHAPTER 2.

The First Decade Of Emperor Alexander's Reign.

The higher military administration during the reign of Emperor Alexander I and the Minister and Ministry of Land Armed Forces:

In accordance with the general course of the reforms carried out in the first years of the reign of Emperor Alexander, the formation of the Ministry of Military Land Forces should have been limited to the establishment of the post of minister; in all other respects, the military administration remained in its previous form.¹ The direction of the affairs of the Military Collegium was entrusted to the vice-president of said collegium, member of the Council and Senator, General-of-Infantry Vyazmitinov, with the rights and title of Minister of Military Ground Forces. In 1803, a dedicated department was established under the minister,² in which all initial considerations on military administrative matters were to be made.

The creation of a single central authority in the person of the minister was, apparently, intended to establish a direct link between the Tsar and the army and, at the same time, to give the entire military administration more agility and speed, but, in reality, it did not essentially change the process of governance that had already been established long before, because the Military Collegium, as one of the three first state collegia, had already managed to establish direct and close relations with the supreme authority in the 18th century, in the person of its president, who had the right to report directly to the Tsar.

The changes that took place in the composition of the higher military administration in the first decade after the establishment of the ministries tended mainly towards the assimilation of those departments of military administration that had not yet managed to become part of the ministry, and then towards a more correct distribution and demarcation between the 'expeditions' of the military board of directors from various elements of the military establishment.

Within the Ministry of Land Forces itself, the distribution of control over the various elements of the military establishment was subject to the following changes:

1. In order to streamline the direction of the engineering and artillery departments, in 1802, the artillery expedition was divided into two completely independent and autonomous institutions, the Artillery Expedition and Engineering Expedition; the former, having at its head the Inspector-General of all Artillery, was to be exclusively in charge of artillery matters, while the latter, being under the control of the inspector of 'the entire engineering department' was to be in charge of the engineering establishments, the construction of fortifications, and so on.³
2. The provisioning and commissariat departments were merged in 1805 through the establishment of the post of Intendant-General of the Army, who was entrusted with the direction of both of these departments and the chairmanship of the corresponding expeditions of the military collegium.⁴

In the same year of 1805, a Supreme Command was issued on the transfer of army medical services, hospitals and all institutions that were dependent on military establishments, from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Land Forces; in order to manage this element, a

1 See above and C.C.L. XXVII, No. 20,406.

2 C.C.L. XXVII, No. 20,582; This department was under the jurisdiction of a director, to whom three expeditors and several clerks reported, together with assistants.

3 C.C.L. XXVII, No. 23,482.

4 C.C.L. XXVII, No. 21,833.

medical expedition was established as part of the Military Collegium, as the head of which a General-Staff-Doctor was appointed.⁵ Moreover, the composition of the ministry was increased in 1808 through the addition of His Majesty's Military Field Chancellery and the *Feldjäger* Corps [military couriers].⁶

The scope of the activities of the Minister of Military Land Forces was extremely broad; a vast number of matters were concentrated in his hands, not only more or less significant, but also small and unimportant ones, which, in any case, distracted his attention from the higher activities of state governance, and in the meantime he did not have an assistant similar to those that some others had in the person of a deputy. It soon became clear in practise that there was a need for a corresponding second for the Minister of War, as a result of which, in 1808, the post of Duty General to the Minister of War was established,⁷ as a personal assistant to said minister 'for those matters which the Minister himself shall instruct him to carry out.' The scope of the activities of the duty general were determined by the fact that 'military combat units, the timely resupply of forces with whatever was needed, their organisation, and military hospitals' constituted the main occupation of the Minister, who, in order to become more closely acquainted with the state and needs of the army, could send the duty general to inspect formations and hospitals. The duty general was answerable to the Minister for the department, His Majesty's Military Field Chancellery, the Inspector-General's Office and the Medical Expedition in relation to ensuring that written matters were processed in accordance with the rules issued by the minister and were always kept in order. All military units moving from one place to another were subordinate to the Duty General. He was obliged to know the current state of the local commissariat and provisioning magazines, and to anticipate these in accordance with the needs of the troops. He could take part in sessions of the Military Collegium only on the specific orders of the minister for each occasion, but had the right to be present on the following 'expeditions': Commissariat, Provisioning, Engineering and Artillery, and also in their depots, and to inspect the procedures therein. The duty general was accompanied by: a field officer, as his assistant, standing in for him in case of his absence; two aides-de-camp and a chief auditor (as were divisional commanders), and a chancellery for clerical work.

The above changes notwithstanding, the Permanent Council on Military Schools was formed in 1805 for the main direction of all military educational institutions, as part of the supreme military directorate, under the chairmanship of Tsarevich Konstantin Pavlovich, which held a position that was completely independent and autonomous from the higher military authorities and in which the Minister of Land Forces was only included as a member.⁸

Minister of War Count Arakcheev:

Thus, the Ministry of Land Forces gradually adopted an internal organisation that corresponded to the differences in the types and nature of business under its jurisdiction, and great strides were made in the unification of the administration in every part of the army. Not everything that was necessary had been done in this regard, despite the fact that, on the departure of Vyazmitinov, Count Arakcheev had been appointed to the post of minister at the beginning of 1808, who, thanks to the trust the Tsar had in him, was able to implement what others had shied away from. Back at the end of 1807, the Military Collegium had been instructed: that 'Supreme Orders announced by General-of-Artillery Count Arakcheev are to be considered our personal decrees'⁹ while in January 1808, by virtue of the decree issued to the same collegium, 'to better communicate matters' Supreme Orders

5 C.C.L. XXVIII, No. 21,866, No. 21,870 & No. 21,955.

6 C.C.L. XXX, No. 21,783.

7 C.C.L. XXX, No. 23,078 (Instructions to the Duty General and Staff).

8 C.C.L. XXVIII, No. 21,685; Lalaev, Historical Essay On Military Educational Institutions, I, 131-133; A. Dobrovolsky, The Basic Principles Of The Organisation Of Central Military Control In Russia And In Major Western European States, 105.

9 C.C.L. XXIX, No. 22,715.

‘regarding the War Department’ were only to be announced to the Military Collegium for execution by the Minister of War;¹⁰ Thus it was ordered that all communiques and any correspondence was to be referred to the Minister of Land Forces.

It cannot be denied that Count Arakcheev contributed greatly to the implementation of the above-mentioned improvements in the sphere of higher military administration, especially in relation to restoring order to almost everything that had been in a more or less disordered or unstable state before him. His activities affected almost every part of military command and control and all parts of the department entrusted to him, but it cannot be said that they extended to these elements to such a degree that would elevate their relative importance in the overall group of military institutions that made up the state military system. The combat arms, the timely resupply of formations with every necessity, their organisation, and that of military hospitals constituted the ‘main occupations’ of the Minister of War, as determined by Count Arakcheev. It may be that all parts of the department entrusted to him could have been brought under one or another heading of this definition in accordance with the correlation of matters, the necessity of which was recognised by Count Arakcheev, but to achieve this a sufficiently broad vision was needed, and a sufficiently broad and sufficiently profound understanding of military affairs was essential. From Count Arakcheev’s related activities, it is not evident that he possessed such a broad outlook and such an understanding of the business entrusted to his care. Why was he appointed to these matters? The answer to this question can be found in one of the Supreme Decrees from this same year, 1808:

Experiences of past military operations have convinced me of the justice of the view that strict discipline is the essence of military service, that the slightest relaxation by a commander is the very origin of disorder in the whole, and that elements of it, weakening little by little from this source, eventually bring consequences with them which neither authority nor wisdom are able to end immediately. These factors were the cause of the lack of obedience by juniors to their seniors, rivalries between the seniors,¹¹ and eventually the resurgence of marauders, who have caused such serious harm to the entire army...¹²

The commander-in-chief, appointed under such conditions, had been given the necessary powers by the Tsar and charged with the duty of using them ‘to maintain good order, discipline and subordination among the troops’ while the Minister of War was to carry out a similar mission in relation to all units, institutions and establishments within the department entrusted to him.

Once this task had been brought to the fore, everything that was hindering its successful resolution had to be destroyed, and everything, even if it was extremely important, yet was not directly related to the resolution of this same mission, had to remain in the shadows.

10 C.C.L. XXX, No. 22,756 & No. 23,111.

11 This is probably referring to the personality clash between Buxhoeveden and his senior general in the army, Bennigsen, during the 1807 campaign (see below).

12 C.C.L. XXX, No. 22,761; Directed Decree to General-of-Infantry Count Buxhoeveden (dated 20 January [1 February] 1808).



Alexey Andreevich Arakcheev

CHAPTER 3.

His Imperial Majesty's Suite of the Quartermasters Department under Quartermaster-General, General P.K. van Suchtelen:

Emperor Alexander, attaching such great importance to the correct resolution of issues related to the sphere of government, including military affairs, could not help but understand the correspondingly important significance of the correct stance, organisation and preparation of the supporting agencies of higher command and control. His well-known attitude towards Count Arakcheev did not prevent him from putting forward two personalities distinguished by completely different qualities, thanks to whom it became possible to improve once again and in many respects elevate the most important of these supporting agencies, His Majesty's Suite of the Quartermasters Department. These were Pëtr Kornilovich van Suchtelen and Prince Pëtr Mikhailovich Volkonsky.

P.K. van Suchtelen was born in 1759 in the Dutch Republic and became an engineer there; he entered Russian service as an engineer lieutenant colonel in 1783. He was one of the most learned men of his time; he was well versed in languages: Greek, Latin, French, German, Dutch and Russian, had extensive knowledge of military and mathematical sciences, in the history of literature, and so on. Having entered Russian service, he carried out various assignments in the engineering department, participated in the war with Sweden from 1788 to 1790 and was promoted to major general for distinction shown. Following this war, Suchtelen was entrusted with the following duties: inspecting and repairing all existing fortifications on the Swedish border, drawing up projects for new construction along this same border, and chairing the commission that was tasked with collating all existing plans, maps, and route cards following the Finnish campaign. During these studies, Suchtelen had the opportunity of familiarising himself with the General Staff of that time, its needs and deficiencies. In 1799 he was already a general-of-engineers, and in 1800, in view of the possibility of war with Britain, he was placed at the head of a corps that was to defend the coast of the White Sea; he did not hesitate to travel around the coast and drafted the essential projects. On 31 July [12 August] 1801, Suchtelen was appointed Quartermaster-General, after which he began to reorganise His Majesty's Suite of the Quartermasters Department at a time when it was already clear that this suite was preparing to rise from the disadvantageous situation in which it had found itself in the final years of the 18th century: a visible sign of this was the Tsar's granting to the Suite, soon after his accession to the throne (20 May [1 June] 1801), of a smart uniform with unique embroidery (the design of which was preserved into the 20th century on the collar and cuffs of the uniform of our general staff),¹ which was evidence of the imminent reform of the Suite into a completely separate, independent institution.

Improvements to the composition of the Suite and the qualifications required of members of the Quartermasters Department:

The activities of P.K. Suchtelen were aimed primarily at attracting the most educated and capable men to the Suite and creating good surveyors and cartographers from them, who were in fact an urgent necessity. At that time, the need for the participation of officers of the Quartermasters Department in peacetime employment with units was not yet recognised, and yet familiarity with the ground should have constituted their main specialisation; it was possible to prepare them for this through surveying, which was all the more appropriate since it provided abundant material for our nascent cartography.

1 The uniform was of a similar cut, made of dark green cloth with red stamen lining, but with black velvet cuffs and collar, on which there was gold embroidery in addition to red piping; the tails had red turn-backs, with black velvet piping; brass buttons in two rows; a gold aiguillette; waistcoat; deer-skin breeches; riding boots; black silk neck-cloth; hat without braid, with a black cockade and a feather plume. C.C.L. XXVI, No. 19,879; Glinetsky, I, 168-169 & 399.

Suchtelen, firstly considered it necessary to increase the manning of the Suite, in accordance with the presented needs, without being constrained by any establishment limits, and then to ensure the proper staffing of the Suite with fully trained young men, bearing in mind that it lacked junior ranks most of all, lieutenants and sub-lieutenants, while in the event of wartime needs it would be necessary to augment them with combatant officers who were not at all trained in quartermaster duties.

In the first years of his administration, Suchtelen replenished the Suite with officers who had served in the former General Staff and in various other departments, made an attempt to select officers for service in the Suite from among sub-lieutenant graduates from the 1st Cadet Corps, and eventually settled on making Column Leaders the sole source of staffing for the Suite.

With regard to officers accepted into the Suite, Suchtelen was guided by them having sufficient mathematical knowledge to carry out surveying; engineering officers were selected in the main, with preference given to foreigners; this latter factor was not without consequence in the overall accumulation of reasons causing or contributing to the strengthening of the noticeable unpopularity of the Quartermasters Department at unit level at the time.

Training for Column Leaders:

In relation to Column Leaders, Suchtelen's concept was to accept young men with a good general education into the Suite, give them specialised training, and then promote them to officer rank upon successful completion of their studies, earlier than they could be commissioned anywhere else in the department. Most of those enlisted as Column Leaders entered service at the age of 16 to 18, but there were 15 and even 12 year olds.

The Column Leaders who were accepted into service were partly assigned to surveying, but were mostly assembled in St. Petersburg, at the 'Depot' of the Suite of the Quartermasters Department, where the direction of their studies was entrusted to Lieutenant Colonel von Vitzthum,² one of the most learned and educated men of his time, who exerted a very positive influence on the youth entrusted to him. He taught the Column Leaders geometry, field fortification and draughtsmanship; examinations on these subjects, were carried out periodically in the presence of the Quartermaster-General himself and, on the basis of these tests, the most successful Column Leaders were commissioned as officers, not being constrained by age or even length of service;³ however, most were promoted to officer rank after two years of training.⁴

P.K. Suchtelen knew how to find capable men and grant them the opportunity; thus, not to mention his own son P.P. Suchtelen, he recruited F.F. Schubert, Harting and others to serve in the Quartermasters Department; he also brought K.I. Tenner out from complete obscurity, who later became an outstanding military officer of the General Staff, and who, aside from this, acquired great fame for his work in geodetics.

Surveyors and topographers, and those who did not have these qualifications:

Suchtelen succeeded in training a significant number of men with an aptitude for geodetic and topographic work; thanks to his activity, by the beginning of the hostile clash between Russia and Napoleonic France, our army had been provided with a relatively large corps of officers in the Quartermasters Department. By the beginning of 1804, this corps consisted of: five generals, 39

2 He was of Saxon heritage but was brought up in Russia. He entered service in 1783 as a private in the Lifeguard Horse Regiment; from 1788 he served in the Engineer Corps, and from 1801 in the Suite.

3 Thus, the following were promoted to sub-lieutenant: Lyutinsky after two months of service as a Column Leader, having joined as a sub-ensign from the Preobrazhensky Regiment, and Count V.I. Apraksin, P.P. Suchtelen, and F.F. Schubert after eight months of similar service.

4 Those who were less successful were promoted to ensign in the line or even graduated as non-commissioned officers.

field officers, 62 subalterns and 45 Column Leaders; the number of the latter would soon reach 60. Promotion in rank was done for distinction, across the board, but without specific rules. The absence of posts for staff-captains in the Quartermasters Department and the promotion of Column Leaders directly to sub-lieutenant constituted a very significant service advantage in the Suite, and attracted ambitious and distinguished youth to it which could not help but be reflected in its qualitative composition in the sense of its improvements. But these improvements would only become apparent in the future; for now, it was necessary to take into account the diversity of the composition of the Suite, which was divided into three categories:

1. Officers who had served in Catherine's former General Staff and were accepted into the Suite during the reign of Emperor Paul.
2. Foreigners.
3. Suchtelen's young proteges.

The highest posts were occupied by men who had begun their service under Catherine II and had been partly schooled in military matters in the Turkish and Polish wars, while others were completely devoid of combat experience; only a few had taken part in the campaign of 1799 under Suvorov's command; finally, some of them had spent the entirety of Emperor Paul's reign in retirement. In general, these were men who, although they had considerable talent, were not up to the task of their assignments under the new developments in the combat situation: some men were notable for their personal bravery in the absence of a breadth of vision and an insufficient level of education, others for their clerical efficiency in the absence or lack of combat experience and specialised operational training, others for their more or less strong connections while caring exclusively about their personal affairs to the detriment of the interests of the service, and so on.

Of the subalterns, only a few had begun their service in the 18th century; the majority belonged to the younger generation and were distinguished by excellent training, if not in the military, then at least in general education; among them there were also highly educated men, but they lacked familiarity with the troops and combat experience. Moreover, their activities during peacetime were to a certain extent one-dimensional, which was largely a consequence of the direction given to the Quartermasters Department by General Suchtelen.

The survey and its output, and the consolidation of the direction of surveying and cartographic works:

Having appreciated the importance of the state survey and well understanding that it could only be of due use if it were carried out correctly and in a systematic manner, he made every effort to give it these characteristics.

Soon after his appointment as Quartermaster-General, Suchtelen was entrusted with the director-generalship of His Majesty's Own Map Depot, while on 23 October [4 November] 1802, he was appointed 'inspector of the entire engineering department.'⁵ This consolidation of three institutions into the hands of one person, that had previously been engaged in surveying and cartographic work evidently had an influence on the success of this task. Indeed, from the very first years of the 19th century, these works benefitted from noticeably successful development; whereupon they were temporarily interrupted by war, but then were resumed with renewed energy as soon as the circumstances were favourable. In 1811, in view of the impending struggle with Napoleon, the large state survey was stopped completely, which then resumed, under different circumstances following the end of this struggle.

Mapping:

By the beginning of the 19th century, the Map Depot had already managed to prepare several large

5 C.C.L. XXVII, No. 20,482.

and, for their day, good maps; they had also undertaken the extensive work of compiling the 'hundred-sheet map'⁶ to whose speedy completion Suchtelen had paid full attention. As he was compiling this map, he found very important deficiencies in it, due to the small number of correctly identified locations, and also due to the inadequacy of the sources for its compilation. In view of this, he began to strive to disseminate astronomical and generally related knowledge, both among the officers of the Quartermasters Department and among the ranks serving in the Map Depot; this also explains the development of survey work that proceeded under him.

Dissemination of astronomical and other knowledge:

In relation to the dissemination of astronomical and other knowledge, Suchtelen found an extremely active and useful assistant in the person of academician F.I. Schubert, to whom he entrusted the training of officers from the Quartermasters Department for geodetic work. From 1802 to 1805, seven field officers and subalterns of the Quartermasters Department were taught astronomy by him; in addition, he trained an excellent mathematician and surveyor in the person of his son, F. F. Schubert, who, in 1803, was assigned by him to serve as a Column Leader, and in the winter of 1803 to 1804 had already been sent to Polotsk with Lieutenant Teslev 2nd in order to determine the latitude and longitude of this city, and to observe a solar eclipse, for which he was promoted to sub-lieutenant in the Suite, at the age of 15. This was the first astronomical expedition undertaken using the new methods proposed by the same academician Schubert.

Astronomical and topographic works:

Of the subsequent works of a similar nature, the following deserve attention:

1. The determination of the astronomical positions of various points on the eastern and southern shores of the White Sea, Lake Onega and Lake Ladoga, also carried out by Teslev and Schubert.
2. Similar determination of various points along the shores of the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Riga.
3. The work of the great astronomical expedition that accompanied Golovkin's embassy to China.

The astronomical element of this embassy was under the direction of academician Schubert and consisted of one field officer and five subalterns from the Quartermasters Department and one Column Leader; the embassy left St. Petersburg in the spring of 1805, and the work of the expedition was completed in January 1807; during the journey from Perm to Kyakhta, the latitudes and longitudes of all the towns along the route were determined, an astronomical log was kept, and in addition, the entire route from Perm to Kyakhta was visually surveyed (at a scale of two *versta* [1½ miles] to an inch); on the return journey, four officers were instructed to survey the Nerchinsk *Okrug* [district] and the entire Chinese border, to the east as far as the Amur, and to the west as far as Omsk; more than 6,000 *versta* [4,000 miles] were covered along the way, plans were drafted of many towns and mining works, and the positions of ten locations in Transbaikalia were determined; These works, which were a kind of practical continuation of the astronomical studies by F.I. Schubert, provided abundant material for the exploration of southern Siberia.

At the time of Suchtelen's accession to the post of Quartermaster-General, officers from the Quartermasters Department were still surveying the subsequent Vyborg Governorate,⁷ which had begun in 1796; this survey was completed in 1804; a total of 36,000 square *versta* [16,160 square miles] (using the milestone scale) were surveyed. Following the example of this survey, Suchtelen

⁶ The compilation of this map was completed in 1805 and it was published in 1814.

⁷ Under the direction of Colonel (Major General after 1798) Steinheil. This survey was carried out almost exclusively by officers of the former General Staff. Their works are distinguished by their precision and painstaking finish.

undertook a whole series of similar projects, under the general name of topographic surveys, which, however, were carried out without pre-determined trigonometric datum points; in total, from 1802 to 1810 (and part of 1811), 192,000 square *versta* [86,188 square miles] were surveyed in Estonia and Livonia, and in the Volhynia, Podolia (including the Ochakov steppe), St. Petersburg, Novgorod and Olonetsk governorates. Independently of this, at the end of 1801, two officers were sent to explore the Caucasus Mountains, and in 1803 another ten officers from the Quartermasters Department were sent to compile a map of Georgia; they were also tasked with compiling an official description of the region. In 1809, an extensive survey of the newly annexed Finland began.

The directors and producers of these surveys were exclusively officers from the Quartermasters Department, who encountered enormous hardships in these activities. In total, 450 surveyors were involved in the surveys (over the course of ten years); both the directors and the producers of the work rotated, especially after the campaign of 1805, following which the wars in which Russia was involved were almost continuous; the work also suffered from a lack of instruments and crew. Nevertheless, many surveys were carried out quite satisfactorily, and all these surveys generally provided extensive material for the 'hundred-sheet' map,⁸ and what is even more important, served as a practical school in which the correct view of this kind of work was developed while the leadership of the extensive topographic works that were undertaken following the end of the Napoleonic wars were formed.

Independently of the state survey, other works of a similar kind were carried out, on the initiative of individual institutions, appointed specifically to meet the needs of the given time; such as the surveys of the Kirghiz-Kaisak steppes and the St. Petersburg Governorate, the city of St. Petersburg, the island of Corfu and the border of the Tarnopol *Okrug* with Austria.⁹

Works resulting from military operations:

When our troops moved into Austria in 1805, the shortage of road maps became quite apparent. In view of this, in 1806, Major Khatov was tasked with compiling a route map. In 1809, seven officers from the Quartermasters Department were sent to inspect the military roads in our western border area; they were to inspect the roads and especially the villages, for overnight halts and rest-camps, and to designate assembly areas; in total they were ordered to cover 25,328 *versta* [16,885 miles]. Of course, these officers made every effort to execute the mission given to them, but this was only the beginning of tasking of this kind, which was to be expanded very widely. Moreover, even such an expansion would not satisfy the posed question entirely, but only part of it. It was necessary to begin a whole body of work in preparation for war, but this matter, at that time, was barely related to the Quartermasters Department at all and fell (mainly) within the sphere of activity of the corresponding department of the Military Collegium.

By 1 [13] September 1805, the ranks of the Suite of the Quartermasters Department were deployed as follows:

1. At the depot - three generals, 37 officers and 36 Column Leaders.
2. On surveying tasks - two generals, 49 officers and 17 Column Leaders.
3. In the Caucasus Inspection and in Georgia - eight officers.
4. In Orenburg - three officers.
5. With the embassies to China and Japan - seven officers and one Column Leader.
6. On Corfu - two subalterns and one Column Leader.

⁸ This map remained in use by us almost until the 1840s.

⁹ In addition, Colonel Budkovsky was instructed to compile a military topographic description of the Caucasus Governorate and the Caucasus line.

7. On various missions outside the direct service of the Quartermasters Department - four officers and five Column Leaders.

Since the Suite consisted of only five generals, 44 field officers, 66 subalterns and 60 Column Leaders, it is not difficult to see that, at the time in question, surveying and drawing maps and plans constituted the predominant and even almost exclusive occupation of the officers of the Quartermasters Department, especially in the first four years of General Suchtelen's administration; They were extremely rarely assigned to formations; if they were sent to locations where units were concentrating, even then they were apparently only engaged in surveying. Even the preparation of the deployment plan for the formations was entrusted to the formations themselves, and reporting on their quartering was confined to the Inspections Expedition of the Military Collegium,¹⁰ from where the essential information was transferred to the office of the Quartermaster-General, as required.

Service with the formations:

Very little information has been preserved regarding the participation of officers of the Suite with manoeuvres.

In 1803, manoeuvres took place in the vicinity of Krasnoe Selo; one side was commanded by General-of-Cavalry Michelson, and the other by Field Marshal Count Kamensky, who was considered 'an excellent tactician' at that time (with which, however, Suvorov had not agreed in his day). When deciding on the appointment of one of the field officers from the Suite to the post of Quartermaster-General to Count Kamensky, many senior officers refused to participate in the manoeuvres, citing the insignificance of the matter, and therefore the young Major Toll was assigned, as a fighting man who had been on campaign and knew the troops.

In 1804, manoeuvres were carried out in the vicinity of the Peterhof, and the above-mentioned favourite of the Tsar, Adjutant-General Prince P.M. Volkonsky, was appointed their main director, selecting Toll once more as his assistant, who, in turn, brought captains Khatov and Selyavin from the Suite to participate in the manoeuvres. Evidently, Prince Volkonsky gave Toll a great deal of independence in issuing orders regarding the manoeuvres, and these orders received Supreme approval from the Tsar himself.¹¹ It was here that Prince Volkonsky first became closely acquainted with Toll, Khatov and Selyavin, who subsequently became his very active assistants in the matter of reforming the Quartermasters Department. It was already clear here how great the isolation of the officers of the Suite from the formations had been in peacetime. Naturally, this was to have an extremely unfavourable impact in wartime, and it would probably have been impossible to correct the situation, because, the following year, Russia was to wage war with Napoleonic France.

10 Thus, in 1804, the commanders of regiments and independent battalions were ordered to submit detailed information on their quartering arrangements to the Inspection Expedition, by 1 [13] January and 1 [13] July, indicating their headquarters, as well as the villages in which the companies and squadrons were located, showing the distance of these locations from the headquarters.

11 Toll was awarded a diamond ring for his contribution to these manoeuvres.



The Battle Of Austerlitz

CHAPTER 4.

His Majesty's Suite of the Quartermasters Department on campaign in 1805:

In 1805, Britain, Austria, Sweden and Naples were on Russia's side, but the assistance of the latter two allies was, overall, of secondary importance at best; in military terms, Britain on land also represented a force far from first-class, while Austria had already suffered many defeats at the hands of the French, of which the most sensitive were those inflicted by Bonaparte, who acted (in the opinion of the Austrians) 'not according to the rules' and who was now transfigured into Emperor Napoleon. He had already made Austria pay dearly for the fate presented to her; it would, of course, be undesirable to be taught the same lesson again, and to pay even more dearly for it. In response to proposals by Emperor Alexander, Austria referred to the sad state of their finances and for a long time did not dare to act against Napoleon. New violations by him of Austrian interests in Italy and Germany, the hope for financial assistance from Britain and for the powerful support of Russia in the form of its valiant forces, all this together prompted Austria to chance a renewed struggle with France.

The coalition forces were quite significant: 200,000 Austrians, 100,000 Russians and, in addition, Swedish, Neapolitan and some Russian units had been assigned to diversionary operations, a total of about 400,000 men. Napoleon's forces numbered just 300,000 men, but they were more concentrated, and most importantly, Napoleon, although inferior to his adversaries in overall numbers, managed to be stronger than them, both in the main theatre of military operations and in the decisive clash of arms.

The final Coalition plan (proposed by Austria) was as follows:

1. Austria would field three armies: the first, of around 90,000 men, in the Danube valley; the second, some 143,000 strong, in northern Italy; the third, of around 53,000 men, in the Tyrol and Vorarlberg, in order to form a link between the first two armies. The main, decisive operations were entrusted to the second army (Erzherzog Karl's), which was to launch a swift offensive towards the river Adda, at the same time as the first army was also to launch an immediate offensive towards the river Lech, where they were to await the arrival of the Russian army, and then, upon the arrival of the latter and upon the second army reaching the Adda, were to move through the Schwarzwald [Black Forest] and Switzerland into France. The third army was to advance in alignment with the first two armies.
2. Russia was obligated to field two armies: one, of 54,916 men and 7,920 horse with 200 guns, which was to reach the river Inn by 8 (20) October, while the other was of 40,000 men, whose mission was intended firstly to intimidate Prussia, and then to occupy Switzerland.
3. The remaining Coalition forces were to execute diversions in other theatres of military operations.

This plan was too complex; the main mass of the Coalition force was not concentrated on the most important axis (Vienna-Paris), but on the secondary, Italian theatre, which did not correspond to the objectives of the entire Coalition, nor even to Austria's true interests, but corresponded to an incorrect perception of their own needs by the Austrians themselves; the plan was also flawed in relation to the choice of timing for the offensive by the first Austrian army, without waiting for the arrival of Russian forces; finally, the offensive had to be carried out with interruptions that would be detrimental to the success of the operation. The actual adoption of this plan was evidence of a repetition of what had happened both in the Seven Years' War and in the campaign of 1799, that is, the subordination of Russian policy and strategy to Austrian policy and strategy.

No overall commander-in-chief had been appointed; Kaiser Franz took this title upon himself in name only, but he did not command the army at all and was not even present with it. He took General Mack on as his assistant, officially as quartermaster-general, an extremely one-dimensional man who attributed absolute importance in war to the ground and, in addition, was prone to unbridled self-delusion, and, worst of all, did not possess the necessary strength of will. He was the *de facto* commander-in-chief of the Austrian army on the Danube, with Erzherzog Ferdinand being officially placed as its head. Our first army was commanded by General-of-Infantry Golenishchev-Kutuzov, while Buxhoeveden commanded the second. Following the unification of the Coalition armies, Kutuzov was to be subordinate to the Austrian commander-in-chief, if he was one of the archdukes.

Such conditions were extremely unfavourable both for the Russian commander and for the supporting agencies of the Russian high command, who were forced to go along with everything from those same Austrians whose incompetence had already been exposed more than once.

While the Coalition had no unifying concept or intent at the head of the army, the French had such unity present, and moreover, at their head stood a brilliant commander who, having decided to concentrate 200,000 men on the Rhine and to defeat the Coalition in detail, beginning with Mack's army, gave a brilliant example of the execution of a plan he had drawn up himself: on 19 October [new style], Mack, who had been tactically encircled at Ulm, capitulated along with 30,000 Austrians. At this time, Kutuzov's army had not yet completed its concentration at Braunau and, of course, could not rescue Mack.

This army (initially 49,370 men, or 46,400 men excluding support elements) began departing from Radsywyliw between 13 and 23 August [25 August and 4 September] towards Teschen [Cieszyn], Brünn [Brno] and Krems and on to the Bavarian border; this move was carried out *en echelon* (in six groups) in order to ensure speed of movement and ease of resupply from the resources of the land. In Brody the army was met by the Austrian General Strauch, who was responsible for organising their ration supply and generally providing them with every necessity. Before Kutuzov's arrival, the army was being led by General Wintzingerode; Kutuzov reached the army and assumed command on 11 [23] September, as our forces were approaching Teschen. Up to this point, the marches had not exceeded 25 *versta* [17 miles], and rest days had been scheduled every three to four days. In Teschen, orders were received from Kaiser Franz to speed up the march,¹ which turned into forced marches as they continued to advance: the infantry would march a half-stage (having put their knapsacks and greatcoats on carts), and were transported on carts for the other half; cavalry valises were also transported thus; the artillery teams were doubled using local horses; local carts were commandeered for the military trains; The resupply of provisions and fodder was increased. Thanks to all these measures, the length of the stages was increased to 50 to 60 *versta* [33 to 40 miles]. The Austrian government demanded even greater speed of march by reducing the rest-days, but Kutuzov vetoed this demand in view of the excessive fatigue of the troops and the large losses of stragglers and sick (about 5,000 men). The first echelon reached Braunau on 29 September [11 October], the fifth echelon on 7 (19) October, while the sixth, having turned back (due to worsening relations with Turkey) and then moved onwards in order to rejoin Kutuzov, but they would arrive no sooner than two weeks hence.

During this march, Major General L. I. Gerard served as Quartermaster-General to Kutuzov, and at his disposal were seven field officers and subalterns from the Suite² and three Column Leaders.³ Almost all of these officers had taken part in the campaign of 1799; as had their chief, who,

1 In reaction to Napoleon's departure from the Boulogne camp.

2 Lieutenant Colonel Engelman, majors Tang and Neidhardt, Captain Kononov and sub-lieutenants Sazonov, Burnashev 1st and Ion.

3 Gudovich, Borovsky and Schilder.

however, was better known for his hydraulic engineering than for his military talents,⁴ and, worst of all, was not a fighting man. Upon the entry of our force into Austria, he had to play a secondary role, because the Austrian Quartermaster-General Schmidt had been assigned to Kutuzov, who had the unlimited trust of Kaiser Franz and was held in high esteem in the Austrian army.

On 2 (14) October, a rumour was spreading in Braunau that General Marmont was stationed 30 *versta* [20 miles] from this city with 30,000 Frenchmen, while the Austrian General Kienmeyer was 15 *versta* [ten miles] away with 10,000 men. Kutuzov took steps to gather intelligence on the French and Austrian positions, but it was very difficult to assess the situation. On 6 (18) October, Kutuzov convened a council of war, at which all the generals spoke in favour of moving forward and giving battle to Marmont, but the Commander-in-Chief disagreed with this. Our army was soon joined by: Kienmeyer's corps (24 battalions and 60 squadrons), driven back from Donauwörth, and the detachment under Graf Nostitz (three battalions and a regiment of hussars), cut off from Ulm, but they too could not shed light on the situation. Kutuzov's force had now reached 50,000 men; the Austrian generals demanded an offensive on Munich, with the aim of reopening communications with Ulm by force, but Kutuzov again disagreed with this, finding the risk incalculable until the situation was clarified. On 12 (24) October, Mack arrived in Braunau; the situation was revealed...

At the same time, Kutuzov had to save the army from a similar fate as had befallen the Austrians at Ulm, and defend the capital of Austria, Vienna. He decided to save the army by retreating, such that, while holding the enemy back step by step, he could also shield the route to Vienna as much as possible. The Austrians suggested that Kutuzov slowly retreat behind the Traun river, where the armies of Erzherzog Johann and Erzherzog Karl were intending to reach him; whereupon 150,000 men would be concentrated in front of Vienna, with whom it should be possible to hold the French off until reinforcements arrived from Russia. On 16 (28) October in Wels, Kutuzov presented his plan in the presence of Kaiser Franz: firstly, to delay the French at the crossings of the Enns river, as long as the security of the army allows, then to cross to the left bank of the Danube, block the enemy from crossing, assemble the scattered formations of the Coalition armies behind the cover of the Danube, and only thereafter to begin a new campaign. Kaiser Franz approved this plan, but considered it possible to concentrate the Coalition armies on the right bank of the Danube; in view of this, it was decided: that the Russian army would initially hold out behind the Enns, and then in the bridgehead fortifications at Krems, until reinforcements arrived.

The retreat march had begun on 14 (26) October and was carried out (due to the unfavourable time of year) along a single road (the highway); at the same time, Kienmeyer was retreating from Salzburg towards Steyr, while Nostitz withdrew from Passau towards Linz (covering Kutuzov's flanks). The French were hot on their heels and threatened to turn the line. Having retreated beyond the Enns, Kutuzov intended to hold on the line of this river for as long as possible, but on 22 October (3 November) Murat drove Merveldt's Austrians out of Steyr, while in the meantime Davout, Marmont and Bernadotte had crossed to the right bank of the Enns and threatened Kutuzov's left flank. Unable to hold on the Enns, Kutuzov continued his retreat to Amstetten and then on towards St. Pölten. Meanwhile, Mortier's corps had been sent along the left bank of the Danube by Napoleon, and was threatening Kutuzov's lines of communications. In view of this, on 28 October (9 November), contrary to the wishes of Kaiser Franz, Kutuzov crossed to the left bank of the Danube at Krems, thereby saving the army from destruction, which would have been inevitable had he fulfilled the Austrians' demands and decided to delay the French in front of Krems.

following the crossing, Kutuzov intended to give the troops a rest in Krems, fatigued from continuous forced marches along roads washed out by rain, to move the supply trains forward and

⁴ He was admitted to the General Staff in 1776 from the Architects of the Admiralty Collegium and took an active part in the construction of the Tsarskoe Selo Park, the Staro-Russky salt mines, the water supply system in Moscow, and so on.

remove the obstacles to the army's movements. However, having received intelligence on the whereabouts of Mortier's corps, he drew up a plan together with General Schmidt, to trap the French, the execution of which led to the famous Battle of Dürrenstein on 30 October (11 November). Mortier was in a dangerous position, especially because he was not only detached away from the other formations of Napoleon's army, but had also hurried forward himself with Gazan's division, while Dupont's division were following at a distance of 12 *versta* [eight miles]; Gazan's division would have been completely destroyed had some mistakes not been made on our part, especially had our enveloping column not been ten hours late (setting out at five o'clock in the afternoon instead of seven o'clock in the morning).

Having learned of the outcome of the Battle of Dürrenstein, Napoleon decided to seize Vienna, capture the bridge over the Danube and, by moving towards Znaim [Znojmo], to cut Kutuzov off from Moravia, and at the same time from his reinforcements. This plan came very close to being realised thanks to the skill of Napoleon and Murat's cunning, who managed to capture the bridge on 1 (13) November. Napoleon immediately sent Murat's cavalry, Oudinot's grenadiers, and the corps under Soult and Lannes to sever Kutuzov's line of retreat, while Bernadotte and Mortier were to fix Kutuzov frontally. Our force, moving very slowly, was again threatened with destruction, because they were still 60 *versta* [40 miles] from Znaim on 2 (14) November, while Murat could have taken this town on that same day. Whereupon Kutuzov sent Prince Bagration to Hollabrunn with 7,000 men and with orders to hold the French there, regardless of any disproportion in strength, until the entire army had passed by, which led to the classic battle at Schöngraben on 4 (16) November; Bagration's detachment withstood the attacks of 25,000 Frenchmen for eight hours in this battle, and were enveloped by them, after which they broke out (with the loss of 3,000 men and several guns) and rejoined the army on 6 (18) November, which had reached Pohrlitz [Pohořelice] that same day, safely evading the danger. The outcome of this operation had also been favoured by Murat entering into negotiations with the Russians, wanting to deceive them, and was himself deceived by Kutuzov, as a result of which the opportunity was lost.

Thus Kutuzov thwarted all of Napoleon's plans aimed at destroying his army, and saved this force, leading them out of the trap in which they found themselves due to the operational subordination of our army to Austrian politicians and strategists. On 7 (19) November, Kutuzov's army withdrew to Wischau [Vyškov] and on 8 (20) November, they linked up with Buxhoeveden's army; on 10 (22) November, they fell back to Olshany [Olšany u Prostějova] near Olmütz [Olomouc]; our Lifeguard arrived two days later. In total, there were:

1. A Russian force of 93 battalions, 85 squadrons and five Cossack regiments.
2. 20½ battalions and 43 squadrons of Austrians.

All together there were 113½ battalions and 153 squadrons and *Sotnia* [Cossack sub-unit], or 70,000 infantry and 16,000 cavalry, a total of 86,000 men. The balance of forces had shifted to the side of the Coalition, because at this time Napoleon had no more than 50,000 men under his command.

Subordination to the Austrians and its results:

Austrian forces constituted between $\frac{1}{5}$ and $\frac{1}{4}$ of the entire strength of the Coalition army; in all fairness, they should have relinquished any direction of operations. In addition to Gerard, the Russian force also included Major General Steinheil of the Quartermasters Department, and also the commander of this department, General Suchtelen. All of them were passed over; preference was given to an Austrian quartermaster-general; unfortunately, Schmidt had been killed in action at Krems; his deputy was Weyrother, who had been with Suvorov in 1799; this factor greatly enhanced his reputation; moreover, great hopes were placed in his ability and his knowledge of the area. He was appointed quartermaster-general of the entire Russo-Austrian force, nominally united under

Kutuzov's command. Emperor Alexander and Kaiser Franz were with the army, but they did not assume supreme command. The position of Duty General was taken by Prince Volkonsky, who took Major Toll as his head of chancellery. The leading role in the direction of operations was played by Weyrother, and the Austrian Quartermaster-General's Staff alongside him.

The command and control of the Coalition army was all the more complicated because it was not yet divided into corps and such like, but, depending on the situation, was either split into columns, or used an established standing formation (*ordre de bataille*), by virtue of which it consisted of a vanguard, first and second lines and a reserve. The officers of the Austrian Quartermaster-General's Staff already had experience in controlling such masses and even boasted of their systematic deployment of units among the various army formations. At the same time, they considered complexity to be the best evidence of military wisdom; to mix and match units was considered the height of tactical logic, just as a good player shuffles his cards and then plays them out. The results of applying this doctrine in practice had been demonstrated by the battles of Rivoli, Hohenlinden, and so on.

Russian quartermaster officers considered themselves laymen in these matters. This speaks more in their favour than against. It is a pity that they did not perceive this and were in awe of the sophistication of the Austrians in the matter of force deployment. This admiration, however, did not last long; it soon gave way to disappointment and dissatisfaction: due to the complexity of the plans, the issuing of orders was delayed and their execution became even more difficult. During the advance from Olmütz towards Austerlitz [Slavkov u Brna], the impracticality of Weyrother's orders was suddenly revealed: the stages were not far, yet (according to Yermolov) they were deployed in 'such an incomprehensible manner' that the units rarely completed them in less than ten or twelve hours; each of the columns was obliged to cross another's route, moreover, more than once, which resulted in a loss of time.

The army headquarters had no precise intelligence on the enemy and made errors for this very reason. Weyrother boasted that he had manoeuvred between Brunn and Austerlitz the previous year and knew the ground where it was proposed to give battle in detail, and yet he had drawn up a disposition which, in the words of Yermolov, 'was more like a topographic description of the Brunn area rather than a concept of operations preparing an entire army for battle.' Moreover, this disposition was drafted in German and forwarded to Prince Volkonsky very late: Major Toll spent the entire night translating it into Russian, and it was only delivered to the formations by six o'clock in the morning, and yet the advance was supposed to begin at seven o'clock in the morning. This disposition covered several pages filled with difficult names of lakes, rivers, valleys and hills; everything in it was so muddled that it was impossible either to memorise or understand; copying it out for the units was unfeasible, because it was vital to have time to read it to the many commanders, and in any case, there was an insufficient number of copies of the disposition available.

The consequences of these orders are well known to all; the army, superior in numbers and motivated by fine morale, suffered a cruel defeat, and the victor was entitled to say the following in his bulletin:

... On 10 (*frimaire*, year XIV of the republic, or 1 December 1805 new style), from the high ground of his bivouacs, the *Empereur* witnessed the beginning of the flanking movement by the Russian army with indescribable joy, with the aim of enveloping his right flank at twice cannon range from his forward outposts. He saw then to what extent prejudice and ignorance of the art of war had overshadowed the commanders of this brave army; he said several times: "Tomorrow, before nightfall, this army shall be in my hands." The enemy, however, thought otherwise... They were concerned by only one thought: that the French army might slip away from them. Everything possible was done to reinforce this idea in them...

Everything was used to encourage the Russian commander in completing the operation they had so poorly planned and executed.⁵

Napoleon did not know that the 'Russian commander' at the same time, also foresaw the defeat of the army entrusted to him, but had been placed in such a situation that he could not correct the matter, because the Russian 'commanders of this brave army' had not only gone voluntarily to the Austrians to be taught, but also completely subordinated themselves, yet the Austrians did not know what they were doing.

Consequences of the failure of the 1805 campaign:

The failures of the war of 1805 made a strong impression on our government, as well as on its entire educated society and on the army, which had not been accustomed to defeat.

The government was quick to introduce a number of reforms in the organisation of the army, which, however, had no effect on quartermaster and staff duties in general. Meanwhile, the campaign of 1805 had revealed that our Quartermasters Department was not yet fit for purpose. There was disorder in the theatre of war, which had been repeated quite often during peacetime movements within Russia. Experienced and knowledgeable men attributed this chaos to none other than the Quartermasters Department and complained about its disorganisation. Thus, Major General Barclay de Tolly, commander of the 3rd Jäger Regiment at the time, noted in his diary that a previous dispersal (in August 1805), designed to provide units with greater comfort and ease billeting, had led to much disorder: in many locations, troops from two or three different units had been assigned, which had generated unnecessary aggravation and correspondence. Of course, this was a consequence of the inaccuracy of the maps and the negligence of the men involved. At the same time, Barclay de Tolly, among other things, made the following remarkable statement:

I would like the Tsar to spare no expense in bringing the General Staff, this most important branch of the army, to a more flourishing state, and to replenish it with capable men. We would find them in sufficient numbers in our army if we only took the trouble to look for them: real talent may not be self-promoting.⁶

To what extent was the activity of the Quartermasters Department deserving of criticism?

This was the opinion of one of the outstanding military men of that time; this point of view was also prevalent in our army. Those responsible for the unsuccessful outcome of the campaign of 1805 were sought out; the Quartermasters Department was blamed for much more than it deserved. There is no doubt that this department had significant shortcomings: in general, despite its well-known merits, it was not fit for purpose as a supporting agency to higher military command and control at war, and even before the war it had not been prepared for this. But this was not their fault, because, given the way it had been established, things could not have been otherwise. Its preparation had not been sufficiently wide-ranging, perhaps even almost one-dimensional, but in this regard it would be unfair to hold only the ranks of the Quartermasters Department responsible; one cannot help but take into account that, given the situation in which they had been placed, they had to satisfy those demands that had been made upon them first of all. Consequently, it was necessary to amend these requirements, and to that end, it was essential that this should be brought to the awareness of the persons and institutions involved, that is, that the corresponding views of higher military command and control itself should be changed and that the latter should enjoy sufficient freedoms in relation to the implementation of both the amended outlook and the requirements arising from them. It was apparent that there should not have been any difficulties in this regard, and a whole series of wars

5 See *Correspondance de Napoléon I* or also *Correspondance militaire de Napoléon I*, II, No. 729; 30^e bulletin de la Grande Armée, 495-496.

6 A few years later, on his rapid ascent, Barclay de Tolly attained the post of Minister of War, from which he would himself begin to bring the Quartermaster Corps to a 'flourishing state.'

waged by Russia, beginning in 1805, should also have facilitated the understanding of both the shortcomings of our military system in general and the Quartermasters Department in particular, and the best means and methods leading to their elimination. This is how things were in reality, but, nevertheless, coming to an understanding of both was not easy at first, and the main reason for this was the fact that the political solutions to those questions in which their connection to strategy was expressed, were inconsistent with the demands of the situation. This becomes even clearer when examining the campaigns of 1806 and 1807, in which, to a certain extent, the same errors in the field of politics and strategy, as well as the mutual links between them, were repeated, which had led to those sad consequences in the campaign of 1805.



The Battle Of Golymin

CHAPTER 5.

The war with France in 1806 and 1807:

Emperor Alexander's main objective, to spare Europe from Napoleon's lust for power, remained unchanged even after Austria parted from him and made peace with Napoleon. Prussia, which had missed the opportunity in 1805 to move its army into Napoleon's rear areas and contribute to his defeat, had now also concluded a treaty with him, in which Napoleon promised to give them Hanover and such like; yet, in reality, he did not want to fulfil his promises at all, and was willing at the same time to return Hanover to Britain. Prussian pride had been wounded; public opinion demanded war with France. Under these conditions, Prussia, under the influence of the politics of passion, presented Napoleon with demands which he did not consider possible even to discuss, and thus war became inevitable.

Russia, Saxony and the Herzog von Weimar were in alliance with Prussia. Primacy among the allies once more belonged to Russia; Emperor Alexander had promised to send 100,000 men to assist Prussia from the very beginning, but it was clear that if the war dragged on and approached the borders of Russia, then these 100,000 would be reinforced by other formations, of which Russia at that time could put forward more than Prussia.

Prudence demanded waiting for the Russians to link up and only then to give battle to Napoleon, and the fresh example of Mack's operations should have served to warn the Prussians against repeating his mistakes. However, the Prussians, possessed of extreme self-confidence, under the influence of memories of the victories of Frederick the Great, decided to begin hostilities without waiting for the Russians, for which they very soon paid: on 14 October [new style], they suffered severe defeats at Jena and Auerstedt, losing 39,000 to 40,000 men out of the 136,000 who had taken part in these battles, and thereafter Napoleon strove to reap the fruits of victory and organised the pursuit of the retreating Prussians, who surrendered to the French in various locations in detail; the Prussian fortresses, starting with Magdeburg and ending with Stettin [Szczecin] and Küstrin [Kostrzyn nad Odrą], surrendered to the victors; the fate of Prussia was decided in less than a month; the enemy had taken possession of their entire territory, with the exception of East Prussia, while only one corps under L'Estocq (14,000 men) and several small garrisons remained of their armed forces.

Thus, a similar thing happened as in 1805; again our German ally was defeated before the arrival of our force, and it was necessary to save them, having much smaller forces than the enemy, and having a commander such as Napoleon facing them.

Meanwhile, some reforms were carried out in our army, under the influence of the combat experience of 1805, notwithstanding the increase in its strength caused by the inevitability of the renewed war against Napoleon. In March 1806, the 11 Inspections were redesignated as divisions composed of all arms and troop types, with a strength of about 13,000 men each; by the end of 1807, the number of divisions had reached 22,¹ not counting three of reserves; a *zemstvo* [territorial] army was raised in the shape of a large temporary *opolchenie* [militia], part of which formed the reserve (replacements) for the regular forces. Despite Napoleon's capabilities, Russia could have fought him with some confidence of success even had he invaded our territory but when conducting operations outside our borders, success was most unlikely, mainly in view of the continuing subordination of Russian strategy to foreign interests and the unsatisfactory solution to the question of selecting a commander-in-chief as well as the organisation of the army leadership in general.

The only commander who would have been at the height of his profession should have been

¹ There were 13 'established' divisions by the beginning of June 1806; on 14 [26] June orders were issued to add one more. C.C.L. XXIX, No. 22,176.

Kutuzov, but he had fallen into disgrace due to Austerlitz. The Tsar wished to take public opinion into account, which was in favour of Field Marshal Count Kamensky, who was appointed commander-in-chief of our 'expeditionary' army, and received 'full powers'² which Kutuzov did not have in 1805; he was 69 years old, he could no longer ride a horse and was generally decrepit, he joined the army on 7 (19) December, had already requested his dismissal from his superiors by 9 (21) December, and on 14 (26) December he resigned his appointment as commander-in-chief and left the army, without even waiting for the Supreme decree authorising this resignation and the appointment of his successor, and entrusted command of the army to the senior of his generals, Count Buxhoeveden. The latter was at odds with the next most senior commander, General Bennigsen, who did not want to be Buxhoeveden's subordinate. Emperor Alexander had appointed General-of-Infantry Knorring³ as deputy to Count Kamensky, but his advanced years and service-related fatigue had already weakened his strength and he was not up to the task of fulfilling this appointment. In these circumstances, complete chaos reigned in the army, which continued until Bennigsen obtained approval from above for his seizure of power as commander-in-chief.

The Expeditionary Army consisted of three corps, Bennigsen's (60,000 men), Buxhoeveden's (40,000 men) and Essen 1st's (22,000 men), for a total of 122,000 men with 624 guns. Furthermore, the King of Prussia had subordinated L'Estocq's force to Bennigsen. These formations were not concentrated: Bennigsen crossed the border at Grodno on 22 October (3 November) and reached Ostrolenka [Ostrołęka] on 1 (13) November; Buxhoeveden reached Ostrolenka on 22 November (4 December), while Essen would only reach Brest-Litovsk in early (mid) December. Bennigsen had intended to march to Silesia, but, having learned of the *pogrom* of the Prussians, he halted on the Narew. Then, with the permission of the King of Prussia, he positioned his main force at Pultusk [Pułtusk], moving the vanguards up to the Vistula.

Napoleon, for his part, moved 160,000 men up to face the Coalition forces; the French soon captured Warsaw and occupied the line of the river Vistula; in view of this, Bennigsen retreated to Ostrolenka, but then, seeing that the French were not pursuing him, he returned to Pultusk. Napoleon, having secured his base on the Vistula, decided to take advantage of the scattered deployment of the Coalition formations and set himself the mission of launching an offensive with his left wing, breaking through the Prussian line (along the Thorn [Toruń] to Strasburg [Brodnica] axis), isolating them from the Russian contingent, and going left-flanking around the latter, pushing them towards the Narew, having firstly captured their nearest crossing on this river at Pultusk. At the same time, Bennigsen hoped to check Napoleon on the river Wkra, and therefore intended to concentrate his corps at Pultusk and persuaded Buxhoeveden to bring his formation closer to him. At this very moment, Count Kamensky joined the army and ordered: Bennigsen to move to the

2 In the Supreme Rescript addressed to Count Kamensky, it stated, *inter alia*: 'I entrust to you the glory of the Russian armed forces, the security of the Empire and the tranquillity of my subjects. My powers by proxy are unlimited, and therefore I consider it superfluous to provide you with any direction here. In any event, dispose of your units and operate at your discretion...'

3 Bogdan Fëdorovich Knorring came from a noble Württemberg family that had moved to Estonia. He graduated from the Land Cadet Corps in 1764 and was promoted to lieutenant in the Nizhegorod Infantry Regiment; he began his service under Weissmann's command. At the beginning of the First Turkish War he was transferred to the General Staff. He took part in operations under Prince Golitsyn at Khotin, Rumyantsev at Larga and Kagul (while with Bauer), Panin facing Bender, Tekelli at Zhurzha and Potemkin at Silistria. Prince Grigory Orlov sent him from the Focsani Congress of 1773 to his brother Alexei. In completing this mission, Knorring travelled across the whole of European Turkey and surveyed the route from Ruschuk to Constantinople and the Dardanelles. After this war he commanded a regiment, and in 1788 he was appointed quartermaster-general of the Army of Finland, directed against the Swedes. He took part in military operations against the Poles; in 1794 he took Vilna after a stubborn defence, for which he received the Order of St. George, 2nd class, and was promoted to lieutenant general. He retired shortly thereafter. In 1806 he was re-activated into service, promoted to general-of-infantry and appointed deputy commander-in-chief of the army assigned to operate against the French. Following the Battle of Preußisch-Eylau he was recalled, while in December 1808 he was appointed commander-in-chief of the Army of Finland replacing Buxhoeveden. After this war he retired from active duty altogether. He died in 1825 in Dorpat.

Wkra; Buxhoeveden to send two divisions to this same river, via Makow [Maków Mazowiecki] and Golymin [Gołymin-Ośrodek], to the right of Bennigsen, while the remaining two divisions were to go to Popowo [Popowo Kościelne] in order to secure the left flank of the army, and, finally, for Essen 1st to close up to Buxhoeveden's latter two divisions. The execution of these orders led to an even greater dispersal of our strength and to a clash between both sides on the Wkra on 11 (23) December under conditions extremely unfavourable for our forces. At Kolozomb [Kołożąb] and Sochocin, the weak detachment under Barclay de Tolly was attacked by Augereau's corps, halted three French attempts to cross the river and, eventually, threatened with envelopment from the left by superior forces, began a retreat towards Nowe Miasto. In the night action at Czarnowo the weak vanguard (seven battalions) under Count Osterman-Tolstoy defended themselves for 12 hours against 40,000 Frenchmen under the direction of Napoleon himself; once the French broke off their attacks, Count Osterman, concerned that Napoleon might notice his weakness, and bearing in mind that the objective of the action (to give his division time to assemble at Nasielsk) had already been achieved, began to retreat towards Nasielsk, at the same time ordering Baggovut (who was at Zegrze and not at all subordinate to him) to hurry to Pultusk and hold it at all costs.

Soon thereafter, having been informed of the actions on the Wkra river, Count Kamensky gave orders for: Bennigsen and Osterman to go to Strzegocin, while Buxhoeveden was to halt one division at Golymin and the other at Makow; his remaining two divisions were to remain at Popowo. Then, at midnight on 12 (24) December, having received intelligence of the French approaching Pultusk, the Field Marshal ordered Bennigsen to hurry there from Strzegocin, but, thanks to the initiative of Count Osterman, this important location had already been occupied by Baggovut's division.

Meanwhile, Napoleon sent Lannes' corps towards Pultusk, in order to seize it and turn the Narew river into an insurmountable obstacle in the area where he intended to encircle our force; the *réserve de cavalerie* marched along both banks, while Napoleon began to change front in a northerly direction himself with the remaining formations, towards Golymin, where, according to his assessments, our main force would be located. This assumption was erroneous, because our forces were concentrating at Pultusk. Napoleon, never underestimating the enemy, now tried to guess the meaning of the actions and movements of our formations, which were the result of Count Kamensky's order, but without success; this 'chaos of our movements' due to the extremely unfavourable local conditions (intersected terrain, poor road conditions, mud due to the thaw and rains), confused Napoleon himself, who even halted for several hours in Nasielsk (with the *Garde* and some of the cavalry) and was late to the action (at Golymin).

Lannes was hurrying towards Pultusk at this time, but had been forestalled there by the Russians; the greater part of Bennigsen's corps was concentrated there by 13 (25) December; the Commander-in-Chief had also directed Buxhoeveden's force there, which aligned with his intention to give battle at Pultusk in order to redeploy the army and drag the artillery and supply trains out of the mud. However, that night, the Field Marshal changed his mind, decided to retreat to our borders, gave the corresponding orders to Bennigsen and Buxhoeveden, entrusted command of the army to the latter and left for the hospital in Ostrolenka.

Under these circumstances, Bennigsen decided not to carry out Kamensky's orders, to free himself from being Buxhoeveden's subordinate and to engage the French in battle. This led to the battle of Pultusk on 14 (26) December, in which every French attack was repulsed, and Bennigsen even went on the offensive into a gap that opened in the enemy battle formation and won a victory. However, due to the generally unfavourable situation in this theatre of military operations (the French flanking movement from the direction of Golymin), he was obliged to withdraw the night after the battle. On that same day, Napoleon's main force (four corps and the cavalry) struck almost without result at Golymin at our weak detachment of mixed elements from various divisions, wandering, as a result of the orders from Count Kamensky, in different directions and finding themselves under the

command of Prince Golitsyn; having held out here until nightfall, our troops began to retreat towards Makow, where, during the aforementioned actions, Tuchkov's division, with which Buxhoeveden himself was stationed, stood inactive.

The battles at Pultusk and Golymin marked a turning point in Napoleon's planned operation, which failed to achieve its objectives. These battles undermined the self-confidence of the French somewhat and raised the morale of our troops: our entire army, from the Commander-in-Chief to the soldier, was overcome with self-confidence; this self-confidence gave rise to Bennigsen's bold decision, which he attempted to execute at the beginning of 1807 following his confirmation in the post of Commander-in-Chief and the removal of Buxhoeveden,⁴.

Finally, unity of command had been established in our army.⁵ The troops were burning with desire to exact vengeance on the French for Austerlitz. Immediately upon taking command, Bennigsen began to implement his plan, which essentially involved moving covertly through the forests and lakes towards the lower Vistula via Arys [Orzysz], Bischofstein [Bisztynek] and Heilsberg [Lidzbark Warmiński], and to exploit the over-extended enemy deployment (200 *versta* [133 miles]), to defeat the left-flank French corps (Bernadotte's and Ney's) in detail, being the most distant from the others, following which he would re-open communications with Gdańsk (Danzig) and lift the siege of Grudziądz (Graudenz). In the event of success, based on these fortresses, Bennigsen could force Napoleon to retreat from Warsaw and generally evacuate the Vistula line with just a single manoeuvre. The implementation of this required secrecy and speed.

On 4 (16) January, the army departed from Biala [Biała] in three columns, covered frontally by three vanguards and from the flanks by Cossack regiments, while on 8 (20) January, the headquarters had already reached Röbel [Reszel]. Meanwhile, Ney was ahead of the others with his corps and, contrary to Napoleon's orders, had advanced even further forwards, to Guttstadt [Dobre Miasto] and Bischofstein; stationing his vanguard at the latter location (20 *versta* [13 miles] from Röbel). In reaction to the appearance of Russian units, Ney began to pull his force back towards Hohenstein [Olsztyn] and informed the corps under Soult and Bernadotte of the situation; on 9 (21) January, Bennigsen reached Bischofstein and halted there for two days giving Ney the chance to retreat towards Hohenstein, thus missing a favourable opportunity to defeat one of the French corps. On 14 (26) January, Bennigsen had a new opportunity to defeat at least part of Bernadotte's corps, because the vanguard of our left column was stationed at Alt-Reichau [Boguchwały], close to Bernadotte's direct line of retreat from Mohrungen [Morąg] to Osterode [Ostróda]; but Bennigsen, instead of supporting the vanguard, pulled it back to Liebstadt [Miłakowo], where he intended to concentrate the army that day, having received (false) intelligence on the approach of Napoleon with his main body. On 15 (27) January, Bennigsen moved from Liebstadt towards Mohrungen in order to attack Bernadotte, but the latter had already managed to withdraw to Osterode. Thus, Bennigsen missed this opportunity to defeat another enemy corps, and then, in view of the concentration of French forces and concerned for his left flank during any further advance towards the lower Vistula, he eventually abandoned the offensive and switched to the defensive.

The execution of Bennigsen's manoeuvre was beyond reproach in relation to secrecy, because Napoleon remained in complete ignorance regarding the execution of Bennigsen's operation in its entirety until 15 (27) January, but there can be no question of the lack of essential pace, as our army covered only 120 *versta* [80 miles] in nine days (13 *versta* [8⅔ miles] per day); moreover, Bennigsen squandered favourable opportunities to defeat the enemy in detail.

4 Count Buxhoeveden was appointed military governor of Riga, while Knorring remained with Bennigsen as an adviser.

5 It cannot be said that Bennigsen was correct and impeccable in relation to the methods by which he achieved his appointment: not only did he fail to restrict himself to a truthful report on the course of the Pultusk battle, but he also presented the outcome in an exaggerated form.

On 15 (27) January, Napoleon realised that Bennigsen's entire army was advancing against his left flank, but he assumed that they were continuing to move in a westerly direction, and therefore decided to lure them as far as possible in that direction, attack their left flank and, having isolated them from Russia, drive them back into the sea or into the lower Vistula. Of the 104,000 men he had at his disposal at the time, he had 74,000 men immediately to hand. A particularly important mission fell to Bernadotte's corps, which was to retreat slowly towards the Vistula and lure Bennigsen on. However, the instructions sent to him were intercepted by our hussars⁶ and were presented by Bagration to Bennigsen, who, having thus understood Napoleon's plan, was able to eliminate the danger that was a consequence of the over-extended deployment of our army, which by the morning of 22 January (3 February) had been concentrated by him in positions near Jonkowo [Jonkendorf], while L'Estocq had set off from Saalfeld [Zalewo] through Wormditt [Orneta] and Mehlsack [Pieniężno], striving at all times to stay aligned with the army as it fell back.

Napoleon had only Soult's corps, Murat's cavalry and the *Garde* to hand, and therefore postponed the attack until the following day, limiting himself for the time being to preparing for this attack by seizing the crossing over the Alle [Lyna] river at Bergfriede [Barkweda], behind our left flank, which led to a stubborn battle at Bergfriede. Count N.M. Kamensky (the Field Marshal's son) held this crossing with three infantry regiments until nightfall, and the next morning, as the concentration of the French was being completed, our army, having already evacuated the Jonkowo position, was retreating towards Wolfsdorf [Wilczkowo] in three columns, shielded by three rearguards (Markov's, Barclay de Tolly's and Baggovut's) under the overall command of Prince Bagration. This retreat march, over a distance of 70 *versta* [47 miles], all the way to Preußisch-Eylau [Bagrationovsk], lasted three days and was accompanied by a whole series of rearguard actions, during which our forces, led by such commanders as Bagration and Barclay, risked themselves many times to save the army and to enable it to achieve the strategic mission it was pursuing.

The final link in the chain of rearguard actions was the clash at Preußisch-Eylau on 26 January (7 February), which, at the same time, served as the prologue to the great drama that took place the next day, 27 January (8 February), and became known as the Battle of Preußisch-Eylau. In this battle, our army and the French army, almost equal in strength (about 70,000 men each),⁷ were smashed against each other; our losses reached 26,000, while the French lost some 25,000 men.⁸ In view of these and earlier losses, Bennigsen began a retreat to Königsberg [Kaliningrad].⁹ The French army was in no better condition than ours; nevertheless, Napoleon remained on the battlefield until 5 (17) February, after which he retreated behind the Passarge [Pasłęka] river.

From February to May there was a pause in the main operations, caused by both political and military reasons, chiefly by the lack of food supplies for the French army. During these three months, Napoleon was actively preparing for the new campaign. In the second half of May, he had 400,000 men in the entire theatre of war, of whom 202,000 men were in the main operational theatre, and 170,000 men were available for operations against Bennigsen. The total strength of our force (including L'Estocq's corps) reached 125,000 men, of whom Bennigsen would have 80,000 men available for offensive operations. This campaign ended with the defeat of our army at Friedland [Pravdinsk] on 2 (14) June. On this day at three o'clock in the morning the French had 12,600 men on the battlefield; at seven o'clock in the morning they had 33,000; at nine o'clock their strength was equal to ours, that is, 46,000 men; while at five o'clock in the afternoon they had

6 We must give credit to our cavalry: during this campaign they performed their duties in the theatre of military operations excellently.

7 Bogdanovich estimated the strength of our army (132 battalions and 145 squadrons) at 58,000 men with 250 guns, or 64,000 men including L'Estocq's corps; the French army, according to his calculations, consisted of 80,000 people. General Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky calculated the strength of our army at 68,000, and the French at 70,000 men. General Leer also concurs with him.

8 Five Eagles were taken from the French; not a single Colour was taken from us.

9 During this period, Knorring had left the army due to differences of opinion with Bennigsen.

85,000 men under Napoleon's personal command. Bennigsen had at least 12 hours at his disposal in which to defeat first Lannes, and then the successively approaching corps under Mortier, Ney and the *Garde*. But Bennigsen, suffering at this time in body and spirit, had been misled by the skilful demonstrations by Lannes, Oudinot and Grouchy and remained passive. It was vital to decide on one of two courses of action: either to attack Lannes immediately and swiftly, or, without wasting time, to retreat to the right bank of the Alle river and continue the march to Wehlau [Znamensk] under its protection, taking up positions there to shield Königsberg and their line of retreat, waiting for reinforcements to arrive and generally to drag out military operations, that is, to return to a decision that Bennigsen had rejected with insufficient reason (also hesitating in making decisions, which is completely unacceptable in a military man). Bennigsen did neither the one nor the other, yet from three o'clock in the morning he started some kind of aimless, sluggish battle and dragged it out until five o'clock in the afternoon, when Napoleon fell upon our army with double its numbers. The battle, which was initially disadvantageous for the French, thereupon became disadvantageous for Bennigsen. Our army had to fight in a position cited in tactical manuals as an instructive example of all the wrong features, 'an impossible position, divided in depth by an obstacle, with a similar barrier to the rear, without any strong points at all in the northern sector;' its southern sector, although not devoid of strongholds, was an extremely cramped area, which was slightly more than two *versta* [1½ miles] from west to east (Postehnen [Peredovoe] to Friedland), and about two *versta* [1½ miles] from north to south (the Mühlenfluss [Pravda] to Sortlack); further to the east it was even more constrained, just 1,200 to 1,500 paces; in short, it was 'a pocket in which the main, decisive act of the battle took place.' The valour of our troops was great, but their limits were reached; they became disordered during the retreat and even such generals as Bagration, Raevsky, Baggovut (wounded), Markov (wounded) and Yermolov could not restore it. The units under Prince Bagration crossed the Alle river over already burning bridges, while the force under Prince Gorchakov had to carve their own line of retreat at bayonet-point through French held Friedland, and then cross the river, some by swimming, others via a ford. Although this success did not come cheaply for the French, as they lost some 12,000 men, our losses were greater, some 15,000 men and 10 to 16 guns.

Following the Battle of Friedland, our army retreated beyond the Neman, and Emperor Alexander considered continuing the war to be unfeasible and entered into negotiations with Napoleon, which led to the conclusion of the Tilsit Peace Treaty of 1807.

Here again, in politics, we must seek the reasons for this thankless task falling to Russian strategy; here again, the leaders of the Russian army, for their part, aggravated the difficulty of the strategic and tactical missions that were the lot of this army, but in 1806 to 1807 these commanders were no longer foreign, but our own, and so it was that although our army covered itself in glory and achieved success in combat against the supposedly invincible French, yet, in the end, the advantage still remained on the French side. This war, of course, also made a strong impression on our army and on Russian educated society; the bitterness against the French grew, and the desire to take revenge on them intensified; at the same time, they sought out the reasons for the failures, as well as the persons who should bear responsibility for such a deplorable outcome to the war. There were many reasons; the main defendants are evident from the above. The question arises, what role did the Quartermasters Department play in this war and what share of responsibility can be attributed to this department?

His Imperial Majesty's Suite of the Quartermasters Department on campaign in 1806 and 1807:

The above-mentioned divisions, consisting of six to eight regiments of infantry, and three regiments of regular cavalry, with corresponding artillery and Cossacks, and so on, could be more correctly called small corps. In any case, the raising of these higher tactical formations represented no small step forward. At the same time, with regard to the organisation of headquarters, the previous

uncertainty still reigned; the headquarters were not directorates for combat units, rather the domain of commanding officers; in these headquarters the main role was played by the Duty Officers [дежурства], who were in charge of the regulatory and administrative elements, while the aides-de-camp were selected by the unit commanders themselves and were completely dependent upon them; quartermaster ranks, appointed by order of the quartermaster-general, were temporary headquarters officers, imposed, as it were, upon the formation commanders or seconded to them; hence the same disunity between the staff ranks, duty officers and the Quartermasters Department that had previously existed in our country in the 18th century.

The information regarding the distribution of officers from the Quartermasters Department to the divisions during the campaign of 1806 to 1807 is insufficiently complete. With the appointment of Count Kamensky as Commander-in-Chief, Major General Steinheil (known for his survey of Finland) was appointed Quartermaster-General of the 'expeditionary' army, who retained this post under Bennigsen, almost until the very end of the campaign, or rather until the battle of Friedland, where he suffered a contusion and had to hand over the execution of his duties to the senior of the available officers from the Suite, Colonel Aderkas. Steinheil was not only a good surveyor and draughtsman, but also a good combat officer, cool under fire, active and decisive, and thanks to his previous experience, he had an excellent eye for ground and successfully selected fighting positions; Bennigsen stated this himself in his report on the battle of Pultusk.¹⁰ In addition, Steinheil had other positive qualities; he was an honest, truthful man, and a stranger to intrigue; it is not surprising that he was respected by his superiors and beloved by his subordinates.

He was in charge, for the most part, of his subordinates from the survey of Finland: colonels B. Berg, Aderkas and Vistitsky 3rd, lieutenant colonels Eichen 1st, Eichen 2nd, Frideritsi, Kornilovich, Kochetov and Sanin, Captain Eberhardt, Lieutenant Vietinghoff, sub-lieutenants Tenner, Schubert, Burnashev 1st, Helffreich, Nasakin, Bartolomey and other junior officers. The officers of the Quartermasters Department assigned to the headquarters were usually co-located with their Quartermaster-General and were with him constantly, and received all orders directly from him (verbally); there was no complex correspondence at that time and staff activity was controlled by remarkable simplicity.

To what extent was the work of the Quartermasters Department deserving of criticism during this war?

The above-mentioned disorder in the high command of our army could never be conducive to the creation of a good school for officers of the Quartermasters Department, but, in any event, the combat experience in the unequal fight against the overwhelming numerical strength of the best European army with Napoleon at the head, did not disappear without a trace. Our military officers of that time were trained mainly in the Turkish wars, during which our forces usually tried to locate the enemy as quickly as possible and defeat them, no matter where they were. In the war with the French, ground took on a different significance: it was necessary to pay particularly serious attention to the choice of fighting positions, upon which the success of our force's actions largely depended. In this respect, both the Quartermaster-General and the entire Quartermasters Department with our army performed their duties quite successfully, as far as it was dependent upon them: our units usually occupied good or reasonably satisfactory positions, from which they were able to repel or hold back superior enemy forces. The exception was, of course, the Friedland position, which, however, had not been selected ahead of time for an engagement with the enemy at all; it was an accidental position, in which our forces were forced to fight the enemy due to the illness and inaction of Bennigsen, and they had to fight without proper coordination, partly because, just before the start of the action, both of the main assistants to the Commander-in-Chief, Duty General Essen and Quartermaster-General Steinheil, were wounded during a reconnaissance. Colonel A.A.

¹⁰ War Diary for 1806 to 1807.

Aderkas, who assumed the duties of quartermaster-general at the very height of the battle, was unable to restore order, which was also hampered by the disruption of the headquarters, which had also suffered some losses: Sub-Lieutenant Schubert had been wounded almost alongside Steinheil; Thereafter, Lieutenant Tenner was wounded during the crossing of the Alle river. It was hardly possible to rectify the situation.

It is not surprising that under such difficult circumstances, with a sick Commander-in-Chief, without his closest assistants, our army, having endured this battle (in which, perhaps, any other army would have perished eventually), retreated beyond the Neman in complete disorder: many units did not receive orders to retreat at all and it was only after learning from the population that we had lost the battle that they headed for the borders of the Empire at their own discretion, often encountering the enemy and fighting them off, even taking prisoners from them.

The impartial judge of history must admit that the quartermaster officers of our army, taken collectively, truly fulfilled their duties in this campaign and brought advantages to the army, as far as the conditions in which they had been placed allowed. The responsibility should not fall on the Quartermasters Department for the errors by Count Kamensky and Bennigsen, for the consequences of their ill health, for the chaos at the army high command as a result of the lack of leadership and the consequences of this chaos, for the shortcomings in the organisation of the army high command, formation headquarters and the Quartermasters Department itself, for the inadequate organisation of this department and even for their inadequate training, since they had been removed from liaison with formations or from serving with them before the war, and the demands that were made on them in peacetime had almost nothing in common with what was required of them in wartime.

The activities of some individuals during this war might still be subject to scrutiny, in order to clarify the question of how much they were at fault in relation to their specific duties, for example, during the Battle of Friedland and throughout the retreat of our forces to the Neman river, but here too, in all likelihood, the results of such an investigation would find in their favour; there can be no question of criticism against the entire Quartermasters Department in the sense of the above. Nevertheless, this conclusion does not dismiss the presence of serious shortcomings and omissions in the organisation, direction and preparation of our Quartermasters Department and our staff institutions in general, which became more or less clear during the wars of 1805 and 1806 to 1807.

The consequences of the unsuccessful outcome of the war of 1806 to 1807:

At that time, our government drew attention to these shortcomings and gaps, and came to the conclusion that it was necessary to reorganise all the staff institutions in general correspondingly.

Naturally, it seemed appropriate to take the French military institutions as a model, which was in complete harmony with the above-mentioned similar attitude towards French institutions in the sphere of general state administration. Adjutant General Prince P.M. Volkonsky was sent abroad in order to study French military institutions in that same year of 1807.



Crossing The Kvarken

CHAPTER 6.

The Swedish War of 1808 to 1809:

Meanwhile, improvements in our military preparations were facilitated by the Turkish War from 1806 to 1812 and the Swedish War from 1808 to 1809, especially the latter, which provided extensive combat experience, not only for generals, but also for line officers, and for officers of the Quartermasters Department in particular. The army assigned to operations against the Swedes was not large (26,000 men with 117 guns and, from the reserves, one infantry division and several garrison regiments). At the same time, the unique conditions of the Finnish theatre of war required a thorough study of the ground, while the division of formations into small, almost completely independent detachments developed the resourcefulness, intelligence and initiative of the commanders of small units and required extreme precision in all orders. It was under these conditions that a school was established to train future members of the Quartermasters Department. The first experiments in a new structure for army headquarters were made here: the closest collaborator and assistant of the Commander-in-Chief Count Buxhoeveden¹ was Quartermaster-General Suchtelen, in the post of Chief-of-Staff and simultaneously Chief-of-Engineers; Finland was already familiar to him from the war of 1789. In turn, his immediate subordinates were: Major General B.M. Berg² in the post of Quartermaster-General, and Lieutenant General Konovnitsyn in the post of Duty General. However, the structure of military headquarters was not changed and, as before, was dependent on the whim of the formation commander; the headquarters were manned by the commander's staff, and did not come from the detachments entrusted to them. Thus, in one case an headquarters staff consisted of the formation commander's secretary (an official) and two officers from the Quartermasters Department; in another, in addition to the officers from this department, the closest associate of the detachment commander was the Brigade Major,³ selected by him from among the line officers. There was still no dedicated chancellery in such detachments at that time; orders were usually promulgated by the commanders office, where the officers assigned to him copied the issued dispositions and orders. Of course, the only benefit to the service came from the simplicity of this office work, in Finland in particular, with those small detachments into which our army was divided.

During this campaign, quartermaster's duties were performed not only by officers from His Majesty's Suite of the Quartermasters Department, but also by engineering officers subordinate to the same overall commander, General Suchtelen. In total, the Army of Finland had the following: 14 field officers, 27 subalterns and five Column Leaders.

During the campaign in question, the officers of the Quartermasters Department had a broad field of activity, which was greatly facilitated by the fact that Suchtelen himself and his talented assistant,

1 Later, General Knorring was appointed to replace Buxhoeveden, who, however, did not achieve any remarkable accomplishments.

2 Burkhard Maksimovich Berg began his service in 1774 as a sergeant in the Voronezh Infantry Regiment; he spent his first years of service as an aide-de-camp to General Igelstrom, and then to his father, General-in-Chief M.V. Berg. Following the death of his father, he was transferred to the Nesvizh Carabinier Regiment; he participated in the Turkish War from 1787 to 1791. He transferred to the 3rd Estonian Jäger Battalion and was then assigned to the provisioning staff. As a military adviser to the Provisioning Department, he took part in the North Holland expedition of 1799. Upon returning to Russia, he was transferred to His Majesty's Suite of the Quartermasters Department as a colonel. In 1806 he served under Count Osterman and distinguished himself in the battle at Czarnowo; he was wounded in the Battle of Preußisch Eylau; for his distinction in this battle he received the Order of St. George, 4th class. On 1 [13] January 1808 he was promoted to major general.

3 In the Military Regulations For Infantry Field Service of 1796, 'Brigade Majors are to possess detailed information on the army or corps, they brief the generals (and so on)... and are to perform similar duties in the army as are carried out by adjutants in the regiment, and they are to be appointed one for each arm of service.' There were to be two of them in an army. C.C.L. XXIV, No. 17,388.

Major General Berg, were heading this department. The very fact that the Quartermasters Department was not subject to similar complaints during this campaign as had been raised during the campaign of 1805 speaks in its favour. The senior commander of this department, Suchtelen, was distinguished by his modesty and did not boast for himself; this trait of his character was reflected in the entire department entrusted to him. Therefore, the excellent performance by this department in 1808 and 1809 in Finland and Sweden is little known; only Supreme Orders from that time, the War Diary and the rather sparse literature of this war testify to it in brief; more detailed information is contained in the archives.

In this case, the awards received by its members for distinction shown during this campaign, as well as the acts themselves, speak eloquently in favour of the Quartermasters Department:

1. In the sphere of activity directly or indirectly related to the duties of the Quartermasters Department: on 30 March [11 April] 1808, Major Neidhardt, serving under General Prince Bagration, the commander of 21st Infantry Division, received orders to go to the Åland Islands with 120 jägers (mostly barely trained recruits) and 22 Cossacks, with the aim of destroying all vessels there, preventing the Swedes from landing and preventing the raising of the local militia (some 3,000 men); one infantry battalion under Colonel Vuich was deployed in support on Kumlinge Island; Neidhardt, to the surprise of the inhabitants, captured the island of Fasta Åland, found and destroyed hidden weapons caches, destroyed the telegraph (maintaining communications with Sweden), confiscated the population's means of transport and, after the ice broke up, destroyed all marker buoys around the islands and in the fairways; in the meantime, Swedish ships had landed troops, who, with the help of the population, captured our weak and scattered outposts; Neidhardt, after three days of stubborn defence, was taken prisoner; he received a diamond ring for these operations; independently of this, on 12 [24] April of the same year, he was awarded a Supreme Commendation for distinction in 'the capture of Finland;' soon afterwards he was promoted to lieutenant colonel. Major Gaverdovsky, through the successful deployment of skirmishers and artillery, contributed to the repulse of a Swedish landing detachment carrying out a surprise raid on our headquarters (at the Vestankärr manor) after the battle at Sandöström on 20 July [1 August] 1808; overall, this officer made a great name for himself during this war thanks to his brilliant military capability; he was awarded a Supreme Commendation for this campaign and was granted a lease, a very valuable reward at that time, especially for an officer of his rank, and so on.
2. For distinctions over and above the duties of the Quartermasters Department: Russia owes the taking of Sveaborg [Suomenlinna] to P.K. Suchtelen himself, which had been considered impregnable, with almost no casualties and, moreover, without a lengthy siege; his main accomplice in this action was his son, P.P. Suchtelen, who, on his instructions, conducted negotiations with the commandant of Sveaborg; the father was awarded the Order of St. Vladimir, 1st class, while the son was awarded the same order, 4th class, and the status of *Flügeladjutant* [Equerry]; during this campaign, in addition to these two awards, the young Suchtelen also received a ring, two decorations, the rank of lieutenant, and so on.

Without listing every exploit and distinction shown by officers of the Suite, it may be said that, overall, they were strewn with Supreme awards: thus, I.P. Liprandi, having started the campaign as a Column Leader, ended it as a lieutenant in the Quartermasters Department and received: the medal of distinction of the Military Order, two promotions, a Supreme Commendation, the Order of St. Anne 3rd class and a Golden Sword engraved *за храбрость* [for valour]; other officers of the Suite received multiple awards, while only a few received single awards.⁴ Thus, for almost the first

⁴ See Supreme Orders for 1808 and 1809; War Diaries for 1808 and 1809; announcements in the St. Petersburg Gazette over the same period; an article by P.P. Suchtelen about this same war; the work by Lieutenant Colonel Prussak of the General-Staff, Military Awards To Members Of His Imperial Majesty's Suite Of The Quartermasters

time, the officers of His Majesty's Suite of the Quartermasters Department stood here in the same ranking with the generals' aides-de-camp, whose representative may be acknowledged as Lieutenant Zakrevsky (later Adjutant General, General-of-Infantry and Count), the aide-de-camp to the hero of this war, Lieutenant General Count N.M. Kamensky. Zakrevsky, for distinction in this same war, received: two promotions, the Order of St. Vladimir, 4th class and a Golden Sword with the inscription *за храбрость*.⁵ This was all the more significant because the military commanders, many of whom had themselves risen through the schooling of aides-de-camp, generally acknowledged this path as the best military education for young officers and, at the same time, regarded officers of the Quartermasters Department with suspicion, among whom were some unfamiliar with the troops, their way of life and all the nuances of a military existence (foreigners, engineers and former Column Leaders, who spent a significant part of their service in the depot or on surveys and generally had not seen combat).

The Turkish War of 1806 to 1812:

Similar conclusion can be drawn with regard to the Turkish War from 1806 to 1812. Indeed, no complaints were heard here about the Quartermasters Department, and therefore it must be assumed that it was directed and its duties were carried out with complete success. Military awards to members of the Suite are, perhaps, less common than in 1808 and 1809 in Finland and Sweden, but this may be explained by the comparatively small number of officers from the Quartermasters Department. Here, among others, K.F. Toll was promoted to lieutenant colonel and received the Order of St. Anne, 2nd class, colonels Khomentovsky 1st and Friedrich were promoted to major general, lieutenant colonels Count Venanson and Michaud were promoted to colonel; the latter received, in addition, the Order of St. George, 4th class for the capture of Turtukai [Tutakan]; the same order was awarded to Major Khomentovsky 2nd, for distinction at Shumla [Shumen], who had also been promoted to this rank for military distinction and in this same campaign received a Supreme Commendation and a Golden Sword (for the battle at Batino [Batin]), and so on.⁶

Although there were no such lessons here as in Finland and Sweden, military operations continued for no less than five years against an enemy who often had superior numbers, across a vast theatre, under the command of such leaders as generals Michelson, Meyendorff, Prozorovsky, Bagration, Kamensky 2nd and Kutuzov, of whom the latter made good the errors of his predecessors, ended the war with the masterfully directed Ruschuk [Ruse] operation and delivered the 'God-given' Bucharest peace to Russia at a most difficult time, thus facilitating the conduct of the war against Napoleon. Under such conditions, the operating procedures from the Turkish War of 1806 to 1812 also acquired great value for the officers of the Quartermasters Department and must have contributed to raising the level of specialised training for this entire department in general; this war should have definitively revealed the characteristics of this enemy and this theatre of military operations against whom and in which Russia had been obliged to wage so many wars. Unfortunately, this was obstructed by:

1. The primary significance of the Patriotic War of 1812, which diverted the attention of our government and military men from this secondary enemy and from this secondary theatre of military operations.
2. The ease with which we achieved success over superior Turkish numbers in the open field, and which we omitted to compare with the remarkable tenacity of these same Turks in defence, especially behind fortifications.

Department And Members Of The General Staff By Supreme Order Between 1796 And 1901 (St. Petersburg, 1902), etcetera.

5 Supreme Orders for 1806 to 1812; War Diaries for this war; announcements in the St. Petersburg Gazette from this period; Colonel Prussak's work, etcetera.

6 Supreme Orders for 1806 to 1812; War Diaries for this war; announcements in the St. Petersburg Gazette from this period; Colonel Prussak's work, etcetera.

3. Our inadequate study of Turkish military doctrine, which, although they were going through a critical period of their existence at that time, was already beginning to improve.
4. The inadequate study of the theatre of military operations and the political situation (with all its possible implications) in which we had to wage war with Turkey.

Was the Quartermasters Department culpable for this? The most severe but impartial judge would either acquit them of this charge altogether, or place them in the last rank of those to whom it might apply.

His Imperial Majesty's Suite of the Quartermasters Department under Acting Quartermaster-General Vistitsky 2nd:

Immediately after the end of the Swedish War and well before the end of the Turkish, General Suchtelen resigned his post as head of the Quartermasters Department, although he retained the honorary title of Quartermaster-General until his death. With the conclusion of peace at Fredrikshamn [Hamina] in 1809, he was appointed Ambassador Extraordinary to Stockholm. Upon his departure for the Army of Finland in 1808, the direction of the Quartermasters Department had been entrusted to Major General Vistitsky 2nd,⁷ and with Suchtelen's assignment to Stockholm, the Map Depot remained under the direct control of Major General Opperman, who was also placed at the head of the Engineering Department; thus this depot became detached from the Quartermasters Department.⁸

During the direction of the Quartermasters Department by Major General Vistitsky, the following very important decrees were issued:

1. From 2 [14] June 1808, officers wishing to enter service with the Suite (as well as in the Engineering Corps) had to undergo an examination of the vital knowledge for successful performance of the corresponding specialised duties;⁹ it is quite possible that this measure was connected to the ideas that would lead to the publication, some time later, of decrees 'on court titles' (3 [15] April 1809) and 'on civil-service status' (6 [18] August of that same year); by virtue of the latter, examinations were established for officials subject to promotion to Collegiate Assessors and Councillors of State.¹⁰
2. From 16 [28] May 1809, 'those applying to serve in the Quartermasters Department as Column Leaders... under the age of 16 should not be accepted';¹¹ it is hardly possible to object to this decree, which indicated the admission of abuses in this regard and categorically prohibited them.
3. From 6 [18] September 1809, 'The Sovereign Emperor, having seen that some of the gentlemen divisional and corps commanders have field officers from line regiments with them as Duty Officers, has deigned to order the following: that from now on and henceforth, these posts shall be held by officials who are none other than field officers or captains from His Majesty's Suite of the Quartermasters Department;' the Military Collegium was charged with the following duties: to order the named military commanders to communicate and continue to communicate on similar issues with the Quartermaster-General, to submit the names of selected officers for Supreme approval, and to return the combat officers occupying the aforementioned posts to their regiments.¹²

7 Mikhail Stepanovich Vistitsky 2nd was with Rimsky-Korsakov's corps in 1799 and compiled a description of the operations by this corps.

8 In 1810, the Map Depot came under the direct control of the Minister of War.

9 C.C.L. XXX, No. 23,057. According to a note by the Military Collegium regarding Lieutenant Arseniev. The examinations were to be conducted by order of the Quartermaster-General or his deputy.

10 For the significance of these decrees, see Schilder's, Emperor Alexander the First, II, 259-260.

11 C.C.L. XXX, No. 23,641.

12 C.C.L. XXX, No. 23,827.

In all likelihood, all these decrees were connected with the ideas that would lead to the publication, at the same time, of a decree on filling posts in the War Department with worthy men and on removing the incompetents from their positions.¹³

It was already evident at this time in the leadership circles of our army, not only were drafts for a radical reform of the entire military system being discussed, but many subjects of the programme being developed were also acknowledged as having already received completely definitive decisions and would be subject to immediate implementation.

Their passage through the War Department was not even hindered by the fact that Count Arakcheev was at the head of this department. He could not prevent what Emperor Alexander had firmly and irrevocably decided upon, and that the Tsar understood perfectly well that he [Arakcheev] was not in a position to implement the reforms reality demanded, to set the new requirements in the sense of the novel factors of this situation, and to lead the army forward in general. In view of this, Count Arakcheev had to give up the post of Minister of War to another person who combined the necessary military-administrative abilities and knowledge of military life in peacetime with combat experience, with the knowledge and understanding of war and everything that was necessary in order to bring the combat preparations of the army to the level of development that was required by the situation.

Likewise, a corresponding change had to take place in the administration of the Quartermasters Department: M.S. Vistitsky was only the temporary replacement for the former and future heads of the Quartermasters Department, who were outside of Russia (the former had moved on to diplomatic activity, and the future was studying the structure of the best of the Western European armies).

Conclusions on the direction of the Quartermasters Department under P.K. Suchtelen and the urgent need for reform:

What was the significance of P.K. Suchtelen's directorship of the Quartermasters Department? He set himself the objective of staffing it with men who were truly outstanding in their education and their abilities. He managed not only to achieve this aim (as far as it was possible), but also to open up a vast stage for the members of the Suite upon which their duties and abilities could be fully demonstrated (the Ionian Islands, the Caucasus, the Kirghiz steppes, Siberia, China and even Japan, in addition to the previous duty theatres).

Suchtelen's great achievement is that he established our cartography on sound principles, laying the foundations for two important maps for the forces: the specialised (hundred-sheet) map and the route map; he also laid the foundations for our geodetic work and the training of several remarkable personalities in this regard for a later era. It is also true that all these activities distracted the officers of the Suite from serving alongside the troops and, in general, from fulfilling the direct duties of the General Staff, as we understand them today.

Suchtelen travelled around what was then our western border area himself, with several officers of the Suite, which, it seemed, was soon to become a theatre for combat operations; on the basis of the work carried out in this regard, contingency plans were drawn up for the defence of the western border of the Empire; among Suchtelen's subordinates in this work, the above-mentioned Major Khatov and Captain Harting should be set in pride-of-place.

The campaigns of 1806 and 1807, the Turkish campaign of 1806 to 1812, and the Swedish campaigns of 1808 and 1809 in particular, had reduced the extent of the capability gaps that had been revealed in the campaign of 1805, brought the Quartermasters Department closer to the formations, and contributed to the restoration of confidence in them on the part of the troops and their commanders. But this was not enough, and the impending decisive clash between Russia and

13 C.C.L. XXX, No. 23,876.

one of the greatest military geniuses of all times and nations, who had an enormous numerical superiority, required a rapid improvement of our combat preparations in general, and at the same time a correspondingly rapid improvement of the Quartermasters Department.



Pyotr Kornilovich van Suchtelen

CHAPTER 7.

Reform Of The War Department From 1810-1812.

Emperor Alexander's main collaborators of in the matter of reforming the Russian military system:

From the beginning of 1810, Emperor Alexander's main collaborators in the matter of reforming the Russian military system were General-of-Infantry M.B. Barclay de Tolly¹ and Adjutant-General Prince P.M. Volkonsky.²

General-of-Infantry Barclay de Tolly:

The former was appointed Minister of War in January 1810 and immediately began to show increased activity, not only giving direction to the business of the department entrusted to him in its main directorates, but also delving into the detail of those matters which, in his opinion, were of the utmost importance, including those issues in the conduct of which the officers of the Quartermasters Department were also involved.³ Yet, neither his military authority, nor the great powers that were granted to him by law, could allow him to be considered the absolute director of the department entrusted to him. Not to mention the position held by the Committee of Ministers, which limited the powers of each of them taken individually, he had to take into account the various regulations that had been developed in previous eras of the state administration, even those that, given the new course of events, were subject to repeal, yet nevertheless continued to exist by virtue of tradition.

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- 1 Mikhail Bogdanovich Barclay de Tolly came from an ancient Scottish family that had moved to Livonia. Born in 1761, he was commissioned as a cornet into the Novotroitsk Cuirassier Regiment in 1778. He served as an aide-de-camp to Major General Patkul, and then to the Prinz von Anhalt-Bernburg; together with the latter he participated in the Second Turkish War of 1787 to 1791, up to and including the capture of Bender [1789], and thereafter in the war with Sweden in 1790. At the end of this war he was transferred to the St. Petersburg Grenadier Regiment; commanding a battalion from this regiment, he took part in the Third Polish War of 1794; for distinction shown here, he received the Order of St. George, 4th class, and was promoted to lieutenant colonel and was appointed commander of the 1st battalion of the Estland Jäger Corps, renamed 4th Jäger Regiment in 1796. He was promoted to colonel soon afterwards and to major general in 1799. He led his regiment to the borders of Silesia in 1805, from where he returned to Russia, since the war had already ended. He took part in the war of 1806 to 1807 and showed great distinction there: at Pultusk, for which he received the Order of St. George, 3rd class, in the vanguard and rearguard actions and at Preußisch Eylau, where he was wounded, after which he was promoted to lieutenant general and appointed commander of 6th Infantry Division. He took part in the war with Sweden from 1808 to 1809, commanding an independent corps; he advanced swiftly here, especially thanks to his famous crossing of the Kvarken. At the end of this war he was promoted to general-of-infantry and appointed Governor-General of Finland and Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Finland. On 20 January [1 February] 1810, he was appointed Minister of War. In 1814, he was promoted to Field Marshal and elevated to princely dignity. He died in 1818.
 - 2 Prince Pëtr Mikhailovich Volkonsky was born in 1776 and was immediately registered as a sergeant in the Preobrazhensky Regiment, with promotion to non-commissioned officer he was transferred to the Lifeguard Horse Regiment, and in 1792 to the Semenovskiy Regiment. He was promoted to ensign in 1793, sub-lieutenant in 1794, and lieutenant (as regimental adjutant) in 1796. His diligent and outstanding service attracted the attention of Emperor Paul and during the five years of his reign he advanced through the ranks of staff-captain, captain and colonel of the Guard. At the same time, he became close to the Heir Tsarevich Alexander Pavlovich. On the day of Emperor Alexander's coronation, he was promoted to major general and appointed adjutant-general. Soon thereafter, he was appointed deputy head of the Military Field Chancellery. In 1805 he was Duty General in Buxhoeveden's corps, and then in Kutuzov's. For distinction in the Battle of Austerlitz he received the Order of St. George, 3rd class. In 1807 he accompanied Emperor Alexander, and after the conclusion of the Peace of Tilsit he was sent to France. Upon returning from this mission, at the beginning of 1810, he was appointed director of His Imperial Majesty's Suite of the Quartermasters Department. In 1813 and 1814 he served under the Tsar as Chief of the General Staff. In 1815 he was appointed Chief of His Imperial Majesty's General Staff. During the reign of Emperor Nicholas I, he was appointed Minister of the Imperial Court, promoted to Field Marshal and received other high awards.
 - 3 See Sources in the Military Educational Archives of the General Staff, Patriotic War of 1812, Part I, Volume I, Chapters I & II; Preparations for War in 1810, St. Petersburg, 1900. General Barclay de Tolly's outgoing and incoming correspondence.

Such was the significance of the decision on the most important military affairs by the Supreme Council, which no longer had a place due to the current legislation, but which, nevertheless, having strengthened its position under Empress Catherine II, had not ceased to exist under Emperor Alexander, at least at the beginning of his reign. The Tsar's adjutants-general were of great importance, especially the individual who was entrusted with the announcement of the Supreme Will to the ministers and the higher state institutions. Count Arakcheev, during his short tenure as head of the War Department, had managed to change these conditions in many ways in the sense of strengthening the power and authority of the Minister of War, but all that he had suppressed was ready to rise up again.

Adjutant-General Prince Volkonsky, his mission to France and study of French military institutions:

At this time, Prince P. M. Volkonsky had returned to Russia from a foreign mission, having previously served as a deputy head of the Military Field Chancellery for five years, where his extraordinary memory, rare powers of observation, and ability to quickly and clearly grasp the most complex ideas served him as valuable qualities for mastering all the command and control functions. Thus, he had taken the opportunity not only to become familiar with every element of the complex and rather confusing (at that time) military administration in detail, but also to understand the connection between this administration with other branches of state administration and, at the same time, to develop a broad view of the structure of the armed forces of the Empire. Combat experience and a lengthy time abroad (from 1807 to 1810), with the aim of studying foreign military institutions, further strengthened these preparations.

Prince Volkonsky's military career began with the campaign of 1805, during which he was Duty General, first in Buxhoeveden's corps and then under Kutuzov. In the latter case, staff duties were divided between him and Weyrother. Thus he had to perform his very difficult and complex tasks under the most unfavourable of conditions. In his report dated 30 November [12 December] 1805, Kutuzov stated: 'At the Battle of Austerlitz, Prince Volkonsky showed virtues that are all the more evident in misfortune than in a victorious battle. He was outstanding not only in his valour, but also in his prudence and the preservation of all the composure necessary in such cases, under direct enemy fire, contributing three times to the rallying of men from the Phanagoria and Ryazhsk regiments, with whom I was able to retreat in some order.'⁴ The campaigns of 1805 and 1806 to 1807 revealed the deficiencies of our military system. It was essential to eliminate them, even if this was in the form of imitation of foreign methods. To that end, at Tilsit in 1807, Emperor Alexander introduced Prince Volkonsky to Napoleon, and soon afterwards he was sent to France to study its military institutions and the structure of the French General Staff in particular.

In what form did these institutions generally appear, and the aforementioned staff in particular?

The French military system under the revolutionary regime, its rationalisation by the *Premier consul* and *Empereur* Napoleon:

In the dying years of the 18th century, the revolutionary republican regime quickly proved its inadequacy. There was almost no liaison between the *Ministère de la Guerre* and the army. Following the establishment of the last republican government known as the *Directoire* (with the *Conseil des Anciens* and *Conseil des Cinq-Cents*), the *ministre de la guerre*, Dubois de Crancé,⁵ was

4 Glinetsky, I, 214.

5 The attitude of the *Premier consul* towards this minister is evident from the following order of 10 Nivôse, An VIII du calendrier républicain (31 December, 1799, new style): 'Citoyen Dubois-Crancé, who was neither a *général de brigade* nor *général de division* in the war, shall be returned to the post of *adjudant-général*, which he held before entering the *Convention nationale* as a deputy, and shall be sent to the *Armée du Rhin*.' *Correspondance de Napoléon I*, VI, No. 4489.

unable to give the consuls even the most superficial report on the state of the army.⁶ General Berthier was appointed *ministre de la guerre* in his place, who needed a lot of time to collect definitive information on the true state of affairs. Soon thereafter, Berthier was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the *armée de Réserve*,⁷ while Carnot took over the administration of the *Ministère de la Guerre*, and tried to restore the power of the *ministre de la guerre*, but did not remain in this post for long, to which Berthier was reappointed.

The *Premier consul* decided to reform the *Ministère de la Guerre* according to a pre-drafted plan, but, initially, it was only possible to introduce dedicated *inspecteurs aux revues* (unit inspectors), who were subordinate to the *ministre de la guerre* and the *directeur général des inspections et des conscriptions* and were in charge of some commissariat matters.⁸ Just two years later, the reform of the *Ministère de la Guerre* was able to proceed.⁹

Ministre de la guerre and ministre, directeur de l'administration de la guerre:

The highest command and control of the *Ministère de la Guerre* was entrusted not to one, but to two ministers: the *ministre de la Guerre* (Minister of War) and the *ministre, directeur de l'administration de la guerre* (Minister (Director) of Military Administration).

The duties of the *ministre de la Guerre* included:

1. The formation and organisation of the army; the *Gendarmerie nationale*.
2. Movements, inspections, cash payments, forage allowances under the care of regimental commanders, replenishment of lost equipment and awards for military achievements.
3. Appointments to posts (within their department), invalids and military schools.
4. The fighting and administrative elements of the artillery and engineers.
5. Pensions, prisoners of war and miscellaneous awards.
6. Chancellery disbursements.
7. Military archives and map depots.
8. Extraordinary and secret disbursements.
9. Reporting on all of the above administrative directorates.

The following were under the jurisdiction of the *ministre de l'administration de la guerre*:

1. Preparation of magazines for bread, meat, drink, fodder, field tools, siege items, bedding, heating, lighting, accommodation and prisons.
2. The establishment of hospitals, the appointment of *ordonnateurs*,¹⁰ *commissaires de guerre*, medical and military administrative officials, and the establishment of field post offices.
3. Clothing, weapons, camp items, vehicles, military transport and trains, staging posts, remounts and horse harness.

Each of these directorates was under the jurisdiction of a dedicated *conseiller d'État*, while all these

6 A remarkable report had been presented to the consuls at the same time by Dubois-Crancé's predecessor, General Bernadotte; see *Compte rendu par le général Bernadotte, ex-Ministre de la guerre... présenté aux Consuls de la République le 1^{er} Germinal an 8 de la République française une et indivisible*. Paris, Prairial, an VIII.

7 In view of the fact that the *Premier consul*, according to the law, could not command the army himself. Nevertheless, Berthier was merely the nominal Commander-in-Chief, while the *Premier consul* was the *de facto* commander of the army in person.

8 *Décret du 9 pluviôse de l'an 8 de la République* [29 January 1800, new style].

9 *Décret du 17 vendémiaire an 10 de la République* [9 October 1801, new style].

10 This was the title given to the head *commissaires de guerre*.

advisers, under the chairmanship of the *ministre*, constituted a *conseil administratif* in which all administrative matters were considered and decided upon and reports verified. The *ministre, directeur de l'administration de la guerre* did not report to the *ministre de la Guerre* but reported on his affairs directly to the *Premier consul*, and later to the *Empereur*.

Unity of military administration:

With this division of military administration between two authorities independent of each other, it had been intended to ease the burden on both elements. In fact, clashes occurred which, instead of facilitating, made it more difficult to conduct business, and it was only thanks to the centralisation and skilful direction of these departments in the hands of Napoleon himself, that these difficulties did not slow down the operations of this entire complex military administrative system, while at the same time the division of labour between the two ministers undoubtedly made it easier for each of them as individuals.

The *état-major général* under the revolutionary regime:

It goes without saying that Napoleon also paid attention to the *état-major général*, which, under the revolutionary regime, had fallen into complete disarray. By the law of 5 October 1790, the French *états-majors* of the army, infantry and cavalry were abolished and replaced by thirty *généraux* or *adjudans-généraux ou de division* (divisional adjutants), with the rank of colonel and lieutenant colonel. Then, on 1 June 1791, the Instructions in the Duties of the *états-majors*, developed under the previous regime (and amended slightly), was announced, according to which all *adjudans-généraux ou de division* had similar duties, but in each division, or when several divisions were combined, whoever was senior in rank and service was the chief of the others; to assist *adjudans-généraux ou de division*, in accordance with this concept, divisional commanders appointed officers from the line who were considered to be 'seconded' for the duration of the war only and without the right to the title of *adjudans-généraux ou de division*. On 5 April 1792, the revised Regulations for Infantry Field Service of 1788 were issued, in which the *chef des officiers de l'état-major général*, who had existed under the previous regime, were restored, but they received the more appropriate title of *chef d'état-major général* (instead of the previous *quartier-maître général*).

However, there were excessive and shameful abuses in appointments to positions on the *état-major*: *adjudans-généraux ou de division* and their *adjoints* [assistants], who were appointed in huge, uncounted numbers and moreover without any vetting (for intrigue, patronage, bribery, and so on), for the most part, being completely unsuited, who (in the words of de Philip) 'had become strangers to all that was honourable;'¹¹ of these, the common soldiers were also the best; General Dumouriez criticised the *ministre de la Guerre*, Pache, for appointing a dancer from the theatre as *adjudans-général* to the army entrusted to him, and according to Grimoard, even women were appointed to these posts.¹²

There were many talented generals in the French army at that time, under whose leadership good officers of the *état-major* could have been developed; such outstanding officers in this kind of duty as Berthier and Mathieu Dumas¹³ remained from the Royal *état-major général*, and at the same time such worthy candidates as de Billy¹⁴ were developed through combat experience. But in order for them to be able to take their rightful places and for the entire French *état-major* of that time to become fit for purpose, it was necessary to change the conditions under which the French army in general and the *état-major* in particular had been placed under the revolutionary regime.

11 De Philip, *Étude sur le service d'état-major pendant les guerres du premier empire*, Paris, 1900, page 10.

12 Grimoard, *Traité sur le service de l'état-major général des armées*, Paris, 1811, I, 183. Grimoard, *Traité sur le service de l'état-major général des armées*, Paris, 1811, I, 183.

13 Berthier's comrade in arms in the American War of Independence; in 1783, *adjoint* to the *quartier-maître général* of the army; in 1805, *chef d'état-major* of the camp at Bruges.

14 Lottin, *Un Chef d'État-Major Sous la Révolution - Le Général de Billy*, Paris, Nancy, 1901.

Improvements to the *état-major* in Italy by General Bonaparte in 1796:

In the midst of the revolutionary chaos, General Bonaparte emerged, who, in a short time, eclipsed the other generals with the brilliance of his victories, amazed his contemporaries with his skill at directing operations, showed and taught others how to wage war without demanding almost anything from the government and even supplying cash to another army and to the government itself. 'We have at last found ourselves a master' wrote one of the generals who found himself under General Bonaparte's command at the very beginning of the campaign of 1796. This opinion began to spread throughout the French army, and then throughout France. It was evident that Bonaparte possessed the secret to victory and the secret to controlling those who were like himself. It was natural that he could and would improve the *état-major*. This is what he set about doing from the very beginning of his first campaign as a Commander-in-Chief. General Berthier was appointed *chef d'état-major de l'armée*, while *adjudant-général* Vignolle was retained as his assistant; at the same time, *général de division* Gaultier was entrusted primarily with the administration of the *service d'inspection d'état-major*. The generals were ordered to select the deficient number of aides-de-camp, while the *adjudans-généraux* who did not have *adjoints* were to present candidates for these important positions without delay, by no means guided by considerations of personal interest, but only having in mind 'the talents, morality and pure and sublime patriotism' of the prospective candidates. The Commander-in-Chief categorically ordered the *chef d'état-major de l'armée* to warn the *adjudans-généraux* that their *adjoints* would undergo a corresponding examination in order to determine whether they could be of use to the service.¹⁵

What General Bonaparte's requirements were can be seen from the whole series of questions, one after the other, which he put to an officer of the *état-major*, Thiébault, who had arrived to report to him from General Masséna's division:¹⁶ How many men are under arms in Masséna's division? How many in each unit? Are there detachments from units of this division to the rear? What is their strength? Where are they? Where are they marching from? When are they expected to arrive? What is the condition of their weapons, clothing and footwear? What resources are available in these units? What is the condition of the artillery? What is the composition of the materiel and horses? Are distributions being carried out correctly? Are the bread, meat, wine and fodder of good quality? How many patients are there in local medical institutions? How many are walking-wounded? What is the state of these medical institutions? What is the mortality rate? What is being done to reduce it? What is the division's location and the deployment of units? What duties are the troops performing? Where are the enemy outposts? What are their quarters (on the ground)? Where are their main forces? What is the latest intelligence on them?¹⁷

Thiébault had difficulty answering, at which the Commander-in-Chief expressed his displeasure, but he turned this to his advantage. From then on, he noted and wrote down the daily answers to these and many other questions,¹⁸ and some time later he published the guidelines he had compiled for *adjudants généraux*.¹⁹ During this same campaign, many *adjudants généraux* (Vial, Franceschi, Frontin, the younger Kellermann, Leclerc, Laguan and others) often received orders directly from the Commander-in-Chief himself and, under his leadership, underwent such practical experience that it replaced the academic education that they lacked.

Thus, General Bonaparte called upon men already known to him and removed those who were incapable, while beginning to compensate for the ambiguity of the scope of activity of the *état-major* and their lack of instructions with orders, instructions and fragmentary orders, in which he

15 *Correspondance militaire de Napoléon I*, I, No. 5; *Ordre du 9 germinal an IV* [29 March 1796] à Nizza.

16 Thiébault was already working as an *adjudant général adjoint* in 1793.

17 De Philip, 19-20.

18 He devised the latter himself.

19 Thiébault, *Manuel Des Adjudans-généraux Et Des Adjoints Employés Dans Les États-majors-divisionnaires Des Armées. An VIII*.

clarified the details of the duties of the *état-major* in full accordance with the requirements of the situation. In short, he began to create a battle-school for the *état-major*.²⁰

By choosing worthy officers as *adjudants généraux* and giving them appropriate instructions, General Bonaparte entrusted them with the most important missions in every branch of military activity, diplomatic matters, legal matters, and so on. This greatly raised the status of *adjudants généraux* within the army. Yet the performance of the *état-major* soon began to deteriorate. Most of the *adjudants généraux* under General Bonaparte's command, from the campaign of 1796 in Italy to the Egyptian expedition, were promoted to higher ranks such that they now had to train and prepare the officers of the *état-major* themselves. They had studied the duties of the *état-major* mainly from the practical point of view and were not able to generalise what they had learned into first principles. They wanted to teach others the way they had learned themselves, but that outcome could never be replicated. Moreover, appointments to the posts of *adjudants généraux* were not made with due consideration, which soon made itself felt: in Italy in 1798 and 1799, the *adjudants généraux*, deprived of the leadership of General Bonaparte, were no longer up to the role he had assigned to them.

Improvements to the *état-major* by the *Premier consul*, in connection with changes to the organisation of the army and in its higher command and control:

Following the *coup d'état* of 18 brumaire an VIII [9 November 1799], General Bonaparte became *Premier consul* and began to reform the *état-major*, in conjunction with some improvements in the organisation of the army and higher command. Each army was divided into three corps: the right wing, the centre, and the left wing; each of these corps consisting of three divisions, was entrusted to one of the three lieutenant generals assigned to each Commander-in-Chief as assistants, and had its own dedicated headquarters staff; *adjudants généraux* were appointed as the chiefs of staff of these headquarters, which, with the formation of permanent corps, led to the establishment of the posts of *chefs de état-major de corps*, with the rank of *général de brigade*. The *adjudants généraux* themselves were referred to as *adjudans commandants* (or adjutant major), and their status became diminished in view of the increased authority and responsibility of divisional and brigade commanders. In an IX de la République (1801), 200 assistants to the *adjudans commandants* formed a special corps called *adjoints à l'état-major* (assistants to the general staff); it was intended that there should be twice as many of them as *adjudans*.

The *adjudans commandants* were in the rank of colonel or lieutenant colonel, and those *adjoints* were in the rank of captain; they were selected from among the officers of the infantry and cavalry. However, these personnel were insufficient to carry out staff duties with the troops in wartime; in view of this, the headquarters would include officers assigned to them from every combat arm of the armed forces (including artillery), engineering officers (who carried out surveying and reconnaissance) and geographic engineers (topographers); finally, the generals were accompanied by aides-de-camp, and orderlies taken from the line.²¹

In 1803, as preparations were being made for a naval expedition against England, an *état-major général* (general staff of the army) was organised, at the head of which the *ministre de la Guerre* was placed as acting *major général* or chief of staff of the army. This *état-major* included: two *généraux de brigade*, four *adjudans commandants*, 16 *adjoints à l'état-major*, one inspector general of artillery and one inspector general from the corps of engineers, one *commissaire général* from the support services, one *directeur général* for each arm of service and the required number of military *commissaires* and their assistants.

The army was divided into four corps, of which three were composed from units that were in camp

20 In that same year of 1796, Berthier presented a document to the *ministre de la Guerre* on the duties of the *état-major* in the *armée d'Italie*, which was partly a reproduction of the draft instructions of 1788. See De Philip, 23-27.

21 De Philip, 12.

at Saint-Omer (four divisions of infantry and one of cavalry), at Bruges and Montreuil [Étaples] (three divisions each); the fourth corps or reserve consisted of two divisions of dragoons, one division of Italians, one division of reserve cavalry and one elite division. Headquarters staffs were then formed in these corps.²²

The higher military command and control and *État-major général* in France during the Napoleonic Wars from 1806 to 1809:

In 1804, the *Premier consul* became the *Empereur des Français*, Napoleon I, and his senior generals became *maréchaux d'Empire*. *Major-général* Berthier was senior to the other marshals, but this did not give him the right to take command of the army in the absence of the *Empereur*; command in this event would be entrusted to him by specific imperial orders and was usually influenced by the fact that Berthier was the *ministre de la Guerre*.

As the armed forces of the Napoleonic monarchy grew, so did their higher command and control. At the beginning of the campaign of 1806, after Napoleon had already reorganised his *grande armée*, the higher command was divided into three parts:

1. Imperial headquarters [*maison militaire de l'Empereur*].
2. The headquarters and directorate of the *major-général*.
3. The *état-major général de l'armée* itself.

The Imperial headquarters included:

1. Five generals who held the highest court positions under the *Empereur*;²³ each of them was accompanied by two or three aides-de-camp (rank-ranged from lieutenant to major).
2. Five *aides de camp de l'Empereur* also with the rank of general;²⁴ these were educated, capable, energetic men, first-class specialists in their own combat arm, but who knew the general operations by every troop-type very well, who had come up through Napoleon's school and who conveyed his concepts to corps commanders excellently; the *Empereur* used them depending on the characteristics and combat experience of each of them (Mouton led infantry columns delivering decisive strikes, Rapp led the cavalry in the attack, Drouot deployed massed batteries); they were known to the whole army as the companions of the *Empereur*, who, in turn, knew that, thanks to them, he would always be perfectly orientated; Each of them had two to three *officiers d'ordonnance* [orderly officers] (captains or majors).
3. The Emperor's *officiers d'ordonnance* (six, then 12) for the transmission of orders; having a similar ranking to the above-mentioned *officiers d'ordonnance* under the *aides de camp de l'Empereur* and, in addition, the *écuyer* [squire], his *chambellan* [chamberlain] and the captain who served under the *grand maréchal du palais*.
4. The *cabinet de l'Empereur*, consisting of a cabinet secretary,²⁵ a *secrétaire du portefeuille*²⁶ and an archivist,²⁷ all personally selected by him.
5. The *bureau topographique de l'Empereur*, which was independent of the topographic section of the *état-major général*.²⁸

22 *Correspondance militaire de Napoléon I*, III, No. 490; *Ordres généraux relatifs à l'état-major et aux quatre corps formant l'expédition de Boulogne...* Paris, 20 frimaire an XII (12 December 1803).

23 *Généraux de division* Duroc, Caulaincourt and Clarke, and *généraux de brigade* Corbineau and Gardanne.

24 *Généraux de division* Le Marois, Savary and Rapp, and *généraux de brigade* Bertrand and Mouton.

25 Initially, General Clarke.

26 He presented the letters and notes dictated to him by the *Empereur* for signature, and so on.

27 Baron Fain.

28 At the head of this office was Major Bacler d'Albe, an excellent geographic engineer.

The *major-général* was accompanied by:

1. Two generals and a colonel of engineers.
2. Assistants to the *major-général*.²⁹
3. Aides-de-camp to the *major-général* (six permanent, four supernumerary and three seconded, of whom two were engaged in field topographic work), six generals or field officers from allied forces (Württemberg, Bavaria, Baden and Hessen), who were entrusted with correspondence with their sovereigns.
4. The office (or bureau) of the *major-général*, consisting of one confidential secretary, two officers or *commissaires de guerre*, the head of the administrative bureau, the head of the bureau of *mouvements des troupes* (with six officials) and a classified section, which included intelligence and correspondence with the marshals;³⁰ all these were educated men, very capable, accustomed to clerical duties and to the rapid drafting of orders and instructions.

It was mainly civil officials rather than military officers who served in the bureau of the *major-général*, as it also was in the imperial headquarters, so as not to divert the latter from staff duties in the field.

At the head of the *état-major général de l'armée* itself stood the premier assistant to the *major-général*, *général de division* Andréossy, who received the grandiose title of *chef d'état-major de l'armée*.³¹ The following belonged to this *état-major*: four colonels or *adjudans commandants*, seven majors, 11 captains or lieutenants,³² one colonel commanding the headquarters security escort, one wagon-master-general and three seconded officers. The *chef d'état-major de l'armée* distributed the duties among the *adjudans commandants* in relation to correspondence between commanders, the locations and directions for units, entrusting them with all manner of things and so on; two officers were always at instant readiness; they were to accompany the *major-général* during a march or battle for the immediate transmission of his orders.

The bureau of the *état-major général* consisted of three *divisions*, headed by *adjudans commandants*; furthermore, the first *division* consisted of a major and three captains, while the other two had two captains each, assigned to the *état-major général*.

The jurisdiction over business was distributed between these departments as follows:

1. First *division* - daily orders; passwords, etcetera; dispatch of orders; correspondence, etcetera; orders for officers on the execution of their duties; movements of units; their status and position; collection of intelligence; the commandant's office; correspondence of a routine nature and significance.
2. Second *division* - accommodation for the army headquarters; military provost department; gendarmerie; provisioning; miscellaneous distributions; hospitals. The work of this department was simplified due to the fact that the *Empereur* worked together with the *quartier-maître général* himself.
3. Third *division* - prisoners of war, deserters; requisitions, etcetera; conscripts; courts martial; regulations and government rulings.³³

29 Bailly de Monthion stood out among them.

30 This section was entrusted to the engineer Colonel Blein, who was attached to the *major-général*.

31 He should be regarded as assistant to the chief of staff of the army, if we adhere to the terminology established subsequently.

32 In addition, two Polish officers acted as interpreters, and also carried out missions.

33 De Philip, 28-37. However, some amendments had been introduced.

This distribution was subject to some changes subsequently.³⁴

Furthermore, the manning of the headquarters of the *grande armée* included:

1. The topographic bureau, subordinate to the director of the *Dépôt de la Guerre*,³⁵ who had at his disposal three field officers and six geographic engineers.³⁶
2. Officers temporarily assigned to the headquarters, namely: newly promoted generals called up from the interior of the empire, or staff officers placed at the disposal of the government and awaiting assignment; the latter being appointed, at the discretion of the *major-général*, to gapped posts both in the various military headquarters and in the *état-major de l'armée*.
3. The commandant of the headquarters and his directorate.³⁷
4. Security escort for the headquarters (usually one cavalry regiment); escort of the *major-général* and guide-interpreters.³⁸
5. Staffs of the Chief of Artillery and the Chief of Army Engineers.
6. The administrative element of the army headquarters (including the *état-major*).³⁹

Thus, the organisation of army command and control which had served its purpose from 1796 to 1800 was now deemed unsuitable: the *Empereur* himself continued to direct operations, reserving the creative element of waging war and commanding forces for himself; moreover, despite the fact that he was burdened with the enormous workload that fell to him as head of state, he also reserved for himself much that might possibly be left to the actual chief of staff of the army (the *major-général*); this has been excused both by his capacity for comprehensive activity and by the primary importance of that which he kept under his control; the *major-général* was not excluded from this and also worked on these same issues; the activities of the *Empereur* and the *major-général* in this, as in all other respects, complemented each other. Although, in this manner, the *Empereur-commandant* worked much harder than Commanders-in-Chief usually did, while this made things easier for the *major-général*, nevertheless, such a multitude of duties and concerns fell to the latter that it was impossible to fulfil them all. In view of this, the entire preparatory element of the work of the *major-général* had been detached and was assigned to the so-called *état-major* proper together with the executive element, at the head of which a dedicated *chef d'état-major général* was also placed, corresponding to a German *Generalquartiermeister*; calling him a *quartier-maître général* was considered inappropriate, because not long before a *major-général* had been subordinate to a *quartier-maître général*, who was second-in-command in an army after the commander-in-chief;⁴⁰ nevertheless, it was desirable to place him high enough on the hierarchical ladder such that he could exercise the necessary initiative on those occasions when the good of the service demanded it; this explains the title granted to him.⁴¹ Within the *état-major* proper entrusted to him, reports and other papers were prepared in rough draft form, which then received their final finishing in the office of the *major-général*. Berthier reserved all the most important issues for

34 De Philip, 39.

35 General Sanson.

36 They had to record the army's situation daily, survey fighting positions, route cards, and so on.

37 General Fezensac recounted in his memoirs that in 1812 when Berthier was inspecting the headquarters, from a distance it appeared that this was a force in battle formation. Naturally, a commandant was needed who possessed the necessary status and authority.

38 In the Boulogne camp, dragoons who could speak English were chosen as guides; from 1806 to 1807, those who could speak German and Polish were selected.

39 De Philip, 44-45.

40 Grimoard, *Traité sur le service de l'état-major général des armées*, Paris, 1811, I, 9, 81 etcetera.

41 Having known General Andréossy since the campaign of 1796, the *Empereur* and the *major-général* were sure that he would be the kind of *chef d'état-major général* they needed. An officer like Jomini, for example, could not have been appointed to this post.

himself, the conduct of operations, the corresponding missions and reconnaissances, and entrusted all administrative and logistical issues and all the detail to the bureau of the *état-major*; these offices comprised no more than one third of the officers of the *état-major général de l'armée*; each of them was engaged in the specialisation that they knew best; the rest, and the most experienced and active, received special assignments outside the headquarters or edited reports under the gaze of the *major-général*; among the tasks assigned to them, pride of place went to the promulgation of orders.

The headquarters of the *Réserve de cavalerie* and army corps underwent a similar reorganisation. At the head of each of these headquarters stood the *chef d'état-major*, with the rank of *général de division* or *général de brigade*, to whom were subordinated:

1. One of the *adjudans commandants* as his assistant.
2. Several field officers and subalterns from the *état-major*, *adjoints à l'état-major* and officer-interpreters (mostly Poles); sometimes there were engineering officers.

The corps commander had four to seven aides-de-camp and subaltern ranks, while the cavalry commander had eight aides-de-camp, including one *général de brigade* and two colonels from among the regimental commanders. In total, each of these headquarters consisted of no less than 15 and no more than 24 officers, not counting the officials from the logistics department, the corps surgeon, the treasurer, the *directeur du poste*, for a total of nine officials; in spite of this, the marshals complained about the small numbers of staff officers. Among these officers, the most important missions were carried out by the premier aide-de-camp to the corps commander (or cavalry commander), the assistant *chef d'état-major* from the corps and other *adjudans commandants*, such as being sent with reports to the *Empereur* and speaking, where necessary, on behalf of the marshal; other officers from these headquarters transmitted orders.⁴²

Each divisional commander was accompanied by:

1. Three aides-de-camp or *officiers d'ordonnance* (including one field officer).
2. A divisional *chef d'état-major* with the rank of colonel.
3. Three captain *adjoints à l'état-major*.

The *chef d'état-major* corresponded and liaised with the brigade commanders and heads of the relevant departments commanding and controlling the troops; subsequently, they were allowed to request an orderly (officer) from the division's units, who, changing daily, was stationed throughout the night in the bureau of the divisional headquarters and was to transmit orders to the *généraux de brigade*. Each *général de brigade* had, in turn, one aide-de-camp and one orderly.⁴³

Evaluation of the organisation, direction and preparations by the supporting agencies of the higher military command and control in France from 1806 to 1809:

Overall, the higher military commanders were personally accompanied by a sufficient number of aides-de-camp, orderlies, and miscellaneous officials assigned to convey their will to the units in the strictest sense; at the same time, they had properly organised headquarters at their disposal, with the help of which they controlled the units entrusted to them on campaign, in battle and during military operations in general, while in peacetime they prepared for war; moreover, the distribution of tasks and assignments between the headquarters in general and the various ranks within these headquarters in particular represents the first example known in history that is instructive in a positive sense, developed by the French Napoleonic military school thanks to Napoleon himself and his closest collaborator Berthier.

A capable officer, who began his practical skills in the regiment, could attract the attention of his

⁴² The so-called *officiers de correspondance*.

⁴³ De Philip, 45-52.

brigade commander and become his aide-de-camp or orderly; if he was only distinguished by an outstanding aptitude for staff duties, then sooner or later the divisional commander or even the corps commander or the corresponding chief of staff would pay attention to him, and in such an event he could join the divisional, and then the corps staff, from where it was not difficult, having shown the appropriate distinction, to get into the general staff of the army and even into the retinue of the *Empereur* himself. Outstanding officers were produced under these conditions, both for the general staff and for the aides-de-camp, between whom there was no sharply drawn dividing line that could not be overcome, and the higher military commanders had excellent support agencies at their disposal, which skilfully facilitated the difficult task of commanding and controlling the troops. It is also true that these commanders were themselves at the peak of their abilities: they knew their business,⁴⁴ knew how to select men who had the necessary gifts for service in the general staff or as an aide-de-camp, knew what could be demanded of both and what could not, and therefore the activities of the commanders and their supporting agencies mutually complemented each other.

It was thanks to all this that Napoleon was able to direct his *grande armée* and, despite the frequency of the wars, heavy losses and other unfavourable conditions, maintained this army as a formidable force and even increased its power, and at the same time augmented this army and strengthened its combat readiness. Nevertheless, the increase in size of the armed forces of Napoleon's monarchy could not help but lower the standards of the *grande armée*, but, until 1810, this decrease had not yet made itself felt, as the culmination of the development of Napoleon's power still lay ahead.

Prince Volkonsky's report and his appointment as director of the Quartermasters Department:

There was nothing similar in any of the other western European states. Naturally, the study of the French military system in general, the French military-administrative system in particular, and especially the French supporting agencies of higher military command and control, made a strong impression on Prince P. M. Volkonsky, which was reflected in the report he submitted.⁴⁵ The Tsar was very satisfied with the intelligence he had collected and appointed him director of the Quartermasters Department. Nevertheless, Prince P.M. Volkonsky understood that a literal imitation of the French would not be advisable; moreover, it was necessary to coordinate reforms in this area with the general spirit and direction of the reforms that were being carried out in our country at that time, especially since a true military man stood at the head of the Ministry of War, who had progressed thanks to his military talents and had developed his own programme for directing the department entrusted to him and for carrying out the necessary evolution of it. It was essential to march in step with him and to act thereafter in accordance with the circumstances.



Napoleon & Berthier At Marengo

⁴⁴ Napoleon had not yet spoken of his displeasure at the fact that they 'knew how to wage war only along the highways' as he would later express it.

⁴⁵ Biography of Prince P.M. Volkonsky (from the book, Emperor Alexander I and His Contemporaries); Glinetsky, I, 215 & 404.

CHAPTER 8.

Activities of the Minister of War, General-of-Infantry Barclay de Tolly and the institution of the War Ministry in 1812:

The period of the direction of the War Department by General-of-Infantry Barclay de Tolly was marked by two major acts of legislation:

1. The Establishment of the Ministry of War.
2. The Manual for the Administration of a Large Operational Army.

The overall establishment of ministries on 25 June [7 July] 1811 affected the Ministry of War only in general terms. The actual reorganisation of the central military administration on the principles as laid down in the foundation of the general establishment was determined by a dedicated establishment for the Ministry of War, granted Supreme approval on 27 January [8 February] 1812.¹ On the basis of both establishments, the direction of all Imperial military land forces was entrusted to the Ministry of War, which consisted of seven departments, the office of the minister and specialised institutions. The departments, in essence, were as follows:

1. Artillery.
2. Engineering.
3. Inspections.
4. Audit.
5. Commissariat.
6. Provisioning.
7. Medical.

The specialised institutions established with the Ministry of War comprised:

1. The Military Sciences Committee.
2. The Military Topographic Depot.
3. The Special Chancellery.
4. The Printing House.

The Department of Inspections and the Military Sciences Committee:

Among the subjects of the Department of Inspection's jurisdiction, attention was 'drawn to the distribution of orders from His Imperial Majesty and the Minister of War throughout the army and instructions regarding various changes being made in the army...' and '... regarding reforms being made in the units.'² The duties of the Military Sciences Committee were equally noteworthy: their main duty 'is to disseminate intelligence on scholarly developments in the art of war, and therefore:

1. ... the committee is to acquire copies of all the best newly published works on the art of war and the various elements associated with it.
2. They are to select the best and most useful of them for translation into the Russian language, examine and correct these translations, and, based on the work, petition for awards for those who translated them.
3. Are to consider various projects and studies for their introduction into use, and present their

1 C.C.L. XXXI, No. 24,686 & XXXII, No. 24,971.

2 C.C.L. XXXII, No. 24,971, Part I, Chapter IV, Paragraphs 44-45.

views on them to the Minister of War.

4. Are to publish a military journal.
5. Are to conduct examinations for all officials entering the technical corps of the War Department³ and for those nominated by them for promotion...
6. Are to participate in the supervision of every technical institution in the Quartermasters, Engineering and Artillery Departments, established for continued military education.'

This committee consisted of a chairman and six members: two each from the Artillery, Engineering, and Quartermasters departments; in addition, they were permitted to have honorary members and correspondents, both within Russia and beyond its borders.⁴

The Military Topographic Depot:

Finally, worthy of attention, no less than the previous departments of the War Ministry, is the Military Topographic Depot, 'established under the immediate command of the Minister of War for the collection, collation and storage of maps, plans, drawings, topographic and statistical data, journals and reports on military operations, contingency plans and dispositions for offensive and defensive wars, and especially for the compilation of comprehensive notes and indices from all the collected historical military intelligence sources.'⁵ The depot consisted of six sections:

1. The First Section was of particular importance, being responsible for 'training on special missions;' the duties of this section were determined by a 'dedicated instruction from His Imperial Majesty to the director of the Military Topographic Depot.'
2. The Second Section was in charge of 'astronomical observations and trigonometric surveys, which were necessary for the compilation of mapping.'
3. The Third Section was responsible for 'collating and drafting mapping' and at the same time 'compiling systematic indices of incoming topographic and statistical data, and extracts from various Russian historical reports.'
4. The Fourth Section were entrusted with: 'supervision of the archives of plans and maps and the library; maintaining them in proper order, compiling essential extracts;' the latter meant extracts 'in order to compile a military history of the Russian Empire' and 'for the compilation of the history of Russian geography and topography.'
5. The Fifth Section was in charge of 'engraving plates and printing maps and plans.'
6. The Sixth Section did 'clerical work, administration and disbursement of funds.'

The members of the first four sections were referred to as engineer-topographers; of these, the members of the first three sections (except for two astronomers) were on the army lists as field officers and subalterns and in the quartermaster or engineering services; the head of the Fourth Section was selected from among military personnel, while the members of the last two sections had civilian status. The Minister of War was given the right to second 'the required number of field officers and subalterns of the Quartermasters Department and Engineer Corps' to the Military Topographic Depot in order to 'fill the trigonometric grid with topographic detail from surveys.' In accordance with the Minister of War's communique, all state archives were required to deliver the files and minutes stored therein which related to the depot's business and were not subject to special secrecy, to the Topographic Depot for a certain period of time, of which those needed for military purposes could be transferred permanently to the depot's archive subject to Supreme approval.

3 Understanding this in the broadest sense, that is, in the sense of the military department.

4 C.C.L. XXXII, No. 24,971 'Regulations for the Military Sciences Committee.'

5 C.C.L. XXXII, No. 24,971 'Regulations for the Military Topographic Depot.'

Duty Generals and the situation of the Quartermasters Department:

The Minister of War had two Duty Generals charged with the following duties:

1. Regarding the army in general.
2. Regarding recruitment.⁶

In the 'establishments' of 1812, the Quartermasters Department was mentioned, but not a word was said about the Quartermaster-General or about the administration of this department in general, which remained, as it were, outside the framework of the reorganisation of the Ministry of War yet at the same time was subordinate to the Minister of War and the director of which was also subordinate to the Minister while, at the same time, due to his intimacy with the Person of the Sovereign, occupied such an influential position that in fact this subordination was often reduced to zero and even the Minister of War himself had to take this situation into account and the corresponding importance of the director of His Majesty's Suite of the Quartermasters Department.

Conclusions regarding the War Ministry as established in 1812:

Overall, the Ministry of War, in accordance with the reorganisation of 1812, drew almost every branch of administration in the military department into itself, while its internal organisation corresponded to the diversity of business under its jurisdiction, and this represented a big step forward; yet, at the same time, the precise delineation of spheres of interest and distribution of subjects of jurisdiction between departments were not carried out; the most important duties of the current General Staff were assigned to the Military Topographic Depot, which thus acquired a crucial significance in the matter of preparing the state for war, not to mention the fact that this same depot was to be engaged in the development of national military history and so on; the military-science and, to some extent, military-training departments were assigned to the subjects under the jurisdiction of the Military Science Committee, and changes and reforms to be carried out by army units were announced from the Inspections Department.

Thus, for the Quartermasters Department there remained only a rather narrow sphere of activity in peacetime, which could not but affect its activities in wartime.



Pyotr Mikhailovich Volkonsky

⁶ C.C.L. XXXII, No. 24,971, Part I, Chapter I, Paragraph 4.

CHAPTER 9.

The Quartermasters Department in the first years of Prince P.M. Volkonsky's administration:

The structure of the Quartermasters Department at that time was not itself based on corresponding definitive legislation; moreover, there were no such laws at all and everything depended on the discretion, that is, on the will of the person stationed at the head of this department. It is not surprising that neither formation commanders nor even the higher commanders themselves understood the significance or the structure of this department, nor their relationship to it. It had a main commander, but this commander did not have a properly organised administration; there were ranks serving in His Imperial Majesty's Suite of the Quartermasters Department, but there were no specific instructions regarding its manning, the duties of the named appointees or the delineation of their tasks.

Prince Volkonsky paid attention first of all to making up for these shortcomings, and he chose as his assistants the very officers he had met during the manoeuvres of 1804, lieutenant colonels Toll,¹ Khatov² and Selyavin,³ young men full of energy, self-confidence and with a thirst to keep busy. Of these, Khatov was especially useful in the matter of training the Column Leaders, Selyavin was Prince Volkonsky's right hand in administrative matters, while Toll played a similar role in relation to the general staff on active service.

The first results of the activity of the new head of the Suite was the establishment of its central administration, under the modest name of the Chancellery of the Director of the Quartermasters Department, the establishment of which, also composed on a modest scale, received Supreme approval in November 1810. This chancellery was intended to have four sections:

1. First Section, current business, consisted of the head (Lieutenant Colonel Selyavin), one auditor, one non-commissioned officer and two clerks.
2. Second Section, topographic, was responsible for the conduct of military surveying and the drawing of plans; it had a drafting office, which, however, had its own independent head.⁴
3. Third Section, route planning, directed everything related to military roads and the accommodation of troops in quarters and in camps. It came under Lieutenant Colonel Toll, who had three subalterns from the Quartermasters Department and three clerks at his disposal.
4. Fourth Section, was in charge of the treasury and archives and was entrusted to Lieutenant Colonel Peiker, who had one non-commissioned officer and one clerk at his disposal.

Following the formation of this chancellery, beginning on 10 [22] December 1810, it was set to issue orders to the Quartermasters Department, which included all orders regarding personnel for this department; these orders were drafted by First Section, signed by the director of the Suite and sent to all senior commanders from the Quartermasters Department with the field forces and to the officers located in St. Petersburg.

1 From 1806 to 1809 Toll served in the Army of the Danube, after which, due to dissatisfaction on the part of Prince Prozorovsky, he was appointed battalion commander in the 20th Jägers.

2 Khatov was at the depot of the Quartermasters Department.

3 Nikolay Ivanovich Selyavin, having received a good education at home, joined the Yekaterinoslav Grenadier Regiment at the age of 16 as a sergeant in 1790 and took part in the Turkish War. After being commissioned, he became regimental adjutant, and then aide-de-camp to Major General Prince Volkonsky (uncle of Prince P.M. Volkonsky). Commanding a company of the Azov Musketeer Regiment, he took part in Suvorov's campaigns in Italy and Switzerland; he was left to care for the sick and wounded in the Muotathal and was taken prisoner. He received two decorations and the rank of staff captain for these campaigns. In 1803 he was accepted into the Suite. He served as an adjutant for the inspection department to the quartermaster general. He had a passion for literature.

4 Colonel Vistitsky 4th, then Dovre and finally Pensky.

In August 1811, the Quartermasters Department moved out of their unsuitable premises in the Mikhailovsky Castle into a newly refurbished building purchased for them.⁵ Here the foundations were laid for the establishment of a library, a collection of maps and instruments,⁶ and even their own technical workshops for the manufacture of the latter.⁷

Thus, the Quartermasters Department constituted a separate department, independent both from the Engineering Department and from the Map Depot, removed from the jurisdiction of the Quartermaster-General back in October 1810, and placed at the complete disposal of the Minister of War and renamed the Military Topographic Depot in 1812. At the head of the latter, from the time of Suchtelen's appointment to Stockholm, was the engineer Major General Opperman, who was also entrusted with the administration of the Engineering Department. This separation was on the basis that this depot had the responsibility for producing large nationwide surveys, for which the Minister of War would have more extensive resources, while the Quartermasters Department was to take care exclusively of military mapping and surveys.⁸

Guidelines for Officers in the Execution of Duties of the Divisional General Staff:

Having established the centralised administration of the Quartermasters Department, Prince Volkonsky began to define the scope of the duties of members of this department, both in peacetime and in wartime. Staff duties were still carried out according to tradition in the main and were dependent upon the personal discretion of formation commanders, because, in this regard there had only been fragmentary instructions in the regulations and laws. Prince Volkonsky attempted to fill this gap by publishing the 'Guidelines for Officers in the Execution of Duties of the Divisional General Staff' compiled in his chancellery under Toll's direct editorship.

The introduction to these guidelines is worthy of note in itself:

The information from an officer of the Quartermasters Department should conform to two principles:

1. To be able to protect oneself securely and to place obstacles for the enemy that are difficult to overcome.
2. To know from which direction and in what form the most sensitive and decisive harm might be inflicted on the enemy.

An officer of the Quartermasters Department, having the knowledge necessary for this service, by virtue of his functions is a true assistant to the commanding general. Guided by his intelligence, diligence in his duties and efficiency, he eases all the general's difficulties and lays the initial foundations for his undertakings and success. No matter how extensive the information from the quartermaster officer may be, he must add to this good morals, modesty and withdrawal from all partisan politics: because it is not so much by the former as by the latter that he can win the complete confidence of the commanding general, who, being unable to see everything for himself, cannot make great progress if this officer does not have a sincere disposition towards him. The art of selecting fighting positions and fortifying them can, in misfortune, mitigate failure and continue the war; but skilful troop movements, in general and in particular, and a suitable ratio of each combat arm are the main weapons of victory and decisiveness on campaign for an entire war. Although an

⁵ The home of the General Staff in 1902.

⁶ Prince Volkonsky personally donated some 500 books on military subjects brought from abroad to this library and invited other officers to donate, after which, in a short time, about 2,000 works in Russian, French and German had been collected. He also requested an annual budget of 2,500 roubles for the purchase of books and maps.

⁷ Its status was approved on 23 January [4 February] 1812.

⁸ The Minister of War solicited generous funding for the depot, thanks to which its activities would have been extensively developed, but this was prevented by the war of 1812.

officer of the Quartermasters Department requires extensive topographic and statistical information, it is equally necessary for him to know: the structure of the force, their developments and the sequence and direction of their missions, both on and off the front line. From this outline concept of the designation of an officer of the Quartermasters Department, it can be seen that knowledge of the structure, direction, location and positioning of units, or tactics, is his most important duty. This knowledge can only be acquired by being constantly in the midst of the troops themselves, at which point it is essential that all members of the Quartermasters Department not held on strength at the depot⁹ be divided among the divisions, and are guided in the performance of their duties by the rules set forth herein.’

The guidelines are in three parts:

1. Regarding the duties of the divisional general staff in general.
2. Regarding the duties of the divisional general staff during troop movements.
3. Contains the rules of service writing.

Each infantry division was intended to have one field officer and two subalterns from the Quartermasters Department, the former of whom was nominated chief of the general staff of the division and was in charge of everything that concerned the movement, location and operations by its units. The inspection and administrative elements were not included in the scope of their activities, but, in order to avoid omissions, they were always to have information regarding the numbers of fighting men in the division, weapons, ammunition, food, munitions items, hospitals, and so on, as well as detailed military-topographical and military-statistical information about the locations where units were deployed, or where they might have to operate. He also oversaw the correspondence between the divisional commander and the Minister of War, the Commander-in-Chief and the Quartermaster-General regarding troop movements. At the same time, he was obliged to report to the Quartermaster General on all duty matters concerning the Quartermasters Department, with reports to the divisional commander, and also to send returns and lists to the former with appraisals for himself and other members of the division general staff every six months, signed by the commander of their division.¹⁰

The second part of the manual is of a reference nature and contains many practical instructions, not only regarding the duties of officers of the Quartermasters Department during movements, positioning and operations by formations, but also for reconnaissance, military surveying and assessments, foraging, selection of fighting positions, and so on.¹¹

The third part sets out the rules for drafting dispositions, historical war diaries, maintaining secret correspondence, various report formats, and so on, while the appendices to the manual contain: conventional symbology for mapping surveys (published officially for the first time) and reporting formats for local resources in the countryside,¹² route cards for units, quartering lists and tables for the stretches covered during route reconnaissances.

In the manual under consideration, we must note a very significant gap: it barely mentions the participation of officers of the Suite in the organisation of security duties at all; apparently, these duties were entirely a unit responsibility and did without the participation of officers from the

9 This is a cause of misunderstanding here. Is this the Map Depot that has already been detached from the Quartermasters Department, or the central administration of this department itself, which until then had also been given the designation of the depot?

10 This first part of this manual is in no way simply a copy of the French model, rather an application where relevant to the characteristics of Russian forces.

11 These guidelines were drafted by a person who was obviously experienced in these matters. Toll's work is evident here, being that for which Prince Volkonsky granted him independence.

12 Statistical tables on the numbers of inhabitants, houses, carts, cattle, acreage, crops and yields, forestry, and so on.

Quartermasters Department.

This manual was the first official document in which the scope of the duties of the General Staff, their activities and relationship to the relevant senior combat commanders were clearly and definitively outlined. It was the first that clearly established the dual nature of dependence of quartermaster ranks on the aforementioned commanders and on the Quartermaster-General, which was the commonest cause of discontent and a variety of conflicts of interest. The establishment of divisional general staffs represented an onward and very important step forward after the above-mentioned order that field officers or captains of the Quartermasters Department should be assigned to the posts of Duty Field Officers in divisions (and corps). Thanks to the institution of this manual, divisional commanders had supporting agencies at their disposal, which united every element of force direction and administration, albeit not completely, yet nevertheless to a sufficient degree. This useful reform, unfortunately, was only temporary; the true reasons for its rejection were its French origins, at a time when France was our most dangerous enemy, while much, if not all, that was French was subject to censure, and served as a pretext, along with the resistance of military commanders to such changes within military headquarters.

Recruitment incentives and promotions within the Quartermasters Department:

At the same time as clarifying and regulating where possible the duties of officers of the Quartermasters Department, Prince Volkonsky petitioned for measures to be taken to best resolve the issues of recruiting for this department and of promotions through its ranks. His lobbying led to a favourable outcome.

By decree of 18 February [2 March] 1811,¹³ it was ordered that: ‘personnel serving in the Quartermasters Department, Field Artillery and Engineering Corps, in accordance with the nature of their duties, shall be granted the same privileges as have been granted to the 1st and 2nd Cadet Corps. The majors from all three of these corps shall be promoted to lieutenant colonel,¹⁴ and henceforth there shall be no majors in these corps; the Junkers, Column Leaders and Conductors are firstly promoted to ensign, such that they can take up vacant sub-lieutenant posts, and thereafter to sub-lieutenant.’ This Supreme favour greatly raised the status of the Quartermasters Department, which until then had been ranked alongside the line.

The St. Petersburg school for Column Leaders:

Specific instructions on the knowledge required for acceptance as a Column Leader were first publicised on 7 [19] July 1810. The priority was mastery of the Russian language and one other foreign language to the standard of fluently writing and translating an essay on a given topic; thereafter, knowledge of arithmetic, algebra, geometry, geography and history was required, within the *gymnasium* syllabus [university entrance qualification] of the time; finally, an ability to draw or sketch plan views. A standing Board of Officers from the Quartermasters Department was formed in order to conduct examinations for those wishing to become Column Leaders.¹⁵ From December 1810, the administration of all Column Leaders was entrusted to Lieutenant Colonel Khatov, who, with the transfer of the Column Leaders to the Quartermasters Department’s new building, was appointed director of the (cost-neutral to the treasury) *ad hoc* school that thus arose; his deputy was Lieutenant Colonel Schefler. The Column Leaders were divided into two classes and were assigned to mentors from among the young officers of the Suite;¹⁶ they received an annual salary of 100 roubles, a 50-rouble uniform grant and the prescribed provision of rations, and thereafter were fully

13 C.C.L. XXXI, No. 24,523.

14 These were announced in another order issued later in February 1811, with 22 majors from the Suite being promoted to lieutenant colonel.

15 This Board comprised: Colonel Vitzthum, lieutenant colonels Khatov and Schefler, and Captain Count Falkland.

16 In 1811, the following were appointed as mentors: Lieutenant Okunev, Sub-Lieutenant (Alexander Nikolaevich) Muravyov 1st and Ensign (Nikolay Nikolaevich) Muravyov 2nd.

self-supporting; all that was required of them was that they absolutely had to spend the nights at the school, returning no later than 11 o'clock in the evening, and that they should attend lectures regularly, but otherwise they could enjoy complete freedom. The administrative and teaching staff performed their duties without any remuneration, solely out of a broadly understood sense of duty and out of willingness for the common good.

The following taught at the school: Khatov himself - tactics and fortifications; Colonel Pensky - drawing and draughtsmanship; Lieutenant Colonel Scheffler, Captain Count Falkland and Guard Captain Rakhmanov - mathematics;¹⁷ and University Professor Butyrsky - Russian literature. Lectures were delivered in the morning from eight o'clock until noon, after which all the Column Leaders together, under the command of Scheffler, went to Tsaritsyn Meadow, where they were obliged to attend troop exercises; on holidays, they, together with the quartermaster officers, were present on parade.

The number of Column Leaders in the school was not to exceed 60, but in reality it fluctuated between 45 and 55; their composition was very diverse, both in age and education, as well as background. Among them were young men who had taken part in campaigns, and those who had worked in the civil service, also 16-year-old boys who had not completed their general education course,¹⁸ and university graduates, and those who had been educated abroad.¹⁹

There was no real camaraderie among the Column Leaders; there were different factions among them; there was not and could not be a serious scientific outlook; there could be neither proper instruction nor proper graduation; each individual attended those lectures most necessary to him, and was then subjected to examinations, which were carried out several times a year.²⁰ The examination programme included:

1. In mathematics - arithmetic, algebra (up to quadratic equations), geometry, plane and spherical trigonometry (as much as is needed to calculate the latitude-longitude grid) and the application of algebra to geometry.
2. In military science - tactics and fortifications.
3. In languages - Russian, French and German; a thorough knowledge of all three languages was required.

Those who passed these examinations were initially promoted to lieutenant in the Suite, while from 27 January [8 February] 1812, to ensign, and thereafter, following some experience on duty, to sub-lieutenant.

Under the conditions described above, this state school could not provide what its founder wanted to achieve, having encountered no small difficulties in implementing this undertaking. In any case, the first experience of organising a specialised educational institution for training future officers of the Suite was important. This experience was not the last; the initiative to repeat it came from private persons, some of whom, however, had belonged to the Suite.

The Society of Mathematicians and Muravyov's Military School:

Those Column Leaders who had not been seduced by social entertainment, but sought science and education, gathered almost every evening in the apartments of three brothers, Alexander, Nikolay and Mikhail Nikolaevich Muravyov, sons of the retired military officer Nikolay Nikolaevich

17 From January 1812 - Ensign (Mikhail Nikolaevich) Muravyov 5th.

18 In 1810, Prince Volkonsky sent Column Leaders Yurenev and Titov, both under 16 years of age, to the 2nd Cadet Corps to complete their education there.

19 Among the latter, attention was drawn to the princes A.M. and M.M. Golitsyn and L.A. and V.A. Perovsky, who had completed a course at the Paris *École polytechnique*.

20 Prince Volkonsky was present at these examinations himself and gave out grades.

Muravyov;²¹ Here they reread and analysed their reading material; here the spirit of camaraderie and the desire for self-improvement were born. This new movement then received further development in Moscow, where Muravyov's father lived. At the end of 1810, the youngest of them, M.N. Muravyov, while still a student at Moscow University and not content with university lectures, gathered a circle of comrades who sympathised with him, formed the Society of Mathematicians with them and wrote a charter for this society. His father was elected president of this society, who, having copied the charter, submitted it, through a trustee of the Moscow Educational District, for Supreme approval, which was granted in April 1811, and thereafter gave the society's activities an exclusively scholarly direction.²²

The aims pursued by this society and the programme of study were defined in the charter as follows:

The Society of Mathematicians, being convinced of the essential assistance of mathematical sciences to the sum of knowledge, which contributes in many ways to the welfare of the state, and at the same time inspired by true and pure love for the fatherland, has set itself the immutable principle of striving to disseminate knowledge of the mathematical sciences by every possible means among its compatriots; whose three main means are through: teaching, writing and translation; which is why the entire purpose of this Society was formed through the combination of all three; but just as, in general, the most useful of the applied elements of mathematics are mechanics and military art; so then the society has turned its attention to them in particular and directed every effort especially to the preparation of young men for military service...

The society undertook to teach free of charge: arithmetic with algebra, geometry with plane and spherical trigonometry, descriptive and analytic geometry, differential and integral calculus, solid and fluid mechanics, tactics in all its scope, fortifications, the theory and practice of all kinds of surveying.

Prince Volkonsky, elected an honorary member of the society, took them under his patronage and encouraged their educational activities in every possible way. All orderly officials and workers who wished to do so from various disciplines of mathematical knowledge were admitted after passing an examination. N.N. Muravyov donated his house for the society's meetings and lectures, and also gave favoured access to his library and collection of various kinds of instruments. He also expressed his willingness to direct training, surveying and reconnaissances and, in general, to demonstrate in theory and practice everything pertaining to the art of war in the Quartermasters Department, and with the diligence characteristic of a man who had grown up believing that military skills and organisation in the army constitute one of the most important elements that contribute to the good of the state.²³

Free lectures on mathematical and military sciences, delivered in the house of N.N. Muravyov, were a great success; the number of attendees grew; they listened avidly. The success of this undertaking was greatly facilitated by the passion for mathematics of the younger generation of that time, which, at the beginning of the 19th century, had achieved significant development, thanks to the works of Lagrange, Laplace and others, and had acquired primary importance among academic subjects.

Perhaps the thought that the great commander, who had stunned everyone at the time with his

21 Son of Lieutenant General N.E. Muravyov, known for his mathematical knowledge. He was born in 1768 and owed his education, career and fortune to his stepfather, Prince A.V. Urusov. In 1778 he was transferred from the Preobrazhensky Regiment to the navy. From 1784 to 1788 he studied at the University of Strasbourg, after which he passed the examinations and was promoted to lieutenant. He distinguished himself in the battle of Rochensalm, but was wounded and taken prisoner. Upon returning from captivity, he commanded the Empress' 'golden yacht.' Under Emperor Paul he was transferred to Dunin's [Yelisavetgrad] Hussar Regiment and retired soon thereafter.

22 C.C.L. XXXI, No. 24,614.

23 *Sovremennik*, 1852, Issue No. 5; N.N. Muravyov's letter to P.I. Golenishchev-Kutuzov; *Glinetsky*, I, 235 & 405.

victories, had begun his service in the branch of the military in which a prominent mathematical education was considered absolutely essential also had some influence. The necessity and usefulness of mathematics for every educated military man was recognised everywhere, and in our country the majority of young men were preparing for military service. Therefore, mathematics became the fashionable science.

Further development of these rudiments was temporarily interrupted by the war of 1812, which forced both instructors and students to abandon their studies: N.N. Muravyov was promoted to colonel and appointed chief-of-staff of the *opolchenie* of 3rd District, which was being raised in Nizhny Novgorod; many mathematicians followed him, not counting those who, like M.N. Muravyov, had been accepted into service as Column Leaders even earlier and had already begun to work as officers of the Suite in 1812.

At the same time, upon the appointment of Khatov as head of the Survey of Finland, the St. Petersburg school of Column Leaders ceased to exist; those not yet qualified who remained were sent to this survey. In 1812, 15 more were recruited, and in 1813, another eight, being recruited directly into the forces or being sent to the Survey of Finland.

The Quartermasters Department on the eve of the war of 1812:

Prince Volkonsky attempted by all means to clear the Suite of men who were not up to the task of their assignments.²⁴ At the start of 1811 the department consisted of 172 officers, and by the beginning of 1812 there were 167 (ten generals, 58 field officers and 99 subalterns); 52 officers were added in 1812. The composition of the Suite was still rather unsettled, although its improvement was noticeable. 'Catherine's servants' were obsolete; it was not easy for them to get accustomed to the new methods of conducting war and combat; with a few exceptions, they soon quit the scene.

Another element within the Suite, and more importantly a most significant and powerful one, were foreigners (French and Dutch), whose numbers, in the main, increased greatly after the Peace of Tilsit (by Germans, mainly former Austrian and Prussian officers). Among them were: Valentini,²⁵ Pfuel,²⁶ Wolzogen,²⁷ Hofmann and Clausewitz,²⁸ A.F. Michaud,²⁹ Baron de Crossard, Kotzebue, von Luce, Bose, Spalding, Heck and others.

Although foreigners occupied a prominent place in the Quartermasters Department, they would not be particularly useful to the cause mainly due, with a few exceptions, to their lack of knowledge of the Russian language, our military institutions, and the nature of our forces. Moreover, the Russian element in the Suite was already growing stronger, which was facilitated by the surge of patriotism in Russian educated society, which began after the Battle of Austerlitz in 1805 and grew stronger and stronger towards 1812.

In classifying foreigners from Russians, one should not, of course, include among the former those bearers of foreign surnames who had begun their service in the Russian forces from the lowest ranks, became assimilated into our army and devoted themselves entirely to the service of the Tsar

²⁴ In 1811, 27 officers were retired or transferred to the line (some 'for incompetence').

²⁵ Georg Wilhelm von Valentini joined the Prussian General Staff in 1810 as a major; he was in Count Kamensky's Army of the Danube, attracted general ridicule and left at the beginning of 1812. He compiled a description of the Russo-Turkish wars.

²⁶ He served in the Prussian and, from 1807, in the Austrian General Staff; in 1811 he transferred to Russian service. See later chapters for more detail.

²⁷ Ludwig von Wolzogen was accepted into the Suite as a major in 1807 having been a lieutenant colonel in Württemberg service. In 1810 he was appointed *Flügeladjutant*. He enjoyed the favour of Barclay de Tolly.

²⁸ Military authors. They did not make a particular name for themselves in Russia.

²⁹ In 1805 Alexandre Michaud de Beauretour was accepted into service as a captain in the engineering corps having been a major in Sardinian service. He was also a combat-arm officer. From 1808 to 1811, in the war against the Turks, he received two promotions and the Order of St. Vladimir and St. George 4th class.

and Russia, not to mention the descendants of foreign ancestors of the 'old and new emigrations' who had already taken on completely Russian qualities. They should be considered Russian representatives of the Suite and even as ethnic Russians.

Among the members of the Quartermasters Department who were in service at the beginning of 1812 and who acquired more or less renown were: Toll, Diebitsch, Harting, Gaverdovsky, Teslevy, Schubert, Tenner, the three Muravyovs, two Neidhardts, two princes Golitsyn, two Perovskys, Count Stroganov, Dannenberg, Liprandi, Ivanov, Shcherbinin among others.³⁰ All these were young men, aged between 20 and 30, who were diligently engaged in self-improvement, striving to better themselves through academic study and through experience, and even extracting whatever was useful from those same foreign practitioners in their midst whom they had in mind to remove from the business themselves completely, when the time came, in order to take their places themselves.

Of these, Toll and Diebitsch deserve the most attention.

Toll, a native of the Baltic region, a Lutheran by faith, was Russian at heart; in 1812 he distanced himself from the German faction; Wolzogen considered him his personal nemesis; Crossard also could not get along with him. Having begun his military service under the command of Suvorov and Miloradovich, Toll knew our soldiers well and all the details of our military system; possessing at the same time a bright mind and quick wit, he had a good grasp of observing and evaluating situations and adapting to them. He would, of course, never get along with any foreign strategic '*petit-maître*' of the Pfuel or Weyrother type.

Diebitsch,³¹ a colleague of Toll's, younger than him in age, overtook him in the field of service over time. Prince Volkonsky knew him personally and valued his abilities and higher military development. As a result of this, he was transferred into the Suite in 1810 as a lieutenant colonel, and soon after that he was assigned as Duty Field Officer in the corps under Count Wittgenstein.

Overall, in the first two years of his administration, Prince Volkonsky did everything within his powers to improve and promote the Quartermasters Department in every respect. It was neither his fault nor the fault of the Suite itself that its organisation, output and preparation suffered from the shortcomings at the time of his appointment as director of this department; it was impossible to eliminate all these deficiencies in such a short period of time; in any case, they were noticeably reduced or mitigated.

Not everyone in our higher military circles of that time agreed with Prince Volkonsky's views on the purpose, organisation and scope of activities of the Quartermasters Department. Combat experience was necessary to answer the contested issues. This experience fell to the lot of Russia, the Russian army and the Quartermasters Department in 1812. The task of planning for the war had not been assigned to the Quartermasters Department at that time, although, incidentally, officers of the Suite were involved in the associated work both before the appointment of Prince Volkonsky and during his time. In any event, the higher military authorities had the entire swiftly formed galaxy of above-mentioned young officers from the Quartermasters Department at their disposal, who would go on to render our army the service that this formidable situation demanded of them.

Our army and our General Staff are indebted to Prince Volkonsky for the fact that such figures as Diebitsch and Toll came to prominence in the ranks of this staff, even though it bore a different designation. They also owe it mainly to him that they quickly formed the aforementioned galaxy of young, talented and energetic figures who, of course, could and did bring invaluable advantages

30 In Glinetsky, I, 240, he includes F. Berg (later a Field Marshal) among them.

31 Ivan Ivanovich, or Hans Karl, von Diebitsch came from an ancient Silesian noble family. Born in 1785, he was educated in the Berlin *Kadettenhaus*. In 1801 he was accepted into Russian service as an ensign (in the Lifeguard Semenovsky Regiment). Taking part in the campaigns of 1805, 1806 and 1807, he received a Golden Sword with the inscription *за храбрость* [for valour] for Austerlitz, while receiving the Order of St. George, 4th class for distinction at Heilsberg, regardless of also being promoted to captain for the same acts.

both to their branch of service and to the entire army.



Column Leaders 1810-1811

CHAPTER 10.

The Manual for the Administration of a Large Operational Army in 1812:

At the same time as the 'Establishment of the Ministry of War' on 27 January [8 February] 1812, the 'Establishment for Administering a Large Operational Army' was publicised with the Minister of War's report for Supreme approval, with the following content:

By Supreme order of Your Imperial Majesty, the Commission for the Formulation of Military Regulations has drawn up the Establishment for a Large Operational Army. Since, from the very first planning for it, to the final flourishes of each of its chapters, it has been compiled, processed and amended under the direct leadership and according to comments from Your Majesty, I shall set out neither the reasons nor the purpose of this manual, which are completely known to Your Majesty; restricting it simply to its submission for Supreme approval.¹

The Tsar himself personally directed the activities of said Commission, both in view of the primary importance of the 'Establishment' it was developing, and in order to reconcile the far from unanimous, and sometimes directly opposing, views of its members, generals Opperman,² Prince Volkonsky and Saint-Priest, and Active Councillor of State Magnitsky, with the Minister of War himself, General Barclay de Tolly at its head.

The Commander-in-Chief:

On the basis of said 'Establishment' the commander-in-chief of a large operational army 'represents the Emperor by proxy and is vested with the authority of His Majesty.' He was appointed by orders to the army from His Majesty and by decree to the Governing Senate. 'The most senior officers of the General Staff and the corps commanders are appointed' based on his selections. The commanders of individual armies were appointed in the same manner as the commander-in-chief, but 'the decrees of their appointments indicate the limits of the powers granted to them.'

The Army General Staff:

The Commander-in-Chief was to direct the large army with the assistance of the Main Army Field Headquarters, which represented 'the centre in which all elements of military field command are united in liaison with their superiors.' The responsibilities of the General Staff were:

1. Drafting maps and plans for troop movements and battles.
2. The compilation of reports and tables presenting the state of the various elements of the army administration.
3. Maintenance of the war diary and dispatches.
4. The deployment of formations and assignment of commanders.
5. Inspection of urgent reports and others from individual corps, divisions and fortresses.
6. Issuing orders and dispatching instructions.

1 C.C.L. XXXII, No. 24,975.

2 Karl Ivanovich Opperman, a native of Hessen, having been an engineer captain, was accepted into the Russian Engineer Corps in 1783 as a lieutenant. During the Swedish War of 1788 to 1790 he was promoted to captain and received the Order of St. George, 4th class. In 1797 he was assigned to the Map Depot as a lieutenant colonel, where he caught the attention of the Tsar and in a short time received two promotions and two decorations, although he was retired from 1799 to 1800. In 1806 he took part in the war against the French. In 1807 he rendered valuable services to the government by bringing St. Petersburg and Kronstadt into a defensible state. In 1809 he held the position of Inspector of the Engineer Corps. In 1811 he was promoted to lieutenant general. In 1812 he was appointed Director of the Engineering Department.

7. Providing the army with food, forage, munitions items, pay, weapons, artillery, and live ammunition in its various locations.
8. Maintenance of order and subordination through the provost and courts-martial.
9. The organisation of camps, wagon lines, movement of trains and hospitals.
10. Providing food and protection for fortresses located in the theatre of war occupied by the army.
11. Exchanges, administration, holding and dispatch of prisoners of war to various depots.
12. Establishment of routes, issuance and certification of passes and travel documents.
13. Investigation of complaints regarding the various elements of the administration.

The Main Army Field Headquarters was divided into four main offices:

1. Main Chief-of-Staff.
2. Engineers.
3. Artillery.
4. Intendant.

In addition, the Commander-in-Chief was also to have his own chancellery. At the head of the Main Staff Section were: the main chief-of-staff, chief of engineers, chief of artillery and intendant-general. The office of the main chief of staff was divided into two sections:

1. Quartermasters Section.
2. Army Duty Section.

The former was headed by the Quartermaster-General, while the second was commanded by the Duty General.

The Quartermasters Section was further split into two sub-sections:

1. First Sub-Section: 'produces all the preparatory planning for military operations; this includes collating all information regarding the ground upon which the war is taking place' (the best maps and military-topographical descriptions, tables of the resources and wealth of the region, tables of the population, historical notes on past wars in the region occupied by the army, and a survey of populated places to the rear of the army); this sub-section included a drawing office and a field printing press for mapping.
2. Second Sub-Section: executes the 'preparatory planning' from the First Sub-Section and is in charge of all matters subject to secrecy; these include: dispositions for battle and manoeuvre, instructions to the commanders of individual units, reconnaissances, staging and movement of troops, the location of camps, the selection of battle sites, proposals for fortifying them, a schedule of temporary and winter quarters, daily notes and dispatches on military operations, a set of general standards for awards for military distinction, and secret correspondence on military operations.

The Army Duty Section had four sub-sections:

1. First Sub-Section: maintained details of the forces and promulgated orders of the day; this included passwords and so on, commands, orders of dress, instructions on the movements of the army, unit listings and 'establishment tables, reports on personnel numbers' and a field printing press.
2. Second Sub-Section: 'directs the policing of the army;' this included: orders regarding

prisoners of war, military roads, the reception and dispatch of couriers, access lists for the headquarters, a schedule of headquarters premises, issuing of pay, rations and provisions, lists of sutlers and so on, tariffs for food stores and so on, the headquarters security force, vehicle states, orders regarding trains and on military-provost units and so on.

3. Third Sub-Section: handled current issues, as well as cases on the opening and sentencing of courts-martial; this included, among other things, liaison with the heads of the main departments of army administration, with the Ministry of War, with corps commanders and with government institutions within the empire.
4. Fourth Sub-Section: 'makes all arrangements regarding hospitals.'

The Main Army Chief of Staff:

The Main Army Chief of Staff was appointed based upon the recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief, by Directed Supreme Decree and was 'selected from the generals based solely with respect to their outstanding capability.' When selecting him, it was assumed that along with an outstanding aptitude and military talents, with the necessary experience, he would have a thorough knowledge of the principles of war, the statistics of the land occupied by the army, and of historic military operations in the region where the war was taking place.

He was required to:

1. Have accurate information on the fighting strength of the army.
2. 'Be in continuous communications with the army intendant-general regarding the means of resupplying the troops with provisions, provide him with information determined by the regulations, and from the information received from him compile reports and tables that present the movement of all ration resupplies to the army clearly and in detail.'
3. Compose dispositions for battles and manoeuvre, together with the Quartermaster-General, by order and specific assignment of the Commander-in-Chief, as well as instructions to the generals commanding detached fighting formations.
4. 'Select the most convenient routes for the passage of troops, according to their type, and for foraging, if necessary, to equip the required number of troops for this, designate the most advantageous locations and give suitable orders for carrying out foraging on operations, taking into account the local situation and circumstances.'
5. Designate locations for camps, magazines, artillery parks, hospitals, wagon lines and headquarters down to and including divisional level.
6. Issue the passwords, challenges and responses, signals and Commander-in-Chief's orders through the Duty General and to monitor their precise execution.
7. Determine the sentry details.
8. Provide the Commander-in-Chief immediately upon his request all information regarding the locations and strengths of the army, about the means of resupplying it with provisions, about fortification works and, in general, about all service matters related to the Quartermaster-General and the Duty General.
9. 'Identify the most capable field officers and subalterns, for partisan duties, for dispatch as *parlementaires*, and in general for any kind of special assignment.'

The chief-of-staff was to accompany the commander-in-chief during battle and during troop inspections; orders announced by him had to be accepted as if they were orders from the commander-in-chief.

In the event of the commander-in-chief falling ill, he would direct the army in his name; in the event of his death, he would take his place until a new Supreme appointment, and even if there were senior generals in the army, they were obliged to carry out his orders, issued in an especially established format. When conducting an inspection of enemy positions in person, he was in command of the force assigned to this mission. He was to carry out all his work through delegation to others; he was only to engage personally in the most important work which demanded secrecy.

All corps and divisional chiefs-of-staff, along with all members of these headquarters, were subordinate to the Main Army Chief of Staff.

The Quartermaster-General:

The Quartermaster-General was appointed on selection by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and was 'chosen from the generals, based solely with respect to outstanding knowledge.' The government³ was to supply him with maps, statistics and historical notes on the region where the war was taking place.

The Quartermaster-General was obliged to:

1. Compose detailed instructions and proposals for combat.
2. Select camp locations and determine the sequence in which the units should occupy them.
3. Draft projects for fortifying combat locations.
4. Produce schedules for temporary and winter quarters.
5. Collect and compile the best mapping and topographic surveys and notes.
6. Plan troop movements and produce route cards.
7. Inspect the locations of 'army forward guard rooms and outposts.'
8. Observe enemy positions.
9. Maintain continuous communications with the Duty General 'regarding the execution of military orders delivered to him.'
10. Compile daily notes and reports on military operations, with the necessary maps, drawings and plans attached.
11. Maintain continuous correspondence with the general and all ranks sent to observe and survey locations in the army rear areas.
12. Execute 'all orders from the Chief-of-Staff in relation to his duties on military operations.'

In battle, the Quartermaster-General was to accompany the Commander-in-Chief. When observing enemy positions in person, he commanded the units assigned for this mission; when inspecting the 'army forward guard rooms and outposts' then 'the relevant Duty Field Officer is to accompany him and immediately execute all his orders.'

The Quartermaster-General had command authority over all Quartermasters Department generals, field officers and subalterns in the army, as well as the Captain of Guides.

The Duty General:

The Duty General was appointed 'on selection by the Commander-in-Chief from among the generals' and directed the formations entrusted to him on the same basis as indicated above for the Quartermaster-General; during battle, he also accompanied the Commander-in-Chief.

³ In this case, the government body was the Ministry of War, while within that it was mainly the Military Topographic Depot.

The Duty General was in charge of the senior aides-de-camp heading their respective sections and all ranks of the administration entrusted to him. In addition, the Duty General was in charge of:

1. The Field Auditor-General.
2. The *Generalgewaldiger* (provost-marshal).
3. The Headquarters Commandant.
4. The *Generalwagenmeister* (transport chief).
5. The Director of Military Communications.
6. The Director of Hospitals.
7. The Field Chaplain-General.
8. The headquarters security force.
9. All army guardrooms in general.

The Captain of Guides:

Of the above appointments, the Captain of Guides was of particular importance, selected 'from the Quartermasters Department's subalterns, on the basis of outstanding capability.' He was in charge of two Column Leaders and a mounted sub-unit under a non-commissioned officer, in order both to recruit guides and to supervise them. He was to receive advance notice from the Quartermasters Department regarding the destinations and routes along which formations were to travel, the number of detachments, columns, and such like, and was to prepare guides for them. He was to recruit guides from the local population, especially those who knew the roads and local area well (huntsmen, foresters and itinerant traders passing through villages); for the guidance of units 'in contact with the enemy, and for surprise attacks, ambushes, retreats and other combat manoeuvres' officers of the Quartermasters Department were to be appointed, preferably from among those who had surveyed the fighting locations or had inspected these places.

Notwithstanding the above, the Captain of Guides was to:

1. Provide guides ahead of time for all ranks sent on inspections or surveys.
2. Attempt to recruit guides with their own horses, or to provide horses for them.
3. Interrogate the guides individually regarding locations and routes 'in full detail' and to bring them together only in case of disagreement.
4. Change the guides quite often upon entering hostile territory.
5. 'Agree contracts for athletic people who also have information about larger areas of the land... to serve in the army with an appropriate salary.'
6. Assign several guides to each column, who were to proceed individually and to march under the supervision of the quartermaster officers directing the column.
7. Double the supervision of the guides when marching in close proximity to the enemy.
8. Provide the guides with the necessary expenses and food, strictly monitoring that, after intelligence had been extracted from them, they could not provide the enemy with any clues regarding the operations of our army.
9. Submit a monthly report to the Chief-of-Staff showing the expenditure of cash received from him for the guides' food and expenses.

Corps Commanders and corps headquarters:

The army consisted of corps, and corps of divisions. At the head of the corps was the corps commander, who controlled it with the help of the corps headquarters. 'The corps headquarters of the line is the centre through which orders and instructions received from the General Staff are executed, and reports and proposals are sent to the Commander-in-Chief.'

The corps headquarters responsibilities were:

1. The submission of reports and tables for the various administrative sections, at the appointed time and in a specified format.
2. The maintenance of the Corps War Diary.
3. The execution of orders and instructions from the Commander-in-Chief.
4. The inspection of divisional reports and tables and commentary on them.
5. The maintenance of internal order and security.
6. The holding and dispatch of prisoners of war.
7. The verification of information and such like.
8. The investigation of complaints and so on.

Should a corps receive orders to operate independently, then the size of the corps headquarters and the range of its activities were expanded to the limits specified for the Army General Staff; at the same time, the powers and responsibilities of the corps commander and his closest assistants and corps senior staff officers, were correspondingly expanded.

In charge of the corps headquarters was its chief-of-staff, and he was supported by:

1. A Chief-Quartermaster.
2. A Duty Field Officer.
3. A Senior Aide-de-Camp.
4. An *Oberproviantmeister* [chief of provisioning].
5. An *Oberkriegskommissar* [chief of commissariat].
6. An *Obergewaldiger* [chief provost].
7. An *Oberwagenmeister* [chief of transport].
8. An *Oberauditor* [chief auditor].
9. A corps staff-surgeon.

The corps commander's chancellery was also located with the corps headquarters.⁴ The headquarters of a corps not detached from the army was divided into three sections: one under the Chief-Quartermaster and two under the Duty Field Officer.

The corps chief-of-staff was selected from among the generals or colonels 'by distinction' and was appointed by Supreme Orders, upon the submission of the corps commander and the approval of the Commander-in-Chief.⁵ He had similar duties, in relation to the corps commander, to the members of the corps and divisional staffs and to the formations within the corps, as the Chief of the General

4 When a corps received orders to operate independently, the following were added to its headquarters: chiefs of engineers and artillery, corps communications and post-master, army *zemstvo* [local government] governors or commissioners and corps headquarters security force.

5 Except in urgent cases, when the Commander-in-Chief himself could appoint the corps chief-of-staff pending Supreme approval.

Staff had in relation to the Commander-in-Chief, the members of all staffs and the formations of the entire army. In an independent corps, he would take the place of the corps commander in the event of his illness or death.

The Corps Chief-Quartermaster was selected from among the generals and field officers of the Quartermasters Department and was appointed upon the submission of the Quartermaster-General, with the approval of the Commander-in-Chief and by Supreme Approval. He had duties and powers within the corps corresponding to those which the Quartermaster-General had in the army.

The Duty Field Officer was selected from among the quartermaster officers and was appointed upon proposal by the corps commander, the approval of the Commander-in-Chief and Supreme Approval. His duties and powers corresponded to those of the Army Duty General (with appropriate modifications).

Divisional Commanders and divisional headquarters:

At the head of each division was a divisional commander, who controlled it with the aid of a divisional headquarters. 'The divisional headquarters of the line is the centre through which the orders of the Corps Commander are executed, and recommendations from all sections of the divisional administration are sent to him.'

The divisional headquarters responsibilities were:

1. The submission of reports and tables from the various administrative sections to the corps commander.
2. The maintenance of the divisional War Diary.
3. The execution of orders from the corps commander.
4. Inspection of reports, returns and tables submitted by brigade commanders and associated paperwork.
5. Maintaining order.
6. The holding and dispatch of prisoners of war.
7. The verification of information and such like.
8. Investigation of complaints and recommendations thereon.

Should a division receive orders to operate independently, then the corresponding 'General Staff resources of independent corps' become the responsibility of the divisional headquarters.

The divisional headquarters consisted of:

1. A Divisional Quartermaster.
2. A Senior Aide-de-Camp.
3. A *Proviantmeister*.
4. A *Gewaldiger*.
5. An *Oberwagenmeister*.
6. An *Oberauditor*.
7. A Divisional Surgeon.

The headquarters of a division not detached from a corps was not divided into sections. The divisional headquarters also included the divisional commander's chancellery. Should a division operate independently, then a divisional chief-of-staff and some other ranks would be added to the

headquarters, and this headquarters would be reorganised similar to the organisation of a corps headquarters. The members of the divisional staff had similar duties within their terms of reference as those established for the corresponding members of higher headquarters.

Senior Aides-de-Camp:

Senior aides-de-camp in all headquarters in general were selected from the most outstanding field officers or subalterns of the line and were appointed to the General Staff on the recommendation of the Chief of the General Staff; to corps and divisions upon the submission of corps and divisional commanders⁶ and generally with the approval of the Commander-in-Chief and Supreme Approval. Their main duties included, directing sections, delivering the most important orders, being sent to inspect units, guard rooms, hospitals, and ‘carrying out various missions of this kind.’ They ‘are to monitor standards and order everywhere, and if any are in violation, they are to report it to the commanders of whichever units it pertained: and if this report is not acted upon, they are to report this to the Chief of the General Staff, or to the corps or divisional commanders themselves.’ On the day of battle, they accompanied their respective generals.

Mutual liaison between headquarters:

The main, corps and divisional headquarters constituted ‘one common command.’ They were ‘the instruments by means of which the authority of the Commander-in-Chief, corps and divisional commanders is brought into action with rapid and precise execution under every circumstance.’ The divisional headquarters was subordinate to the corps headquarters, and the corps to the General Staff. The heads of these three headquarters ‘are to be in continuous communication on matters that require their attention.’

The corps and divisional chiefs-of-staff,⁷ ‘upon receiving their guidance from these superiors on the concept to which all operations by members of the General Staff should constantly be directed’ may ‘submit their views on various subjects from their duties for the consideration of the corps and divisional heads.’ Their loyalty to these superiors ‘consisted in the execution of each of their orders; but if they were given an order that was not in accordance with the regulations or good order, then they were obliged, having executed it, to report this to their superiors in a timely manner, and were not held responsible for the consequences of the order thus executed.’ This was relayed as follows:

1. From corps and divisional chief-quartermasters to the Quartermaster-General.
2. From Duty Field Officers and Senior Aides-de-Camp to the Duty General.
3. From artillery and engineer ranks to the chiefs of artillery and engineers.
4. From intendant, provisioning and commissariat ranks to the Intendant-General.
5. ‘From all ranks of other sections of the General Staff’ to the relevant commanders.

Divisional headquarters were required to submit to corps headquarters, and corps headquarters were required to submit to the Chief:

1. Reports on troop strengths.
2. Information on ration supply for men and horses.
3. Listings and locations of units.
4. Topographical surveys, military commentary on locations and all necessary statistical details.

⁶ In the manual in question, corps commanders and divisional heads are referred to as both ‘heads’ and ‘commanders.’

⁷ Here one cannot help but note the omission resulting from the failure to take into account that the divisional chief-of-staff only existed in a division detached from its corps or otherwise independent.

5. War Diary entries.

Corps and divisional headquarters 'are to operate under their generals according to the same rules as the General Staff operate under the Commander-in-Chief.' These headquarters 'are to be issued the full picture and every type of operation by the General Staff.'

Officers of the Quartermasters Department in the Army rear areas:

'The timely inspection of convenient locations in the army rear areas, their selection and fortification, is to be assigned by the Commander-in-Chief to a dedicated member of the Quartermaster-General's Section, at their discretion for capability and outstanding knowledge.' The necessary number of quartermaster and engineer field officers and subalterns, pioneers and an escort were to be assigned to assist him, 'depending upon the extent of the operational axes.'

He was to inspect 'all locations in the army rear areas; the most important of them are to be mapped and, if necessary, fortified; adding topographic military notes' to the plans drawn; he is to recruit residents from the surrounding villages with the aid of the *zemstvo* [local government] authorities (or his escort), to work on fortifying selected locations. He was to maintain continuous communications with the Army Chief-of-Staff, obtaining from him all essential information, and was to report back on all his plans and activities. Based on information regarding operations and the location of the army received from the Chief-of-Staff, he was obliged, in accordance with his own assessments, to undertake and arrange works and fortifications that would ensure the army's security in the event of a retreat. In such an event, he could use all local resources while every authority, *zemstvo* and military, was obliged to assist him.

The Army headquarters security force:

A security force was to be established at army headquarters, the purposes of which were:

1. Protection of the Commander-in-Chief.
2. Escorting all ranks sent to observe the enemy.
3. 'Service at locations being surveyed.'
4. Identification, inspection and improvements to routes.
5. Prompt and reliable communications between 'members of the General Staff.'
6. Security duties for corps and divisional commanders, for their General Staffs and, in general, for all generals, and so on.

Based on the manual in question, this security force should consist of four squadrons of dragoons and two regiments of Cossacks.⁸

Overall, the manual for the Administration of a Large Operational Army, although it represented a compromise between two source doctrines, French and German, was nevertheless an improvement on the 'Institution' of the Ministry of War of 1812: it established the unified authority of the Commander-in-Chief at the head of the army, operating in a single theatre of war; a well-organised system of well-appointed headquarters and administrative echelons, with the help of which the Commander-in-Chief and the higher military commanders subordinate to him could conveniently manage the formations entrusted to them, and finally, established to a satisfactory standard, at least in theory, the supporting agencies of the higher military command and control, which had now secured the opportunity to serve the army in accordance with the demands of the situation. It is true that their preparations for this matter were far from complete, to say the least; they remained to be

⁸ The 'brigade commander of the Headquarters security force' was its head, reporting to the Duty General. C.C.L. XXXII, No. 24,975, parts I & II, in particular, pages 43-62. The rules concerning trains escorts also deserve attention (Part II, Chapter II, Section VIII, pages 70-73 and so on).

completed in the best of schools, that of combat. It was here that the discrepancy was revealed between the peacetime organisation of our army and the direction of its preparations for war in peacetime on the one hand, and the demands of the wartime situation on the other. The responsibility for this discord cannot be attributed to the Quartermasters Department of that time, with its chief at its head, since the reasons for the existence of this discord were rooted in the above-mentioned state of development of the entire Russian military system, that is, outwith the Quartermasters Department itself.

Despite the presence in the manual under consideration of German names for various appointments in the army command, the spirit of the corresponding French military institutions had, perhaps, triumphed over the spirit of similar German institutions. Of course, this was better than the opposite phenomenon, but the good of the matter required that best practices be thoughtfully and carefully extracted and implemented without the slightest forcing or straining. Although in this respect the manual for the Administration of a Large Operational Army was not free from some errors, nevertheless, in reality, during the war, the mitigation for them was the excellent fighting qualities of our troops in general, and in particular the presence in them of that truly combative spirit that had received such great development in Catherine's glorious era, in the days of Rumyantsev and Suvorov: the pupils from their military school were still alive and active, the spirit of initiative and energy in conducting military operations was still alive, for which a wide field had opened up in the war of 1812; this spirit served as an excellent corrective to the untried theories imposed on us by German 'authorities' like Pfuell. It is true, there was a strong tendency among us to bow down before these authorities, who were not worthy of such worship. For this we had to pay, of course, but from the moment we refused to follow the instructions of these authorities and embarked on the path of an independent search for truth, success would pass to our side. To the credit of our Quartermasters Department of that time, it must be acknowledged that, despite its aforementioned weaknesses and the aforementioned unfavourable conditions, it was capable of fairly rapid self-improvement.



Subaltern & Column Leader 1812-1814

CHAPTER 11.

His Imperial Majesty's Suite Of The Quartermasters Department

From 1810-1814.

Preparations by both sides for the war of 1812:

Napoleon began as early as 1810 to direct his attention towards an appropriate solution to the issues related to the preparation of his colossal empire and its military system, in view of the probability of war with Russia; once he had become convinced of the inevitability of this war at the beginning of 1811, he began to prepare for it in the most active manner.¹

In its final organisation, his *Grande armée* consisted of 13 corps and four reserve cavalry corps, a total of 542,000 men, of which 448,000 to 470,000 men formed the actual active army and were allocated to the invasion of Russia.² Of course, this army had many weaknesses, but, overall, it was a formidable force, the likes of which Russia had not seen since the invasion by the great Mongol conquerors' hordes. The enormous superiority in forces was quite obvious to everyone at that time especially in terms of preparations for war in general.

Yet the Russian Tsar, Russian educated society and the Russian people did not lose heart, while the Russian armed forces were burning with desire to fight the French, to exact revenge on them for Austerlitz and Friedland and to remind them of Suvorov's era, who had inflicted many defeats on them. Of course, the rise in morale among the people and in the army would have a powerful influence on the final outcome of the war, but still the degree of our readiness for war, perceiving it in the broadest sense, was of great importance.

Russia's preparations for war began almost simultaneously with those of Napoleon.³ A significant part of our armed forces had been diverted to fight Turkey (87,000 men); there were some 20,000 men in the Crimea and the Novorossiysk region, 34,000 men on the Caucasus line and in Georgia, and 30,000 men in Finland. Under these conditions, at the beginning of the war we could field only ten infantry corps and four of reserve cavalry, or 249 battalions, 262 squadrons and 36 Cossack regiments, a total of about 200,000 to 210,000 men with 906 guns, that is, we were so inferior in strength to Napoleon that the concept of the necessity of dragging the war out arose, avoiding decisive encounters, depriving the French army of food supplies, striving to operate by trading space for time, and only once they were weakened to a sufficient degree, to switch to decisive operations with all force, which had to be carried out with full energy.

Activities of the Quartermasters Department in preparation for the war of 1812 and summary of tasks:

Quartermaster officers were sent to various parts of western Russia as early as 1809 in order to inspect the roads and designate overnight halts along them, indicating all villages within a 30 *versta* [20 mile] radius of these halts.⁴ In 1810, a large-scale military survey of the western border was undertaken. The overall direction of this task was carried out by General Barclay de Tolly himself.

1 V. Kharkevich, *The War of 1812 From the Neman to Smolensk*, St Petersburg, 1901, page 26; *Correspondance militaire de Napoléon I^{er}*, VI, No. 1225; Letter to the King of Saxony regarding the strengthening of the fortresses of Torgau and Modlin, regarding the state of the army of the Duchy of Warsaw, and so on.

2 V. Kharkevich, 33.

3 V. Kharkevich, 41; *The Patriotic War of 1812*, Part I, Volume I, Chapters I and II (General-of-Infantry Barclay de Tolly's outgoing and incoming correspondence).

4 These officers examined the roads over a distance of more than 25,000 *versta* [16,667 miles]; this data served as material for the military road map compiled under the editorship of Lieutenant Colonel Khatov.

It was impossible to do this without involving quartermaster officers; moreover, they had to carry out and did carry out this most important work, yet all this, with few exceptions, did not go beyond the relatively narrow terms of reference granted to the Quartermasters Department:

1. On 31 March [12 April], the Minister of War informed the acting Quartermaster General, Major General Mikhail Stepanovich Vistitsky 2nd, regarding the distribution and appointment of quartermaster officers.
2. On 29 July [10 August], Adjutant General Prince Volkonsky was informed with regard to what reconnaissance officers should be paying attention.
3. On 21 August [2 September], the latter was informed of the summary of tasks and the compilation of the 'large-scale general military map' indicating positions, the numbers of houses in towns and villages, and so on; in addition, a military-topographical and statistical description of the sector between the Western Dvina and the Dniester was demanded.⁵
4. On 4 [16] September, he was informed that it would take several years to produce detailed maps, and yet time was precious; not only was mapping needed, but also a study of positions; a statistical, physical and military description was required;⁶ precision mapping should be left for the time being, while the existing maps should be enlarged and supplemented by eye.⁷
5. On 15 [27] October, he was informed regarding what Colonel Dovre [d'Auvray] was to do.
6. Beginning on 12 [24] February, General Barclay issued the required instructions personally to the officers of the Quartermasters Department; his correspondence with Lieutenant Colonel Diebitsch, who was sent to Old Finland on 12 [24] February in order to survey the coast as far as the Schwarholm fortress, deserves special attention, while in May he was already sending reports to the Minister of War;⁸ On 28 May [9 June], General Barclay wrote to Diebitsch: 'I received your letter from Düna [Daugavpils] dated 5 [17] July, but its content does not correspond much to the objective of the mission assigned to you. In future, I expect your reports with plans regarding detailed inspections of locations and roads in the area assigned to you' and so on.⁹

In March 1810, 30 officers had been assigned to the above-mentioned tasks,¹⁰ divided into several groups, whereupon the results of these tasks were presented to Prince Volkonsky in September 1811: a military map of the western border area on 55 sheets, 37 separate plans of positions and a description of the entire surveyed area.¹¹ During these tasks, the instructions of the Minister of War to Prince Volkonsky could not be fully implemented in that the attention of officers conducting the reconnaissances should be particularly directed to the environs of Vilna, Svetsiany [Švenčionys] and Koltyniany and on the routes leading from these locations to the Desna, and in the southern theatre of war to the areas between Lutsk, Dubno, Pinsk and the Berezina and Dnieper rivers; as a result of this, new groups of officers were sent to these areas.¹²

5 At the same time, General Barclay notes that Colonel Yemelyanov had not justified selection by his superiors, and Major Eberhard did what he had been ordered to do in an exemplary manner.

6 At the same time, General Barclay pointed out that the Poles had property boundary plans and so on.

7 Prince Volkonsky had to petition for the release of the necessary maps from the depot, which then, after the general map had been compiled, had to be returned.

8 His report dated 9 [21] May 1810 (in German) is worthy of attention; Sources, Military Science Archive of the General Staff (M.S.A.G.S.), Patriotic War of 1812, Part I, Volume II, Chapter II, No. 60 (page 87).

9 M.S.A.G.S. Part I, Volume I, Chapter I, No. 53, No. 174, No. 183, No. 191, No. 223, No. 12, No. 104 etcetera.

10 M.S.A.G.S. Part I, Volume II, Chapter II, No. 35.

11 The director of this task, Colonel Dovre, was promoted to major general for this. Glinetsky, History of the Russian General Staff, I, 213.

12 Glinetsky, referencing the classified archives of the chancellery of the Ministry of War.

The overall collation of these and all similar tasks was entrusted to General Opperman, who was in charge of the Map Depot, later the Military Topographic Depot, and to engineer and *Flügeladjutant* Colonel Barclay de Tolly, who had been seconded to him.¹³

Tasks devoted to the impending hostilities:

Apart from their cartographic activities, some officers from the Suite, at the same time, drew attention to themselves with tasks devoted to imminent military operations. One such, back in the spring of 1810, was a draft presented by Lieutenant Colonel Diebitsch to the Minister of War for a requisitioning system in the event of hostilities under the title: *Organisations Plan eines Requisitions System*;¹⁴ Lieutenant Colonel Chuikov, in April 1812, submitted a paper entitled: 'Patriotic thoughts or political and military reasoning regarding the impending war between Russia and France;' in this paper he explained the need for defensive operations against Napoleon, in conjunction with sending Cossack patrols behind French lines in order to incite a popular uprising. Lastly, Colonel Toll presented Prince Volkonsky with a memorandum regarding operations against Napoleon, which Prince Volkonsky presented to the Tsar; Toll was criticised for the fact that his conclusions were based on incorrect assumptions, while the central Quartermasters Department was criticised for not having accurate intelligence on enemy forces and locations.¹⁵

Lack of proper liaison between the support agencies of the higher military command and the exclusion of the Quartermasters Department from the development of campaign planning for 1812:

It should not have been otherwise than that this directorate would be entrusted with the duty of collecting such intelligence and generally taking care of preparations for war, and that it should have the opportunity to do this on its own initiative; in this regard, the Military Topographic Depot (and earlier the Map Depot) played a more prominent and influential role; everything of the utmost importance, however, was sent directly for the assessment of the Minister of War himself; he was being provided with excellent intelligence on the French army by his *Flügeladjutant*, Colonel Chernyshev;¹⁶ Lieutenant Colonel Tursky also reported to him with regard to the forces of the Duchy of Warsaw and such like;¹⁷ he was also given the corresponding intelligence on the Saxons and other forces obtained by diplomats, and so on.¹⁸ This intelligence, it appears, was not forwarded to the Quartermasters Department, or if it was communicated, it was not done in a timely manner. From this alone it is clear that the Quartermasters Department was completely uninvolved in the development of campaign planning, the execution of which placed our armies in such a difficult position in the first period of the war of 1812.

Development of campaign planning for 1812 and the significance of foreigners led by Pfuell:

From the middle of 1810 until the very outbreak of the war, many plans, papers and assessments regarding the conduct of the impending hostilities were presented to the Tsar. The central concept of most of them was the above-mentioned retreat into the interior of the country, avoiding battle with superior enemy forces, exhausting the latter and moving on to decisive operations only after sufficient preparation for their success. Emperor Alexander had been completely imbued with this same idea, but thereafter it was not easy to make a choice and settle on any one of the plans presented, especially since the people surrounding the Tsar disagreed among themselves and often also expressed directly conflicting views.

Regrettably, foreign elements were very strong and influential among us at that time, and their

13 Ivan Bogdanovich Barclay de Tolly, elder brother of the Minister of War.

14 Glinovsky, I, 245 (referencing the M.S.A.G.S.).

15 Glinovsky, I, 245.

16 M.S.A.G.S. Volume I, Chapter II, No. 112, No. 120 and others.

17 M.S.A.G.S. Volume I, Chapter II, No. 6, No. 110 and others.

18 M.S.A.G.S. Volume I, Chapter II, No. 60, No. 104 and others.

representatives closest to the top of the army, although they were distinguished for the most part by their astonishing conceit and other qualities that did not speak in their favour, at the same time they shone with such erudition that Russian figures were upstaged.

It did not matter that this was false knowledge and not valid; it was perceived to be true. Suffice it to say that serious importance was attached to such works of flawed strategy as the plan of the above-mentioned Wolzogen,¹⁹ that the King of Prussia's *Flügeladjutant* Knesebeck²⁰ was so bold that he attributed the operational plan that led to Napoleon's demise to himself, and finally, that the Prussian General Staff *Generalquartiermeister* *Generalleutnant* Pfuel,²¹ who had brought more harm than good in Prussia itself, was not only accepted into Russian service, but also became an oracle among us.

Pfuel was a follower of the famous single-issue military theorist von Bülow,²² who, in his work: *Geist des neuen Kriegssystems*, investigated the impact of military-logistics elements on the tactical side of strategic operations during the period of the dominance of the obsolete magazine system of provisioning, and, not content with this, he promoted all of his conclusions as an absolutely superior system for operations under all circumstances. Pfuel's take-away from Bülow was precisely that which should not be adopted (for example, that a defensive war should always be waged by two armies operating along eccentric axes) and did not allow any deviations from the rules that he had, in one way or another, concocted. He based these rules on the carefully studied campaigns of Frederick the Great, but drew incorrect conclusions from them, and through the name of this great king he influenced his interlocutors or listeners, who were unable to refute him.

This one-dimensional desk-bound warrior, in teaching others how to wage war, was himself not familiar with its practical side. Possessing an irritable nature whenever contradicted, he easily lost his temper and responded harshly;²³ thus, in all probability, he was always immersed in his ideas, avoided society and aroused an almost general antipathy towards himself. Yet he also had great virtues: he was an honest man, noble even, and was a stranger to intrigue. This, in all likelihood, explains his influence on Emperor Alexander, who saw constant political manoeuvring around himself and mutual hostility between the people close to him and, with a bitter feeling in his heart, became more and more disappointed both in these people and in everything going on around him in general.

Pfuel's plan:

Pfuel, like Wolzogen and other 'planners'²⁴ believed that the best means of countering Napoleon was retreat and skilful avoidance of battle with the French army as it moved away from its sources of reinforcements and moved into inhospitable Russia, having to suffer daily losses of materiel and declining morale, while Russian forces would constantly be concentrating and gathering strength. He considered it vital to determine the axes of retreat in advance, to study and strengthen the most advantageous positions along them and to set up magazines along the lines of retreat such that the army would be provided with rations, while the enemy would have to endure hardship, aggravated by the deployment of partisan detachments across their lines of communications.

19 Kharkevich, 78 and 79.

20 At Auerstedt he saved the Prussian king from captivity, after which, of course, he fell into the king's favour, who, however, in this case, made a good choice. Knesebeck was close to Scharnhorst, which was the only thing in his favour.

21 Baron Karl Ludwig August von Pfuel (1757-1826); was educated in Stuttgart; was in Prussian service from 1777; was on the *Generalquartiermeister* staff from 1781, and left Prussian service after 1806.

22 Adam Heinrich Dietrich von Bülow was Prussian corps commander, Friedrich Wilhelm Bülow von Dennewitz's younger brother.

23 Pfuel's character traits were accurately captured by V. Kharkevich, from whose work we have extracted them.

24 Among whom was d'Allonville (a French *émigré*), who pointed out the necessity of increasing the depth of the theatre of military operations and, to that end, proposed that the Duchy of Warsaw and Silesia be occupied in order to advance the forward line of defence to the Oder river.

Thereafter, Pfuel proceeded from the point of view that Napoleon, having assessed the difficulties of provisioning the army, would inevitably have to restrict their numbers,²⁵ and therefore acknowledged the possibility of significantly reducing the depth of the theatre of military operations, defining the Western Dvina river as the limit of retreat.

In accordance with the border area being divided by the swamps of the Pripet river into northern and southern theatres, while allowing for the possibility of Napoleon's invasion of both, Pfuel recognised the requirement to form two armies: the first, centred on Vilna, while the second would be centred on Dubno or Lutsk; for intercommunication between these two armies, he considered it appropriate to have an intermediate corps-of-observation at Brest-Litovsk.

In the event of Napoleon's invasion of the northern theatre, which Pfuel also considered most likely, the First Army was to retreat to a strongly fortified camp, which was to be built on the Dvina, while the Second Army was to move north of Polesie, defeat the weaker enemy facing them and operate against the rear areas of Napoleon's main force.

During 1811, Barclay de Tolly and Pfuel made several proposals, which, not limited to establishing a general concept, already went into detail on force concentration and initial operations. These proposals of theirs were circulated for mutual discussion and comment.²⁶

In June 1811, Wolzogen, who was in close association with Pfuel, was commissioned to carry out a very extensive reconnaissance of the western border area; he was to tour the proposed base and operational areas and indicate the positions and locations on them that were to be fortified. The instructions issued to him were compiled almost entirely on the basis of Pfuel's concept, and the axes-of-operations were defined as: Zhitomir-Kiev for Second Army; Slonim-Nesvizh-Bobruisk for the corps-of-observation, and Vilna-the Dvina at Dünaburg-Druya for First Army.²⁷ Wolzogen had to select a location on the Dvina to set up the fortified camp.

Wolzogen came to the conclusion that the above-mentioned axis-of-operations for First Army was disadvantageous, because the army would be exposed to danger when retreating through the obstructed terrain between Koltyniany and Druya, intersected by an almost continuous line of lakes. In view of this, he chose Drissa on the Dvina as the location for establishing the fortified camp and defined Vilna-(Vidzy)-Drissa as the axis-of-operations that was subsequently selected for First Army.

Barclay de Tolly's plan:

In the autumn of 1811, Barclay de Tolly briefed a plan to the Tsar for an invasion of East Prussia and the Duchy of Warsaw, whereby light troops were to devastate the country, carry away or destroy military stores and food supplies, demolish bridges and crater roads, burn villages and evacuate the population to Russia, along with working animals and beef cattle, that is, to turn the border forest into a wilderness, in order to thereby place an almost impassable barrier between themselves and the enemy.

Emperor Alexander's decision:

Emperor Alexander would not permit the idea of exposing the innocent population to the horrors of war, he feared condemnation in the event of such a course of action and preferred to wait for the enemy on his own territory, and therefore rejected Barclay's proposal.

At the beginning of 1812, our forces assembling on the western borders of the empire were:

25 In this case, Pfuel showed astonishing wishful thinking in that he acted completely contrary to what had been promoted as a principle by the Prussian General Staff during [the Elder] von Moltke's era.

26 Barclay, at this time, gave preference to active operations and intended to begin the war by occupying East Prussia and the Duchy of Warsaw.

27 The shortest routes from the middle Neman to St. Petersburg led through this sector.

Wittgenstein's corps at Schawel [Šiauliai]; the main body of First Army was at Vilna and at some distance, more or less, from this location; the corps-of-observation was at Pruzhany while the Second Army was in the vicinity of Lutsk.

Barclay de Tolly's instructions:

Meanwhile, Barclay de Tolly had been developing instructions that represented a combination of Pfuel's concept and his own, and in April 1812, construction of fortifications at Drissa and Borisov and the establishment of magazines was begun in accordance with Pfuel's instructions.

The instructions drawn up by Barclay envisaged both offensive and defensive scenarios. In the second scenario, should the enemy main force move against the right-flank corps, then this corps must retreat towards Riga, the First Army would advance against the enemy flank and rear, the Second Army was to threaten their lines of communications in the direction of Lublin and Warsaw, while the corps-of-observation would maintain communications between them. Should the enemy move against First Army and the corps-of-observation, then First Army were to retreat, step by step through Svetsiany towards the Drissa fortified camp, avoiding a pitched battle; the corps-of-observation would retreat towards Slonim and Bobruisk, and then defend the line of the Pripet river; at the same time, Second Army were to advance into the Duchy of Warsaw, while their right-flank corps was to operate against the enemy flank and rear. Appropriate assessments and instructions had also been drafted for the unlikely event of an offensive by the enemy main force against Second Army.

Of course, specific instructions were required in the event of an outbreak of hostilities, yet the question still arose as to whether there was any great value in Pfuel's plan and the above-discussed instructions that captured its essence, considering the fact that we were dealing with Napoleon, who always strove to concentrate his forces, and consequently our disjointed armies and corps would be doomed to defeat in detail.

It should be noted that these instructions were passed to comte Saint-Priest, Chief of Staff of Second Army, but not to the Commander-in-Chief of this army, Prince Bagration. Likewise, Wolzogen, appointed chief quartermaster of the corps-of-observation, also had to keep them secret from his own corps commander. Thus, distrust of the higher commanders led the head of the army to violate the basic principles governing relations between these commanders and their supporting agencies.

Orders upon the Tsar's arrival at First Army:

In mid-April, Emperor Alexander arrived in Vilna to inspect First Army, following which orders for the force were made by him, or at least were issued in his name, while among his advisers, Pfuel's voice retained decisive significance.

In May, once news had been received of the concentration of the main mass of Napoleon's force on the lower Vistula, it was decided to strengthen the formations in the northern theatre, and therefore Prince Bagration was ordered to allocate part of his force to form the Third Reserve Army (of Observation) in Volhynia, and to proceed to Pruzhany with the remaining formations in order to replace the corps-of-observation, which had received orders to move to Wołkowysk. As soon as Prince Bagration arrived at Pruzhany in early [mid] June, intelligence on the concentration of the majority of the French army between Kovno and Merecz [Merkinė] caused new orders for a closer redeployment of First and Second armies.

Immediately before the opening of hostilities, our forces in the northern theatre occupied the following locations: General Barclay de Tolly's First Western Army (127,000 men) were along a line from Kiejdany (out to Rossieny) to Lida (170 *versta* [113 miles]), with the headquarters in Vilna, and Second Western Army under General Prince Bagration (40,000 men) along a line from

Novy Dvor to Wołkowysk (40 *versta* [27 miles]), with their cavalry at Zelwa and the headquarters at Wołkowysk; the gap between the inner flanks of both armies reached 100 *versta* [67 miles], while their overall strategic front slightly exceeded 300 *versta* [200 miles]. Napoleon directed three groupings of his forces against them, of 218,000 men, 78,000 men and 79,000 men respectively, a total of 375,000 men, deployed over a frontage of 200 *versta* [133 miles].²⁸

The critical situation of our armies, the solution to it and the further course of the campaign:

With the opening of hostilities in mid [late] June, our army found itself in a critical situation, from which it would only emerge on 22 July [3 August], after joining forces at Smolensk; they emerged from it, of course, thanks to their own valour, thanks to the resourcefulness and skill of many, if not all, of their commanders, and, finally, thanks to the excellent performance of their duties by the supporting agencies of the higher commanders for both armies, and was in no way thanks to the presence and direction of Pfuel, Wolzogen and other lesser-known foreigners; moreover, our armies barely escaped the trap into which each of them could have fallen during the execution of Pfuel's plan and Barclay de Tolly's instructions.

In the conduct of ongoing operations, it would be necessary not only to completely abandon the services of foreign mentors, but also to appoint a new Commander-in-Chief. The Tsar entrusted the discussion of this issue to a dedicated committee,²⁹ which unanimously pointed to Suvorov's contemporary, Prince M.I. Golenishchev-Kutuzov,³⁰ who had just given a first-class example of skill in the late campaign against the Turks on the Danube and had forced Turkey to sue for peace with Russia at the very moment when Napoleon had just begun advancing on Russia. Operations, of course, did not end soon after Kutuzov had been appointed Commander-in-Chief, but in their conduct there was no longer that unreality and confusion that characterised the first period of this war under Pfuel, and which were not appropriate to any force, and the Russians in particular. This change alone, of course, with Russia straining every possible nerve, was sufficient to completely break Napoleon.



Mikhail Andreas Barclay De Tolly

28 The factual events of the operations in 1812 were taken from G.V. Kharkevich's: War of 1812, pages 26-74.

29 The committee included: Chairman of the Council of State, Field Marshal Count N. I. Saltykov, General Vyazmitinov, Count Arakcheev, General Balashev, Prince Lopukhin and Count Kochubey.

30 At the end of the Turkish war, the Tsar granted Kutuzov the title of count, and a few days before his appointment as Commander-in-Chief (29 July [10 August]), he was granted princely dignity.

CHAPTER 12.

The Quartermasters Department in the active armies at the beginning of the campaign:

During the campaign of 1812, some 140 field officers and subalterns of the Quartermasters Department were assigned at various times to the active armies facing the French; there were always never more than two or three officers with each infantry corps, one, or on rare occasions, two officers per infantry division, and about ten to 15 officers at army headquarters; the exceptions were the cavalry corps, which each had one Column Leader. There were generally few Column Leaders at unit level;¹ they had regimental quartermasters issued with riding horses instead; they carried a carbine on a shoulder-belt, and were assigned to quartermaster officers in order to deliver dispatches and for marking out the occupation of positions, and so on.

At the beginning of the year, the ratio of officers from the Quartermasters Department to the formations of the Western Armies was quite sufficient,² but their appointments had been made before the introduction of the corps organisation and before the establishment of new divisions; these measures disrupted the initial plans regarding the distribution of Suite officers to the formations of these armies.

In the spring of 1812, army and corps headquarters were formed on the basis of the Administration Of A Large Operational Army, and within them, the quartermasters-general and chief-quartermasters were appointed. The following chiefs-of-staff were nominated: Lieutenant General Lavrov in First Army, an elderly man, with an aptitude mainly for clerical work, while Major General comte Saint-Priest was assigned to Second Army, a clever and educated man, who participated both in the drafting of the above-mentioned manual and in the discussion of plans for the impending campaign. At the same time, the first quartermasters-general were appointed: Major General Mukhin in First Army, a man with no formal education or self-confidence,³ while Major General Aderkas was assigned to Second Army,⁴ soon to be replaced by the above-mentioned Major General Vistitsky 2nd. Third Army staff was made up of men who had once served under Field Marshal Prince N.V. Repnin: the Commander-in-Chief, General Tormasov, the Chief-of-Staff, General Inzov, and Quartermaster-General Rennie, who had a reputation as an experienced and effective officer.⁵ It was apparent that their complete agreement and unanimity contributed in no small way to the fact that it was this 'reserve observation' army that won the first victory over Napoleon's troops (at Kobrin on 15 [27] July) and acquired the first trophies in this war, which was important in terms of raising the morale of the troops.

The combination of personalities who made up the command of the other two armies was not so successful, yet in the army under Prince Bagration the inadequacies of Vistitsky were redeemed to a large extent by the talents of comte Saint-Priest, while in First Army, Mukhin found himself in an extremely difficult situation, and nothing and nobody would help him out: the Tsar was with this army himself along with Prince Volkonsky and a large retinue, in which there were many contenders for the post of quartermaster-general. Without mentioning Pfuell, there were many men, not as highly regarded such as Wolzogen, Michaud and Toll, who did not hesitate to criticise every order and to present their own plans and assessments. Mukhin, knowing no foreign languages, could not debate with them; and their intrigues finally defeated him.

1 The majority of them were surveying in Finland and such like. See above.

2 Thus in February 1812, Second Army (some 37,000 men) had one general, seven field officers, 30 subalterns and three column leaders assigned. See Prince Volkonsky's dispatch No. 592 to Major General Aderkas dated 26 February [9 March] 1812; Glinetsky, I, 247 and 406.

3 An excellent draughtsman. He had taken part in the Polish and Turkish wars at the end of the 18th century.

4 He retired soon after.

5 Roman Yegorovich Rennie began regular service in 1794. He had an excellent education. He participated in the Dutch expedition of 1799 and in the campaign of 1807.

Major General Yermolov as Chief-of-Staff and Colonel Toll of the Quartermasters Department in First Army:

Upon the entry of First Army into the Drissa camp, Colonel Michaud pointed out all the obvious disadvantages of this encampment, while Prince Volkonsky gave him the opportunity to report this to the Tsar in person. The fate of the Drissa camp was sealed, as was that of some of the commanding officers, including Mukhin: it was decided to abandon the camp; orders were issued to send colonels Michaud and Eichen 2nd to the outskirts of Moscow to select a new location for a fortified camp; Colonel Toll⁶ was appointed acting quartermaster-general in place of Mukhin, while Major General Yermolov was appointed chief-of-staff for First Army.⁷

Thus were the closest assistants of the Commander-in-Chief of First Army appointed; young men, full of strength, incredibly talented and very capable, which, as became apparent, would have very favourable consequences for the course of events; however, in reality, the extreme arrogance of both of these individuals made complete agreement between them impossible. In his papers, A.P. Yermolov himself stated the following regarding Toll:

An officer of outstanding talent, capable of rendering great service over time; but his excessive pride must be humbled, and his superiors must not be weak, such that he does not become excessively powerful. Through his effective abilities in accordance with the nature of his official profession, he has a quick mind, is hard-working and active; but he is so committed to his opinions that sometimes, contrary to common sense, he does not recognise the most valid objections, denying not only the possibility of others having superior abilities, but also of not admitting to having equals.⁸

With regard to another of his subordinates, he also stated:

My first assistant for duty matters, acting Duty General, *Flügeladjutant* Colonel Kikin... not wanting to serve under my predecessor, claimed to be ill, and the commandant of the headquarters, Colonel Stavrakov, took over his post. If it is possible to conceive of the meaning of the following words: 'this surname so full of fate' then it seems that it suited him more than any other, because his fate has been to pursue every former commander-in-chief...⁹ I asked for him to be replaced, but the Commander-in-Chief finds him quite capable. No matter how much I try to persuade Colonel Kikin, he will not agree to rid me of Stavrakov!

Yermolov said about himself: 'hardly anyone could like me; being a precise executor of the will of a demanding boss, I did not see anyone who was well-disposed towards me, but many envied me.'¹⁰

The duties performed by officers of the Quartermasters Department under Toll's direction:

Toll's acceptance into the appointment of quartermaster-general of First Army was marked by a new

6 Promoted to colonel relatively recently, on 15 [27] September 1811.

7 Alexey Petrovich Yermolov (1772-1861), began his service in the Preobrazhensky Regiment. In 1791, he was a captain in the Nizhegorod Dragoon Regiment and was appointed senior aide-de-camp on Lieutenant General Samoilov's staff. In 1791 he returned to service with 2nd Bombardier Battalion. In 1794 he took part in the Third Polish War and received the Order of St. George, 4th class. In 1796 and 1797 he served in the corps under Count Zubov. In 1798 he was dismissed from service and imprisoned in a fortress, while in 1801 he was released and re-admitted into service. He took part in the campaigns of 1805-1807 and was awarded the Order of St. George, 3rd class. In 1808 he was promoted to major general.

8 Alexey Petrovich Yermolov's Papers Regarding The War Of 1812, Loudres, Bruxelles, 1863, page 21.

9 He was in Italy under Suvorov (who, however, 'was the only one daring enough to take him of his own free will'), under Buxhoeveden and Bennigsen in 1806-1807 in Prussia, and under all the main commanders in Finland in 1808-1809.

10 Yermolov had turned down the post of chief-of-staff, and Count Arakcheev approved of this refusal, finding that this appointment 'under the Minister of War was incomparably more difficult than under any other.' But, in view of the emphatically expressed will of the Tsar, there could be no talk of rejecting it. A.P. Yermolov's Papers, 20.

allocation of quartermaster officers within it: no more than three officers were left with each of the infantry corps, while one officer and one Column Leader was to be with each of the cavalry corps; dedicated officers were assigned to the vanguard and the wagon-laager; six field officers and 11 subalterns were at the disposal of army headquarters, while two officers accompanied the Commander-in-Chief of First Army.

The following procedure was established for the transmission of orders to formations: all chief-quartermasters would assemble at army headquarters daily at a pre-set hour, where Lieutenant Colonel Gabbe, and sometimes Toll himself, dictated the dispositions for the next day to them, with every possible precaution taken such that those passing by could not overhear; the building in which the dispositions were drafted was often cordoned off by sentries. Once the dispositions were written out, Toll signed them and sealed them in envelopes with the seal of the Commander-in-Chief with the inscription: 'open at such and such a time.' The chief-quartermaster had to maintain absolute secrecy and present the package to his corps commander only at the appointed hour.¹¹

When the army was on the march, some of the quartermaster officers would be sent out to inspect the roads and select fighting positions.¹² Bivouac locations were usually surveyed by eye, but more often the main landmarks were sketched on paper from the situation-map and the details were added by eye.¹³

It became apparent that not every important road could always be inspected in a timely manner, which, when the maps were inaccurate, often led to misunderstandings and disorder in troop movements; thus, during the army's retreat from Smolensk, inadequate reconnaissance of the routes almost led to the destruction of our force.¹⁴ Likewise, disorder occurred during the retreat after the Battle of Borodino, as well as during the army's transit across Moscow, as attested to by Barclay de Tolly himself. The responsibility for this and similar disorders can only partly be placed on the quartermaster officers, since in the first event, it seems, there were no such officers accompanying the columns of First Army at all,¹⁵ and in any case it has never been clarified what orders they had received from their superiors and, in general, under what conditions they were obliged to carry out the assignments entrusted to them.

At the same time, it became clear that security duties were often carried out in a manner that was not all it should have been, given its immense importance. This has been explained away mainly by the fact that our troops had become familiar with these duties during the wars with the Turks, who had been in combat with us more often than others up to that time, and had accustomed us to negligence. It is difficult to agree that the Turks might be identified as the main cause of our carelessness; rather it should be admitted that it is more likely we ourselves were to blame; with incorrect attitudes to these duties and errors in peacetime preparations being the culprits. In any case, it is worthy of attention that, among the factors that contributed to the manifestation of such negligence, the small number of quartermaster officers with front-line units is notable.¹⁶ Therefore, it is not the Quartermasters Department that bears responsibility for the unsatisfactory performance of security duties by our troops.

11 I.I. Liprandi, Sources For The Patriotic War. Communiqué from General Dannenberg. See Glinetsky, I, 252, 253 and 407. It is also mentioned here that Captain Brozin faced court-martial for violating this order.

12 Starting from Smolensk, the occupation of camps for First Army was entrusted to Lieutenant Colonel P.I. Neidhardt; all officers from the Quartermasters Department and unit supply officers [*фурьеры*] were to assemble at his quarters and proceed under his orders in the vanguard.

13 Such sketches were rather roughly drawn in pencil, and sometimes with pen and ink.

14 Prince Bagration wrote to Yermolov on 8 [20] August: 'It is vital to inflict an exemplary punishment on that officer from the Quartermasters Department who directed Tuchkov. Imagine that he led him 18 *versta* [12 miles] too far, and Gorchakov had to wait until such time as your army had just arrived.' Yermolov's Papers (footnotes), 213.

15 Some of them had gone to occupy bivouacs for the night of 7 to 8 [19 to 20] August, while others had been sent from Smolensk in the direction of Dorogobuzh in order to select fighting positions. Glinetsky, I, 254.

16 Glinetsky, I, 254.

The greatest development was the participation of officers of the Suite in the marshalling of troops into bivouacs and fighting positions. The choice of the latter was, of course, of primary importance under the given conditions of the situation and was entrusted to one of the chief-quartermasters, and most often to Lieutenant Colonel Gabbe or Lieutenant Colonel Harting, to whom several more officers would be assigned; having found an appropriate location, they inspected it and instructed one of the officers to make a visual survey of it over a few hours; the others continued moving for a closer inspection. Following the unification of both armies, sketches of every inspected location were presented for preliminary approval by both quartermasters-general, or rather by Toll alone, or by General Bennigsen, who had been appointed Kutuzov's Chief-of-the-General-Staff. The final approval of a position depended on the Commanders-in-Chief, who usually went out themselves to inspect it. This was how the fighting positions had been selected in front of Vitebsk, at Usvyatye, near Dorogobuzh, Vyazma, Tsarevo-Zaimishche and, finally, at Borodino. With the exception of the latter, all these positions had been found to be disadvantageous, and the assessments of them were controversial. The proud and ardent Toll usually defended his approval of these positions passionately and almost paid dearly for it.

The Commander-in-Chief's dissatisfaction and its consequences:

On 10 [22] August, the troops were having a rest-day near the village of Usvyatye.

The rearguard was still far away. The Commander-in-Chief, together with the Grand Duke and Prince Bagration, accompanied by all the corps commanders and many of the generals, were inspecting a fighting position selected for the army by Colonel Toll. The Commander-in-Chief remarked to him that there was high ground on the right flank from which it would be easy to enfilade along the front line and that this disadvantage had to be mitigated. In response to his proposal to construct a redoubt on the high ground, he was shown a small lake between the high ground and the end of the line, which would prevent reinforcements from being sent to the redoubt... Colonel Toll replied that there was no other better position, and that he did not understand what was being asked of him, making it clear that he knew his business.¹⁷ The Commander-in-Chief heard him out with incredible coolness, but Prince Bagration reminded Toll that in responding to his commander, and moreover in the presence of the Tsar's brother, impudence was most inappropriate, and having said that, the too indulgent Commander-in-Chief should have made him wear a soldier's pouch, and that he, a mere lad, should have sensed that many of them would be no less familiar with the subject than he. The left flank of the position was also found to be quite weak, and therefore the troops moved to spend the night just short of Dorogobuzh without taking up fighting positions, while Colonel Toll was ordered to redeploy them near the city the following day...¹⁸

Following this, the Commanders-in-Chief criticised the position selected by Toll at Dorogobuzh, and 'he was given a severe reprimand, while someone else was ordered to put matters right.'¹⁹ Toll's pride had been dealt a terrible blow, and he submitted a report asking to be dismissed from the appointment of quartermaster-general. Yermolov testified to his hard work, diligence, activity and foresight in combat, but, nevertheless, Toll was soon ordered to leave the army; he went to Moscow without receiving a new assignment.²⁰

Toll's rise had not been to the liking of many, and the Commanders-in-Chief took up the cause against him, in all likelihood, with the participation of Generals Saint-Priest and Vistitsky in this

17 Without denying that Toll's behaviour in this case was incorrect, one cannot help but note that no one, including A.P. Yermolov, could have known how much stress Toll was under and feeling at that time.

18 A.P. Yermolov's Papers, 67.

19 A.P. Yermolov's Papers, 68.

20 A.P. Yermolov's Papers, 72; Glinetsky, I, 255-256.

business, as well as Wolzogen, who was in Barclay's favour and wanted to take Toll's place.²¹

The strengthening of Toll's influence with the appointment of Prince Kutuzov as Commander-in-Chief:

However, a few days after his dismissal, Kutuzov was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Western Armies, having been a patron to Toll since he was just a schoolboy and was proud of the fact that he had forecast his military talents even then. General Vistitsky was appointed quartermaster-general of the combined armies (as if as a concession to Barclay), while Toll remained under Kutuzov for special missions, but in reality he was in complete control of the quartermaster officers of First Army, for which a new quartermaster-general had not been appointed. In Second Army, Lieutenant Colonel Khomentovsky 2nd, an excellent officer both in education and in combat experience, was appointed to this position.²²

Vistitsky's new appointment was merely a formality; he was completely self effacing;²³ also, all the quartermaster and engineering officers, as well as pioneer units, were subordinated to Bennigsen and took orders either from him or from Toll, who by the time of the Battle of Borodino was already playing the primary role among the officers of the Quartermasters Department for the combined armies.

The Borodino position was selected and the deployment of units upon it was executed by Lieutenant Colonel Neidhardt,²⁴ with the participation of Toll. On 23 and 24 August [4 and 5 September], Toll instructed the acting chief-quartermaster of VI Corps, Lieutenant Liprandi, to construct a battery at Gorki;²⁵ on 24 August [5 September], surrounded by quartermaster officers, he monitored the movements and deployment of enemy columns forming up against Shevardino; on 25 August [6 September], when Kutuzov toured the position, he disagreed with Bennigsen on the issue of what form the central fortification should take; there can be little doubt that Kutuzov agreed with Toll's opinion, who immediately made all the arrangements for the construction of the fortification, entrusting this to Lieutenant Liprandi and to the acting chief-quartermaster of VII Corps, Staff-Captain Fonvisin; on the day of the battle he was with the Commander-in-Chief, who sent him to the left flank of our position (after Bagration had been wounded) in order to personally verify the extent to which reinforcements were needed there; finally, on the evening of that same day, he rode around the units and the battlefield together with Khomentovsky; his report convinced Kutuzov of the impossibility of resuming the battle and the need to retreat.²⁶

On 16 [28] September, a reorganisation of the main headquarters took place:²⁷ Vistitsky left the army altogether due to illness; Toll was appointed in his place as quartermaster-general of the general staff of the combined western armies, which now formed a single army, Lieutenant General Konovnitsyn became duty general, and Lieutenant Colonel Eichen 2nd (Toll's friend) was appointed head of the Field Marshal's secret chancery for military affairs; several quartermaster officers

21 In all likelihood, it had also been taken into account that Toll's appointment to replace Mukhin took place with the involvement of Prince Volkonsky.

22 Mikhail Yakovlevich Khomentovsky took part in the Turkish War of 1806-1812 and received a Supreme Commendation for the battle at Rassevat, the Order of St. George 4th class for distinction at Shumla and a Gold Sword for the battle of Batin. He was also promoted to lieutenant colonel there for military distinction. See Lieutenant Colonel Prussak, Military Awards, 7. Glinetsky, I, 257.

23 His participation was also not evident at Borodino; he was charged with the inspection and selection of routes in the event of the army's retreat from Borodino.

24 According to Bernhardi's statements, this task was entrusted to Lieutenant Colonel Harting.

25 This has not survived to this day. See Lieutenant Colonel Novitsky of the General Staff, A Brief Guide To The Borodino Battlefield, St Petersburg, 1902, page 6.

26 Liprandi, Sources; Bernhardi, Denkwürdigkeiten aus dem Leben des Grafen von Toll; Glinetsky, I, 257-258 & 407.

27 Army Order of the Day for 16 [28] September; Bogdanovich, History of the Patriotic War of 1812, Volume 2, 249 [English translation by Peter G.A. Phillips]; Glinetsky, I, 259.

selected by Toll were assigned to this chancery.²⁸ Barclay de Tolly would soon leave the army.²⁹

Disadvantages of the organisation of the army's command and control and their consequences:

The following also remained with the army: General Bennigsen as Chief of the General Staff of all Western Armies (also as deputy to the Commander-in-Chief) and Major General Yermolov as Chief of the General Staff of First Army,³⁰ who was removed from this appointment as he preferred to be with the vanguard and the forward detachments rather than at headquarters, where, according to him, constant intrigues and power struggles were taking place. Toll also took part in these struggles, and apparently used Konovnitsyn to satisfy his conceit. He was inseparable from Kutuzov, usually lived in the same house with him and worked in his presence. Together with Konovnitsyn, he acquired complete influence over the Commander-in-Chief, who was weighed down by age and illness.³¹

It was, in all likelihood, Kutuzov and Toll who together came up with the idea of retreating towards the Ryazan road, moving to the Kaluga road, and so on. All the credit for the success achieved belongs, of course, to Kutuzov; he made it easier for himself to achieve this success by being able to appreciate and put such a capable, active and dedicated assistant as Toll in the right appointment.

It cannot be said that the above-mentioned reorganisation of the army's command and control was beyond reproach, but one must choose the lesser of several evils; this assessment weakens the strength of any criticism. It can hardly be denied that these weaknesses had a detrimental effect on the army's situation, mainly in relation to its timely resupply of all necessities, but it must, at the same time, be borne in mind that the difficulties in this regard were entirely to be expected under such conditions and that, thanks to the pause in the Tarutino camp, enemy immobility, the arrival of reinforcements and the precautions taken, the supposed difficulties were eliminated, the morale of the army grew stronger and order was restored.³²

The duties performed by officers of the Quartermasters Department under acting Quartermaster General Toll of the General Staff:

During this period of the war, the quartermaster officers did not just do office work and left behind many drawings and sketches made in the field. This is partly explained by the shortage of mapping, especially after the retreat beyond the Dnieper, when every move required an inspection of the roads and the selection of bivouacs and fighting positions on the ground; this was, in part, a consequence of the remnants of the previous structure of our command and control, which had not yet been abolished, in which the entire clerical element was on active duty. Since the appointment of General Konovnitsyn as Duty General, even the dispositions were drafted while out on duty and signed by the Duty General. Moreover, the clerical element was poorly developed at that time. Orders, dispatches and reports were issued by means of loose minutes, mostly on scraps of paper (and not particularly legibly). Reports were few (even from the forward outposts). Only military historical diaries were kept quite neatly by quartermaster officers.³³

28 These changes were, in all likelihood, correlated to Prince Volkonsky's arrival at army headquarters (at Krasnaya Pakhra), who stayed there for several days.

29 The official reason given for this was illness. There were other additional factors. See Bogdanovich, II, pages 249-253 [English translation by Phillips]. The *Opolchenie* officer Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, who later transferred into the Quartermasters Department, was appointed to the aforementioned chancery; he was an educated man who over time acquired great fame as a military historian.

30 In his report No. 535 to Prince Kutuzov dated 21 December [2 January], Yermolov mentions taking up a new position and so on. A.P. Yermolov's Papers (footnotes), 187.

31 Glinetsky, I, 259.

32 Bogdanovich, II, 249 [English translation by Phillips]. Extract: Kharkevich, 1812, Berezina, St. Petersburg, 1893, 40-41.

33 Glinetsky, I, 260. Not every corps' war diary has been preserved, but a brief headquarters' diary has been kept.

While formations were stationary, quartermaster officers were sent to inspect the roads, but were rarely appointed as column leaders; once movements re-started, they were sent forward to select bivouacs and fighting positions; should the Commander-in-Chief or any senior officers chose to ride around the positions or bivouacs, then the chief quartermasters had to accompany them on horseback; in combat, they were assigned primarily to transmit orders and for a variety of missions.³⁴

Thus, in 1812, these duties was carried out by quartermaster officers in the field, on horseback, and came close to the ideal that Toll had formed for himself with regard to general staff officers:³⁵ in his opinion, he should be capable of travelling 100 *versta* [67 miles] on horseback non-stop and memorise all the ground features he had observed.

The duties carried out by officers from the Quartermasters Department, under such conditions, were very strenuous, especially if we take into account:

1. The hardships of bivouac life in poor, sparsely populated country in autumn and winter.
2. The situation of a solitary officer who had no opportunity to join any kind of military *artel* [mess].
3. The deep-rooted conviction among most military commanders that there was no need to show concern for the officers subordinate to them, especially staff officers.
4. A lack of logistical support for officers of the Suite.³⁶

Despite all these difficulties and unfavourable circumstances, the officers of the Quartermasters Department carried out their duties and generally fulfilled the requirements presented to them from above outstandingly.



Karl Wilhelm Von Toll

34 Glinetsky, I, 261.

35 The Quartermasters Department was often referred to by its former name at this time.

36 N.N. Muraviev's Papers; see Glinetsky, I, 261-264 & 407.

CHAPTER 13.

An assessment of Barclay de Tolly's activities in 1812:

In a letter to Barclay de Tolly, after his departure from the army, Emperor Alexander wrote:

The plan of action we adopted, as I hitherto believed, was the only one that could guarantee success in a war against Napoleon, which was vindicated by experience itself; but it would inevitably meet with criticism among those people who do not have profound knowledge of the art of war and were boastful of the easy successes gained in previous wars over weak enemies, or over poor military commanders. It was difficult for such people to reconcile themselves to a plan of action aimed at drawing the enemy into the depths of the country. It was necessary to anticipate opposition beforehand, but I was prepared for that. But it was necessary, at the same time, to carefully avoid anything that might attract unfavourable comment, and in this respect you deserve some blame.

As soon as it was decided to operate in accordance with the concept of this plan, it was essential to prepare all resources for its implementation. We had sufficient time for that, but still much was left undone.

Shortly after My arrival in Vilna, I ordered you to send away all the unnecessary baggage of regiments that were permanently stationed in quarters in Lithuania, but in spite of this, they were sent no further than Niemenczyn [Nemenčinė], Svientsiany, Wiłkomierz [Ukmergė] and Schawel, and as a result of this the troops were forced to retreat among huge convoys. I reminded you several times to construct the necessary bridges; many of the engineers from the Highways Department were with the army, yet for the most part, the bridges were in quite the worst condition. As soon as it was decided to retreat, it was necessary to withdraw the hospitals accordingly, but, on the contrary, upon my arrival in Vilna, I found several thousand patients there, about whose evacuation I reminded you constantly.

Such are the criticisms which, speaking frankly, I can make to you. All of them have come from a single mistake of yours: you are not quite convinced that issuing orders and completing the execution are two completely different things, and that there is no method of eliminating omissions by subordinates except for active supervision of them and constant confirmation by trustworthy persons.

The mistakes by Prince Bagration, which had the effect of the enemy forestalling him in Minsk, Borisov and Mogilev, forced you to fall back towards Smolensk. Fortune favoured us, beyond all expectations, to unite both armies there. It was time to end the retreat. But the lack of intelligence on the enemy, which has subjected you to unfavourable consequences throughout the entire campaign, made you mistakenly move towards Porechye against the left wing of Napoleon's army, while they concentrated on their right flank at Lyady and crossed the Dnieper. You rectified this error by forestalling the enemy to Smolensk. But since both of our armies were concentrated at this location and you had the intention of subsequently accepting a general battle, would it not have been better to decide upon this at Smolensk rather than at Tsarevo-Zaimishche? At Smolensk, your troops were in the best condition, because they had not yet suffered the losses from the actions on 6 and 7 [18 and 19] August and thereafter. As for the concerns about being outflanked, you were just as subject to this at Tsarevo-Zaimishche, as anywhere else. The enthusiasm of our troops at Smolensk was aroused in the extreme by the fact that, by fighting there, they were defending the first ancient Russian city.

The loss of Smolensk produced an extraordinary effect on morale throughout the Empire. 'Experience itself has shown the disastrous consequences of this plan' said the detractors of

your operations. 'Russia is in immediate peril,' and as, unfortunately, all the mistakes I have recounted were obvious, I was accused of sacrificing the salvation of the Fatherland out of pride, in order to support the Commander in Chief I had chosen. Moscow and St Petersburg unanimously praised Prince Kutuzov as the only commander who could preserve the Empire...¹

Meetings and conclusions by the Committee of the supreme dignitaries of the Empire:

The Committee in question, having familiarised themselves with the reports from both commanders-in-chief and with the private letters by Prince Bagration and other generals, acknowledged 'the lack of hope for successful operations against the enormous forces under Napoleon' (in Barclay de Tolly's opinion), the indecisiveness of the Commander-in-Chief of First Army, which was a consequence of the influence of public opinion, which was not in accord with his convictions, and the complete disagreement between him and Prince Bagration, and therefore unanimously acknowledged that 'the inactivity in military operations was due to the fact that there was no positive unifying authority over all the active armies, and their general unification is just as essential at the present time because this fragmentation of authority is, in contrast, so disadvantageous.' In the Committee's opinion, 'this reality was based both on the state of the situation in general and on the fact that, when different armies operate over a significant area, they are always obliged to coordinate their movements and operations with each other.' Therefore, the Committee found it absolutely vital to appoint a single common Commander-in-Chief over all active armies.

The Committee, however, decided that this appointment should be based on proven experience in the art of war, outstanding talent, general confidence and seniority of service. They short-listed Bennigsen, Bagration, Tormasov, and even the retired Pahlen; but it was found that none of them met the conditions set for selection; When Kutuzov's name was mentioned, every member of the Committee voted unanimously to entrust him with command over all armies, granting him sole authority determined by the manual on the management of a large army.²

Kutuzov really did satisfy all the conditions established by the decision of the Committee for the selection of a commander-in-chief, while most importantly, he was a natural-born Russian man, which, during the Patriotic War, was of paramount significance. The entire Russian nation trusted him, Russian soldiers were ready to follow him anywhere. These conditions were not satisfied by Barclay de Tolly, during whose command, moreover, foreigners played a very large role at army headquarters; given his non-Russian heritage, the Russian people and Russian soldiers would not forgive him for his joint ventures with Pfuell, Wolzogen's closeness to him, and so on. To top it all off, he was junior in rank to that favourite of the people and the army, Prince Bagration, who complained about Barclay de Tolly, echoing the general discontent against him in the most successful manner possible:

'...For God's sake, send me somewhere else, even just to command a regiment... but I cannot stay here; the entire headquarters is filled with Germans, such that it is impossible for a Russian to live, if only there were some...'³

What had prevented our operational success against Napoleon before Prince Kutuzov was appointed Commander-in-Chief?

Thus, in the first period of the war, the outcome of our operations against the French, or at least a sufficient weakening of the significance of Napoleon's successes, was hindered by:

1 Emperor Alexander's letter dated 24 November [6 December] 1812, Bogdanovich, II, 251-252 [English translation by Phillips].

2 Bogdanovich, II, 11-12 [English translation by Phillips].

3 Prince Bagration's letter to Count Arakcheev dated 29 June [10 August] 1812, Bogdanovich, II, 11, 343-344 [English translation by Phillips].

1. The inadequacy of our preparations for war, which did not involve the Quartermasters Department in appropriate tasks under suitable direction and, in general, did not exploit it skilfully enough, which was partly due to the fact that the Minister of War, Barclay de Tolly, demonstrated excessive zeal, taking on too much work, and moreover, tasks that should have been carried out by the support agencies of the higher military command and control.
2. The lack of coordination between the support agencies of the higher military command and control, their flawed organisation and the faulty distribution of responsibilities between these agencies; not to mention that the office of adjutants [*адъютантура*], the Quartermasters Department on the one side and the Engineering Corps, the Map Depot, later the Military Topographic Depot and the Military Science Committee on the other, had very little in common with each other; until recently, officers of the Quartermasters Department had mainly been engaged in what should have been the duties of military topographers and even surveyors; the wars, beginning in 1805, brought them closer to the formations, yet the mathematical-topographical element still prevailed in their training over the operational-tactical elements; at the same time, the Map Depot, and then the Military Topographic Depot, which had one common director with the Engineering Corps, was called upon to perform one of the most important duties of the General Staff;⁴ under such conditions there could be no discussion of proper preparations by the aforementioned support agencies of the higher military command and control.
3. The disparity and even the total opposition of the organisations of the higher military command and control and its support agencies in peacetime and in wartime (according to the manual of the Ministry of War and to the manual for the Administration Of A Large Operational Army of 1812), of course, could not but be reflected in the organisation, preparation, and activities of the aforementioned support agencies in general and the Quartermasters Department in particular.
4. The flawed organisation of the leadership of our army (the lack of unity of powers in the hands of a single commander-in-chief, having full authority) with the presence of foreign advisers who aroused hatred towards themselves throughout the army, which undermined the authority of the very top of this army.

During the war itself, the significance of the above-mentioned unfavourable factors gradually diminished; having paid dearly for our errors and for the shortcomings of our military system, we nevertheless showed greater vitality than the armed force of Napoleon's monarchy threatening us with destruction; unity of command was established; a commander-in-chief who enjoyed universal confidence was placed at the head of the army; the despised foreign advisers left the army or faded into obscurity. Although the various weak points of our military system still made themselves felt in this new state of affairs, in any case, conditions had been established under which joint activity by the commander and his supporting agencies turned out to be entirely possible and sufficiently fruitful. In generally similar terms, so was joint activity by other senior officers and their supporting agencies.

The result of this new state of affairs were Napoleon's failures once he had begun the retreat. Although Emperor Alexander's remarkable plan, which amounted to a simultaneous and decisive switch to the offensive by all formations operating on the flanks, to the defeat of the forces guarding Napoleon's rear, and to blocking the French army's line of retreat, was not fully executed, nevertheless the enemy armed forces were destroyed. The commander and the army had accomplished the great mission entrusted to them by the Tsar for the benefit of Russia, and without foreign commanders or advisers. Evidently, the supporting agencies of the higher military command

⁴ Which had been entrusted to the General Staff during the reign of Empress Catherine II, but then, with the abolition of this Staff, would not find a suitable successor.

and control, with the assistance of which this commander and other senior commanders directed the formations of this army, both across the theatre of military operations and in combat, also accomplished a relatively great, but invisible act.

The importance of operations in 1812 as a school for our Quartermasters Department and the presence of commanders who were at the peak of their performances:

During this memorable war, the Quartermasters Department found itself to be an excellent school, swiftly starting to eliminate its weaknesses through practical experience and generally made a giant leap forwards. The main features of the quartermaster service were reorganised in 1812, such that they were already being carried out in an established manner in the campaigns that followed, under the leadership of experienced and, moreover, self-confident senior officers of the Suite of the Quartermasters Department. Naturally, these leaders were Toll, Dovre,⁵ the Chief-of-Staff in Count Wittgenstein's corps, and Diebitsch, the Quartermaster-General in this same corps.

Count Wittgenstein repeatedly spoke of Major General Dovre in his reports with the greatest praise, and directly attributed the success at Svolna (30 July [11 August]) to him, as the immediate commander in this action.⁶ Diebitsch's significance and fame were also connected to Count Wittgenstein's success.⁷ By the end of 1812, Diebitsch, already holding the rank of major general, was the skilled commander of the independent detachment sent to cut across Macdonald's line of retreat, and an equally skilled diplomat in conducting the negotiations that led to the defection of General Yorck's Prussian corps from the French.⁸

The war in 1813 and 1814:

In the Manifesto of 3 [15] November 1812, having publicly announced the flight of the French from Moscow and having explained at the same time what the Russian people had done in order to achieve this result, Emperor Alexander solemnly declared:

... We consider it our duty and obligation to express our gratitude to the whole world with this nationwide announcement, and to render due justice to the valiant, faithful and pious Russian people... We, together with the Orthodox Church and the Holy Synod and the Clergy, calling upon God for help, believe beyond doubt that if our indomitable foe and desecrator of the Holy Places does not perish completely at the hand of Russia, then at least he shall feel its strength and power through his deep wounds and flowing blood...⁹

On 11 [23] December, the Tsar reached Vilna and the next day, addressing the generals gathered in the palace as representatives of the entire army, he said: "You have not only saved Russia; you have also saved Europe."¹⁰ It is already clear from Emperor Alexander's words that he had decided to continue the war until Europe was liberated from Napoleon's domination. This decision by the Tsar, in conjunction with the resultant decisions by Russia's allies and Napoleon's desire to swing everything back to his advantage, were causes of the war of 1813-1814.

These wars cost Russia very dearly, especially since her finances were in ruins, and all the state's

5 Fëdor Filippovich Dovre was born in Dresden of French heritage in 1766; after completing a course at the engineering academy there, he entered Polish service. In 1795, thanks to P.K. Suchtelen, this engineer transferred to Russian service as a captain. In 1801, he was transferred to the Suite of the Quartermasters Department with the rank of colonel. A participant in the campaign of 1807, he was in command of reconnaissance along the western borders of the Empire.

6 Glinetsky, I, 267. Dovre received the Order of St. George, 4th class for this. In addition, in this same war he received three decorations and two cash awards.

7 During this war, Diebitsch was promoted, received the Order of St. George, 3rd class (for Klyastitsy) and St. Anna, 1st class, a Golden Sword with diamonds and a Supreme Commendation.

8 Glinetsky, I, 269.

9 C.C.L. XXXII, No. 25,257.

10 Bogdanovich, III, 244 [English translation by Phillips].

resources had been exhausted by the struggle that had just been fought.

In February 1813, Prussia concluded an alliance with Russia before any other first-class power; thereafter Austria joined this Coalition; Sweden, back in 1812, had pledged to carry out diversionary operations along the northern coast of Germany, but only once they had annexed Norway; this condition was later cancelled, but at the beginning of the campaign of 1813 it was impossible to hope for the assistance of the Swedes: Britain's participation in operations in the main theatre of war was limited to subsidies alone.

Our forces at the end of November 1812, numbered no more than 100,000 men; in February 1813, 56,000 Prussians were added to our 140,000 men; following the armistice, with the accession of Austria, the Coalition put forward no fewer than 490,000 men, and adding 24,000 Swedes and some smaller contingents, some 520,000 to 530,000 men.

Under such conditions, the question of command in the Coalition forces assumed paramount importance, and its solution was fraught with great difficulties.



Fyodor Filippovich Dvornitskiy

CHAPTER 14.

The war of 1813 and 1814:

Upon Emperor Alexander's arrival in Vilna, the Tsar's headquarters was established, and the following were appointed: Adjutant-General Prince Volkonsky as Chief-of-the-General-Staff; the recently promoted Major General Toll as Quartermaster-General; Colonel Selyavin from the Quartermasters Department as acting Duty General; Lieutenant General Yermolov as Chief of Artillery for all operational armies.¹

The above-mentioned composition of the General Staff was maintained throughout the war of 1813 and 1814 and gave Toll a very prominent and very influential position as Prince Volkonsky's closest collaborator and confidant, especially since he had to report to the Tsar almost daily and take the closest part in all military planning.

Command and control of Russian and Coalition forces and Emperor Alexander's headquarters under Chief-of-the-General-Staff, Adjutant-General Prince Volkonsky:

The work and activities of the headquarters which directed their operations were further complicated by the fact that the Tsar, without personally accepting supreme command over the Coalition armies, nevertheless retained his predominant influence over them. At the very beginning of the war of 1813, the Commander-in-Chief, Prince Kutuzov, did not approve of the operational plan drafted by the Prussian General Scharnhorst. He died on 16 (28) April.² Under his successors, although it was sometimes easier to obtain the consent of the Coalition army commanders, matters were not much improved by this. The French generals Moreau and Jomini came over to Emperor Alexander before the start of the autumn campaign of 1813.

Without entering the Russian service, Moreau was constantly in Emperor Alexander's Suite, who praised the skill of his operations on the Rhine highly and constantly honoured him with his favour; yet he found no sympathy or trust in himself among the other Coalition sovereigns and their main supporters.³

Jomini had long intended to enter Russian service.⁴ In 1813, he was passed over for promotion to

1 He was required to compile reports on all necessary subjects and deliver them to Count Arakcheev in order for the will of the Tsar to be announced to the Inspector of all Artillery, Baron Meller-Zakomelsky. Yermolov's papers, page 159.

2 Prince Mikhail Illarionovich Golenishchev-Kutuzov was born in 1745. Empress Catherine II referred to him as: 'my Kutuzov' and Suvorov reported on him (after the storming of Izmail): 'Kutuzov was on my left flank, but was my right hand.' Like his mentor, he became a national treasure and hero. A brief introduction on him is not enough. The whole biography is needed.

3 Jean-Victor Moreau (1763 to 1813) was the most distinguished general of the First French Republic after Bonaparte. In 1791 he joined the *Garde nationale* as a battalion commander, and just four years later he was commanding an army. In 1799 he was defeated by Suvorov. In 1800 Bonaparte appointed him Commander-in-Chief of the *armée du Rhin*. During this campaign he won a decisive victory over the Austrians at Hohenlinden. In 1804 he was brought to trial and sentenced to imprisonment, which Napoleon exchanged for exile. He was seriously wounded in the battle of Dresden on 15 (27) August 1813 and died five days later.

4 Antoine-Henri de Jomini (1779 to 1869), Baron, Adjutant General and General-of-Infantry. A Swiss by birth, he felt a calling to military service from a young age, but due to circumstances beyond his control, had to join the offices of a Parisian merchant. On studying the descriptions of the campaigns of Frederick the Great and comparing them with operations by General Bonaparte, however, he came to the conclusion that the art of war is based on certain solid principles that can be formulated. From then on he devoted his life and work to the discovery of these principles, their formulation and popularisation through extensive and fundamental literary works.

In 1798 he entered Swiss service in the Ministry of War; in 1799 he was promoted to field officer rank. Wanting to enter Russian service, he approached the Russian ambassador Baron Ubri and presented him with the manuscript of the first volume of his work *Traité des grandes opérations militaires*, but encountered a negative reaction. Murat reacted to him in a similar manner. Having said that, Ney approved of his composition, took him with him to the Boulogne camp and helped him enter French service.

He took part in the campaign of 1805 as a volunteer, where he demonstrated courage and remarkably accurate views on

général de division due to his bad relations with Marshal Berthier, which prompted him to leave the French army. Emperor Alexander accepted him into service as a lieutenant general and treated him very kindly. He was also received very warmly by many Russian officers, who, having studied his works, had a profound respect for him, acknowledged his authority as a first-class universal author, and were confident that he would render important services, in which they were not mistaken.⁵

Political considerations constantly made military operations more difficult and complex, not only in their execution, but even more so in their discussion and planning. The conflicts of state interests, the personal views of the Coalition sovereigns, the heterogeneous nature of the composition of their armies, the imperfections in the structure of their logistic and administrative elements, all this had a huge impact on the course of military operations. All these factors had to be balanced by Prince Volkonsky, and not through imperative orders in the name of the Tsar, rather by exhortation, through counter-argument, often through pleading, persuading the Coalition commanders into unanimity and so on.

The headquarters of the Austrian and Prussian armies:

The Austrian *Generalstab* had performed in the preceding wars in such a manner that it could no longer assume first place, despite the fact that supreme command had been entrusted to the Austrian *Feldmarschall* Prinz Schwarzenberg and that the representatives of this staff were military men who undoubtedly had higher standing than previously with the likes of Weyrother and even Zach, namely: the *Generalstabschef*, *Feldmarschallleutnant* Radetzky, *Generalquartiermeister* Langenau and *Feldzeugmeister* Duka, the confidant of Kaiser Franz.

The Prussian General Staff had only recently begun to improve itself after the *pogrom* of 1806, in conjunction with improvements to the entire Prussian military system, in the doctrine outlined by Frederick the Great; the Prussians had moved away from this doctrine under the influence of a perverse misunderstanding of the reasons for its success, and an unreasonable exaltation of the virtues of an outdated Prussian military machine, the shortcomings of which, as Frederick himself perfectly understood, had escaped the understanding of the Prussian statesmen and military leaders who replaced him at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries; once the *pogrom* of 1806 had given impetus to the improvement of its military system, people were present who could be put in charge of these matters; pride of place in their ranks belonged to *Generalleutnant* Scharnhorst,⁶ who had a great influence on the education of Prussian officers in general and had the gift of selecting and appreciating people. The Prussian *Generalstab* had just taken the correct path of development at this time; it already included Gneisenau, Grolman, Müffling, Boyen, Clausewitz, Hofmann and other excellent officers. Scharnhorst was appointed *Generalstabschef* of the Prussian

strategic issues. Ney sent him to Napoleon with a report and presented him with two volumes of his work. Napoleon was dismayed that a book explaining his system of waging war had been published, but approved of the content itself and ordered him to be presented for promotion to colonel of the general staff, with the appointment to the position of *premier adjudant-commandant* to Marshal Ney. After the war of 1806 to 1807 he was confirmed in the position of *chef d'état-major* to this same marshal. On his return from Spain, after the campaign of 1809, although he was promoted to *général de brigade*, constant clashes with Berthier and harassment from the latter had a detrimental effect on his career.

In 1813 he was again appointed *chef d'état-major* to Ney. After the Battle of Bautzen, Berthier struck him off the promotions lists, in which he was placed at the head of 640 officers, of whom 638 received promotions. Relations between them became so strained that Jomini found it impossible to remain in the French army and defected to the Coalition side on the day the armistice expired.

5 Bogdanovich, History of the War of 1813, Volume 1, pages 212, 407 & 409, & Volume 2, throughout [English translations by P.G.A. Phillips].

6 Gerhard Johann David Scharnhorst (1755 to 1813) was the son of a smallholder. He entered Graf Lippe's service; after 1776 he transferred to Hanoverian service; he participated in the war against the French, starting in 1793; in 1794 he was appointed *Quartiermeisterleutnant*; in 1796 he became an *Oberstleutnant*, but did not receive a regiment, as he was not a noble. In 1801 he transferred to Prussian service and was the 3rd *Generalquartiermeister* (after Pfuell and Massenbach).

force entrusted to *General-der-Kavallerie* Blücher, while *Generalmajor* Gneisenau was appointed *Generalquartiermeister* on the same staff. It was a very successful combination of a senior commander with his closest associates. Scharnhorst might have played a pre-eminent role, both because of the personal favour of Emperor Alexander and because of his own merits, but he was wounded at Lützen and died shortly thereafter.

The place of honour of our Quartermasters Department among the general staffs of the Coalition armies:

Despite all of Emperor Alexander's concessions, he was still *primus inter pares* among the allies. It could not have been otherwise, since only Russia had stood up to Napoleon and even overthrown him from his hitherto unassailable pedestal, destroying and burying his *Grande armée* in its snows.

Naturally, the Russian Suite of His Imperial Majesty in the Quartermasters Department, which now had talented commanders at its head and had acquired combat experience, took pride of place among the general staffs of the Coalition armies.

Quartermaster duties were performed by the members of the Suite during these campaigns in a similar manner to 1812, but since it was necessary to operate in foreign countries, together with allied troops that were alien to us in every respect, and since the numbers in the Coalition armies were very large, all these factors could not but be reflected in the complication of these duties, the performance of which was now associated with extraordinary difficulties. If our army, occupying pride of place in the ranks of the Coalition armies, achieved brilliant successes in the fight against Napoleon, who was eventually overthrown, then it owes this to a large extent to its Quartermasters Department, starting with the famous members of the high command and ending with 'those workers who, without ever being noticed by anyone in the enormity of the events taking place, nevertheless made their (not insubstantial) contributions to the common cause.'⁷

Examples of the activities of the Quartermasters Department as demonstrated by its outstanding representatives:

It would be impossible to mention all the noteworthy manifestations of activities beneficial to the forces by diligent, outstanding, and successful officers of the Suite in these wars, even limited to just those who were awarded military decorations. It will have to be enough to dwell only on the more remarkable ones.

Toll:

Major General Toll was Prince Volkonsky's closest collaborator in the performance of his complex and extremely difficult duties as Chief-of-the-General-Staff to Emperor Alexander, who was the heart and soul of the entire Coalition hostile to Napoleon. In addition to his primary duties, he had to carry out many other assignments. Thus, he was often sent to secure agreements between various Commanders-in-Chief:

1. In April 1813 he was sent to Count Wittgenstein to establish the final provisions for the offensive.
2. At the beginning of June, he convinced the Crown Prince of Sweden of the expediency of the operational plan he had proposed, and then went to the headquarters of the Austrian Commander-in-Chief (who was also appointed as the overall Coalition commander-in-chief), Prince Schwarzenberg, to agree on the impending campaign.⁸
3. On the eve of the battle at Kulm on 17 [29] August, Toll was sent to Barclay de Tolly to convey to our Commander-in-Chief the Tsar's Supreme will on how to operate against

⁷ Glinetsky, I, 281.

⁸ Bogdanovich, History of the War of 1813, I, 389-390 [English translations by P.G.A. Phillips]; Glinetsky, I, 265.

Vandamme.⁹

4. As the Coalition was concentrating at Leipzig, he accompanied the main Austrian force in order to speed up their movements; Prince Schwarzenberg, preferring extremely cautious operations at all times and everywhere, proposed sending two Austrian corps along the Lützen road towards Lindenau, and sending the Austrian reserve, the Russian and Prussian guard and Russian cuirassiers, through Audigast, to the area between the Elster and Pleiße, and to move the remaining formations of the Army of Bohemia along the right bank of the Pleiße, which would have led to the splitting of this army into three isolated bodies;¹⁰ Toll, considering the Austrian disposition to be inappropriate to the situation, tried to convince Prinz Schwarzenberg and his advisers of this and proposed to direct the main body of the army along the right bank of the Pleiße and envelope the enemy position from the left flank, but all his efforts in this direction were unsuccessful; whereupon he asked Prinz Schwarzenberg not to issue the dispositions until Emperor Alexander had expressed his consent to them, and immediately went to the Tsar and reported to him on the Commander-in-Chief's plans; Barclay de Tolly and Diebitsch agreed with Toll; the Tsar, having invited Schwarzenberg, Radetzky and Langenau to see him, wanted to achieve a change in the disposition by force of persuasion, but, driven beyond patience by Schwarzenberg's stubbornness, said to him with obvious annoyance: "So, *Herr Feldmarschall*, you, remaining true to your convictions, may dispose of the Austrian forces as you please; but the Russian units under the Grand Duke and Barclay will cross to the right bank of the Pleiße, where they should be, and shall not go to any other point;" from the above, Toll's value in this case is clear.
5. On the second day at Leipzig, Toll went to the aforementioned city for negotiations with the King of Saxony and immediately, through his eloquence, inspired the troops of some members of the *confédération du Rhin* to defect from Napoleon.
6. In 1814, he was in Prinz Schwarzenberg's vanguard, reporting daily to Prince Volkonsky, in order to inform the Tsar on the movements of Coalition and enemy forces; the battle of Brienne, operations by the Kronprinz von Württemberg, the concentration of the Coalition armies at Arcis-sur-Aube and, finally, the march on Paris which decided the fate of the campaign and the entire war, 'Toll was closely involved in all this;' he was promoted to lieutenant general for both these campaigns and received several other decorations.¹¹

Of course, Toll's rise was stunningly swift and full of distinctions, but he was not the only one who rose quickly and had influence on the course of military operations. Dobre and Diebitsch should be nominated first.

Dobre:

Chief-of-General-Staff Dobre,¹² after the battles that took place at Chashniki and Smoliantsy, applied his efforts with the utmost diligence to ensure the best possible outcome in the execution of the orders I had issued regarding troop movements and the battles that took place at Borisov and Studyanka;¹³ also during the pursuit of the enemy all

9 The measures taken by Emperor Alexander to concentrate the Coalition forces himself and to ensure success in the battle of Kulm are remarkable. The King of Prussia also contributed to this success. Bogdanovich, II, Chapter 31 [English translations by P.G.A. Phillips].

10 General Jomini was the first to report to Emperor Alexander that the proposals of the Austrian headquarters were not in agreement with basic tactical principles and exposed the army to obvious danger. Bogdanovich, II, Chapter 39 [English translations by P.G.A. Phillips].

11 The Order of St. Vladimir, 2nd class, many foreign decorations and wealthy tenancies and so on. Glinetsky, I, 265-266 & 407; Bogdanovich, II, Chapter 39 [English translations by P.G.A. Phillips].

12 See also Chapter 13 above.

13 The beginning of this extract dates back to 1812, but is placed here due to the awkwardness of dividing it.

the way to Königsberg and the Danzig fortress, after which he was sent by me to blockade the Pillau fortress, and, using his skill and knowledge, he persuaded the commandant of the fortress to surrender it, without the slightest loss on our part. It was under his care that the *têtes de pont* [bridgeheads] on the Oder and Elbe rivers were built; it was in accordance with his dispositions and under his command that the siege of the Spandau fortress was carried out, which subsequently surrendered. During the battle of Lützen, while I was on the left flank, he was constantly in the centre, from where, in my absence, he issued orders and contributed to the success of this part of our force. During the retreat from Lützen to Bautzen, and especially on the first stage from Pegau to Frohburg, he took charge while I was in Altenburg and took the necessary precautions to ensure the security of the artillery, and afterwards designated positions for the rearguard, thereby contributing to the success of the withdrawal. He demonstrated new examples of his experience in choosing and preparing the Bautzen battlefield and on 8 [20] May he was sent by me to the right flank, to General Blücher, in order to supervise the attack that was being executed in this direction. On his return from this point, when the enemy was strongly attacking our left flank, he was near the village of Nadelwitz, which was held by the French at the time and where we had no units located. Having taken six guns, the Tenginsk Infantry Regiment and several squadrons of dragoons, he delayed the strong enemy drive, who had hoped to break through the centre and envelope our left flank.

He subsequently handed over command of this part of the force to Lieutenant General Yermolov and went on to other locations where his presence was required. On 9 [21] May, he was with me, while during the retreat from Bautzen towards Schweidnitz [Świdnica], he made the vital arrangements for good order and security and issued directions to the rearguard. He insistently asked me not to abandon Strigau [Strzegom] and Jauernig [Stary Jaworów], despite the orders I had received, and thus the fortress of Schweidnitz remained in the hands of Coalition forces.'

This is how Major General Dobre was assessed by his superior, Count Wittgenstein. For these distinctions, Dobre was promoted to lieutenant general (with seniority from the day of the Battle of Lützen). He remained as Chief-of-Staff under Count Wittgenstein beyond the end of the 1813 campaign, also under his successor, General Raevsky, in 1814 and again received several decorations. His services were highly valued by the Tsar.¹⁴

Diebitsch:

Major General Diebitsch, in accordance with the operational plan to oppose Napoleon, approved by Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia, as devised on 28 May (9 June) 1813 in Trachenberg [Żmigród], travelled under Supreme orders to the Austrian Kaiser (in Brandeis [Brandýs]) with the original minutes of the meeting;¹⁵ For distinction at Dresden, Kulm and Leipzig, he was promoted (at the age of 28) to the rank of lieutenant general and received the Order of St. Vladimir, 2nd class, with further decorations thereafter. Worthy of attention is his circular order (No. 183) in the appointment of Quartermaster-General of the combined Army of Bohemia dated 7 [19] August 1813, which established weekly Situation Reports from each *Oberquartiermeister* on all movements, locations and operations; moreover, it was required that the officers of the Quartermasters Department in combat monitor all troop movements, both their own and the enemy's, and immediately send the Quartermaster-General a 'detailed and accurate Contact Report, describing the action as clearly as possible and mentioning at what time the action began and at what precise time movements were made and the consequent results.' From then on, reports of this kind were a consistent requirement from officers of the Quartermasters Department.¹⁶

14 Glinetsky, I, 267-269.

15 Bogdanovich, History of the War of 1813, I, 390 [English translation by P.G.A Phillips].

16 Glinetsky, I, 269-270.

Following the above-mentioned commanders and senior representatives of the Suite in the Quartermasters Department came their subordinates and junior colleagues.

Neidhardt as Rudzevich's deputy, and other outstanding officers of the Quartermasters Department:

Colonel Neidhardt,¹⁷ for distinction in the battles of Lützen, Bautzen and the Katzbach, was promoted to major general (with seniority from the day of the battle of Lützen). In August 1813, he had to perform the duties of chief-of-staff for comte Langéron's corps, because the man appointed to this position, one of the most brilliant generals of our army of that time, Rudzevich, was usually detached to the vanguard.¹⁸ On 6 [18] October, during the battle of Leipzig, he needed to show personal initiative, and take full responsibility for it:

Blücher, wishing to encourage the Army of the North under the Crown Prince of Sweden to march on Leipzig, instructed... comte Langéron... to place himself and his corps at the Crown Prince's disposal, in order to convince him to take part in the decisive battle that was to take place that day. The Crown Prince agreed and assigned Langéron's force to the reserve of his army. Neidhardt remained with the corps in the absence of the comte, and knew nothing as yet of the outcome of the meeting between his commander and the Crown Prince, when he was informed by General Rudzevich, commanding the vanguard of the corps, that the force under Marshal Ney, stationed behind the Parthe river, were slipping away column by column and were heading towards Liebertwolkwitz, against the main Coalition army. Without wasting any time, Neidhardt went to Blücher with this report and asked for his permission to act on it. Blücher did not wish to deviate from his plan... and suggested that Neidhardt request orders from His Highness, who was then 1½ *Meilen* [seven miles] away... Neidhardt steeled himself and explained the threat of danger to Blücher once more, asking him to allow the corps to respond and launch a spoiling attack... in order to distract the French force. After several moments of silence, Blücher replied... that he fully approved of Neidhardt's concept, but could not issue any orders... having the benefit and importance of the common cause in mind. Neidhardt sent word to update Langéron of what was happening, while at the same time, having reinforced... Rudzevich with artillery, suggested that he attack the enemy. This happened at around nine o'clock in the morning. Rudzevich immediately crossed the Parthe via a ford. Other units followed him, and comte Saint-Priest's corps captured part of the village of Schönefeld, which forced Ney to return and draw his units back, one after another, away from their previous direction and to demand reinforcements. Under Neidhardt's orders, the force edged ever more forwards, and bitter fighting had been raging for about three hours before the Crown Prince arrived at the battlefield with... General P.K. Suchtelen. Neidhardt went to the Prince and, having reported to him what was happening, received in response that although Langéron's corps had been intended to be a reserve for the Army of the North, nevertheless, as units had not yet arrived to relieve them, the battle that they had begun must be supported. "It is not good to make too many changes during a battle when things are going well" added the Prince.¹⁹

Neidhardt received the Order of St. George, 3rd class for the Battle of Leipzig. In 1814, he distinguished himself at Soissons, reconnoitred the heights of Montmartre under heavy enemy fire,

17 See also Chapter 12 above.

18 Alexander Yakovlevich Rudzevich, after completing the course with the Greek Cadet Corps, was promoted to captain of the general staff in 1792 (at 17 years of age). He took part in the 1794 campaign in Poland, and then went surveying. In 1801, he transferred to the Troitsk Musketeers with the rank of lieutenant colonel and spent ten years in the Caucasus, constantly on active duty, and was promoted to colonel then major general and received the Order of St. George, 3rd class among other decorations. Commanding a brigade in 1812, he served in the corps under comte Langéron; he continued under his command in 1813 and 1814, and displayed many distinctions, for which he was promoted to lieutenant general, and received the Order of St. George, 2nd class as well as other awards.

19 This description was extracted from Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky.

and distinguished himself alongside Rudzevich once more. In one of his reports to the Tsar, Barclay de Tolly stated that Neidhardt 'showed the greatest courage, diligence and efficiency in every action.'²⁰

R.E. Rennie and Baron K.F. Clodt von Jürgensburg²¹ must be counted among the valiant, efficient and precise senior staff officers.

Colonel Poncet²² was part of Count Vorontsov's detachment. He was promoted to major general for distinction in the Battle of Groß-Beeren. He selected the Craonne position and commanded the forward detachment of the Tula Infantry and Navaginsk Infantry regiments; being on the front line here and standing in front of the regiments on crutches, he received two orders to retreat, to which he replied: "I shall die, I will not move a single step." In any other action, it would have been impossible to justify this, but at the Battle of Craonne, the entire mission of Count Vorontsov's force was to distract the enemy and delay them. For this action Poncet received a Golden Sword with diamonds. Poncet took part in the battles of Laon and Paris with this same brigade, but in the uniform of the Suite, and always remained the same as he had declared himself to be earlier.²³

Thereafter proceeded a whole series of younger members of the Suite, some of whom have already been named above, who, in the words of one of our military historians, were formed 'in the image of their quartermaster-generals, just as the spirit of every possible army is cast in the mould of their commanders-in-chief, gradually descending from his closest commanders to the soldiery.'²⁴ The following should be included here: N.N. Muravyov, M.N. Muravyov,²⁵ the Perovsky brothers,²⁶ Dannenberg,²⁷ A.I. Neidhardt, F.F. Schubert, Tenner, Harting,²⁸ F.F. Berg (the future field marshal), Baron Prittwitz, Shcherbinin, Miloradovich, Ozersky, Baron Uexküll and others.²⁹ All of them received awards corresponding to their merits, and many of them were promoted two or three ranks for military distinction, in addition to the award of decorations. The outstanding behaviour which gave rise to these awards can in no way be considered incidental and should be attributed to the entire rejuvenated Quartermasters Department and not simply as individuals.

Those killed in action, died from wounds or disease, wounded or sacrificed their health from 1812 to 1814:

One cannot help but remember those officers of the Suite who suffered all of the hardship and privation, yet were not destined to enjoy the glory and honours, or who, although they remained alive, yet, with just a small number of happy exceptions, did not have the strength to endure the extremely heavy strains of a period of almost ten years of constant war. From 1812 to 1814, ten officers were removed from the rolls of the Suite of the Quartermasters Department due to being

20 Glinetsky, I, 273-275 & 408; The Military Gallery of the Winter Palace, VI, biography of P.I. Neidhardt.

21 Both served with distinction in General Wintzingerode's corps, one as chief-of-staff and the other as *Ober-Quartiermeister*.

22 Transferred to the Suite in 1811 as a colonel. From 1806 to 1807 he showed the valour of a combatant officer, and from 1810 to 1811 the orders, diligence and efficiency of an officer of the Quartermasters Department.

23 Glinetsky, I, 276-278, 408 & 409.

24 I.P. Liprandi; Glinetsky, I, 278, 407 & 409.

25 Nikolay Nikolaevich Muravyov (1794 to 1866). He joined the Suite in 1811. Was made a Chevalier of the Order of St. George, 4th class, for the siege and storming of Kars (from 1828 to 1829) and 2nd class, for the capture of Kars in 1854. Became an adjutant-general. Was Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasus Corps and was Viceroy of the Caucasus. Was a Member of the State Council. One of the most scholarly generals in our army.

Mikhail Nikolaevich Muravyov (1796 to 1866). Was a Column Leader in 1811. An ensign in the Suite in 1812. In 1863, he was Governor-General of the North-West Territory and Commander of the Vilna Military District.

26 Glinetsky, I, 280-281 and more. Count Vasily Alexeevich Perovsky (1794 to 1857), adjutant-general, Governor-General of Orenburg and commander of the Orenburg Corps.

27 Glinetsky, I, 278 and more. Pëtr Andreevich Dannenberg (1792 to 1872), commander of IV Infantry Corps; member of the Military Council.

28 Glinetsky, I, 174-280 and more.

29 Glinetsky, I, 280.

killed or having died from wounds received in battle; of seven wounded, five died in service from illness (no later than 1816) and more than ten officers were discharged due to illness immediately after the end of the war;³⁰ in sum, more than 27 out of a total average number of 125 to 150 officers of the Suite who served with the armies, that is, more than 18 to 21 percent.

In 1812, two excellent field officers, Gaverdovsky³¹ and Kotzebue,³² and Sub-Lieutenant Savich³³ were killed or died of wounds on the battlefield; among the wounded were: Major A.I. Neidhardt at Klyastitsy and in the Battle of Borodino: Captain Brozin, lieutenants Bezhev, M.N. Muravyov, Ensign Prince M.M. Golitsyn 2nd and Column Leader Burnashev; Sub-Lieutenant Weyrauch suffered a contusion.

In 1813, Lieutenant Helffreich was killed at Lützen and the following were wounded: Prince A.M. Golitsyn 1st also at Lützen, Lieutenant Colonel Manderstjerna at Leipzig, Captain Gasfordt³⁴ and Lieutenant Baron Seddeler,³⁵ who had just transferred from Austrian service to ours, and Lieutenant Terletsky during operations under the Crown Prince of Sweden; Staff Captain Markevich suffered a contusion at Dresden.

In 1814, the Suite of the Quartermasters Department lost six officers: Colonel Rappatel, Lieutenant Colonel Rochechouart, captains Kheka and Knorrning, 18-year-old Sub-Lieutenant Count Stroganov and Lieutenant Lyutinsky, who died of wounds received at Paris; Staff Captain L.A. Perovsky was wounded (at Nancy).

Among the dead, particular attention should be paid to colonels Sosnin³⁶ and Sosnovsky³⁷ and Captain Zon,³⁸ who participated in every war from 1806 to 1814 and ‘died of exhaustion;’ close to them were those who died from disease due to intense privation during the war: in 1812, Sub-Lieutenant Count Fugassier (a French émigré), in 1813, captains Beber and Brun and in 1814 Colonel Gabbe. There were also quite a few officers who more or less ruined their health from unending work and hardship and were close to death, but survived and remained in service.³⁹

An evaluation of the service of the Quartermasters Department in the fight against Napoleon:

All these losses suffered by the Suite during the Napoleonic wars⁴⁰ are very strong evidence of the diligence and zeal with which the youths, recruited by generals Suchtelen and Prince Volkonsky, treated the service, serving with faith and truth, ‘not out of fear, rather, due to conscience.’ Prince Volkonsky made strenuous efforts to staff the Suite as well as was possible, attracting the most outstanding officers to the Quartermasters Department from other arms, mainly from units that, at that time, were in the process of gaining first-class practical combat experience in the wars against Napoleon. By this means, Prince Volkonsky brought the Suite closer to the combat arms, made the army a participant in the recruitment for the Suite, and encouraged competition between the

30 Glinetsky, I, 283-286 & 409.

31 Glinetsky, I, 201 & 283.

32 Vasily Avgustovich [Wilhelm Friedrich] Kotzebue transferred from Austrian service into Russian in 1811, already holding the St. George Cross and a Golden Sword (for 1805); he died of wounds received at Polotsk at 27 years old, with the rank of lieutenant colonel.

33 Where exactly he was killed is unknown. Glinetsky, I, 283-284.

34 Gustav Christian von Gasfordt transferred into the Suite from the lines of communications engineers; serving with the active army, he worked as both an engineer and an officer of the Quartermasters Department.

35 He began his service in Austria, in the hussars, and then in the general staff. He came to notice for his bravery at the battle of Wagram. Glinetsky, I, 284 and more.

36 He was a Column Leader in 1793, a good surveyor and brave officer.

37 Graduated in 1802 from 1st [Cadet] Corps; awarded a Golden Sword for Borodino.

38 Became a Column Leader in 1806.

39 Glinetsky, I, 285 and more.

40 Although Russia was part of the Seventh Coalition in 1815, Napoleon's fate had already been decided before the arrival of the Russian force. From the point of view of this study, the campaign of 1815 does not require any attention.

members of the Quartermasters Department itself. He reached the point that the troops began to look upon a transfer to the Suite of the Quartermasters Department as a very honourable reward, which was made available to anyone who distinguished themselves through honest talent, education and corresponding aptitude; at the same time, the Suite itself ceased to be a closed corporation and strove in every way to justify the high expectations that had now fallen to its lot.

The Guard General Staff:

As a memorial to the generally acknowledged merits and service of the Quartermasters Department during the Napoleonic Wars, to be passed on to posterity, among other things, was the creation of an elite institution within the Suite itself, designated the Guard General Staff, consisting of the most distinguished field officers and subalterns of the Quartermasters Department; these officers were granted equal privileges in rank with Lifeguard regiments and were given special insignia on their uniforms.⁴¹ The number of officers of the Guards General Staff was not limited by any establishment table; initially, 24 officers of the Suite were assigned to this Staff.⁴² These officers were not intended to serve exclusively with Lifeguard units, but were distributed equally with all the others throughout every formation and on surveying tasks. This was a personal distinction granted to the most outstanding officers of the Suite, wherever they were serving.⁴³

The success of the Quartermasters Department since Prince Volkonsky took over its direction and acknowledgement of the need for its continued improvement in conjunction with the general reform of higher military command and control:

From the above it is evident that, in the first five years of Prince Volkonsky's administration, the Suite of the Quartermasters Department made enormous progress and, having rapidly improved during the preparations for the struggle against Napoleon and more particularly during the wars of 1812, 1813 and 1814, in fact took its rightful place as the main supporting agency of higher military command and control within the Russian armed forces. The experience of the Napoleonic wars revealed that the supreme interests of the state, especially from the point of view of its external security, required, first of all, changes in the fundamental organisation of the Quartermasters Department, which until then had not yet been judged ready to occupy the above-mentioned place. The main obstacle to it taking this place were the conditions created partly by the establishment of the ministries in general in 1811 and mainly by the establishment of the Ministry of War in 1812.

The manual for the Administration of a Large Operational Army in 1812, although it was a corrective to the above-mentioned institutions of ministries in general and the Ministry of War in particular, yet the strength and scope of their activities could only be fully manifested in wartime, whereas in peacetime their reduction was inevitable, and this, in turn, could not but be reflected in the preparations for war not only by the Quartermasters Department, but by the entire Russian armed forces.

The experience of the war of 1812 made a very strong impression on Emperor Alexander I in this regard, who then, during the wars of 1813 and 1814, became convinced of the great advantages of the provisions brought into being by the 1812 manual for the Administration of a Large Operational Army. It goes without saying that the spirit of this manual was inspired mainly from the corresponding doctrine of Napoleonic France. And why not extract whatever is considered appropriate, useful and is indicative of good results?

41 'On the uniforms, as a distinction, there should be a gold border on the collar and cuffs above the embroidery next to the red piping, similar to that of the Guards *Équipage* [Imperial Yacht Crew].'

42 Colonels Harting, Cherkasov and Pyatin; captains Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Shcherbinin 1st and Traskin; staff-captains Durnovo, Perovsky 1st, Muravyov 1st, Berg and Dannenberg 2nd; lieutenants Prince Golitsyn 1st, Muravyov 2nd, Lukash and Glazov; sub-lieutenants Raumburg, Shcherbinin 2nd, Prince Golitsyn 2nd, Perovsky 2nd and Muravyov 5th; ensigns Count Buturlin, Rochefort, Muravyov 6th and Burtsov. Order No. 67 for the Quartermasters Department dated 16 [28] August 1814.

43 C.C.L. XXXII, No. 25,628; Glinetsky, I, 264-286 & 407-409.

Such were the considerations of the Tsar and Prince Volkonsky, his most important collaborator in the management of military affairs at this historical moment, with regard to reforming the higher military administration in the spirit of the principles laid down in the foundations of the 1812 manual for the Administration of a Large Operational Army, which was reflected most of all in the placement of the Suite of the Quartermasters Department in the general composition of military institutions of our fatherland, in the sense of its elevation instead of previous humiliations.



Ivan Ivanovich Diebitsch