

THE HISTORY OF THE GRODNO HUSSAR REGIMENT 1806-1814

Extracted From

**History of the 18th Klyastitsky Dragoon, His Royal Highness the Grand Duke of Hessen's
Regiment 1806-1886**

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CHAPTER 1.

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To what date the appearance of hussars in Russia can be attributed is definitely impossible.¹ During the reign of Aleksei Mikhailovich, the term 'hussars' in the Stories of Stolnika Pereyaslavsky-Chemodanov (1657), which says that 'after the Streltsy, the oldest troops in Russia are Dragoons, Horse and Hussars, recruited around 1650.'

At the time of this Tsar, in fact, besides the Horse role, there were Hussars, but as to the role of this latter troop type, whether they were armoured men, as in Poland, or light cavalry - there is no information. Most likely, Alexei Mikhailovich, by whom the first Military Charter was published, wished to have representatives of this kind of arm according to the Hungarian model, whose fame was rapidly growing in our western regions. Before the reign of Peter the Great, these hussars were not formed into homogeneous units, rather there were companies armed with lances which were called 'horse and hussar squadrons' with every Streltsy regiment.

The Great Reformer realised the need for an organised light cavalry capable of augmenting the Cossacks. Whilst he was abroad, he noticed the benefits brought by the Hungarian and Serbian Hussar regiments and, returning to Russia, decided to establish several foreign regiments that would serve as the nucleus for the future Russian light cavalry. In 1707, a certain Apostol Kigich (20 April [1 May]) was entrusted with the task of recruiting 'good and skilful personnel' 300 men with eight officers from the Hungarians, Serbs, Moldovans and Wallachians. This first light-cavalry regiment was called the *Voloshsky Horongvi*. The small force at the beginning began to grow so quickly that in 1711, in the war with Turkey, we already had six *Volosh* regiments and two *Horongvi*: of Poles and Serbs. All these newly formed units, however, did not exist for long. The reason that all the Hussar regiments were disbanded, with the exception of 1,500 men, consisting of three 500 man units, was partly due to their expensive upkeep and partly the disorder caused by the foreigners. Even these three units shrank little by little: the few Cossacks serving in them were reluctant to endure the conditions of service in the hussars, and the Wallachians and Hungarians, while they could be useful in wartime, during peacetime treated the new homeland they were defending like conquered territory. By 1721 they had been completely disbanded.

Peter the Great, despite the failure of his first experiment and the obvious shortcomings of mercenary regiments, did not take his eyes off the light cavalry. In 1723, the Decree was first held on conscription from the lowest serfs, on the formation of regiments of hussars from them instead of Land militia. Subsequently, the Serbian Major Albanetz [Jovan Albanetz] was instructed to call Serbs into the Russian hussar service - with the assignment of the same conditions as they received in Austria and with allotment of domestic land and arable land. Albanetz set about collecting the required foreigners and in 1727 formed the Serbian regiment, which was assigned to Tar in Ukraine. From 1736 to 1741 four more hussar regiments were founded from the natives of Romania and the Caucasus. The conditions for transferring to our service were so favourable that men of all ranks and classes, especially Serbs and Wallachians, who until then exclusively entered Polish service,

1 Some scholars give the word hussar a Slavic origin, which in their opinion would mean the 'Free' or 'Flying Horseman.' The following origin is much more plausible: during the thirty-years war, the Hungarians suffered greatly from the pillaging and robbery of their light troops, especially the Croats, so the nobility decided to get rid of them. In view of this, they decided to arm every twentieth nobleman and make up cavalry units from them, which were called Huszar from Husz (20) and ar (lodge). This cavalry was considered irregular and completely replaced the earlier Croats.

began to flood in. Of the latter, two more hussar regiments were formed during the Turkish War of 1735, with a strength of 510 and 1,000 men respectively.

The number of Serbs increased to 1,045 men, and the Caucasian nobles (Georgians) and princes already represented a contingent of 200 men, divided into two companies. In 1741, the same four Hussar regiments still existed, with a strength of 963 men each, while the number of regiments, in 1751, increased by two new ones recruited by the Austrian Colonel Jovan Horvat, consisting of 20 companies each. The last two regiments were settled between Kavorlik and Omelnik, tributaries of the Dnieper. To protect both these settlements and others that were on the right bank of the Dnieper, the fortress of St Yelsevet (now Yelisavetgrad) was built, the defence of which was assigned to the Pandur regiment, recruited from Croats, and fighting as dismounted hussars.

Already upon accession to the throne by Elizabeth Petrovna, the regiments received more solid foundations and the newer hussars differed significantly, both in spirit and in combat value, from the men recruited at the time of Peter and Kigich. This arm no longer had the appearance of a wild, unbridled crowd more like a Tatar horde, rather, properly organized cavalry; uniforms of the same pattern as the hussar form of the time issued in Austria, as well as weapons. The former consisted of a dolman or cloth tunic, heavily laced with cords with a small standing collar and pelisse. The pelisse was a jacket laced with cords and decorated with buttons, edged with fur; it could be worn on the left shoulder, serving as a protection for the arm from sabre cuts and in cold weather was worn with the arms in the sleeves. In addition, in the event of bad weather, the poncho, a long woollen cloak, which reached half length, was worn. The headdress was a fur cap, which, however, was replaced a few years later with a cylindrical fleece shako without a visor.

Elizabeth's hussars were armed with broadswords or long sabres, in scabbards set in iron (for lower ranks) or brass (for officers); the sabre was hung on a sword belt (*pasak*), worn under a sash, together with a leather sabretache. In addition to the sabre, the hussars had carbines with a bayonet for dismounted action and pistols for when riding. Thus, it was mistakenly thought that the original hussars served solely for reconnaissance and raiding: they carried out dragoon service at the same time, dismounting in case of need and mounting guard with the gun at the shoulder.

The distinctions between the officers and lower ranks was that the former had silver or gold cords, while the latter had woollen ones. Non-commissioned officers were identified by the narrow metallic braid on the collar: a single row for Corporals, two for Quartermasters and three for *Wachtmeisters* [Sergeant-Major]. The first positive decree on hussar clothing appeared with the establishment of statutes for these regiments on 14 [25] October 1741, but this was only carried out in the reign of Elizabeth Petrovna. The second statutes (10 [21] May, 1763) had already identified the distinctions between officer ranks: subalterns were allowed narrow metallic braid on the sleeves, majors and lieutenant-colonels - wide, and colonels - both. There were no distinctions between subalterns' ranks, uniform distinctions did not exist at all until 1828, when stars were introduced on the epaulettes of undress uniforms; it was only in 1844, that badges were ordered to be worn with stars signifying the rank on the pelisse and dolman.

The government did not cease to care about the increase in hussar numbers. In 1754, the Serbs Shevich and Preradovich, founded two more eponymous regiments, the strength of both, combined, reached some 1,300 men. Three years later, the Sloboda Hussars were established from the Sloboda Cossacks and, then, in 1759, Lieutenant-General Horvat formed the Macedonia and Bulgaria regiments, of 20 company establishments.

These hussars did not yet belong to the actual field cavalry, but constituted, as it were, an intermediate state between the regular (Horse and Dragoons) and irregular cavalry; they were used as field troops only in wartime. In 1760, the number of existing hussar regiments increased by the Yellow Regiment (10 companies), but at the beginning of next year the Bulgaria Regiment was so weakened that it had to be disbanded and its remnants were sent to strengthen the Macedonia. Three

years later, the Macedonia ceased to exist.

The reason for the disbandment of these regiments was partly because a stricter view began to be taken with both the establishment of men and the internal administration of the units. And in both, a whole series of abuses were revealed. Wanting, for example, to parade as many men as possible, necessarily natives of one nation, the colonels accepted any scum, often those unsuitable for any service, solely on the grounds that they were Hungarians, Serbs or Moldovans. In addition, since equipment, uniforms and weapons were provided by the commanders without scrutiny, the latter purchased horses in numbers incomparably smaller than the numbers they declared. In some regiments, the hussars did not immediately receive horses, but remained on foot until an amount sufficient to purchase horses was accumulated from the money allocated for fodder. The cash for remounts given in advance went straight into the pockets of the Colonels, who, for the most part having the complicity of the captains, returned to their homeland, passing their regiment to their successor in two forms: official and domestic. Under these conditions, the hussars were often a fictitious cavalry, not very useful and also extremely expensive, since they received a very large salary at that time, and portions and rations were issued at nominal and trading prices, exorbitantly high in wartime.

If the composition of the lower ranks was poor, then, comparatively, the corps of officers was even worse. Most of them were illiterate men who were not able to keep accounts before issuing pay to the hussars entrusted to them, which was mainly the reason for the constant complaints, claims and reproaches from subordinates about their superiors in twenty languages.

In 1764 there were three new regiments, formed from the former hussar and Pandur regiments, settled in Novos Serbia (Novorossiysk Governorate). In the same year, the regiments of Shevich and Preradovich, which were in the Slavyanoserbsky settlement, merged together, forming the Bakhmut Hussar Regiment.

Looking through the history of this troop type, one cannot help but be surprised that Russia, until the second half of the 18th century, could not form hussar regiments from its sons without recruiting them from foreigners. But since the time of Peter the Great, the conviction was formed that some foreigners were able to ride famously and wear jackets decorated with cords and braid and this conviction was rooted so strong that attempts to introduce a Cossack element into the hussar regiments in 1757 was soon recognised as unsuccessful. Meanwhile, the hussar differed little from the Cossack: the system was almost the same, the tactics were the same and Little Russians could serve as well in the hussars as Serbs, Hungarians or Romanians did. In 1765, a new era began in the life of hussar regiments, since this year for the first time in the Russian cavalry, hussar regiments were recruited from Russians. For this purpose, Catherine took advantage of the Sloboda Cossacks. The Sloboda Cossack regiments began as early as the 17th century, when before the accession of Khmel'nitsky Little Russia into Greater Russia, the people, for various reasons, moved to Sloboda Ukraine as whole villages. In their new found homes, the settlers had to defend themselves from raids by Crimean Tatars: settlements appeared, surrounded by ditches and earthworks, for the defence of which the former civilians of the free Ukrainian steppes formed a standing army from their own resources. The army gradually settled down, little by little formed the true Cossack regiments.

The first was in 1651 the Izyum Cossack Regiment,² which, as will be seen from the following story, can be considered the origin of the current Klyastitsky Regiment. In the initial establishment, the Izyum Regiment did not exist for long: at the end of 1651, the name temporarily disappears from the lists of Sloboda regiments, and then three new regiments appear: Akhtyrka, Sumy and Kharkov, moreover, parts of the Izyum Regiment were included in the establishment of the latter. In

2 This date is on our regimental standard, granted in 1851 by Emperor Nicholas I on the occasion of the 200th anniversary of the 1st and 2nd Squadrons of the Klyastitsky Regiment.

1688, due to the over-extension of the Kharkov Regiment, the former Izyum Regiment was assigned to it and thus formed two regiments: Kharkov and Izyum.

Under Peter the Great in 1700, various privileges were granted to these regiments for loyal and exemplary service; they were kept in the best order and in 1732 they were subordinated to the management of a Brigade Commander. By Supreme Decree of 3 [14] March, 1765, finally, Major Shcherbinin [Evdokim Alekseevich Shcherbinin] of the Lifeguard Izmailovsky Regiment was ordered to form Hussar regiments from the Sloboda Cossacks: Izyum, Sumy, Akhtyrka, Ostrogozhsk and Kharkov. The decree was not particularly sympathetic to the Cossacks: they were wary of Western discipline, which was supposed to replace the old patriarchal order of the previous era. As the Colonel of the Izyum Regiment, F.F. Krasnokutsky, hearing about the reform, put it: “a Cossack can never be an Hussar!” and quickly tried to resign; many would have followed his example if the energetic Shcherbinin had not suppressed the discontent of the colonels. Then the famous Major-General Tekeli [Peter Abramovich Tekeli] arrived and began to reform the Sloboda regiments and, thanks to his activities, the number of hussars in Russia soon reached 8,500. Thus, as a result of these reforms in the Russian army, two types of hussar were obtained:

1. Settlement - formed from foreign immigrants;
2. Non-settlement - formed from the Sloboda Cossacks.

Officers in non-settlement regiments were appointed personally by Tekeli from the settlement regiments.

While the described reforms were underway in Russia, this type of cavalry began to be widely used in the West, especially after Marshal Saxe [Maurice de Saxe] and Frederick the Great established a close order system with their hussars, instead of the especially loose formation, adopted from the Hungarians. Seydlitz [Friedrich Wilhelm von Seydlitz] and Zieten [Hans Joachim von Zieten] perfected the previously unpopular cavalry line, and soon the significance of this light cavalry, capable of striking as well as the heavies, and seemingly tireless, thanks to their mobility, increased so much that all states had started recruiting hussars. Around the same time, the inconvenient three-rank system, which made movements and turns so difficult, was abolished in Western armies, but these changes would reach us only in the reign of Pavel Petrovich. In 1775, the settlement regiments were reorganized. There were nine of them in the Novorossiysk Governorate: Hungary, Serbia, Macedonia, Dalmatia, Moldavia, Bulgaria, Slav, Illyria and Voloshsky. All of these regiments were to have an establishment of 10 active squadrons and two replacement. Each field hussar regiment contained 1,032 men, and the settlement ones - according to peacetime establishment 744, according to wartime establishment 1,032; field regiments were to have 972 horses, 612 in settlement regiments. The Hussars of Catherine's times did not differ much in clothing and weapons from those of Yelisavet, in terms of type of structure and internal organization they changed: training began to be carried out frequently and in accordance with European regulations; a more correct fodder allowance was established, which differed from the current one only in the fact that for four summer months the horses were put out to pasture and grazing (grass).³ Administratively, the regiments (in 1783) were divided into Ukrainian (field) and Yekaterinoslav (settlement) cavalry.

After 1783, the word hussar disappears altogether in Russia. All previous regiments were renamed light-horse and remained so until 1788, when the old names were returned to the regiments. There were seven light-horse regiments, excluding the former Sloboda: Taurida, Voronezh, Konstantinograd, Kherson (all four were abolished in 1796), Alexandria (from Macedonia and Moldavia), Yelisavetgrad (hussars from 1796) and Olviopol (from Serbia and Bulgaria).

From 1776 to 1796, the President of the Military Collegium was Potemkin [Grigory Aleksandrovich Potemkin], to whom the Russian army owed many cavalry reforms. Thanks to his constant care, the

3 Under Catherine II, 18 roubles were allocated for the purchase of horses; on terms of eight years.

hussars gained not only the proper organisation, but also popularity, which they had not had for so many years. By various measures, he encouraged those joining the light-horse regiments, reduced the service life of lower ranks from 25 years to 15, those who served three years in excess of 15 were issued silver medals and gold for five additional years. Of the administrative reforms, the subordination of regiments into brigades is still noteworthy. With him, we already saw attempts to introduce a two-rank system, but, in the absence of a Charter, this novelty was not adopted yet and the system remained the same. Potemkin's orders best show how this statesman was interested in hussars. On 27 January [7 February] 1789, he wrote: 'Gentlemen Commanders of light-horse regiments must make every effort to maintain their regiments in accordance with the status of light-horse, why increase the burden for horses in the cavalry like the heavies, which is heavy on its own, and not a blow to the enemy; the men sit freely and the sabres work well...'⁴ Thanks to him during the reign of Catherine II, the hussars became particularly fashionable. Although most of the officers consisted of men of the old school, distinguished more by ignorance and self-will, than by feelings of honour and a sense of duty, the standard of the corps of officers nonetheless rose quickly. Young men with a good education began to enter the hussar regiments of Potemkin's army, seduced by the daredevil, somewhat reckless lifestyle and partly by the elegant, brilliant uniforms of light-horse regiments. Already from that time, the hussars received citizenship rights in Russia and the people ceased to be afraid of these regiments, which they had previously regarded as mercenaries selling their blood for money.

With the accession to the throne of Emperor Paul I the hussars, like the rest of the cavalry, were brought into Prussian fashion. Due to his concerns, the two-rank system was finally introduced and subordination into squadrons and platoons was adopted.⁵ The Emperor's attention was drawn to the convulsion and deployment of columns, which was carried out at speed, which even impressed foreign cavalymen. All the hussar regiments were distributed according to the inspections into which the army was divided, with Shevich's [Georgy Ivanovich Shevich] Regiment (Sumy) entering Moscow, Klyucharevsky's [Daniil Klyucharevsky] (Izyum) in Livonia, and Nikoritsy's [Ivan Andreevich Nikoritsy] (Alexandria) in Lithuania. The regiments began to be known by the surnames of their Colonels-in-Chief and bore them until 1803, when Emperor Alexander I returned them to their former names.

As the hussar regiments, undergoing various reforms, were brought under a better organisation, a noticeable turn for the better also began to be revealed in their morals. The first hussars formed from Serbs and Hungarians, who came to offer their blood and service to Russia, because of the impossibility of finding a use for them in their homeland, everything about life in their new homeland was alien to them. They got along a little with a people who did not understand their language or customs: they were not German *Landsknechts* or *Reiter*, who, bit by bit, entered Russian life as a necessity, with whom both appearance and customs were familiar; the first hussars, on the contrary, were crude, lawless mobs, without discipline or order, frightful at war, frightful in peacetime. The Germans that the people met, these Germans were mercenaries, Russians fell in love with their quiet, calm manners, but the hussars until the beginning of this century remained a bugbear for the people, used to scare children. These relations with society made them live together, in isolation, where consolation was found in revelry, wild as they were, drinking and gaming. When, under the influence of the all-powerful Potemkin, the regiments began to be filled with Russian nobility, this new element, gradually merging with the old, seemed to ennoble it, but at the same time it followed the customs of the old days. Thus, the new hussar regiments, gradually losing the character of the former wild rampant, which did not recognise either order or discipline, retained the best features of the former hussars, which, from then on, began to really become evident. Their

⁴ Potemkin's merits include the prohibition of using carbines from horseback.

⁵ This nomenclature was adopted under Elizabeth Petrovna, but it was soon replaced again by the previous reference to the company.

courage and fighting quality became known within society, which until then knew only about their vices and if the hussar remained synonymous with reckless revelry, he simultaneously became the ideal type of light cavalryman. The enormous benefits of the hussars became especially noticeable in the wars with the French and under Alexander I this troop type reached the apogee of its glory and popularity.

The campaign of 1806 began. The Emperor's main concern was to bring all the forces of the Empire into a formidable defensive state and the first measure of the Military Council established for this was the compilation of 13 Divisions from the Inspections into which the troops had been divided; these divisions were composed of cavalry, infantry and artillery. A little later, in addition to the 13 Divisions, it was decided to form another - the 14th. Cavalry was needed for the newly formed Division and now, by the Registered Supreme Decree of the Military Collegium, on 13 [25] June, 1806, it was ordered: taking squadrons from the Izyum, Sumy, Olviopol and Alexandria regiments, to form a new regiment - the Grodno Hussars.

The formation of this regiment was entrusted to *Flügel-Adjutant* Colonel Dmitry Dmitrievich Shepelev.

CHAPTER 2.

The first colonel-in-chief. - Initial raising of the regiment. - External differences between squadrons. - The officer corps, their spirit and customs. - Training of the lower ranks. - Uniform, equipment and weapons of the regiment. - A glance at the uniform. - 'Chats.' - Drill training. - Dressage. - Types of fighting formation. - The first commander. - The origins of the war of 1807. - The state of the regiment before the war. - The lucky and the unlucky. - Departure on campaign.

Shepelev, appointed Colonel-in-Chief of the Regiment, energetically set about raising the unit entrusted to him.¹ In order to expedite the purchase of transport, uniform items and draught horses, he was given double the standard funding. The squadrons from the old regiments appointed to form the cadre of the Grodno Regiment were supposed to go to Toropets (Pskov Governorate) just with their horses, not their weapons. These squadrons had been selected by decree and were to arrive with full kit and all their field officers and subalterns. Lieutenant-Colonel Tursky's squadron was assigned from the Alexandria Regiment, Major Kulnev's from the Sumy, *Rittmeister* [cavalry captain] Hildebrant's from the Olviopol and Major Hirsch's and Kamashev's squadrons from the Izyum. These five squadrons constituted the original Grodno Regiment until 1807, when, supplemented with recruits, it was brought to two battalions, each with a strength of five squadrons, with one reserve.²

Shepelev's task was not easy: he had to cobble together a regiment from squadrons of disparate regiments, in which the spirit and customs were completely different. The squadron from the Olviopol Regiment was especially weak in composition, since in its ranks there were still many old foreigners who did not get along well with their fellow Little Russians; the same could be said of the squadron from the Alexandria Regiment. The Sumy and Izyum stood out from the Alexandria and Olviopol, not only in spirit but also in appearance: since the time of their settlement, the latter had grown long, rounded curls from the temples, similar to Jewish *payot*, falling below the chin; the hussars from Little Russia shaved their heads, leaving on one side only a long lock of hair or *chuprin*, which was usually tucked behind or draped over the ear.³ The officers joining the regiment remained with their squadrons but for the most part were soon converged once having been in combat: they were driven by a desire common to the whole army to engage the enemy which had declared war on Russia once more. The young men who arrived from different regiments did not differ as lower ranks in anything particularly to one or another regiment: the young men were closely bonding in the new regiment around Hirsch, Kamashev and Kulnev, who were very close to each other. Shepelev himself, a kindly, somewhat weak man, cherished the partnership most of all, under which only, but not without thorough supervision, the regiment could achieve proper unity.

The character, spirit and tone of the officers of that time, as in all cavalry regiments, consisted of youth and daring. To feast, rage, duel with sabres - this was considered fit and belonging to military life in peacetime. Duelling with pistols was very rare: the pistol was recognised as a lethal weapon only for particularly important cases, when honour had been impugned; except for that, they fought

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- 1 Until the end of the first decade of the reign of Emperor Alexander I, regardless of the commander, who was entrusted with the front-line training of ranks, each regiment had its colonel-in-chief with the rank of general, managing the economic and internal management of the unit and having general supervision over their training. According to our hierarchical concepts, the colonel-in-chief is the regimental commander and the former commander was what we now call the assistant commander. In the Klyastitsky Regiment, the title of colonel-in-chief in this sense was abolished on 1 [13] September 1824.
 - 2 The establishment was to be: in the regiment (two battalions): one general, four field officers 63 subalterns, 1,461 other ranks. In the reserve squadrons; one field officer, four subalterns, 134 other ranks. The establishment for active squadrons was to be: six subalterns, 12 non-commissioned officers, two trumpeters, 120 mounted privates (augmented to 136 in wartime), 12 dismounted privates.
 - 3 Officers did not wear side-locks or *chuprin*.

with sabres over every little thing.⁴ The fight continued until first blood was drawn and then went to a city restaurant, where peace was concluded over a good glass of wine. Bulgarin [Faddey Venediktovich Bulgarin] wrote; 'The corps of officers in a cavalry regiment was one big family, everything was held in common; money and time and trouble and danger.' The notions of honouring the Klyastitsky Regiment (as the Grodno Regiment later became) immediately became very strict - anyone who would go back on his word, not to mention a more serious misdemeanour, was certainly excluded from the regiment even for a first offence.

The spirit of the lower ranks was distinguished by the bravery, courage and daring that their officers constantly encouraged. The soldiers, like the commanders, loved the regiment as something patriotic, were proud of its name, exploits and glory. Especially after 1814, there were old veterans in every squadron who sacredly maintained the ancient traditions and passed on everything they had seen and experienced to the recruits. These veterans were the main support for the morale element in the lower ranks. The time, however, in which the Grodno regiment was formed was the period of the Napoleonic Wars, when the military almost annually was in combat and there was a lot to talk about. As for the training of a soldier, it is all covered in this short verse:

The bullets whistle - don't blink!
When in action - cut boldly.
Lead the attack with the point
Don't hold back your horse!
Entrust your soul to God:
If needs be, this is the way to die!⁵

This soldier's verse, this covenant, was not memorised for nothing; our soldiers were not afraid of the bullet and proved that they knew how to die if in the war in the regiment's lists, as the results of crosses against surnames reached almost 400!

The Grodno regiment was given an elegant, not conspicuous uniform, like most of the hussar uniforms. It consisted of a pelisse and dolman. Pelisse, in the style of a short jacket without tails, dark blue in colour, with 15 cords with small trefoils at the ends, worn draped over the shoulder to cover the left arm. Three rows of white metal buttons ran down the cords; wide white braid was sewn on the back along the seams from the shoulder to the lower back. The fur trim was white for privates, black for non-commissioned officers and of grey Crimean lambskin for officers. Dolman, the same colour and cut as the pelisse, but with a high collar, differing from the latter in that, in addition to the absence of fur, the collar and cuffs of the sleeves were lighter blue.

The collar of the officers dolman was edged with braid and white silk embroidery; the lower ranks cords were mixed white and red. There was also a minor distinction in the embroidery: on the officers dolman there was a band of braid forming a rectangle around the cords, from shoulder to shoulder and shoulder to waist. The lower ranks did not have this braid.

Breeches, of tight fitting white cloth, replaced on campaign with grey overalls with covered buttons.

The headdress consisted of a black cloth shako, six *vershok* [10½ inches] high, slightly wider at the top, with a visor and two 'fans.' A doubled cord (*ketish-vetish*) of red and white was looped around the top, with red tassels for privates and of three-colours for non-commissioned officers. The horse-hair plume was eight *vershok* [14 inches] tall, white for privates and white with a three-striped tip for non-commissioned officers; for officers, it was white with a three-coloured base. This shako, the legendary shako of Alexander's times, which for ten years was found lying on almost all the battlefields of Europe, had many inconveniences: it was heavy, served as a good target for

4 Faddey Bulgarin *Воспоминания* [Memoirs].

5 This verse, as well as many details about the regiment (1807 to 1814) were given to us by Mikhailov, when they were heard from childhood from his uncle a private in the Grodno Hussar Regiment, Ivan Kalitki.

marksmen and when it rained, getting wet, turned into a cake, whose appearance was only saved in the front view, where the shako plate supported it. The lower ranks, however, considered their shako as some sort of voluminous suitcase worn on the head and where everything that did not fit on the saddle was put. In quarters, the shako was replaced by a forage-cap dark-blue with a band of the same colour as the collar.

The cloak, was made of grey cloth, cut Caucasian style, with a grey stand-up collar with a blue edging, it fastened on the chest with a larger flat button. Boots were short, Hungarian, with tassels, when worn with breeches, they had stiffened uppers but with softened uppers when in overalls. A blue sash with barrels of the cord colour(s) was worn around the waist over the dolman. From under the sash hung a blue sabretache, with white cords and monogram and lighter blue toothed edging. The hussars were armed with carbines, pistols and sabres. The sabre hilt was steel, had a leather scabbard with iron fittings (non-commissioned officers also wore a cane, which was hung on a button on the dolman; canes were discontinued late in 1806).⁶ Hussar officers, when off duty, also had a dark green undress frock coat, double-breasted, with red lining, with standard hussar cuffs and collar. When in undress, a cocked hat was worn with a plume and a sabre.

At that time flamboyance was cultivated to extremes between officers, despite the fact that prices were obscenely high. A cartridge pouch cost 120 roubles, a sash about 100 and were made of pure silver, since invoices were not used and there was no mention of elaboration. A saddle with fittings cost 125 roubles, this sum is four times more than its current value. A good plume for a hat from Berlin would cost 60 roubles

As for the regulation pattern of uniform, in the Grodno regiment, as in all hussar regiments, this was a matter of secondary importance. The uniform existed for display, and for the most part the officers dressed as they wanted, the only rule being the ability to recognise a hussar by his uniform. The embroidery, despite the existence of approved samples, was made however it was requested, the *mentish* chains were worn almost a *sazhen* [seven feet] long, with brilliants, and the same for shako cords. The embroidery on breeches was done on a whim: there were jokers who embroidered kissing doves on the seat, and in silver thread, as a contemporary wrote, these doves did not turn out badly;⁷ one of our officers once appeared at a ball in Toropets with a whole hunt embroidered on his chest and a smiling silver moon on his back. The same can be said about the rest: boots were made with intriguing folds (accordions) around the ankles and the shabraque was often replaced with a tiger or leopard skin.

Such deviations from form these days would be considered, at least, proof of a man's shallowness but then it did not offend their eyes and did not surprise anyone. The simplicity of the clothes with which Major Kulnev was distinguished was preserved in the recollections of all his contemporaries, for example, Bulgarin, Denis Davydov and the like. They were surprised that he wore a uniform of just a rough cloth tunic and, meanwhile, the same Kulnev in 1808, commanding a detachment in the ranks of colonel and general, throughout the duration of almost the entire war, wore a large red tobacco pouch presented to him by D. Davydov as a night cap. This headgear has become legendary: Bulgarin in his memoirs suggests that it was a red scarf 'similar to those worn by Finnish peasants' but from Kulnev's side it was just partly surrendering to the influence of the hussar spirit of that time, partly a fad of the playful nature of Yakov Petrovich. However, the authorities did not pay attention to this. The cords, for example, were all silver, not white silk, as the following situation shows: this was the reason that on 9 [21] February, 1809 uniforms with silver cords which had been ordered to be 'cancelled in 1803, could once again be used but worn only for parades.' It

6 In addition to these items, there were: a sheepskin warm coat, a cartridge pouch of red leather with a belt. The carbine was carried with a red leather cover on a whitened leather cross belt.

7 Much of the information in this part was taken from S.G. Chartorizhsky (Bessarabian Governor from 1875). This article, compiled from the stories of a veteran hussar, was told to us by G.L. Essen, relating with great participation to our work, as well as to everything concerning the regiments of the division which he commanded.

was only in 1807 that they began to stick a little more strictly to the pattern. Things were simplified; braids, curls and top-knots were cut off and only the traditional hussar moustache was left, which for a long time, almost until the reign of Emperor Nicholas, horrified the sticklers for tradition.

Horses, both riding and draught, were especially flaunted; it is true that at that time it was possible to purchase such a horse for 300 to 400 roubles, for which it would now be necessary to pay several thousand.

In describing the past of our regiment, we must not remain silent about its shortcomings. The vices of the hussars, like in other regiments, were drunkenness, card games and bureaucracy. The first was a consequence of parking men with great wealth in small villages with an absence of any kind of entertainment. Invariably they gathered at the quarters of one or other officer and punch, the drink then very expensive, thanks to the Continental System, heated up their notorious 'chats.' Here, a young officer, with a glass of hot *zhenka* [syrup], listened to the stories of the seniors - these 'chairmen' about whom Denis Davydov later recited⁸ - about previous campaigns, recognising the difficulties, hardships and good times of a fighting life. After the punch, the games began, the only pastime outside of service in this secluded, closeted life. The need for gaming reached the point that officers not only at home but on campaign, on horseback, could not live without it. This was practised as follows: the reins were held in the left hand, a deck of cards was taken in the same hand, the first card was removed with the right hand and placed under the right leg, the second under the left leg, and so on. This required, of course, well-known skill, but practice occurred often, and then things went smoothly.

As for philandering with brides and wife-stealing, that was a part of the romantic age; there was a risk, a kind of danger, and that was enough to attract young officers.

These morals now seem strange, this carelessly vacuous life with drinking parties, card games and adventures; but one cannot regard them only negatively. They connected and united our forbears; there was nowhere and never had been such a true brotherhood as amongst the hussars of those times. Duelling, with the exception of cuts, which was not in the nature of revenge for insults or offence, as mentioned above, was almost absent, they rarely quarrelled and in case of a misunderstanding, then somebody in the form of a grey-haired field officer would be a mediator, whose authority was always admired by his comrades. Gossip and incitement, never happened in the close circle of officers and anyone who might violate the accepted order of things would not be long tolerated in our regimental family.

Squadron business at the beginning of the present century differed markedly from that existing now, and contributed a lot to the development of the hussar spirit in the men. Every year, in early May regiments would gather in cantonments for six weeks, where they 'broke in' completely raw remounts. Whichever of the squadron commanders could present their young horses first was considered the best. Dressage parades went as follows: if the horse was wild, then it was hauled down, sandbags weighing five or six *Pud* [82-98 kilogrammes] in weight were placed on it and a martingale [*канцун*] put on the face and then it was driven on a halter to exhaustion. This was repeated two to three times, but already fitted with a saddle. A few days later the final dressage took place: an accomplished rider, a strong man, with a whip in his hand, quickly jumped on the horse and, lifting its head, raced around a circuit for three *versta* [two miles] to complete exhaustion. Little by little the circuits reduced with the transition to a trot, then to a walk and, upon reaching the stables, the rider dismounted.

These parades would last for several days, but with reducing resistance. This limited dressage sometimes ended in breaks, tears and inflammation. It is no wonder that most of the horses were worn out and some were overwhelmed. Osten-Sacken remarked; 'Not a single course ended without

⁸ 'Where are the hussars of previous years!' D. Davydov served with our regiment in the campaign of 1807 against the French and in Finland in 1808-1809 and had a great friendship with all of our officers.

the fall of a few men and injuries!’ Of course, training on such horses could not have the harmony that we see now, but it was done well - the regiment was deployed on the orders of the commander with remarkable speed, which was the advantage of the cavalry of that time.

The formation was of two-ranks with 16 files; the end files of each platoon were assigned as flankers. Two-thirds of the flankers (riders) went in open order and covered the front and flanks of the unit, while the remaining third followed them in closed formation, in the form of a reserve. Charges were delivered in closed, linear formation, while open order was allowed only when pursuing a scattered enemy or attacking skirmishers. If the squadron was in open order, then it left six or eight files to protect the standard, which followed behind at a reduced gait.

When changing locations a squadron would use platoon column while a regiment would deploy by squadrons. In battle the regiment would form two echelons: the first in line at full interval, the second either directly behind (as the regiment was at Druya) or in platoon columns opposite the intervals of the first line (as at Friedland [Pravdinsk]), in other words, in a chessboard layout.

Combat was usually initiated by the flankers who skirmished and fired upon the enemy until his strength and location were revealed. When the commander received from the flankers the information that he needed, having assessed the situation, he would lead the regiment towards the enemy in the formation that seemed to him most appropriate. The selection of flankers, therefore, was made very carefully from the most agile and brave men.

Our regiment, of five-squadrons, had to be heavily manned with recruits to achieve the ten-squadron establishment. Shepelev’s closest and most active assistant was Lieutenant-Colonel Tursky, who was at Skidel [Skidzyel] accepting and distributing the arriving men amongst the squadrons. He selected personnel for forming units from the old squadrons, but these cadres were extremely lacking: the regiment was about to go campaigning, old soldiers were needed, while the recruits would still not be ready to march. The reason that the formation of the regiment was hardly completed in 1808 was partly this and partly the need to replenish the ranks of the active units from the squadrons remaining in Skidel, due to the heavy losses to the regiment in 1807.

By January 1807, despite all Shepelev’s efforts, he managed to form only seven squadrons: the Colonel-in-Chief’s,⁹ Major Kamashev’s, the 1st vacant, the Commander’s, Major Kulnev’s, Major Hirsch’s and the 2nd vacant. For the purchase of horses for the remaining squadrons, old experienced officers were sent to Little Russia for remounts: majors Silin and Hirsch and their assistants, lieutenants Kirilenko and Kurilov.

In November, Colonel Stepan Matveevich Bibikov arrived on transfer from the Lifeguard-Ulan Regiment. Bibikov was an energetic man, active and not evil, but at the same time, under the influence of a painful condition, bilious, quick-tempered and sharp in his remarks.

Stepan Matveevich, was an excellent cavalryman and a dedicated officer, he zealously set about training the recruits sent from the southern provinces of Russia, who were transferred to squadrons as they became ready.

In December 1806, *Rittmeister* Rüdiger took over the 1st vacant squadron, Colonel Gorgoli the Colonel-in-Chief’s, Colonel Davydov the Commander’s and *Rittmeister* Domeyko the 2nd vacant.

In the Kingdom of Poland, the war had already begun, a war with an enemy before whom Europe shuddered. The troops heading west began to pass by our young regiment and the officers and soldiers looked enviously at those lucky ones who would be where there was the smell of blood and

9 Until 1831 the squadrons were not numbered, but took the names of their commanders. What is now 1st Squadron was known as the Colonel-in-Chief’s, or *Leib* Squadron, while the first squadron of the 2nd battalion was the Commander’s. The remainder were known as Lieutenant-Colonel or Major whomever’s Squadron. The commander would refer to his unit as ‘the squadron carrying my name.’ If the approved Commander was lost, then his squadron, before the approval of a new commander, was referred to as vacant.

gunpowder, where, as they said at that time: 'laurels grow and glory is gained.'¹⁰ Every day, officers came to the Colonel-in-Chief, asking for transfers or secondments, the opportunity to be in combat and not to sit idly by while others were fighting. Shepelev held back the impulses of youth and hastened preparations for the campaign; Bibikov, mockingly, delivered training and, occasionally when officers accosted him, sentencing them to his eternal: 'Patience, there's enough for everyone!'

January 1807 arrived. The war flared up and the roar of guns over the Vistula seemed to reach Toropets, where our ill-fated hussars were languished impatiently. The 14th Division, to which the regiment belonged, had already managed to get near to Pultusk, while the Grodno men waited and waited in one place. Finally, the long-awaited, good news came: the regiment was going on campaign: the seven squadrons were ordered to move and those three still forming were to remain in Skidel under the supervision of Lieutenant-Colonel Tursky. Everything set in motion, but a new issue arose here: none of the officers wanted to stay in Russia while the regiment was abroad; endless disputes began, where everyone presented their rights to participate in the campaign to the overwhelmed Shepelev. Bibikov put an end to these disputes by inviting the officers to draw lots. Since there was no other solution, the officers agreed.¹¹

The 'lucky ones' began to collect all that was necessary for the campaign, while the 'unlucky' reluctantly helped their comrades with their preparations.

On 10 [22] January, with cheerful and vigorous songs and music, smashing glasses on their tall shakos, the Grodno men went on campaign.

The regiment, accompanied by the good wishes of the townspeople and their remaining comrades, soon disappeared across the snowy plains, along which the echo of the merry tune of the farewell soldier song echoed for a long time.

10 From Kulnev's squadron orders.

11 Subsequently, almost all those remaining joined existing squadrons, as new officers arrived, transferred from other regiments.

CHAPTER 3.

Arrival of the regiment in Königsberg. - The Grodno Regiment joins Prince Bagration's vanguard. - The first action at Mischenitz. - The regiment under the command of Ataman Platov. - The composition of the vanguard. - Sweeps. - The regiment in cantonment quarters at Heilsberg. - Relations between officers of the Coalition armies. - The theatre in the second part of the war of 1807. - The delayed offensive against Ney's corps. - Battle of Guttstadt. - The reverse at Ankendorf. - Attacks by the Grodno Regiment. - Destruction of the French parks by Kulnev. - The feat of Private Plesch. - Retreat of the army to Heilsberg. - Battle of Heilsberg. - Feats of the lower ranks. - Military comradeship. - Successful attacks. - Retreat to Friedland. - Battle of Friedland. - The encirclement of the regiment by French cavalry. - Crossing the river Alle. - Retreat to Tilsit. - The regiment in the rearguard. - Armistice. - Campaign at Tilsit. - Peace. - Losses to the regiment in 1807. - Welfare for those wounded and maimed, awards. - Return to Russia.

The Grodno Regiment arrived in Königsberg [Kaliningrad] on 28 January [9 February 1807] via forced marches. At that time, the city was crowded with wounded, transport and men separated from their regiments. Our Commander-in-Chief, Baron Bennigsen [Leonty Leontevich Bennigsen], after the action at Preußisch-Eylau [Bagrationovsk] was streaming towards this point with the main army.¹ After giving the regiment several hours of rest, Shepelev immediately made inquiries about the whereabouts of 14th Division, but it was not easy to find out: all that was known was that the commander of the division, General Anrep [Roman Karlovich Anrep], had been killed on the 13 [25] January, at Mohrungen [Morąg]. Nobody knew anything about the location of his division.

On 29 January [10 February] Bennigsen arrived in Königsberg and the regiment was immediately assigned by him to Prince Bagration's rearguard, still stationed on the battlefield near Preußisch-Eylau. Shepelev set off from the bivouac and moved towards the indicated place, but, before getting 17 *versta* [11½ miles] from the town, he stumbled upon the head of the retreating rearguard at Mahnsfeld [Polevoye]. A sorrowful sight emerged in front of the eyes of our young regiment; hungry and cold soldiers in uniforms ragged from bullets and the bayonet, covered with bivouac dirt and icy hoarfrost, stretching out towards Königsberg, barely dragging their feet from fatigue. But, despite their plight, there was neither a decline in the men's morale, nor the apathy that usually accompanies a retreat carried out under such conditions.

Reporting to Bagration, the Colonel-in-Chief was ordered to cover the retreating infantry with his hussars and drive off the French *Chasseurs à Cheval* from Murat's vanguard, sent by Napoleon to monitor our detachment.

On 31 January [12 February], the French horsemen, who had previously kept a decent distance, appeared once more, but now began to come closer to our screen. The flankers of the Grodno Regiment rushed forward, supported by the entire *Leib* Squadron. The commander of the latter, Colonel Gorgoli, moved at a trot and when the French turned around, he rushed along with the flankers behind him. The enemy, accustomed recently to pursuit by Cossacks, whose exhausted and hungry horses would not allow a sustained race, retreated, firing, without haste. The Grodno squadron flew in like a whirlwind and cut off the French flankers, entering the forest breathing down the necks of the remainder. In the forest near Mischenitz in a wide clearing, Gorgoli stumbled upon a column of French infantry (*Voltigeurs*) under General Grandos, who, at the sight of the enemy, formed a rather fragile square and greeted the hussars with a volley. Despite the unexpectedness of this encounter, Gorgoli was not fazed. Having given the order "march, march", he charged the *Voltigeurs* with the squadron and, having cut into the square, overran the infantry,

¹ Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky. History of the Second War Between Emperor Alexander and Napoleon 1806-1807 [English translation by P.G.A. Phillips].

which scattered in all directions. The Colonel-in-Chief's Squadron that day was the first to come under enemy fire. The hussars, fuelled by their successful onslaught and now aware of their superiority, charged again after the *Voltigeurs* hiding in the forest. When this pursuit ended and the scattered Grodno men regrouped, a mass of dead and wounded Frenchmen lay in the clearing, not counting those that were cut down in the forest; 32 Frenchmen were taken prisoner.

In this action, besides Gorgoli himself, the *Junkers* [trainee officers] Brenner, Apayshchikov, Poltavtsev and Matlen distinguished themselves by charging at the head of their platoons into the French square. In this skirmish, the squadron lost Lieutenant De Salvert, who was found dead in the forest and eight privates killed; the number of lower ranks wounded is not known.² From this day until 5 [17] February, the regiment's operations were limited to isolated clashes between our flankers and enemy horsemen, who still occasionally appeared ahead of our screen.

At the beginning of February, Prince Bagration, having been sent to St. Petersburg, was replaced by the famous *Ataman* Platov [Matvei Ivanovich Platov], the 'shame of the human race' as Napoleon called him in one of his bulletins. Platov was indeed a real scourge of the French: by day or night, he would suddenly fly at the enemy and, after each strike, disappear without trace, each time leaving whole piles of killed and wounded. On 5 [17] February, when Napoleon finally decided to leave Preußisch-Eylau, Platov was sent after him. Throughout the day, the Grodno Regiment followed on the heels of the enemy rearguard, the retreat of which was strewn with abandoned carts, dead and dying soldiers. The Cossacks constantly harassed the enemy, retreating and hiding from sight as soon as the French cavalry began to move; and when, losing patience, the enemy cavalry set off after the elusive men of the Don, they were faced by the flankers of the Grodno Regiment, behind whom columns of blue hussars (*les Hussards bleus*) deployed with the speed of lightning. Thus, without rest day or night, the ill-fated French rearguard crossed the Passarge [Paślęka] river, behind which Napoleon deployed his troops. The Russian army, having established its headquarters at Bartenstein [Bartoszyce], on 20 February [4 March], was placed in cantonments around Heilsberg [Lidzbark Warmiński]. The warring factions stood in these positions from February to May.

The reason for this long inaction was extreme exhaustion, in which both ours and enemy units were trapped, due to the difficulties of winter campaigning and the lack of food. The magazines were depleted, and the country's resources were too limited to feed both armies. The greatest hardships fell on our vanguard, thanks to the disorder that prevailed in the army at that time. From time to time fodder transports arrived from Russia, but the divisional commanders disputed with one another and therefore they did not reach the forward units at all. The horses, fed with old straw torn from the village roofs, covered the roads from the vanguard to Bartenstein with their cadavers. The soldiers were forced to prod with their sabres and ramrods to look for their next meal, buried by the population, and God knows that there was little food in this devastated country. Denis Davydov stated; 'There are no expressions strong enough to describe the calamitous state of our army.' In this regard, our regiment, although recently arrived, was no exception. It is enough that from 30 January [11 February] to 20 June [2 July], the losses of lower ranks in the Grodno Regiment were as many as 184 men, from deprivation rather than from wounds.³ These losses were replenished from the three squadrons formed in Skidel, from which Lieutenant-Colonel Tursky allocated parties for the active units of the regiment as soon as they were ready.⁴

2 In this action, non-commissioned officer Nikifor Zaichenko was especially distinguished, having being seriously wounded in the back and arms by bullets, falling from his horse, encouraged his comrades while lying on the ground, (recommendation for lower ranks for the award of the Military Order). For the action at Mischenitz, Colonel Gorgoli was granted a Golden Sabre with the inscription *за храбрость* [for valour].

3 Regimental monthly returns for 1807. These reports, in their brevity, make it impossible to trace how many men eventually died or recovered. Overall, only six were saved, according to the 1807 Monthly returns.

4 The following arrived from Tursky's, 3rd vacant and Hildebrandt's forming squadrons,: in January, 675 men from the Volzhsky recruitment area, under the command of Lieutenant Zhilinsky, and in May - 93 men with Cornet Belli

The Grodno Regiment, however, did not rest for long. Napoleon, wanting to distract Bennigsen's attention from Danzig [Gdańsk], sent General Zajączek [Józef Zajączek] towards the left wing of the Russian army, with orders to demonstrate his intention to break the link between the main army and Essen's independent corps through various movements. Platov, however, was already in the area assigned to Zajączek and daily clashes began between them. The Grodno regiment, placed at the full disposal of this famous chieftain, was divided into small detachments which scattered in various directions on patrol. Lieutenant-Colonel Yakov Petrovich Kulnev was especially distinguished in these constant raids and skirmishes with the enemy,⁵ he was unknown at this time but to whom the campaigns of 1808-1810 were soon to deliver an immortal name to the history of Russian cavalry. Our operations in this guerrilla war were greatly assisted by the local population, informing units about French locations and movements: setting out from a village on patrol, the detachment was always accompanied by warm wishes and, upon returning, with glee by the inhabitants who prayed to God for a successful outcome of this war, difficult for both us and them.

At the end of February, the regiment's headquarters was first moved to Seeburg [Jeżiorany] and then to Heilsberg; two villages near this town were assigned to the squadrons for rest.⁶ The patrols nevertheless continued. On one expedition (on 19 February [3 March]) *Rittmeister* Rüdiger, ordered to patrol from Heilsberg to Spitzberg, lost his way and found himself among the French bivouacs. Exploiting the darkness of the night and the inattentive sentries, he managed to get out of this dangerous position safely and, bypassing a chain of vedettes arranged around the bivouac, reached Spitzberg.⁷ Upon returning from an expedition, the officers, bored in the villages, usually went to Heilsberg, where, besides the headquarters of our regiment, there were a lot of units and was consequently the place to find diversions for the mind. There were other temptations in Heilsberg: the Jewish merchants supplying the army assembled there and, thanks to these benefactors, terrible binges took place, which provided a strange contrast to the distressed state in other camps. Officers and soldiers went hungry for months, enduring cold, hunger and all kinds of hardships, but on their arrival in Heilsberg, the peacetime 'hussar lifestyle' began. The Russians did not see eye-to-eye with the Prussian officers who were in the town and who were our allies at that time, while the French, on the contrary, were honoured and hosted wherever they were met. The Prussian officers behaved arrogantly, quarrels and duels between them and Russian officers occurred frequently. More often than not, our hussars fought with the Prussians, mainly because the Prussian officers, faithful to Friedrich's traditions, considered their cavalry to be the best in the world.⁸

In the army there were many anecdotes on this score, one of which compares the relations and customs of the officers of the Coalition armies particularly well. It was said that a Russian hussar officer quarrelled with a Prussian over cards. A challenge was issued. The Prussian was an excellent shot, could hit swallows in flight and did not want to fight otherwise than with pistols.

The Russian asked; "Do you really intend to kill me? I'm a bad shot as it happens, but if you cut the deck, I will stake my life. If you beat the card, you can kill me like a bear, but if the card beats you, I will kill you!"

The Prussian would not agree at first, but his comrades, thinking it was a joke and hearing the ridicule of our officers, persuaded him to accept the Russian proposal. Deep silence reigned, the Prussian officer began to deal - and lost the cut.

(from monthly reports).

5 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, p. 129.

6 Two squadrons were stationed in Bischofstein [Biszynek] from 2 [14] March (Military Science Archive, No. 1609 Bennigsen's letter).

7 *Kurze Biographie d. Gen. Th. v. Rüdiger*, p. 15. This biography in manuscript form was kindly lent to us by the widow of our late Colonel-in-Chief, Countess Rüdiger.

8 From Bulgarin's Memoirs. This antagonism between the allies seems all the more strange since the Prussian king sincerely admired the Russians. In 1813-1814, when our regiment was in Prussia for the second time, the closest friendship connected our officers with the Prussians, who were in the same formation.

Everyone thought that this would be the end of it, but the Russian hussar said quite calmly: “Now let us go to the garden and settle up!”

Many officers of both armies followed the crowd after the loser, who stopped in the middle of the high street.

A few minutes later, the Russian officer appeared with a hunting gun taken from a landowner.

“I don’t have my pistols”, he said, “but this gun will do. Would you mind standing 30 paces away”.

The Prussian officer who had lost his life still did not understand: was it a joke or reality, but at the invitation of the Russian, he counted out the paces and stopped. The hussar took aim, pulled the trigger and the Prussian crashed to the ground: the bullet had hit him in the heart.

Those present involuntarily recoiled in horror and did not know what to do. The hussar said; “I don’t joke about with my life, if I had lost the bet, I would not have accepted his mercy and would have made him kill me!”⁹

Bulgarin added; ‘This event seems incredible, but whoever knew Count Podgorichanin would believe it. I later asked him: was it true? He answered, I don’t remember it rarely happens in reality. He twisted his moustache and turned away.’ No one, not the Prussian officers, who thought the matter was completely in order, nor the Russians who saw in this episode a legitimate and natural outcome of the quarrel, were surprised by what would currently be perceived as barbaric violence. Manners were different, life was not valued dearly and a loser to the bank would settle a bet exactly whether it was a matter of a handful of *chervonets* [gold sovereigns] or a comrade’s mistress.

Reconnaissance expeditions continued by the entire army until the resumption of hostilities in May. The theatre of the second half of the war consisted of no more than 100 square *versta* from Eylau to Friedland, between the rivers Alle [Łyna] and Passarge. The main French forces were positioned behind the Passarge; closest to us was Ney’s corps, stationed near Guttstadt [Dobre Miasto].

Bennigsen intended to attack him with a quick movement, smash him, cross the Passarge and strike each remaining corps before they could unite. On 29 April [11 May], Emperor Alexander himself set out from Bartenstein for Heilsberg, where he reviewed units posted near the town. The Grodno Regiment, in anticipation of the Tsar, was located in front of Heilsberg, rejoicing at the opportunity to fight in full view of the Tsar. Having been greeted affectionately by the troops, the Emperor travelled around the lines of the assembled units and was about to give a signal for the planned movement, but at that moment Bennigsen rode up to him and reported that Napoleon was marching on Guttstadt with his entire army. This changed all the Commander-in-Chief’s decisions. The attack on Ney was postponed and the troops, upon the departure of the Monarch, were dismissed back to their quarters. The inaction resumed; only our regiment and the Cossacks continued to maintain vigilant surveillance on the banks of the Passarge.

Bennigsen however did not abandon his intention to defeat Ney. In the middle of May, he decided to carry out the original plan. On 23 May [4 June], they left the cantonments, while the Grodno Regiment was sent from the vicinity of Heilsberg to Bagration’s vanguard, stationed at Launau [Łaniewo]. The regiment departed from Launau at three o’clock in the morning of 24 May [5 June], on the Altkirch [Praslity] road, towards Gronau [Gronowo] where they were ordered to move into the forest. At Altkirch, our flankers came across enemy skirmishers scattered in front of the village and at the edge of the forest. Some of the skirmishers were cut down, others were taken prisoner, and the hussars, having cleared the place of their infantry, gathered in front of the river, on the left flank of the detachment.

Marshal Ney, attacked by Bagration’s infantry, stubbornly defended himself, but when in the

9 From Bulgarin. Count Podgorichanin was killed in 1812 at Riga, commanding our replacement squadrons when Major Hirsch was ill.

distance the head of Sacken's detachment appeared at cannon range, sent to envelope the French left wing, he hastily removed himself and began to retreat towards Ankendorf [Jankowo]. The Grodno Regiment was impatiently anticipating this moment. Having received orders from Bagration to pursue the enemy, Shepelev, supported by horse artillery, set off at the trot for the French. For the first time in this war, the Grodno men got to go into action as a whole regiment. The squadrons led by Davydov, Silin, Gorgoli, Kulnev, Rüdiger, Kamashev, Lüders and Domeyko dashed at the retreating infantry and, having broken into their ranks, began to generously deliver sabre blows. Yermolov's horse artillery battery [Alexei Petrovich Yermolov], which had meanwhile taken the high ground, incessantly smashed the enemy, already shaken by the hussars; Bagration's jägers followed behind the hussars. Squadron after squadron fought through the thinning ranks of the French, who, abandoning two guns and some of their trains, including Ney's own baggage, hurriedly retreated to Ankendorf. Before reaching Ankendorf, Ney tried to ease the pressure from the cavalry, but his rearguard, already shot up by Yermolov's guns, was overrun and partially cut down by our hussars. Reporting to the Tsar regarding this action, Bennigsen had this to say: 'The Grodno Regiment, sent to pursue the enemy, inflicted a severe defeat upon them...'¹⁰

Ney halted in Ankendorf. Having forwarded his heavy baggage across the Passarge, he began to wait with his corps for our next move. The night put an end to the pursuit, which had continued all day; exhausted men and horses demanded rest, the squadrons needed to settle down and put themselves in order; in particular, help was needed for the wounded, of whom many, remaining exposed for about 20 hours under the scorching rays of the sun with hastily bandaged wounds, were literally bleeding out.

Setting vedettes in front of Ankendorf, the regiment set up bivouacs in view of Ney's corps; the main body of the Russian force, located behind the regiment, had occupied Queetz [Kwiecewo] and Glottau [Głotowo]. This ended the operations of the Grodno Regiment on 24 May [5 June], known as the action at Guttstadt. Our attacks did not come particularly cheaply; our wounded officers were Major Kamashev, quite severely, Stabs-Rittmeister Milkovich, lieutenants Nortsev and Ostrogradsky. Three other ranks were killed and eight died of wounds; the number of wounded who were evacuated was not recorded. The awards for this brilliant first action against the enemy were: Regimental Colonel-in-Chief, Shepelev the Order of St. George 3rd class; colonels Bibikov and Gorgoli the Order of St. Vladimir 3rd class; Major Kamashev and Lieutenant Ostrogradsky the Order of St. Vladimir 4th class; lieutenants Davydov and Ilinsky the Order of St. Anne 3rd class; Major Lüders, *Rittmeister* Nikora 1st and Stabs-Rittmeister Milkovich Golden Sabres.¹¹ Eight medals of distinction of the Military Order were awarded to other ranks in the regiment.¹²

The following day, on 25 May [6 June], at three o'clock in the morning, in accordance with Bennigsen's dispositions, Bagration moved his regiments towards the strong position held by the French on the high ground near Ankendorf. The Grodno Regiment moved to the right of Yermolov's guns and served as protection for them. As soon as the bombardment began, the French, struck by Russian fire, began to pull back to the Passarge; Bagration, noticing Ney's movement, sent an infantry column to outflank him and ordered our regiment to pin the retreating enemy frontally together with the Poland Horse under the command of Major-General Count F.D. Pahlen. But a reverse awaited us here. Enemy guns were turned towards the galloping cavalry as soon as the brigade set off, clouds of white smoke appeared on the high ground, a deafening crack was heard and a hail of bullets and canister fell on us. A moment later, only riderless horses were galloping

10 The Commander-in-Chief's report to the Tsar; War Diary of 1807 (General Staff Library).

11 We are indebted to Colonel V.V. Krestovsky for the list of officer awards. This list in the hands of the talented historian of the Yamburg and Lifeguard Ulans comprises some of the sources he has collected for a future Military Almanac of the Russian cavalry.

12 The medal of distinction of the Military Order was established in 1807 and was originally issued to very few personnel. Nevertheless, by 1814 the number of recipients in the regiment had reached 437, as can be seen from Appendix III.

across the plain, and the glade was covered with the bodies of dead and wounded horsemen. The ranks opened and men wavered: it was the first time the Grodno men had been under such intense fire... But the sense of duty and example of the officers and the squads led by unshakeable non-commissioned officers kept our hussars from complete disorder.¹³ “Wheel about!” ordered Shepelev and both regiments trotted back, leaving behind a bloody field dotted with dead and wounded.

The French infantry, having stopped the attack by Pahlen’s brigade with the fire of several battalions and three batteries, considered the action against the cavalry to be completely over and continued to fall back. But the enemy were not triumphant for long. As soon as they reached the woods between them and the Passarge, Shepelev, supported by the fire of Yermolov’s guns, launched a second attack. Just at that moment, the French, scattering a thick screen of skirmishers, began the crossing, at times firing on Yermolov’s horse battery, which pressed forward keenly. The enemy, who did not wait on our bank for a new attack, more than paid for our first reverse. Lieutenant Ostrogradsky, who was sent forward with flankers and a squad of skirmishers, went around the forest and hit the *voltigeurs* in the flank, whereupon the squadrons under Kulnev, Rüdiger, Kamashev, Silin, Domeyko and Lüders raced up in line.¹⁴ There was a desperate hack; the clang of sabres mixed with shots, screaming, moaning and curses. The French, reeling from the initial impact, began to retreat, at first slowly, then faster and faster and finally ran towards their reserves. A mass of prisoners remained in the hands of the hussars: *Wachtmeister* Pokhodun, *Junker* Worms, Private Portola from Kulnev’s squadron, cut down several men in front of them and the first two delivered five French *chasseurs* to him, while the latter presented eight; non-commissioned officer Bukhtoyar, having had his horse killed under him, chased the infantrymen into the woods along with several dismounted hussars.¹⁵

The enemy, having moved some of their units to the other side of the Passarge, tried to hold up the Grodno men and, to that end, placing several guns there, opened fire on the cavalry, while his infantry, under the protection of marksmen, retreated to the bridge. The imbalance of forces did not stop our hussars. Lieutenant-Colonel Kulnev charged at the marksmen with two squadrons (his own and Rüdiger’s) so swiftly that the French were overrun before they could come to their senses and scattered, leaving more than 100 prisoners in the hands of Yakov Petrovich. The valiant Kulnev was not satisfied with this: seeing a large convoy on the other bank of the Passarge, near Kämmerdorf [Komorowo], he charged into the river himself in full view of the French, swam across it and rushed towards the carts. Having scattered the escort, Kulnev took possession of a cannon, a mortar and 40 wagons with gunpowder, round shot and shells.¹⁶ Five dragoons from the fleeing escort rode away from the main force, but then *Wachtmeister* Gasenko and three hussars chased after them: Having caught up with the enemy dragoons, they cut down two, while three surrendered and were led to the squadron. The emergence of enemy infantry had been delayed somewhat, who, however, were soon notified of the audacious raid by the blue hussars. Three squadrons were sent against them, which, having moved around Kulnev, decided to eject our battalion over the Passarge. Yakov Petrovich did not ponder long about what to do. Having given orders to blow up the convoy, as it was not possible to bring it to the other side, he charged at the enemy squadrons, overwhelmed

13 *Wachtmeisters* Rybalkin and Saprunov, non-commissioned officers Nezhivoy, Bondarev, privates Schembur, Podolyak and Pistolet (commendations for the award of the Military Order medal).

14 The 2nd vacant squadron had been disbanded in May to provide replacements for the remaining six: the Colonel-in-Chief’s (Rüdiger’s), Kamashev’s, Kulnev’s, Hirsch’s, 1st vacant (Silin’s) and the Commander’s (Lüders’); Gorgoli and Davydov were the battalion commanders (from monthly returns).

15 Commander-in-Chief’s report to the Tsar; Count Uvarov’s report to Baron Bennigsen, dated 27 May [8 June] (Military Science Archive, No. 4705); Listing of lower ranks for the Military Order medal.

16 Kulnev had first run into a convoy of sick and wounded. These unfortunates, seeing the bearded hussars, were very frightened, but Yakov Petrovich approached them shouting in French: “Do not be afraid, the sick need have no fear of the Russians” (Denis Davydov). During the attack on the park, several artillerymen tried to save the gun, but Private Minailo charged at them with four hussars, cut down the crew and captured six men. When forced to abandon the gun, he spiked it (recommendation for the award of the Military Order medal).

them and drove them a whole *Meile* [$4\frac{2}{3}$ miles] from the river.

The demolition process itself was entrusted to Private Akim Plesch, under the supervision of Lieutenant Chechensky with an escort of 10 men. Plesch performed his task with great skill. Having laid a powder trail to one of the caissons and placing several logs under a wagon of shells, he first set fire to the wood and calmly waited for Kulnev to return for the demolition. By this time Kulnev was already hurrying back; in the distance the masses of cavalry sent to capture the Grodno squadrons moved off. Plesch, holding a slow match in his hand, had already come up with a very good plan: having let the squadrons get across the Passarge and given time for his escort to rush to the river (under the command of non-commissioned officer Kuzmin), and under pressure from enemy hussars, Plesch threw a fuse at the end of the powder trail. 'A fearsome thud caused alarm in both armies'¹⁷ and once the smoke had cleared, Kulnev and Rüdiger were across on our side of the Passarge, Plesch was swimming his horse, and next to him Kuzmin was holding a captive hussar's by the bridle. Near the seat of the explosion, the French squadrons that had been pursuing Kulnev stood, looking as if they had been exhumed. This episode marked the end of the fighting on 25 May [6 June] 1807, in which the regiment lost 13 killed. *Rittmeister* Nikora 1st was among the wounded.

Since that time, Kulnev and Rüdiger have earned great renown in the army. In the evening of that same day, congratulating the distinguished officers upon the nomination for their awards,¹⁸ Bennigsen told them jokingly: "*Le bruit de vos exploits est parvenu jusqu'à moi*" [The noise of your exploits has even reached me]. This witticism by the Commander-in-Chief was related to the terrifying noise made by the explosion of the artillery park.

On 26 and 27 May [7 and 8 June], both armies were inactive, confining themselves to rare exchanges of fire between the outposts. The Grodno Regiment was ordered to monitor the banks of the Passarge vigilantly through vedettes and patrols. On the morning of 28 May [9 June], Bagration occupied Reichenberg [Kraszewo] and Liewenberg [Miłogórze] with his vanguard, concealing the movement of his detachment from the enemy. The French, meanwhile, marched on Launau. At 10 o'clock in the morning, the vanguard, having heard firing to their front, near Launau, moved towards this village, where Prince Gorchakov was defending himself against an enemy who was attacking him with superior forces. Arriving in Launau, the Grodno men, along with the Poland Horse Regiment, were sent a little to the right of Bewernick [Bobrownik] to support Raevsky on the left flank of our battle line. The task given to Shepelev mainly consisted in preventing the enemy from crossing over the Alle and then going around our left wing. But we did not stay in Bewernick for long. Shepelev manoeuvred as much as possible against an overwhelming number of enemy cavalry, covering the retreat of the infantry from the destroyed village. When the infantry left the position, our Colonel-in-Chief fell back, retreating, as was intended, towards Heilsberg. On this day the regiment suffered no fatalities; the only killed were 18 horses. On 29 May [10 June], the Russian army was located in front of Heilsberg, on both banks of the Alle; Bagration was sent to Bewernick with his vanguard, but, having arrived there, he saw that the troops under Borozdin [Nikolai Mikhailovich Borozdin] and Lvov [Pyotr Petrovich Lvov], who were holding the village, had been driven out of the position and were in full retreat. Bagration halted both detachments and, deploying his columns, began a firefight. A screen of flankers, reinforced by skirmishers, was scattered from the Grodno Regiment sent to the left flank, under the command of Lieutenant Predaevich, for observation or attack, depending on the circumstances. The French cavalry, for their part, sent several dozen *chasseurs à cheval* against our hussars and isolated clashes began to break out between the horsemen.

These jousts were of little importance in themselves, they presented several examples of brilliant courage, outstanding agility and remarkable devotion between the lower ranks and their officers.

17 Commander-in-Chief's report to the Tsar; Acts by Russian commanders; Recommendation for award of the Military Order medal. Life of the valiant Major-General Kulnev.

18 Kulnev and Lieutenant Chechen receive the Order of St. Vladimir 4th class, Rüdiger a Golden Sabre.

During the firefight, enemy flankers, noticing an officer in the screen, opened fire on him. The shooting was accurate: Predaevich's horse, killed instantly, fell and the officer was wounded by a bullet and remained on the ground, crushed under the body of his horse. Seeing him alive, a handful of *chasseurs à cheval* rushed towards Predaevich, taking advantage of the fact that this action was happening on the extreme flank, where there were not many hussars. The nearest flankers were: non-commissioned officer Shcherban and Private Pankratiev, the two of them rushed at the enemy and while Shcherban was trading blows with the French swords, Pankratiev, freeing the officer and setting him on his saddle like a child, carried him out of the melee.¹⁹ When Rüdiger's horse was killed during the retreat, non-commissioned officer Bobryshev got off his horse and offered it to his squadron commander.²⁰ Flanker Private Matveenko, at the other end of the screen, having lost his horse, took out his pistol and, running at a *chasseur à cheval*, shot him and having jumped onto the dead man's horse, Matveenko cut down a Frenchman who had charged at him, in full view of the entire regiment.

There were many such examples. Cornet Zhitkov having been cut off by the enemy which made it necessary either to surrender or die, was rescued by a strong man, non-commissioned officer Persiyaninov, who attacked the enemy surrounding Zhitkov and cut down several horsemen with his sabre.²¹ Along with these facts proving the soldiers' loyalty to their officers, it is impossible not to mention that there were often such cases when an officer risked his life to save a private soldier. Such already were the notions of this great time that 'jack' soldiers, that is, those who would not defend their commanders at any cost, were considered dishonourable in the eyes of the squadron, and the officer who would not do the same with respect to the lower ranks was the subject of ridicule by his comrades. This feature, this military comradeship, however, has always been fundamental to the character of the Russian army. All our officers who fell into the hands of the enemy were only taken prisoner after being wounded, and even then, only if their entire escort had been wiped out by the enemy.

Having made this retreat, let us return to the description of the encounter between Bagration's vanguard and the enemy. The French gradually reinforced their flankers; all our reserves had already been committed to the screen; in some places small subunit attacks began, preceding the massed cavalry attacks. Bagration's infantry, having withdrawn from their positions, had already begun the retreat, while the Grodno men were still engaged with enemy flankers. Shepelev did not want to send the regiment into action: far away, like a huge serpent, the columns of French cavalry meandered; throwing a regiment into the attack meant drawing the whole mass of the enemy cavalry onto Bagration's flank, who, at that point did not know what forces he was dealing with. But between Langwiese [Długoleża] and Lawden [Lauda] a huge cloud of dust rose and a loud cheer was drowned by the thunder of hooves and the clatter of sabres: it was Uvarov's cavalry, moving at the gallop against the French *chasseurs à cheval*. Seizing the moment, Shepelev until then powerless, ordered the trumpeters to sound the long-awaited signal. The Grodno men, deploying by squadron, rushed forward and the flankers and a whole regiment of *chasseurs à cheval*, who had been threatening our infantry before, were overrun, swept away and driven off towards Bewernick.

Behind this village, the French rallied and turned to face towards us again. A new melee broke out; the two masses, meeting with a fearsome shock, began to slash at each other in a terrifying frenzy.²² The *chasseurs à cheval* could no longer stand the onslaught: the battlefield was held by us as a

19 We extracted these examples from the Award List of the Grodno Regiment for 1807. Unfortunately, the list is only available in the Archive of the General Staff for the years 1807 to 1809.

20 *Kurze Biographie*, p. 19

21 The grandson of one of our veterans of 1807-1814 said that his grandfather was rescued four times under circumstances very similar to those described above.

22 The commander of the *chasseur* regiment was cut down by Private Kalashinkov.

mournful trophy, covered with horses and men, blood and weapons. Having collected the wounded, Shepelev quickly led his regiment towards Heilsberg: carried away by the massacre, the regiment had advanced far ahead, Uvarov had already returned to the main position and the Grodno men, for the rest of the day, risked being cut off, almost behind enemy lines. At Heilsberg, our regiment, like Bagration's entire detachment, exhausted by rearguard actions, was placed behind the main force (for four hours).²³

At five o'clock in the afternoon, after fierce close quarter combat, the enemy were repelled and Uvarov was moved into the fighting line with all his cavalry, including our regiment.²⁴ The French columns, overwhelmed by several successful attacks from our squadrons, hastily retreated to Bewernick. In the above mentioned encounter, our three squadrons led by Colonel Gorgoli managed to free two battalions of the 2nd Jäger Regiment, which had been cut off by the enemy and considered themselves lost.²⁵ The resistance shown by our troops infuriated the *Empereur des Français*, he threw his tired regiments forwards several times, hoping to crush the Russian detachment, but his infantry, throwing their usual courage at our bayonets, smashed themselves every time on a granite rock: Heilsberg remained in our hands.²⁶

The losses for the regiment on 29 May [10 June] consisted of 15 lower ranks killed and three taken prisoner.²⁷ Amongst the wounded were; cornets Grevs, Yelchaninov and Zhitkov; lieutenants Predaevich, Baron Grothuß and Nortsev. The latter, having received a very serious wound, was already in the hands of the French, who, laying him on a tarpaulin, were discussing taking him away, when privates Korobtsov and Litvinenko came to the rescue, releasing their officer and handed him over to our orderlies on a French stretcher. The number of lower ranks wounded in the Battle of Heilsberg remains unclear, due to the absence of Administrative Orders for the regiment.

During the rainy night after the Heilsberg battle, the *Garde* and the remainder of Ney's corps reached Napoleon. With these forces, he nevertheless decided to manoeuvre the Russians out of Heilsberg and moved his army towards Domnau [Domnovo], in order to lure Bennigsen out of his strong position. The fog was so thick that it was impossible to discern the direction taken by the French. With Napoleon's intentions unknown, the Commander-in-Chief considered it best to retreat towards Bartenstein, where it would be easier to hold defensively. Prince Bagration was left with the rearguard, where he also had our Grodno Regiment. By dawn on 31 May [12 June], we stood on the banks of the Alle, observing the enemy outposts while our army was retreating along the road to Friedland; on 31 May and 1 June [12 and 13 June], having gained time for the other detachments, the regiment, in turn, set out for the town under whose walls the outcome of the campaign was to be decided. From time to time, enemy flankers appeared in the distance, but they confined themselves to firing aimless volleys that had no consequences: on the route from Heilsberg to Friedland, only one private was killed from the ranks of the regiment.²⁸

On 2 [14] June, as soon as the sun appeared over the horizon, a firefight broke out in our forward screen. The enemy was already in front of us, dispersing into the positions planned by Napoleon. The Grodno Regiment, as part of Bagration's force, stood on the left flank, not far from the Sortlack [Temkino] forest, behind us in the second line were the Alexandria Hussars and Lifeguard Ulans. Masses of French cavalry began to appear opposite us outside the village, up to 50 squadrons of cuirassiers and dragoons under General Grouchy [Emmanuel de Grouchy]. Immediately, abiding by

23 Mikhaylovsky-Danilevsky.

24 Count Uvarov's report to the Commander-in-Chief, dated 4 [16] June (Military Science Archive of the General Staff).

25 Book of rescripts, 1809.

26 Dumas. *Précis des événements militaires 1806-1807*.

27 Of these, two privates, Zaychenko and Chernyavsky escaped from captivity and returned to the regiment on 14 [26] June (monthly reports for 1807).

28 During the night of 1 to 2 [13 to 14] June, during the withdrawal of Rüdiger's squadron, the magazines in Schippenbeil [Sępopol] were destroyed before being occupied by the French.

the rules of the old tactics, our flankers poured forward for single combat; skirmishing and small arms fire between them and the riders of the enemy ensued, which lasted until five o'clock in the morning. Finally, at five o'clock, the French marched towards us in three columns: the central one charged at our centre, both others at the flanks. As soon as the heavy cavalry started, our regiment charged to meet them, and the melee began. There was a crackling sound across the field, the clang of crossed sabres, the sound of blows raining down on armour, pistol shots that mingled with the shouts of the combatants and the groans of the wounded.

The weather was calm and clear, a standing cloud of smoke and dust formed, which did not allow anything even a few paces away to be seen. In this dust, where one could hardly distinguish friend from foe, the battle lasted for several hours with varying success. We drove the French away, then they us. It was a continuous wave of both lines; first one attacks and the other leaves, then the latter, having galloped to their reserves, turn their horses, rushes at the former and drives off the enemy mass. During these races, the blows of sabres and swords mostly fell on those who showed their backs, that is, both we struck the French and they in pursuit of us.²⁹ This moving mass seemed to be as one, running back and forth; our hussars frantically cut into the middle of the French and rode along with them, striking in all directions. The occasional wounded man rose; having fallen, if he tried to get out of the melee, was immediately knocked down again by the masses of horsemen moving in the thick dust and, in most cases, perished under the hooves of galloping horses. In this long melee, our soldiers, as usual, showed quite a few examples not only of outstanding personal courage, but especially of loyalty to the officers whom they rescued from danger. The following exploits of the lower ranks deserve particular attention: having already established his renown, the valiant Kulnev, having cut into the middle of the French, was surrounded by cuirassiers and his demise was undoubted but Private Bondarets flew to his aid and freed him; the wounded Kamashev had already fallen into the hands of the dragoons who were leading him away - privates Tsirul and Kozlovsky drove them from their commander. No less worthy of the memory of the regiment is the Trumpeter Kulib: this modest hero, cut by the broadswords of French armoured horsemen, despite his wounds, did not leave his place behind Silin, protecting the commander with his body, until he fell from his horse from loss of blood.

At the Sortlack forest, however, the upper hand would have remained on the side of the numerous enemy had Uvarov not arrived on the battlefield with the reserve cavalry. He appeared in the nick of time for us. The Grodno Regiment, carried away by its courage, rushing too far forward, was surrounded by the cavalry under Grouchy and La Tour-Maubourg [Marie-Victor-Nicolas de Faÿ de La Tour-Maubourg]. The enemy, as if sensing perfect prey, gathered all ready to attack to crush the hussars. At that moment, when it seemed that the fate of the Grodno men had already been decided, the sonorous, familiar voice of Kulnev sounded throughout the regiment: Yakov Petrovich saw Uvarov in the distance! In an instant, his squadron, and after him the others, desperately struck the nearest dragoon regiment on the spot, and overran it.³⁰ Ahead were heard the Russian commands; Uvarov's cavalry charged, raising dust, bringing support, revenge, victory and salvation from a shameful captivity. Combining with the reserve cavalry and encouraged by its emergence, the hussars again charged at the French along with the newly arrived regiments, overwhelmed them and drove them back to the Sortlack forest.

If now on the left flank, the battlefield remained ours, then on the right - our situation was very bad. Marshal Victor [Claude-Victor Perrin] located his artillery in Bagration's previous position and opened a lethal bombardment on the units on their right flank. Prince Gorchakov, seeing the dangerous position of this wing, ordered the infantry to retreat under the protection of the cavalry. A strong column of French cavalry was immediately sent against them, but the latter limited themselves to observation and did not attack.

29 Faddey Bulgarin, *Memoirs*, volume 3.

30 Alexander I and his contemporaries, biography of Ya.P. Kulnev; *Deeds of Russian Commanders*.

It was 10 o'clock in the evening; beyond the Alle, Friedland was already burning when the infantry approached the river. Only a few battalions held open the line of retreat. With a final effort, tired Russian regiments pushed their way through the masses of the French with fixed bayonets, but on the bank a new unexpected calamity awaited the unfortunates: the bridges over the Alle were burning! Noticing the hopeless situation of the Russian infantry, the French General Sénarmont [Alexandre-Antoine Hureau de Sénarmont], taking advantage of the formation's disorder, pushed forward his thirty-six cannon to a range of 46 *sazhen* [322 feet] from our front, firing shots at the crowded Russian columns. The Grodno regiment, and after it some other cavalry units, which had arrived at the bridges, charged like madmen, but the canister mowed them down in rows and near the battery whole battalions poured volleys into the tormented cavalry. Thus the hussars could not reach the battery.³¹

There were three options: surrender, swim for it, but the river was wide and deep, or die. The French cavalry, which had been standing at a distance until then, began to move closer, and as Sénarmont's guns increased their fire on the troops pressed against the river, they, having rested their flank on the river and turned around, closed off the last escape route for the formation. As Uvarov later reported to Bennigsen: 'It was our good fortune that the French cavalry did not dare attack us at this time!'³²

Eventually, a ford on the Alle was found and the infantry entered the water. The artillery followed, while the cavalry remained on the bank, facing the enemy. Many infantrymen drowned and weapons were lost but the formation was saved. Once all the infantry had cleared the left bank of the river, the cavalry began crossing. Bulgarin wrote: 'What was it like to swim at night, not knowing the area and they were firing round shot and incendiaries from behind us! Hell was on the banks of that river! There was terrible screaming and noise... People were drowning here, begging for help, here the dying and wounded groan... The infantry and cavalry were all mixed up together... It is impossible to reach the bank and all the while round shot were falling on the crowds and into the river.'³³

Over the river, the regiments assembled in the forest. There were torches and sounding trumpets and loud drums rallying the scattered men. Not until dawn could everyone find the remnants of their regiments in the confusion.

For the Russian army, the Friedland battle was what the French called *une glorieuse défaite*, a defeat but one without shame. Pressed against the river, under deadly fire, the weary troops, realising that victory was going to the enemy side, did not raise a white flag and did not give any thought to giving up. The best description of our army are the words of a witness to the Battle of Friedland, the British envoy Lord Hutchinson [John Hely-Hutchinson, 2nd Earl of Donoughmore]: 'I lack terms sufficiently strong to describe the valour of the Russians, and which would have rendered their success undoubted, if courage alone could ensure victory, but, whatever may be the end, the officers and men of the Russian army have done their duty in the noblest manner, and are justly entitled to the praise and admiration of every person, who was witness of their conduct.'³⁴

The sorrowful retreat to Wehlau [Znamensk] began; the rearguard was entrusted to Bagration. At Wehlau, as soon as our regiment crossed the Pregel, the leading French units appeared on the left bank; but the bridges were already burning and the enemy did not try to cross the river, which our cavalry was monitoring. On 4 [16] June we rode to Schirrau [Dalnee], and on 7 [19] June, Bagration's detachment moved across the Neman, not far from Mikieten [Mikytai]. Twice during

31 In this attack, Lieutenant Gukov, whose horse was killed under him, was snatched from enemy hands by Private Tkachenko.

32 Count Uvarov's report to Bennigsen, dated 5 [17] June.

33 Faddey Bulgarin, *Memoirs*, volume 3, p. 241.

34 Sir Robert Wilson, *Sketch of the campaigns in Poland, in the years 1806 and 1807*.

this retreat Murat prepared to strike the tail of the rear guard and each time the combined brigade under F.D. Pahlen (Grodno Hussars and Poland Horse regiments) deployed to repel the attack. But Murat never attacked: all cavalry operations were limited to small skirmishes between the Russian and enemy flankers. Having reached Tilsit [Sovetsk], we stopped ahead of the main body on the right bank of the Neman.³⁵ Retreating without a fight was difficult, especially after an unsuccessful battle, and this displeasure among the troops, eager to take revenge on the enemy, was known to the Commander-in-Chief. In the text of an order to the army he wrote; 'I am quite aware of the regrets of the Russian units retreating after the battle... Unfortunately, I have discovered that the current withdrawal from Friedland is being thought of as a retreat, when it is nothing more than a manoeuvre, with which I am striving to draw the enemy into positions favourable to us and to rain new blows on them, I am convinced that the brave and victorious Russian army will in any case succeed in defeating the enemy. The honourable commanders must inspire their subordinates in this regard.'³⁶

Hostilities were suspended between 7 to 12 [19 to 24] June; on 12 [24] June, an armistice was finally concluded. The next day, in Tilsit, a meeting of the two Emperors took place, putting an end to the war, which had cost us so much blood and sacrifice. On these days, the regiment published its losses and rested after hard days spent on watch, shielding the army. The number killed from the regiment on 2 [14] June had been significant; on that day the following were killed: Cornet Escher 1st and *Rittmeister* Nikora 1st, wounded: *Rittmeister* Domeyko, *Stabs-Rittmeister* Gukov, cornets Bibikov, Yermolov, Dematchenko-Romasenko, Zdroevsky, Korostovtsev and Prince Drutskoy-Sokolinsky. Eighteen lower ranks were killed and one taken prisoner.³⁷ The Colonel-in-Chief, D.D. Shepelev, was awarded a Golden Sabre decorated with diamonds for 29 May [10 June] and his heroic actions at Friedland, colonels Bibikov and Gorgoli, received the Order of St. George 4th class; Major Kamashev and Lieutenant Chechensky, Golden Sabres; Major Lüders, the Order of St. Valdimir 4th class with ribbon, Lieutenant-Colonel Kulnev, the Order of St. Anne 2nd class and promotion to Colonel; *Rittmeister* Rüdiger, the Order of St. Anne 3rd class and the rank of Major; *Rittmeister* Olshevsky, lieutenants Predaevich, Gukov, Vishnevsky, Kempfert, Kaverin, cornets Kusovnikov, Zhitkov, Nortsev and Grevs received the Order of St. Anne 3rd class.

During this period at Tilsit, Russian officers were not allowed to enter the town, with the exception of aides-de-camp, but the curiosity to see Napoleon led to the evasion of the prohibition and every day our officers went into Tilsit in undress frock-coats. They often paid heavy penalties for this, but it was boring in the camp, and the town was full of Frenchmen, with whom our hussars managed to make friends.

The peace was signed on 25 June [7 July]. On 28 June [10 July], the regiment departed from Tilsit for Disna [Dzisa], where it was intended to be stationed in a newly established camp in the Vitebsk Governorate. The wounded were sent to hospitals closest to the camp (in Vitebsk and Polotsk), but many of them did not make it that far: three hussars died of wounds on 20 June [2 July] (including Trumpeter Kulib), four more died over the following days; on 18 [30] June, Cornet Korostovtsev died in Tilsit from sabre wounds suffered at Friedland.

It is difficult to confirm the precise losses in the Grodno Regiment in its first campaign. The data on this is in the following figures, but is by no means complete.³⁸ Including those who died abroad from wounds, there were: one officer and eight lower ranks killed in January; one lower rank killed in February; seven lower ranks killed in April; 11 officers wounded and 40 lower ranks killed in May; three officers and 25 lower ranks killed, and seven officers wounded in June, for a total of

35 War Diary for 1807; Höpfner, *Geschichte des Krieges von Jahre 1807*.

36 From Army Orders by Count Bennigsen, dated 4 [16] June 1807, in Popelken [Vysokoe].

37 Escaped from captivity on 10 [22] June. Monthly Returns.

38 As can be seen from the Monthly Returns, the regiment lost 184 men through illness or died of wounds in 1807, from 1 [13] February to 20 July [1 August].

four officers and 81 lower ranks killed, 18 officers wounded.

How many lower ranks were wounded is unknown, due to the absence of Administrative Orders for the regiment; other information concerning deaths due to wounds has not been preserved anywhere in the Archives.

The Sovereign Emperor did not forget the victims of this war: it was ordered that the widows of the officers who laid down their lives on campaign were to be paid the full salary of their dead husbands in the form of a pension, paying this pension, upon the death of the widows, to their children of both sexes: to males until their 16th birthday and to females until marriage. Those discharged due to wounds or injuries, received full pay for life, to be delivered to their chosen place of residence. The lower ranks who had suffered wounds and could not continue in service were placed in invalid homes, and if there were no vacancies in the homes, were granted their salary and provisions, entrusting them to the patronage of local governors.³⁹ Officers who had received the Monarch's favour had the service limit for receiving the Order of St. George (at age 35) reduced: field officers by two years, and subalterns by one year.⁴⁰

The bloody, hard war was over. The exhausted regiment arrived in Disna, for rest and recovery. After continuous wars in Europe, peace finally came and after the Treaty of Tilsit, nowhere on the political horizon were there black clouds, harbingers of war. But for the Grodno Regiment, the peace did not last long: a new campaign was in preparation, full of hardships and difficulties, a struggle with the elements and with men, with hunger and cold - war with Sweden.

39 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, War of 1806-1807.

40 Colonels Shepelev, Bibikov, Gorgoli, *Rittmeister* Olshevsky, Colonel Davydov, Lieutenant-Colonel Kulnev, majors Kamashev, Lüders, Rüdiger, lieutenants Nortsev, Predaevich, cornets Kavarin, Bibikov 2nd and Teygert.

CHAPTER 4.

Garrisoned in Vitebsk Governorate. - The state of the regiment after the war. - Relations between regimental and squadron commanders. - S.M. Bibikov. Preparations for the war of 1808 to 1809 with Sweden. - The march to the borders of Finland. - Orders before the campaign. - Distribution of squadrons of the Grodno Regiment among detachments. - The theatre of war. - The advance into Finland. - Skirmish near the town of Forsby. Occupation of Helsingfors. - Skirmishes at Elimä chapel, Drombom and Kuuskoski. - Occupation of Tavastehus and Åbo. Seizure of the city of Åbo by the quartermaster of the Grodno Regiment. - Occupation of the Åland Islands by Lieutenant Sineokov. - The action at Tammerfors. - Pursuit of the Swedes to Björneborg. - Skirmishes during the pursuit. - Hard patrolling. - Skirmish at Sundby. - Occupation of Jakobstad and Gamlakarleby. - Operations by General Tuchkov near the town of Kuopio. - Skirmish at Kalajoki. - The situation of the detachments in late March [early April] 1808. - Movements by the northern detachment in early [mid] April. - Cavalry action on the ice of the Gulf of Bothnia near Pyhäjoki. - Skirmish on 6 [18] April. - Reverse at Revolax. - The disastrous situation of the Russian army in Finland. - Reconnaissance of Karlö Island. - Operations by Shepelev's detachment on the southwestern coast. - The Swedes recapture the Åland Islands. - Spring campaign. - The peasant uprising and its consequences. - The dangerous situation of the coastal outposts at the outbreak of the uprising. - Actions at Lappo, Lintulaks and Perho. - The second action at Lappo. - Retreat to Tavastehus. - Operations in August. - The action at Alavo. - The Battle of Karstula. - The action at Kuhalambi. - The action at Kuortaneenjärvi lake: hussar support for the infantry at the village of Heroja. - The retreat of the Swedes from Salmi. - Operations by Shepelev and Bibikov in the south. - The Battle of Oravais. - The action at Gamlakarleby. - The pursuit of the Swedish army. - The armistice. - The state of the regiment during the armistice.

The Grodno Regiment remained in the Vitebsk Governorate almost until the end of November [early December] 1807. The squadrons under Lieutenant Colonel Tursky were brought up from Skidel to Disna, and they immediately reinforced the active elements of the regiment. At that time, the six squadrons could barely muster 409 available men, or 668 men including those being raised. In view of this shortfall of lower ranks, Shepelev ordered Tursky to detach enough of his men needed to bring the seven active squadrons into a nine-rank formation. Thus, there were seven active squadrons once more and three forming up, which, due to their small numbers, were almost imaginary. Only thanks to the energy of Tursky, with the constant demand for reinforcements, was the Grodno Regiment able to reach its full ten-squadron establishment in 1809.

During the regiment's time in the Disna camp, training exercises went on as usual, under the leadership of Stepan Matveevich Bibikov; Shepelev limited himself to general observation, being more concerned with the administrative elements of the regiment, which had suffered greatly in the late campaign. This laissez-faire attitude from Shepelev towards combat training was the cause of frequent clashes between Bibikov and the squadron commanders. Due to his position, being merely assistant to the Colonel-in-Chief of the fighting echelon, Bibikov did not enjoy the power that is vested in current Regimental Commanders: he was considered senior to other field officers, even their superior, but the hierarchical relations between them were similar to those that currently exist between a squadron commander and a 'divisioner' [senior of the squadron commanders in a pair of squadrons]. Colonel Bibikov, who had little service in the line and was completely unfamiliar with life in an hussar regiment and the comradely relations between officers, immediately wanted simply to appoint himself the commander. This was all the more difficult because in hussar regiments, with the spirit of self-reliance still deeply rooted, the authority of the commander was based mainly on respect, personally earned, and not on the principle of discipline alone. The field officers we had around at the time were: Kulnev, Gorgoli, Davydov, Hirsch, Kamashev, Lüders an entire fraternity

of officers grouped together, sincerely admiring those men in whom they saw potential for heroism, the reciprocal relationships between Bibikov and the squadron commanders would not grant the former much popularity.¹ Bibikov, meanwhile, was a truly effective officer, energetic and capable, but at the same time hot-tempered, irritable and harsh; he was respected for his noble bearing and military skills, but was not well-liked. It was only shortly before the death of Stepan Matveevich, that the regiment came to appreciate the qualities and skills of its sometimes unpleasant, but efficient, honest and brave commander. It was not until after the war where the benefits of Bibikov's work on the development and training of the regiment were once again demonstrated, after the Finnish campaign of 1808-1809.

In November, during the lull that followed the stormy season of 1807, quite unexpectedly an order came to prepare for a new campaign. The good understanding that had existed between Sweden and Russia since 1790 was interrupted by the King's refusal to meet the treaty obligations of 1780 and 1800, after the British, having occupied Copenhagen, took possession of the fleet of our ally, the King of Denmark. Gustav IV's response and, in part, the need to have Finland's backing in order to secure St. Petersburg, caused Emperor Alexander to move the 5th, 17th and 21st divisions located in the Vitebsk and Estland governorates towards the borders of Sweden. These divisions, which were under the command of General Tuchkov 1st (5th Division), Count Kamensky (17th Division) and Prince Bagration (21st Division), were drawn towards the capital, with the exception of the cavalry organic to these divisions, which was detached and did not go on campaign. Four cavalry regiments were assigned in their place: our Grodno Hussars, the Finland Dragoons, Loshchilin's Cossacks and the two-*Sotnia* Lifeguard Cossacks.

The Grodno Regiment set out from Disna in late November [early December] 1807 and arrived in St. Petersburg on 20 December [1 January 1808]. The transfer from the Vitebsk Governorate to the capital was accomplished very hastily, which disordered the regiment, not yet fully recovered from the late war. Their uniforms were in the worst possible condition, since, despite all of Shepelev's efforts to bring the regiment's equipment into the correct state, it had been impossible to repair and issue new clothing for 600 men in five months. The Grodno Regiment, as with other units assigned to the campaign, passed through St. Petersburg at night, so that the residents of the capital would not notice the rags of the victorious army, and settled on the Okhta river.¹

To facilitate the move, the 123 cart-horses required on establishment were reduced by 26: 24 from infirmary carriages and two from the chapel. These 26 horses were ordered either to be left in Disna, with Shepelev being given the choice of feeding them from forage funds, or sent to Novgorod Governorate, where forage would be prepared for them. These horses were sent to the village of Krasnoe with Lieutenant Davydov 2nd.² The remaining administrative orders for the Government concerning the regiment were as follows:

1. When issuing funds, calculate the value of *chervonets* [gold sovereigns] at three roubles and 80 kopecks in silver.
2. All combatant lower ranks are to be given a wine and meat allowance three times a week, while support personnel are to receive it once a week.
3. The following are to be issued to war horses: 10 *funt* [four kilogrammes] of hay, four *garnets* [13 dry litres] of oats or barley each.

1 The relationship that existed between him and the field officers was especially evident from the report by Lieutenant Colonel Kulnev, dated 16 [28] September 1807, which became part of Count Rüdiger's papers, where Kulnev complained that Colonel Bibikov, having summoned the squadron commanders, had been shouting indecently and ordered the sergeant major, via the senior aide-de-camp, to make all the non-commissioned officers of his squadron run the gauntlet.

1 F. Bulgarin, Memoirs, volume 4, p. 22; Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, *Описание Финляндской войны на сухом пути и на море в 1808 и 1809 годах* [Description of the Finnish War on Land and Sea in 1808 and 1809], p. 8.

2 Monthly reports for 1808.

4. Cash is to be issued in lieu of fodder for draft horses: five silver roubles for a *chetvert* [210 dry litres] of oats, and 50 silver kopecks for a *pud* [16.4 kilogrammes] of hay.³

In terms of health, the regiment's condition was no better than its administrative state. There were many sick men: diseases and epidemics were raging in Lithuania and Belorussia at that time, and Tursky had already lost 22 men to them in June.⁴ At the time of departure, necessity forced us to take a significant portion of recuperating men on campaign.

On 22 January [3 February], the regiment was divided into detachments: the following squadrons were assigned to 17th Division: Kulnev's, the Colonel-in-Chief's (Colonel Gorgoli, and then *Rittmeister* Baron Grothuß) and the Commander's (*Rittmeister* Rüdiger's); to 5th Division: 2nd vacant (Major Silin's), 3rd vacant (Major von Lüders'); to 21st Division: Major Hirsch's and 1st vacant (*Rittmeister* Olshevsky's). The squadrons still being raised, under the command of Colonel Tursky, were transferred to Gudova Yama, while the new replacement squadron that was being established was transferred to Polotsk.⁵ On 30 January [11 February], the Grodno Hussars joined the headquarters of their divisions, and those sick who could not proceed with their squadrons were left in St. Petersburg hospitals. Despite the severe cold, cases of cold injury were quite rare, both during the campaign and in the camps around St. Petersburg; the frosts only made themselves felt once they had crossed the border into Finland.⁶ By 1 [13] February, the detachment assigned for operations in Finland, under the command of Count Buxhöwden, was located as follows: Tuchkov in Nyslott [Savonlinna], Count Kamensky in Friedrichshamn [Hamina], and Prince Bagration in Villmanstrand [Lappeenranta]. Our Regimental Headquarters was attached to 21st Division.

The campaign was going to be difficult. The numerous lakes and mountainous terrain made war in Finland difficult. In its northern and especially northeastern parts, there are vast expanses covered with dense, almost virgin forests and waterlogged swamps, impassable in summer even for the locals. The areas that were comparatively more suitable for military operations were: the Baltic coast, Ostrobothnia and the Åland Islands, populated by Swedes, that is, the intelligentsia, but even in these places, from the very beginning of the war, all stores and supplies had been destroyed, the population had gone north or to the cities, and the region seemed as deserted as the northern provinces. Moreover, the Swedish forces were far from inferior to ours: they amounted to 19,000 men under the command of General (later *fältmarskalk* [field marshal]) *greve* [count] Klingspor, in Finland; 32,000 more in Sweden and 14,000 British were available to help Klingspor in case of a reverse.⁷ Against this force we could only put up 24 battalions, 11 squadrons and eight Cossack *Sotnia* [squadrons, literally 'hundreds'].

On 9 [21] February, the Russian force crossed the Finnish border. Having entered Swedish territory, 17th Division, preceded by hussars, moved to Abborrfors [Ahvenkoski] and occupied Lovisa [Loviisa], evacuated by the enemy. From here the vanguard was sent after the retreating Swedish detachment, commanded by *Överste* [colonel] Gripenberg. The hussars at the head of the leading units, located the enemy at Forsby [Koskenkylä]. The Swedes, taking advantage of the inaccessibility of their positions on the crest of bare cliffs, tried to hold the vanguard back, but after a short exchange of fire, Rüdiger, having learned that it was possible to pass along the ice of Pernåviken [Pernajanlahti] bay, past the enemy flank, went out almost behind Gripenberg with his

3 Complete Collection of Laws, XXX, 35.

4 Monthly reports for 1807.

5 Monthly reports for 1807.

6 Kulnev's orders, 30 January [11 February] 1808: 'Yesterday's march was the same for everyone. In the squadron entrusted to me and in the *Leib* Squadron, not a single man suffered cold injuries, while in the Regimental Commander's squadron, four men did. From which we must conclude that their boots were too tight and cannot accommodate warm foot-wraps. It is better to be diligent on active service than to ruin the body with shallow dandyism, especially at a time when you are on the way to acquiring new honours and glory' (Military Science Archive, No. 1642).

7 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, p. 15.

squadron and charged at part of the *Nylands lätta dragonregemente*. The *Nylands lätta dragonregemente* were overwhelmed by their uninvited guests and scattered in all directions, pursued by the hussars. During this pursuit, Cornet Smolensky was captured by the enemy, having suffered a blow to the head with a sabre, and was carried into a crowd of *Nylands* men by his horse. The wounded officer was rescued by Private Dvornikov, who charged at the enemy dragoons escorting Smolensky, and, following his release, was handed over by brave privates into the care of the medical staff.⁸ Having defeated the Swedish flank guard, Rüdiger threatened to envelope Gripenberg. This forced the Swedes to withdraw from the position, the impregnability of which everyone had been convinced, and retreat to Borgå [Porvoo]. In the skirmish with the *Nylands lätta dragonregemente*, the Grodno men lost one non-commissioned officer and three privates: these were the first drops of Russian blood spilled on Finnish soil in 1808. Among the prisoners, two officers remained in our hands, captured by the trumpeter Koleda.

On the same day [21 February], Prince Bagration's column moved towards Orimattila, pushing the Swedes back, who retreated towards Tavastehus [Hämeenlinna]. Elements of the 17th and 21st divisions were to link up at Borgå, until enemy locations could be determined. To that end, Major General Orlov-Denisov was sent towards Helsingfors [Helsinki] with the *Leib*-Squadron, while another detachment, entrusted to Lieutenant Colonel Anselm de Guibours of the Grodno Regiment, also headed in that direction across the ice-covered strait separating Helsingfors from the Sveaborg fortifications [Suomenlinna]. Both detachments reached the capital of Finland almost simultaneously on 18 February [1 March], striking the enemy detachment hastily retreating towards the fortress. During the clash that took place between our hussars and the Swedes, the quartermaster of the Colonel-in-Chief's squadron, Grabovsky, saved the life of *Rittmeister* Grothuß, who had fallen from his horse.⁹ Having driven the enemy back, the Grodno men burst into the city, and the infantry followed them, eventually isolating Helsingfors from Sveaborg. An independent detachment was left to blockade this fortress, which included Major Olshevsky's squadron.

Tuchkov 1st's column only crossed the border at Nyslott on 16 [28] February and, without encountering any Swedes, occupied almost the entire Savolax [Savo] *Landskap* [region].

Prince Bagration had advanced the furthest, leaving Lappträsk [Lapinjärvi], on the night of 15 to 16 [27 to 28] February, attacked the brigades under General Adlercreutz, defeated them completely and forced him to retreat towards Tavastehus; General Adlercreutz joined forces with Klingspor in this town, intending to repel the advancing Russian columns. Along the route, the Russian detachments had to drive off the Swedish rearguards several times as they converged on Tavastehus; these skirmishes mostly fell to the lot of our hussars: on 10 [22] February, Rüdiger, in Prince Bagration's vanguard, pushed the enemy back at the Elimä chapel [Elimäki] and, on 11 [23] February, also drove the Swedes out of the villages of Muttom [Muttala, two miles east of Mörskom] and Mörskom [Myrskylä] with brilliant attacks.¹⁰ On 12 [24] February, 12 *versta* [eight miles] from Drombom [Rumpila, 2½ miles west of Liljendal], the squadrons under Hirsch and Rüdiger came across 250 enemy jägers defending an abatis on the main road by holding the edge of the forest on either side of it. Hirsch, seeing that there was no way to get through or go around the forest, attacked the Swedes' flank and forced them to retreat to the village of Kuuskoski [*sic*], where the *Björneborgs regemente* was located. The enemy were driven out of the village of Kuuskoski by our approaching infantry, and as their troops began to retreat, Hirsch attacked them with his squadron. This attack was so swift that the Swedes abandoned nine wagons with provisions and forage, carriages and a small convoy, which, together with the prisoners, remained the prizes from this action.¹¹ The regiment's casualties from this engagement consisted of three wounded hussars and

8 Citation for the award of the Military Order Medal.

9 Citation for the award of the Military Order Medal.

10 At Mutom and Mörskom the regiment lost two hussars and eight horses; Rüdiger had a horse killed under him.

11 Among the prisoners were *Överstelöjtnant* Stjernvall and the Regimental Auditor.

several horses killed.

On 24 February [7 March], all the cavalry from the vanguards advancing on Tavastahus began to form up in a ring around the town for a general attack. In front of the town, on level ground, individual horsemen from the Grodno Regiment had been prancing about since the early hours; by 11 o'clock, black columns of Russians were already visible in the distance against the white backdrop of snowy fields. The speed of the Russian units' advance perplexed Klingspor so much that he did not dare give battle and, after some hesitation, ordered a retreat from Tavastehus towards Tammerfors [Tampere] and Björneborg [Pori]. No significant clashes occurred during this retreat; due to the nature of the ground, the actions were limited to minor individual skirmishes between the hussars and Swedish dragoons.

Having occupied Tavastehus, the Russian army split up: Bagration, with the squadrons under Kulnev and Rüdiger in his detachment, went after *greve* Klingspor; another element of Bagration's infantry was detached with the squadrons under Hirsch and Lüders, under the command of Shepelev, in order to seize Åbo [Turku] and, if possible, the Åland Islands; Tuchkov 1st (with Silin's squadron) moved towards Kuopio, while Count Kamensky was stationed at Helsingfors in order to blockade Sveaborg and maintain communications between this fortress and Åbo.

On 25 February [8 March], Shepelev's detachment set out for Åbo, completely unaware of what forces they would have to deal with. Imagine the surprise of the good Colonel-in-Chief when, instead of the cannon fire he expected, our vanguard was met at the gates of Åbo by the inhabitants of the city, who had an officer from the Grodno Regiment leading them. The reason for such a warm welcome was the following circumstance, told by Denis Davydov, the original cause of the entire incident. The famous partisan recounted:¹²

'At the beginning of the campaign, the quartermaster of the Grodno Hussars, Lieutenant Maekovsky, came to me. During our time in the vanguard (in 1807), he often overheard me talking about military operations and often saw me looking at maps, which was enough to convince him of my military talents. Believing that no one knew of the location of the regimental headquarters better than me, to where he was headed in a rush after completing the mission assigned to him in St. Petersburg, he came with a request that I direct him by the shortest route from Helsingfors to said headquarters. Delighted at such trust and knowing that the Grodno regimental headquarters was co-located with 21st Division, I unfolded the map, calculated the number of stages from Tavastehus to Åbo and, assessing the day of departure for this division, I confidently announced to Maekovsky that the regimental headquarters was now in Åbo. In my calculations I had forgotten that there was no snow on the map, let alone deep snow, that the wide roads had been turned into tracks along which the cavalry could not move except in single file, so that instead of 25 to 30 *versta* [17 to 20 miles] per day, the division was not able to travel more than 10 or 12 *versta* [seven or eight miles per day. Maevsky bowed deeply to me, set off on his way by post-horse and entered Åbo as if it were central Moscow or St. Petersburg. In Åbo there was neither sight nor sound of our troops; it is true that there were also no enemy troops, but there was the population who were far from sympathetic towards the Russians. Fortunately, no offence was taken towards our paladin, because the governor managed to hide him before word of his arrival spread. He stayed with the Governor until the arrival of (Shepelev's) detachment in Åbo from 21st Division.

Thus began Maekovsky's true triumph. As soon as our troops appeared, the governor and the senior officials became seriously concerned. Without delay, they resorted to our quartermaster with a request to take the city under his protection and to notify the

12 Military Science Archive of the General Staff, No. 1642. This anecdote was not approved by the censors for a long time; it later appeared in the complete works of D. Davydov.

commander of the detachment that the city had submitted to Russian armed forces from the moment the Russian officer, Lieutenant Maekovsky himself had arrived. Maekovsky donned his full-dress uniform, mounted the governor's horse and went to the detachment, accompanied by the officials. The commander of the detachment, seeing a crowd in uniform, and a hussar officer in front of them, took it for a patrol sent out from the city. Everyone in the detachment began to move, they began to form up in combat formation, moved their guns forward and were about to cock the hammers, when suddenly the white handkerchief that the conqueror was waving and his approach to the detachment brought the latter out of their misconception.'

After the taking of Åbo, the occupation of Åland did not present any greater difficulties. On 12 [24] March, Lieutenant Sineokov was sent ahead from Shepelev's detachment across the ice in order to reconnoitre the islands. Sineokov returned on the fourth day and reported that there were no enemy troops on Åland, and that the population, although they treated the hussars very unsympathetically, did not intend to offer any resistance. At the same time, Shepelev sent Colonel Vuich to Åland with a battalion and a half-squadron of Grodno men in order to garrison the islands. Thus ended the mission assigned to Shepelev.

On 28 February [11 March], Prince Bagration's detachment set off from Tavastehus towards Tammerfors, sending Major General Yankovich ahead with the squadrons under Kulnev and Rüdiger. The *Leib* Squadron was left in Tavastehus to secure the division's communications with the town. Kulnev did not encounter resistance until Tammerfors, but the Swedes halted near the town with the intention of giving the rearguard time to remove supplies from the magazines. Seeing that it was impossible to take Tammerfors with cavalry, Yankovich limited himself to sending out patrols either side of the town showing the enemy his intention to sever their line of retreat. The Swedes, however, did not wait for the arrival of Russian infantry and evacuated Tammerfors. Meanwhile, Rüdiger had bypassed the town and already managed to reach the Björneborg road near the village of Lempäälä and attacked the nearest enemy company. During this attack, they managed to cut down several men and capture an officer (Lieutenant Colonel Stackelberg) of the *Björneborgs regemente*.¹³

The march began again, but the Swedish forces were divided: Klingspor went towards Björneborg, while Adlercreutz went towards Vaasa via Kuru and Nummijärvi [*sic*]. Yankovich moved after the former, while Kulnev was detached behind Adlercreutz with hussars, one gun and four companies. On that same day [11 March], Rüdiger with Yankovich's column had a second clash with the enemy. At the Hatanpää manor, our flankers discovered a Swedish battalion lagging behind the others on the way to Björneborg. Rüdiger went to move against them. Just at that moment, two enemy squadrons, wishing to seize the manor, headed towards it across the ice of Lake Numijärvi [*sic*, Pyhäjärvi]. Rüdiger left the battalion alone and, quickly changing front, raced at the flank of the enemy dragoons. The shock happened on the ice of the lake. Overall, the *Nylands lätta dragonregemente* was unlucky in its clashes with the Grodno men in 1808; despite its excellent organisation and undoubted bravery, it suffered a second defeat when engaging our hussars: the *Nylands* squadrons, taken by Rüdiger from the front and flank, raced off in disarray, pursued by the hussars as far as the infantry lines of their rearguard.¹⁴ Rüdiger followed this rearguard, retreating towards Björneborg, never losing sight of them.

The pursuit was very difficult: the Swedes were moving very quickly, demolished the bridges behind them everywhere and blocked the roads with abatis in suitable locations, such that bypassing blocked or damaged areas had to be carried out with major reinforcements and loss of time. The severe cold, reaching 25 degrees of frost, further increased the hardship of the pursuit: the

13 At Tammerfors we had three hussars wounded (21st Division War Diary, Military Science Archive, No. 1646); Count Suchtelen, *Précis*.

14 We had seven men wounded here.

inadequately dressed men had to constantly dismount to warm their hands and feet, which were on the point of frostbite. The cold was in our favour only when we were making detours as it covered the small lakes we encountered along the way with an icy crust, giving us the opportunity to bypass cratered stretches of road and demolished bridges.

On 5 [17] March, Klingspor halted at Haistila, near the village of Kumo [Kokemäki], to buy time for the removal of government property from Björneborg. At 11 o'clock in the morning, skirmishers emerged to face the vanguard hussars, who were engaged with musketry by jägers who had taken up positions in the houses. General Yankovich ordered Rüdiger to halt and wait for the infantry to come up. At 12 o'clock the artillery fire began, then small-arms fire between ours and Swedish units, but success remained on the side of the enemy until two o'clock, as they were well protected by abatis and the buildings. Rüdiger decided to try to dislodge the enemy with a cavalry envelopment and an attack from the rear, but as soon as the Swedes saw the cavalry on their flank, they withdrew from their positions in good order and in formation and retreated towards Björneborg. At Ulvsby [Ulvila], the second attempt to hold back the Russian vanguard ended in failure despite the fact that the defence was directed by Klingspor's Chief-of-Staff, *greve* Löwenhielm himself. Once again Rüdiger used the most expedient manoeuvre in such cases, that is, envelopment, and, threatening the enemy line of retreat, forced Löwenhielm to retreat in haste. There was, however, a minor skirmish with the *Nylands lätta dragonregemente*, who were shielding the infantry's movements. After a short fight, the dragoons were driven back by the hussars, losing several men killed. The last cannon shots directed against our squadrons killed one hussar and wounded Major Rüdiger (with a contusion) and two men, which comprised all the casualties in the regiment during the march from Tammerfors to Björneborg.¹⁵ The vanguard had occupied Björneborg by nightfall.

While General Yankovich was pressing Klingspor, Kulnev was moving quickly up behind Adlercreutz, who, having passed Tammerfors, changed direction and advanced towards Nykarleby [Uusikaarlepyy] via Lappo [Lapua]. On 11 [23] March, Yakov Petrov, without abandoning the pursuit, sent one half-squadron of the Grodno Regiment to Kauhajoki, with the aim of threatening the enemy flank located at Kristinestad. At Ilmola [Ilmajoki], on 13 [25] March, the lead platoon of Kulnev's vanguard drove off a Swedish picket of 40 dragoons, and from that time on daily skirmishes with enemy flankers began, both in Kulnev's vanguard and in the half-squadron sent to Kauhajoki, the most significant of which took place between Lappfjärd [Lapvärhti] and Kristinestad.¹⁶ On 14 [26] March, an officer reached Kulnev from Björneborg with new orders from the divisional commander (Prince Bagration): the pursuit of *greve* Klingspor was to be left to General Raevsky, while he, Kulnev, was ordered to march parallel to the former's column, sending patrols to the right. In this manner, Raevsky and Kulnev had to move behind the entire Swedish army, which was assembling at Gamlakarleby [Kokkola], with just two squadrons of hussars (Kulnev's and Rüdiger's) and 12 companies. Yakov Petrovich's mission was especially difficult. He had to maintain communications with Raevsky on the left and with General Tuchkov 1st on the right, who was heading for Kuopio. These communications, of course, consisted of our hussar patrols, who had to cross mountains, lakes, forests and swamps, either on horseback or on foot, without guides and without maps, finding their way where often no human had ever set foot.

On 21 March [2 April], the squadrons from both columns were in the vanguard, they attacked the enemy at Sundby and drove them out of the village, pushing them back to Jakobstad [Pietarsaari]. The hussars, pursuing the disordered enemy, broke into the town behind them, where they captured a major in Swedish service, the secretary of *greve* Klingspor and 19 guns that were on merchant

15 War Diary of 21st Division; Rüdiger's biography, according to which, following the actions at Tammerfors and Haistila, Rüdiger was awarded the Order of St. Vladimir 4th class.

16 War Diary of 21st Division and returns, listing of lower ranks. One man was killed at Ilmola.

ships.¹⁷ Keeping the enemy under pressure, at Kronoby [Kruunupyy] the Grodno men attacked the Swedish pickets and captured one of them, the rest scattered towards Gamlakarleby. By nightfall on 21 March [2 April], Kulnev had taken Nykarleby without a fight.

Kulnev had been expecting reinforcements in this town: Colonel Turchaninov, sent by Major General Tuchkov 1st to support Yakov Petrovich, had arrived from Kuopio. He reported that Tuchkov, moving north in February, had reached Kuopio without resistance, where his vanguard (Major Silin's squadron) encountered the first enemy fortifications on 3 [15] March. Upon the arrival of the infantry, a heated battle ensued, during which Silin, on the flank, attacked the enemy skirmishers and then their dragoons. After stubbornly defending their field-works made of snow and ice, the Swedes retreated from Kuopio, which was occupied by Russian troops. Silin's squadron also took part in the attacks resulting in the capture of the Swedish fortifications, and Lieutenant Predaevich was even the first to jump into the entrenchments.¹⁸ Having passed through Kuopio, the hussars continued to pursue the enemy, captured several prisoners including two officers,¹⁹ losing on their side four killed, one wounded and 27 horses. From Kuopio, Tuchkov dispatched the detachment under Colonel Turchaninov along the road to Vaasa, consisting of two to three companies and Silin's squadron.²⁰ The second squadron from Tuchkov's detachment (Major Lüders') was left in Kuopio.

Thus, all of southern and central Finland, with the exception of Sveaborg, was in Russian hands, and in each of the numerous skirmishes that accompanied the occupation of the region, the Grodno Regiment took a more or less active part. It is true that from the beginning of the campaign until the middle of the summer campaign, the hussars, together with the Finland Dragoons and Cossacks, were scattered among all the detachments and constituted the entire cavalry contingent of the forces operating in Finland. In mid [late] March, two squadrons were in Kuopio, two with Raevsky, one with Kulnev on the shores of the Gulf of Bothnia, one was stationed outside Sveaborg, one was with Shepelev at Åbo and on the Åland Islands.²¹

General Tuchkov soon followed Turchaninov himself, leaving General Bulatov's detachment with one squadron in Kuopio in order to secure his lines of communications. Having linked up with Kulnev in Gamlakarleby, he took command of this detachment; Yakov Petrovich was sent himself to Brahestad [Raahe] with his squadron and Silin's squadron to monitor the enemy. Kulnev moved along the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia, having constant skirmishes with the enemy cavalry rearguard and taking Lochteå [Lohtaja], Simango [*sic*, Himango?] and Oulais [Oulainen] one after the other; eventually, on 28 March [9 April], his flankers drove off the Swedish rearguard at Kalajoki, which retreated to its main body, located at Pyhäjoki; on 30 March [11 April], Kulnev reached Brahestad, in front of which the enemy had halted. It was impossible to go further given the weakness of Kulnev's detachment: the entire Swedish force was concentrated between this town and Uleåborg [Oulu].

Meanwhile, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Finland, Count Buxhöwden, wishing to isolate the enemy from their base by taking Uleåborg, sent orders to General Bulatov in Kuopio, to march through Idensalmi [Iisalmi] into the Swedes' rear area. At the same time, Kulnev, supported by Raevsky, was to push Klingspor northwards along the coastal road. In order to secure this movement from the sea, which was beginning to open up in some places, the coastal area was

17 *Жизнь храброго Г.М. Кульнева, писанная А.Н.П. 1815* [The life of the valiant G.M. Kulnev, written by A.N.P. 1815], General Staff Library.

18 Lieutenant Predaevich was awarded a Golden Sabre for this act.

19 These officers were captured by privates Lakhtionov and Suprunenko.

20 With a strength of five officers, three non-commissioned officers and 61 privates (General Tuchkov 1st's report dated 7 [19] March, Military Science Archive).

21 Ten-day reports of the Army of Finland, dated 11 [23] March (Military Science Archive, No. 1656). The total strength of the seven-squadron regiment was 590 men.

divided into three sectors. Outposts were set up along the entire coast, with the exception of the area held by Tuchkov, the maintenance of which fell to the lot of the Cossacks and our hussars. In the event of landing, the outposts were ordered to attack a weak enemy, and to lure a stronger one into the interior of the country.

According to the new plan Tuchkov's movement was to begin on 1 [13] April. The vanguard, which included the squadrons under Kulnev and Silin, was commanded by Yakov Petrovich. He went along the coastal road to the north, while Bulatov, with Grothuß's squadron at his head, moved to the right of him. The troops moved more slowly than in March: *greve* Klingspor halted frequently; having managed to concentrate almost all his forces, he was waiting for the arrival of the *Savolaxbrigaden* from Torneå [Tornio] for the decisive counter-attack. On 4 [16] April, Kulnev caught up with the Swedish rearguard near Pyhäjoki. Our infantry was moving along the coastal highway, while the hussars, who formed the left wing, were moving across the ice of the bay, not far from the shore. A firefight broke out in the forest through which the main road ran before reaching Pyhäjoki. The Swedes, keeping the infantry of the vanguard busy with skirmishing, decided to attack the left flank of the main force, sending the *Nylands lätta dragonregemente* across the ice on the bay with this mission. The *Nylands dragonregemente*, having left the shore, found themselves facing a small handful of Cossacks, dashing about ahead of Silin's squadron. The Cossacks began to lure the dragoons on, who, seeing easy prey, set off after the flankers, but as soon as the entire regiment left the shore and, gliding along the smooth surface of the bay, had broken into a trot, they were swiftly attacked by the Grodno men and Cossacks, the former with a loud hurrah, and the latter with a whoop as they rushed towards the Swedes. The dragoons were overwhelmed, defeated and cut down, while the remnants, put to flight, were pursued either along the shore, or across the ice towards the Swedish front line.

The mass of enemy dragoons lay fallen, 70 men were taken prisoner, including the chief-of-staff of the Swedish army, *Generaladjutant greve* Löwenhielm, who was leading the patrol, and *Kapten* Klerfeldt, who was with him. Both were wounded and surrendered to Kulnev,²² who had ridden up to them. Yakov Petrovich, having personally cleaned up the blood flowing from the wounds of the captured officers, kissed them and led them behind the infantry reserves. In this action, only two hussars were killed while nine were wounded; including Major Silin among the latter.

Having witnessed the defeat of their cavalry, the Swedish infantry under Gripenberg retreated, because the Grodno men, who had reached their right flank, now threatened to envelope them. The pursuit of the enemy continued as far as the church at Pyhäjoki. On 6 [18] April, the Swedes were this time driven out of Olkijoki and Brahestad and pushed back towards Siikajoki, where they gave us an unexpected repulse: Yakov Petrovich, true to his ardent nature, never paying attention to the numbers opposing him, led the infantry attack on the centre, while the hussars were intending to operate on the flanks. The attacks continued without result until nightfall. Silin tried several times to repeat the manoeuvre of 4 [16] April and force the enemy to withdraw from their position through envelopment, but as soon as the hussars appeared on the flanks, they were met with lethal fire from the *Nylands* skirmishers located on the shore. The Grodno men rode down the first line of skirmishers, but could not break through the reserve in close-order, such that the flanks remained impregnable and envelopment was unfeasible. The hussars returned with a small convoy they had

22 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Description of the War of 1808-1809. This same historian, describing the action at Pyhäjoki in his work, *Александр I и его сподвижники* [Alexander I and his companions], stated that Löwenhielm was surrounded by enraged hussars, who were about to kill him, when Kulnev arrived and saved his life. Denis Davydov, who was riding with Kulnev at the time and was a witness to the action, stated that Kulnev heard shouts: "Koulneff, Koulneff, sauvez-moi la vie!" He saw Löwenhielm surrounded by Cossacks; Löwenhielm had been wounded in the throat with a lance. Kulnev raced up to him, released him from the Cossack's grip and, wiping away the blood flowing from the wound, took the general aside. The lance wound itself indicates that Löwenhielm was not surrounded by Grodno men, since the hussars did not have lances (complete works of Denis Davydov).

captured, one officer and 15 jägers taken prisoner.²³ As night was falling and seeing that it was impossible to wrest the strong Siikajoki position from the hands of the Swedes with his small forces, Kulnev ordered a withdrawal and suspended further attacks until support arrived. Two horses were killed under Silin in this action.²⁴ General Suchtelen wrote: 'From that day on the names of Kulnev and Silin were spoken with respect in both armies.'²⁵ The valiant major was awarded the Order of St. George, 4th class, for his brilliant participation in the actions at Kuopio, Pyhäjoki and Siikajoki, Kulnev was awarded a Golden Sabre, while lieutenants Escher and Kozodaev were awarded the Order of St. Anne, 3rd class.

The action on 6 [18] April 1808, although it did not end in success for the Russian detachment, did not provide any advantages to the enemy: the Swedes retreated to Himango [*sic*, Limingo?] themselves at dawn the next day, despite the fact that they had held the position. This vanguard action was remarkable, among other things, for its examples of rare chivalrous contests on both the Russian and Swedish sides: Kulnev, seeing that one young enemy officer (Björnstierna), carried away by enthusiasm, was exposing himself to obvious danger, forbade the infantry from shooting at him, and the hussars from cutting down this daredevil. At the same time, Adlercreutz, one of the most valiant generals of the Swedish army, following the mild and magnanimous orders from Yakov Petrovich, ordered that Kulnev be spared unconditionally.²⁶ The campaign of 1808 to 1809 presented many similar examples and served as the basis for the sympathy that Russian troops later felt for the Swedish uniform.

After the Siikajoki action, Kulnev did not follow the enemy further; Siikajoki remained the extreme northernmost point of the Russian offensive in 1808. The vanguard was held back in particular by a lack of food supplies, the transport of which, due to the spring thaw, was happening very slowly. Another reason for our halt was the need to bring in Major General Bulatov's detachment, which, in accordance with instructions, was marching from Kuopio to get behind Klingspor, and was in obvious danger of being cut off. The Swedes did not attack us, but we did not attack their outposts either: both armies remained like this until 16 [28] April.

Meanwhile, Major General Bulatov, with whom our half-squadron (58 men) was located on 12 [24] April, knowing nothing of the recent past clashes with the enemy, settled down for the night on the left bank of the Siikajoki river, at Revolax [Revonlahti]. The hussars were stationed in the outposts on the right bank of this minor river, still covered with ice. Before dawn on 13 [25] April, Adlercreutz's vanguard entered into a firefight with our outposts, which began to retreat towards the detachment. Bulatov deployed his two battalions, but while he was repelling the attack by Adlercreutz, General Cronstedt's column emerged from the right flank on the Paavola road [towards Frantsila]. The latter, having pushed the hussar flank picket back, encircled Bulatov's detachment with four battalions, while he was already under strong pressure from Adlercreutz. By an unfortunate misunderstanding, which arose due to the confusion and snowstorm, one of the battalions, believing the other to be retreating, fell back towards Siikajoki.²⁷ Our half-squadron, which was on the extreme flank three *versta* [two miles] from Bulatov, seeing the retreat of the neighbouring battalion and knowing nothing of the fate of the other, attacked the nearest Swedish company together with the Cossacks and broke through to Siikajoki with great difficulty. At Revolax the following were *hors de combat* from the Grodno Regiment: two men killed; Lieutenant Shembel, *Wachtmeister* Tagasin and two privates wounded; two hussars missing in action and 14 horses lost to wounds. General Bulatov, three officers and 487 men (one battalion) were taken

23 Citation for the award of the Military Order Medal to lower ranks of the Grodno Regiment.

24 Directed Supreme Decrees of 1808.

25 Count Suchtelen, *Précis des évènements militaires des campagnes de 1808 et 1809 en Finlande*.

26 Suchtelen, *Précis*.

27 Aminoff, *Relation om f.d. Sawolaks brigadens* [Report on the former Savolax Brigade] (Military Science Archive, No. 1643).

prisoner by the enemy.

This unfortunate action, the threatening Swedish stance and the necessity of shortening the extremely extended operational line, forced the vanguard to retreat to Gamlakarleby. The war was becoming more difficult with each passing day; the snow was melting, torrents were rushing down the valleys from the mountains, carrying away bridges and causeways and forming thousands of channels and rapids along their course. Communications were interrupted, and therefore the supply of provisions became almost impossible; there was nothing to eat. That the Swedes were suffering hardship, having collected everything they could find during their retreat on Klingspor's orders,²⁸ made things so much worse for our troops. The peasants and landowners drove their herds into impenetrable forests, and hid any grain that still remained underground. When the soldiers discovered rye or barley, the grains were boiled in cauldrons and eaten as porridge or crushed with stones, if there was enough time. There was a complete lack of salt. Under these conditions, Tuchkov's retreating detachment returned to Karleby. The Grodno men's last mission in April was a reconnaissance of the island of Karlö [Hailuoto], located 15 *versta* [10 miles] from the shore level with Uleåborg. This reconnaissance was entrusted by Kulnev to the famous partisan Denis Davydov, as a volunteer for the Grodno Regiment. Having arrived on Karlö before dawn with Silin's squadron, Davydov took several Swedish soldiers by surprise as they were foraging with an escort of dragoons. Davydov attacked the enemy horsemen, cut some down, took several prisoner; the rest fled, abandoning their foragers and the supplies they had collected.²⁹

Let us leave Tuchkov 1st's detachment in Gamlakarleby for a while and turn to operations by the southern detachments.

As was mentioned above, having occupied the city of Åbo, Shepelev assigned a small unit to occupy the Åland Islands under the command of Colonel Vuich. On 1 [13] April, Vuich seized the islands of Kumlinge and Vårdö, while on 2 [14] April, he crossed the entirety of Fasta Åland to Signilskär, having Lieutenant Sineokov of the Grodno Regiment in the vanguard with 22 hussars; On 3 [15] April, the detachment returned to Storby, while the hussars set up four outposts at Storby, Frebbenby, Hammarudda and at the Ferren [*sic*] spit. The hussars remained in these outposts until 9 [21] April. The occupation of the archipelago presented no difficulties: all of Sineokov's demands were fulfilled precisely, despite the fact that the residents looked askance at the hussars. On Åland, 30 *versta* [20 miles] from the Swedish coast, the inhabitants, having constant communications and liaison with the capital across the ice, gave the appearance of having reconciled themselves to the complete transfer of the islands into Russian hands, but were secretly waiting for an opportunity to defeat the invader's detachment. On 9 [21] April, the hussar outposts were relieved by infantry; Sineokov returned to Kumlinge on the evening of 10 [22] April and, upon leaving Vuich's detachment on 13 [25] April, he rejoined Shepelev's force in Helsing [Helsinki in Taivassalo].³⁰ By that time the ice was already unstable and Colonel Vuich's situation, with a handful of men completely removed from the mainland, had become extremely precarious. Assessments on the possibility of an uprising by the islanders with the support of landing forces had been voiced by Vuich and Sineokov and were not slow to come true. On 27 April [9 May], armed ships appeared on the horizon from the direction of Sweden, and their approach served as a signal for the Ålanders to revolt. After a desperate two-day defence by the Russian detachment on each of the islands, separated from each other by drifting ice, Vuich was taken prisoner by the enemy with his entire force (including eight Grodno Hussars who were at his disposal). Thus the Åland Islands, occupied

28 This concern for provisioning on Klingspor's part, who had previously been an intendant general, saved the Swedish army more than once. It remained legendary in Sweden and was unfairly taken advantage of by his critics. Runeberg in *Fänrik Ståls sägner* [Ensign Ståhl's Tales] on the War of 1808-1809 stated: 'Klingspor marched to the bread magazine with heroic speed, well, it is such a miracle that he loves a sack of flour more than a fight' (*Fältmarskalken*).

29 War Diary (Military Science Archive, No. 1646).

30 War Diary (Military Science Archive, No. 1646).

without a fight by 30 hussars and constituting a very important acquisition for Russia, had returned to the Swedes once more. This third reverse for the Russian armed forces in Finland, following the Siikajoki and Revolax actions, had disastrous consequences for the army, demolishing the Finns' perception of the invincibility of our troops. Unrest began among the peasants along the coast entrusted to Shepelev's observation, and attacks on the screen of hussar outposts began to happen more frequently: on 30 April [12 May], Lieutenant Sineokov, who was visiting his outposts, was surprised by a crowd of armed villagers and taken prisoner along with the two hussars accompanying him; transported to Fasta Åland at night, he was handed over to a Swedish detachment. On 2 [14] May, an attack was made on our observation post at Helsing, 200 paces from Lüders' squadron, who swept away and scattered the peasants; a few days later, a series of daring simultaneous attacks took place on three outposts.³¹ Only the firm hand of Shepelev, the vigilance of our outposts and the leadership of Lüders and Hirsch kept the villagers of the southern coast from a full and open uprising.

There was little to brighten up the end of April [early May]; the only good news was the capitulation of Sveaborg. The surrender of the 'Gibraltar of the north' as the Swedes called this fortress, released the blockade detachment and Major Olshevsky's squadron to the field force.³² The latter, however, was left in Helsingfors as a pool of replacements for the other squadrons.

In early [mid] May, preparations began for the so-called summer campaign, but the formations in the north were inactive until 20 May [1 June]. Movements were hampered by flooded rivers, muddy roads and the need to procure food, which brought great difficulties with it, because communications between the south and the north were almost completely interrupted. In the first half of the campaign we were only fighting against regular troops, and even then only on the northern edges of Finland, but now everywhere had risen up against us except the south. The King's proclamations and the pastors' sermons had been inciting the Finnish peasants to revolt for some time now, and the officers who had been sent home after the capture of Svartholm and Sveaborg gave the final impetus to the uprising. It was not difficult for these officers to recruit gangs of strong, agile, excellent volunteers and convince them to take up arms; these gangs formed detachments, whose leaders included Fieandt, Sandels, and Tianet [*sic*, Törne?]. These partisans soon became just as dangerous to Russian forces as the armies under Adlercreutz and Klingspor. This national militia proved especially dangerous to the few Russian cavalry, which consisted of just three regiments at this time; given the scattered nature of the detachments, their communications with each other had to be entrusted to cavalry patrols, which, wandering without maps and guides for hundreds of *versta* through unfamiliar wilderness and forests, became easy prey to the rebels. The same thing happened with transport convoys and especially with orderlies carrying packages: somewhere in the forest a shot would ring out from behind a tree, and a rider, having fallen from his horse, would fall into the hands of the shooter along with his documents. Whenever an hussar paused to feed his horse, or a hungry soldier asked a local for a crust of bread, the peasants would pounce and after several weeks of waiting, yet another man was added to the regiment's losses of those missing.

The partisan warfare launched by Finnish villagers, like any nationalist war, was not distinguished by particularly mild treatment of prisoners and wounded soldiers: if prisoners fell into the hands of such commanders as Fieandt, Sandels and others, they might still be sure of kind and caring treatment from these patriots, but a completely different fate awaited those in the hands of rebel peasants let off the leash. Hardest of all were the conditions of our outposts located along the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia in remote, mountainous areas, often at a distance of many *versta* from each other. Ahead was the sea, a boundless surface which one must watch closely: danger may be coming

31 War Diary (Military Science Archive, No. 1646).

32 Lieutenant Plekhanov of this squadron was awarded the Order of St. Vladimir 4th class for distinction at Sveaborg, while Colonel Anselm received 300 *Chervonets* and a diamond pendant.

to the Russian army from there, while to their rear a rebellion had broken out in the rocks, which had also turned its gaze to the blue swell: they were expecting support from there. Situated between the sea and the agitated population, our hussars took up positions along the coastal cliffs, from where, as the uprising developed, the outposts became the target of constant attacks by enemy partisans: almost every day, with the whistling wind and the raging roar of the waves, firing from the outposts under attack and the tramping of units rushing to their rescue were intermixed, followed by shouts, clashing sabres, then calm again, until the next day. The squadrons under Hirsch and Lüders led such an existence until the end of 1808.³³

The sector from Vaasa to Gamlakarleby was entrusted to Rüdiger, who stretched his cordon along the coast, occupying small islands in the skerries wherever possible. The outposts sent out liaison patrols, which were dispatched just twice a day, because the threat was less in this part of Finland, close to Tuchkov's division, than in the south-west. Their Instructions stated:³⁴

Patrols are not to halt in villages, and if any misfortune should happen on the road, the nearest outpost (checkpoint) is to be informed, and is to send a squad to meet them in order to apprehend the culprits, not as happened yesterday with a patrol travelling from Munsala [a suburb of Nykarleby] - an hussar had been shot in the forest two *versta* [1½ miles] away, but they (the patrol) went on to Nykarleby, without informing the outpost stationed in Munsala about what had happened. Provide two men to accompany any transport, solely in order to notify what has been happening in the area. Deal with the population as gently as possible.

Kulnev added to this instruction: 'If you have only two men left, then your duty must consist of always keeping the enemy in sight and informing me of everything. There is always chance to withdraw, but rarely for victory.'³⁵

At the end of May [early June], military operations resumed: some of the outposts were removed and the squadrons of the Grodno Regiment were placed with divisions in accordance with a new deployment. Silin's and Gorgoli's squadrons (*Rittmeister* Grothuß, because Lieutenant Colonel Gorgoli himself had been assigned as aide-de-camp to the Minister of War), joined Tuchkov's column, Kulnev and Rüdiger, went to 21st Division (Raevsky's); Lüders' and Hirsch's squadrons went to General Baggovut's detachment (the former was at Shepelev's disposal, while the latter was at the disposal of General Sazonov), while Olshevsky's was with Count Kamensky 2nd. The last three squadrons remained in Åbo, Nystad [Uusikaupunki] and Helsingfors.³⁶

On 28 May [9 June], General Raevsky, who had taken command of two columns, learned that the Swedes had appeared at Perho to the rear of the right flank. Realizing the impossibility of holding out at Gamlakarleby any longer, on 1 [13] June, he withdrew to Lillkyro [Vähäkyrö], 18 *versta* [12 miles] from Vaasa. General Kozachkovsky was sent from Lillkyro to Lappo with five battalions and Rüdiger's squadron with orders to hold this town, which lies at the junction of four roads; Silin's squadron was sent to Nykarleby to assist Yankovich's vanguard.

Ten days later [23 June] Klingspor opened the offensive with a three-sided attack on the vanguard at Nykarleby, but Yankovich, supported by Silin and Grothuß, fought back and retreated to the main body. Following this action the Swedes headed towards Lappo, where Rüdiger was bound, as was General Kozachkovsky behind him, but when Rüdiger reached the town, he found it occupied by

33 In May, three hussars were killed from Lüders' squadron, the number of wounded is unknown.

34 Orders for the Vaasa to Jakobstad cordon. From documents shared with General Mikhailovsky by Count Rüdiger (Military Science Archive, No. 1647).

35 Denis Davydov, *Воспоминания о Кульнев* [Memories of Kulnev]. Kulnev commanded the vanguard and the screen force.

36 Army of Finland ten-day reports (Military Science Archive, No. 1656 and monthly reports for 1808). Grothuß's squadron had remained in Nedervetil [Alaveteli] for some time in order to rest their horses.

the leading enemy column, which he reported to Count Raevsky. Wanting to seize this location at all costs, Raevsky led his entire force there, dividing the detachment into two parts: the first, to which the squadrons under Silin and Grothuß were assigned, marched directly towards Lappo, while the other (Yankovich, with one squadron under Kulnev) went towards the Swedish flank. Yakov Petrovich himself marched on the Lintulaks farm [by Kauhajärvi lake], where Colonel Vlastov had repelled attacks by Fieandt's partisans.

On 26 June [8 July], Raevsky and Kazachkovsky launched their attack: the squadrons under Grothuß and Silin were stationed on the flanks, in support of the attack.³⁷ Lappo was taken by the infantry after a stubborn fight, while the Karelian skirmishers, driven out of the village, were pursued by the Grodno men for a distance of six *versta* [four miles].³⁸ The next day [9 July], Yankovich, having captured the town of Perho, relieved Colonel Vlastov and defeated Fieandt; his hussars (from Kulnev's squadron) after this action returned, on Raevsky's orders, and joined the other two squadrons, dispersing a Swedish cavalry patrol encountered on the way.

There was no major movement between 27 June and 1 July [9 to 13 July]: on 29 June [11 July], only two squadrons, reconnoitring the area between Lappo and Lintulaks [Kyyjärvi], forced enemy patrols out of Kouhava and drove them back towards Övervetil [*sic*].³⁹ On 1 [13] July, *greve* Klingspor attacked the town of Lappo for a second time. Raevsky took up positions in front of the town with his left flank and his rear to the river; hussars were stationed on both wings of the detachment, the battle would have turned out quite well for us, had one incident not completely changed the face of the battle: the peasants, who had not shown any particular hostility towards the Russians until that time, suddenly set fire to the bridge, which served as the only line of retreat. The detachment's situation, under pressure frontally and backed up against the river, was reminiscent of the Battle of Friedland and began to get much worse. Fortunately, a swamp behind the right flank had become passable in places due to a dry spell, and Raevsky took advantage of this: his entire fighting line changed front in an orderly manner and began to retreat: firstly the artillery was withdrawn, then the infantry: the Grodno men, commanded by Silin, retreated last, covering the moves by other units with their counter-attacks until the guns and skirmishers had taken up positions on the far side of the swamp. The regiment's losses at Lappo on 2 [14] July consisted of two hussars and 11 horses killed.

Following this battle, Count Raevsky retreated to Salmi, and being unable to defend himself successfully against the combined Swedish forces, retreated to Alavo [Alavus] on 6 [18] July. He held on waiting for reinforcements or orders from the Commander-in-Chief, but did not receive any, and so held a council of war, where even Kulnev, the most ardent opponent of any retreat, considered it necessary to fall back to Tavastehus. Everyone realised that the retreat after an unsuccessful battle could be disastrous, because the population, who until then had still been convinced of the eventual success of the Russians, were now rebelling en masse to the rear of the detachment. Our patrols were constantly being attacked, communications were interrupted, and where we had previously seen only ill will, we now encountered fierce rebellion, which we had to fight through, while Klingspor pressed us from the front with his superior numbers. The rebellion that had begun after the Swedes retook the Åland Islands was spreading further and further, encompassing Raevsky's detachment, and could now only be extinguished by streams of blood.

During this difficult retreat, the squadrons from the Grodno Regiment all went over to the rearguard, with the exception of a few men needed as messengers. On 10 [22] July, Rüdiger's squadron fought back against the attacking Finns for 10 hours;⁴⁰ the other squadrons had daily skirmishes with the enemy and peasants, skirmishes that mostly ended with minor losses, but cost

37 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, p. 173.

38 5th Division's War Diary (Military Science Archive, No. 1646); Kulnev's biography.

39 One hussar killed at Lappo, one killed and one missing at Perho.

40 Colonel Lebedev, Memories of the Commander of the Guards and Grenadier Corps (Rüdiger).

us a great deal of effort.⁴¹ To make matters worse for the detachment, a new disaster loomed - hunger. Every convoy had been chased off by the enemy and none reached the detachment: on 11 [23] July, two squadrons had to be sent to Jyväskylä, 115 versta [77 miles] away, for provisions, which were already in short supply in the army.

In the last days of July [early August], Raevsky's detachment reached Jämsä, where they rallied; their vanguard was stationed at Saarijärvi. The latter consisted of four hussar squadrons, a total of 333 men; these squadrons patrolled for 10 days to scout out the ground between Saarijärvi and Karstula.

Count Buxhöwden realised the need to entrust the units operating in the north to someone, because his orders could reach them only with difficulty and not quickly enough. His choice fell on Lieutenant General Count N.M. Kamensky 2nd. The young general arrived on 12 [24] July and took command of Raevsky's corps. Colonel Erikson's detachment was immediately sent up to Alavo, with Silin's squadron; one and a half squadrons went to Munsala; Rüdiger's squadron, in Vlastov's detachment, went to Karstula, and one half-squadron was left for liaison between Alavo and Jyväskylä. Following behind these detachments, Count Kamensky moved forward on 2 [14] August, but on the fourth stage he learned of Colonel Erikson's defeat at the hands of Klingspor. It emerged that Erickson had initially driven the enemy out of Alavo, but having advanced too far, he suffered a reverse on 5 [17] August. Erikson's force was positioned near Alavo, with their right flank facing Alajärvi lake and their left flank facing the forest; the hussars were stationed in the second line in reserve. The Swedes, seeing that they could not dislodge the infantry with a frontal attack, sent a flanking column through the forest. The pickets in the forest reported this to the squadron commander, who was stationed on the Tammerfors road, and the latter, having informed Erikson of the danger, went to engage the flanking column. The hussars charged at the enemy several times as they came up from behind and through their strikes helped the infantry break through the Swedish ranks pressing in on them, but the advantage remained on the enemy side. The carnage lasted from one o'clock until five o'clock in the afternoon, and had a particularly formal aspect, because the Russian troops were in full dress uniform on the occasion of a holiday. Our losses were great; never before in 1808 had the Grodno Regiment suffered such casualties: six of our men were killed; Lieutenant Kempfert and four hussars were wounded; a non-commissioned officer and 10 privates who were part of the flank picket were taken prisoner, 10 horses were killed. Erikson's detachment retreated to Ruovesi.

Once Count Kamensky had learned of the unfortunate action at Alavo, he drew in his scattered units and marched on this village, sending a squadron from the Grodno Regiment ahead. This squadron found that the enemy had evacuated the village and it was then reoccupied by Count Kamensky. In Alavo, word was received from Vlastov, who had been sent to Karstula with a small detachment and Rüdiger's squadron regarding contact with the enemy at Karstula. This action proved to be quite successful. The partisan Fieandt held a strong position at Karstula near Pääjärvi lake, on an isthmus traversed by the Lintulaks road. There was a bridge across the strait connecting one of the arms of the lake with the main lake, behind which the Swedes were positioned; an enemy picket was stationed to their front, behind the cover of an abatis. The leading half-squadron of hussars, moving towards Karstula, came across this picket and drove it off; the Swedes scattered and dashed to a second line of abatis at the entrance to the isthmus, where the Grodno men were quickly engaged with volleys. The hussars retreated and a firefight began between the Russian infantry and the enemy: it lasted for several hours, after which the Russians resorted to the bayonet. At this moment, Rüdiger, who had been following the progress of the battle, entered the strait, swam across it with a squadron, and, when our infantry were on the point of capturing the fortifications and were driving the Swedes away, found himself behind enemy lines. Rüdiger raced to engage the Swedes with his squadron and defeated the first column, after which he eventually scattered his opponents

41 On the following days, three hussars and seven horses were killed, two hussars were taken prisoner.

with three strikes in succession.⁴² The Swedes defended themselves desperately, fighting off the cavalry and infantry with extraordinary courage: all the officers from the Grodno squadron were wounded, that is, Rüdiger, Lieutenant Novosiltsev and Cornet Apayshchikov. Novosiltsev, whose wound allowed him to sit on a horse,⁴³ took command of the hussars, and he led the pursuit of the defeated Fieandt. For a distance of 18 *versta* [12 miles], the road was strewn with corpses and wounded, abandoned weapons and carts; having retreated to Lintulaks, Fieandt could barely rally a third of his detachment, the rest either remained on the battlefield, or, despairing of the success of their armed forces, wandered through the forests.⁴⁴ The losses suffered by the regiment in this action, which History has preserved as a regiment of officers,⁴⁵ thanks to the valour shown by the officers, consisted of four killed, five wounded hussars, and 12 fallen horses.

The next day [22 August], the Grodno men continued the pursuit under Rüdiger's direction, along the Lintulaks road as far as the junction with the Salmi road, that is, a distance of almost 30 *versta* [20 miles]. On 11 [23] August, two platoons from Rüdiger's squadron headed for Alavo, from where they joined Kulnev's vanguard, which was stationed at Sarvik [Sarvikas]; another half-squadron, commanded by Colonel Lukov, was pursuing the remnants of Fieandt's detachment, which had been driven back to Perho.⁴⁶

On 19 [31] August, Count Kamensky began offensive operations, intending to attack Klingspor forwards of Salmi in a strong position near Kuortane lake. The attack was scheduled for 20 August [1 September], with Lukov's detachment intending to strike the Swedes from behind. According to the disposition issued on 19 [31] August, our four squadrons were distributed before the start of the movement in the following manner: in Kulnev's vanguard - his own squadron and Grothuß's; Silin's squadron behind the vanguard, in Colonel Erikson's detachment, while a half-squadron under Rüdiger was with the main body.⁴⁷ Erikson's detachment, which had suffered at Alavo, had joined the corps shortly before (on 13 [25] August), after several skirmishes with the enemy, in which the hussars had distinguished themselves, especially on 9 [21] August at Virdois [Virrat], holding back the onrushing Swedes pursuing us.

Two platoons were ahead of Yakov Petrovich's vanguard and had already seen the enemy rearguard from the high ground at Kuhalambi [*sic*, Kuhajärvi?], which had entrenched itself on the main road. Kulnev attacked the entrenchments with infantry, and sent our two squadrons to the enemy flanks. Stabs-Rittmeister Grothuß, having enveloped the Swedish wing, attacked the entrenchments from the rear and cut down some of the skirmishers manning them,⁴⁸ who fled first to Maenyu [*sic*, Mäyry?], and then into the Kuortane position pursued by the Grodno men. The Swedes had damaged the bridges along the way, but while the infantry were repairing the decking and the supports, the hussars, bypassing these obstacles, pressed the disordered rearguard and reached the first line of field-works behind them. Having reached these positions, Yakov Petrovich sent Lieutenant Chechensky to the corps commander with a report on enemy locations, while he entered into a firefight with the enemy himself, which continued until late at night.

Count Kamensky arrived before first light. He ordered Kulnev to form the left flank, while the

42 P. Lebedev, Short Biography, Memoirs; *Piecis*.

43 Proforma listing (Moscow Branch of the Miscellaneous Archive of the General Staff, No. 823).

44 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky; Faddey Bulgarin's memoirs.

45 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky; Faddey Bulgarin's memoirs.

46 War Diary (Military Science Archive, No. 1646).

47 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, shows two squadrons of the Grodno Regiment with the main body. These figures are hardly possible: in August there were only seven squadrons in the theatre of war: four under Kamensky; one under Lieutenant General Wittgenstein, in Helsingfors (Olshevsky's); one under General Baggovurt in Åbo (Lüders'); one under General Sazonov (Hirsch's) (Army of Finland ten-day reports, Military Science Archive, No. 1656). The regiment's monthly reports do not indicate the number of squadrons with the detachments, only the names of the officers assigned to the divisions.

48 From the book of rescripts for 1860.

detachment commanded by General Raevsky was to go around the enemy left wing; Colonel Lukov was to move towards Salmi ahead of Raevsky with Rüdiger's half-squadron and an infantry regiment; Raevsky had the two remaining platoons from Rüdiger's squadron and Kulnev's own squadron. At 10 o'clock Lukov sent a hussar with the news that he was pushing the Swedes back at Salmi on the extreme left flank of the enemy line. Raevsky immediately set off. A witness stated:⁴⁹ 'Nothing can compare with the difficulties that the flanking detachment had to overcome: rocks, rapids, swamps, bogs and impassable forest slowed their progress. It took four hours to cover five *versta* [3½ miles].' Eventually, when Raevsky emerged onto the road at three o'clock in the afternoon, from where he needed to launch the attack, he found it blocked by abatis. In the meantime, *greve* Klingspor, seeing the hopeless situation of the Russian flanking detachment, decided to cut Raevsky off from the main body. In order to achieve this, it was enough to take the village of Heroja [between Kuortane and Salmi], which lay between them, and the Swedish columns moved in that direction. Count Kamensky, who was also monitoring the flanking movement, immediately noticed the accumulation of Swedes facing Heroja, being held by Raevsky, but it was impossible to send him even part of the infantry to support him: they would have been shot to pieces during the long flank march. Kamensky decided to send the cavalry to Heroja. To that end, he ordered Colonel Silin to go to Raevsky's aid with Grothuß's squadron and another from the Lifeguard Ulan Regiment (which had reached the detachment shortly before). There was only one narrow path left for these squadrons to pass through, and even that was under enemy fire; without thinking twice, Silin, having given the command: 'single file by the right' raced along the path at full gallop. Initially the Swedes did not understand the significance of this long column, but then, assuming that the cavalry was racing towards the entrenchments, the Swedes sent skirmishers out against them and increased the fire of their batteries; the squadrons, however, managed to fly across this killing ground under bullets and round shot without harm. This support, although of no great importance, nevertheless greatly encouraged the detachment holding Heroja. Silin positioned the hussars and lancers behind the village, which gave Raevsky the opportunity to put his entire reserve into the firing line, since the Swedes could no longer encircle the village.⁵⁰ The Swedes began to retreat in the evening, after a stubborn and bloody fight: the infantry from Raevsky's column immediately charged with the bayonet, while the squadrons deployed to the flanks. The hussars and infantrymen attacked the line of fortifications together, the first to jump the parapet was the Grodno Regiment non-commissioned officer Maxim Fedorov, who 'conducted a powerful hack into the entrenchments with the hussars who were with him.'⁵¹ The plain was swarming with Swedes driven out of their positions, hurrying to occupy a second line of entrenchments and abatis, while our cavalry rode into this crowd. Some were hacked to pieces or trampled by the Grodno men, some managed to escape from the sabres and bayonets behind the high earthworks, where they were saved from further pursuit by the extreme fatigue of the horses and the onset of darkness.

Thus the battlefield remained in enemy hands, but Klingspor did not consider it possible to remain in his fortified position any longer: behind him, at Salmi, Rüdiger's patrols (from Lukov's detachment) emerged, scurrying around to the rear of the Swedish army. At night, taking advantage of the deep darkness, the enemy withdrew from their positions and went to Salmi, leaving only a battalion on the battlefield to maintain the bivouac fires.

No one knew of the Swedes' retreat in the Russian detachment: their vedettes stood opposite our outposts and many fires were burning in front of Kuortane lake, but if the enemy movement remained unnoticed by most, it had not escaped the keen eye of Kulnev. Yakov Petrovich was always the first to rouse his detachment from their overnight camps, the last to go to sleep, and every evening he personally checked the forward screen. Having ridden around it after the battle, he

49 Bulgarin.

50 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky; Suchtelen, *Précis*.

51 Citation for lower ranks of the Grodno Hussars for the medal of distinction of the Military Order.

began to peer into the enemy camp: noticing that the fires had all flared up at once and were not being maintained evenly, he rode closer to the Swedish screen, which turned out to be more sparse than usual. Kulnev reported everything to Count Kamensky, who ordered preparations for the march to begin at first light.⁵² On the morning of 21 August [2 September], Yakov Petrovich moved forward with the vanguard (Kulnev's and Silin's squadrons) behind Klingspor, while strong patrols from Grothuß's squadron were sent to establish communications with Colonel Lukov. The latter, on that same day, joined the detachment, having encountered the cavalry patrols along the way.

When Colonel Lukov arrived, Count Kamensky ordered Yakov Petrovich to attack the enemy position at Salmi. The firefight lasted for three hours, but it proved impossible to dislodge the enemy. Whereupon Kulnev divided the assault detachment: some (including the squadrons under Silin and Grothuß) were detached, under the command of Colonel Khudinsky, to envelope the left wing, while others, under Kulnev's personal command, marched on the Swedes' centre, including his own squadron. Two hours later, Khudinsky emerged at his designated location and Kulnev gave the signal for a general attack. The Swedes opened a withering fire, but could not withstand them and began to retreat. Khudinsky's infantry, supported by the hussars, rushed into the assault, and our Grodno men especially distinguished themselves: Grothuß's squadron, through the rapidity of their onslaught, were the first to break through into the fortifications, while Silin with his and Kulnevsky's squadrons sabred those who had escaped the infantry bayonets.⁵³ The Swedes retreated hastily, pursued by our squadrons for a distance of 10 *versta* [6⅔ miles]. The news of this three-day battle, which ended in victory, soon extended across Finland, spreading a complete collapse of morale everywhere: the popular uprising, begun after the June defeats, began to subside, and even the centuries-old sympathy of the Finns for the Swedes was gradually cooling, despite the fact that the latter at Kuortane and Salmi appeared worthy of their military traditions. Our casualties from 19 to 21 August [31 August to 2 September] were six killed and eight wounded; among the officers, Stabs-Rittmeister Predaevich, Cornet Zaborovsky and *Rittmeister* Grothuß were wounded.

The heroes of this battle, Silin and Grothuß, were awarded Golden Sabres, Stabs-Rittmeister Predaevich and Lieutenant Escher received the Order of St. Vladimir, 4th class.

On 23 August [4 September], Kulnev was sent towards Topari [*sic*] with the vanguard, which now included his own squadron and Silin's; Vlastov, who had Rüdiger's squadron, marched on Gamlakarleby, while Grothuß was to serve as the link between the two detachments. On 29 August [10 September], Kulnev caught up with the tail of the Swedish army at Ylistaro, which, having dismantled the bridge over the ravine, was hastily retreating; Yakov Petrovich, having found a passable route across the ravine without a bridge, proceeded forwards with the squadron launching several successful attacks, scattering the infantry of the Swedish rearguard, after which Kulnev's offensive to the north continued hot on the heels of the defeated enemy. Count Kamensky, following the vanguard himself, reached Ylistaro and, on 30 August [11 September], turned towards Lillkyro with the aim of getting closer to the left wing of the army, operating on the Gulf of Bothnia.

Before continuing to describe the ongoing operations by the squadrons of the Grodno Regiment, under Count Kamensky's command, we shall turn to the other elements of the regiment, on the left flank. When Count Kamensky began his offensive in mid [late] July, Count Orlov-Denisov and General Ushakov were assigned to assist him, and were ordered to support the movement by the right wing by attacking Lappfjärd and Kuru. Count Orlov-Denisov's detachment included three platoons of hussars.⁵⁴ Orlov operated successfully against the partisans and rearguards of the

52 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, p. 237.

53 Lieutenant Escher 2nd was the first to jump onto the parapet (book of rescripts).

54 According to Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, there were hussars in Ushakov's detachment, but the official lists of the regiment's ranks show participation by Grodno men in all the actions involving Orlov's detachment and in none of the actions by Ushakov's detachment, from which one can conclude that there were no hussars in Ushakov's detachment at all (service records for *Rittmeister* Vorneo, Colonel Anselm, cornets Durnovo, Maskovsky, Nazimov

Swedish army until 21 July [2 August]; from that time, having fallen ill, he handed over command of the detachment to the Colonel-in-Chief of the Grodno Regiment, Dmitry Dmitrievich Shepelev, who had been in charge of the coastal outposts until then.

On 23 July [4 August], the Swedes began to advance towards Lappfjärd and occupied Kauhajoki. Shepelev went out to face them, but the attacks by hussars and infantry were repulsed. Feeling unable to hold out with a small detachment against superior Swedish numbers, our Colonel-in-Chief retreated to Björneborg; but on 1 [13] August, he fell seriously ill on the march and had to hand over command of Orlov's detachment to Bibikov, the regimental commander. On 6 [18] August, the latter, having established communications with Ushakov, marched on Ömossa, sending the hussars forward under the command Colonel Anselm de Guibours from the Grodno Regiment. Through a swift advance on 7 [19] August, Anselm drove the Swedes out of this village and held the place until Bibikov arrived. On 17 [29] August, Bibikov's detachment reached Lappfjärd for the second time, but here a reversal of fortune awaited him: engaged by eight battalions and two squadrons, he had to fall back once more behind Ömossa. During one of the attacks at Lappfjärd, our half-squadron, surrounded by dragoons, was almost taken prisoner, but broke out albeit with difficulty.⁵⁵

Not wanting to permit the Swedes to consolidate themselves on the shores of the Gulf of Bothnia, the Commander-in-Chief sent infantry reinforcements to Bibikov and ordered that the enemy be driven out of Lappfjärd at all costs. Bibikov reached this town at a time when the Swedes, as a result of the defeat at Kuortane, were beginning to withdraw from their positions on the orders of General Klingspor. Moving ahead of Bibikov's detachment, Colonel Anselm first attacked the Swedish pickets with his hussars, and then, striking the flank and rear of the retreating enemy, broke into the entrenchments before the Russian infantry occupied them. Bibikov pursued the Swedes driven out of Lappfjärd towards Vaasa; in late August [early September] he established communications with Kamensky, continuing to form his left wing during ongoing operations. The hussars from Bibikov's detachment suffered little in the fighting at Lappfjärd and Ömossa: the casualties were limited to six killed and several wounded, including Colonel Anselm and Cornet Bibikov 2nd. Eleven horses were killed.⁵⁶ The regimental commander, Bibikov, received the Order of St. Anne, 2nd class, for his actions at Ömossa and Lappfjärd, Colonel Anselm received the Order of St. George, 4th class, Lieutenant Bibikov 2nd, the Order of St. Vladimir, 4th class, and cornets Maskovsky and Durnovo received the Order of St. Anne, 3rd class.

While these skirmishes were taking place in southwestern Finland, in the north Klingspor was preparing to deliver a decisive reverse to the Russian army at Oravais [Oravainen]. On 1 [13] September, he took up strong positions, with one flank reaching the seashore and the other adjoining a forest littered with abatis; these positions were defended by brigades under Vegesack and Adlercreutz, with a strength of about 7,000 men, the *Nylands lätta dragonregemente* and two squadrons of *Livgardet till häst* [Horse Guards]. Count Kamensky's vanguard, commanded by Kulnev, advancing towards Oravais, came across enemy cavalry outposts occupying a defile before reaching this location. The squadrons under Kulnev and Silin drove in these outposts, clearing the route for the vanguard, which, having passed through the defile, took up positions in front of the enemy position (Grothuß's squadron at this time was 14 *versta* [9½ miles] behind the vanguard with Kamensky's main body, while Rüdiger's squadron, as part of Vlastov's detachment, was on the road to Gamlakarleby).

The attack on the position was scheduled for 10 o'clock in the morning of 2 [14] September, but the impatient Kulnev did not wait for the appointed time and at eight o'clock a firefight began to crackle along the entire vanguard line; two hours later, Yakov Petrovich's entire strength had been

and others).

55 During this retreat, *Junker* Porokhovnikov saved the life of Cornet Kamenev, who was assigned to the Grodno Regiment (citation for the award of the Military Order medal).

56 The regiment lost 36 horses in August (monthly reports).

committed, and Count Kamensky, still not knowing anything about what was happening ahead, had just set off for Oravais. The Swedes, having pushed the weak infantry back, swiftly moved forward, and at 11 o'clock the entire vanguard fighting line was in total retreat. The squadrons under Silin and Kulnev were also ordered to retreat. The enemy, who had descended from the hillsides, relentlessly pursued our infantry; in some places the ranks of our detachment were intermixed with the Swedish, and in other places the enemy even penetrated into the rear of our force and managed to surround the baggage train and the infirmary wagons in which the wounded officers and soldiers lay. Lieutenant Colonel Silin, commanding both hussar squadrons, witnessing the defeat of the vanguard, could not stand by and rushed into the attack. The strike by our squadrons, however, was not crowned with success: on the plain the Russians were so mixed up with the Swedes that, racing into the attack, the squadrons posed an equal threat to both their own and the enemy combatants. Silin had to lead the hussars back, by sixes, seeing the infirmary wagons in enemy hands, they turned about and decided to save their comrades or die trying. Non-commissioned officer Yermenko, privates Belik, Trufanov, Ignatenko, Stepanenko and Pogrebnyak, courageously rushed at the Swedes, cut down five of them and, grabbing the carthorses by the bridles, brought the wagons to the reserves, and these valiant soldiers also delivered three captured *Nylands* dragoons to Silin.⁵⁷

The appearance of the fighting grew worse and worse: Yakov Petrovich, gloomy and sad, unable to rectify the course of events, threw himself into a thicket of enemy bayonets, apparently seeking death, which might wash away the guilt of defeat. But bayonets, bullets and round shot spared Kulnev, who was destined to die four years later under very similar circumstances near Klyastitsy; on this occasion death fled from him, and, according to folk legend, 'the unfortunate Kulnev, not yet ripe for a cruel death'⁵⁸ passed unharmed through the enemy ranks with the hussars escorting him... Eventually, Count Kamensky reached them. With a loud hurrah they rushed at the enemy and the infantry, hussars, Cossacks, all took part in this attack. It was a massacre, not a battle. Stabbed and hacked to bits by the arriving troops, the Swedes, who had bravely resisted the first onslaught, fled to their fortifications, into which the fresh Russian units had jumped with them. The hussars did not lag behind the infantry into the entrenchments: it was not the first time that they had attacked over the parapets of the earthworks, and these attacks always made a terrifying impression on the defenders. The fighting inside the fortifications continued until evening; at six o'clock *greve* Klingspor, considering the battle over, gave the signal to retreat.

Kulnev, encouraged by the victory, chased after the enemy with three squadrons. Taking advantage of the shallow waters of the Nykarlebyälv [Lapuanjoki] river, he forded it and, having attacked the defeated enemy with the Grodno men, forced them to continue their retreat as far as Nykarleby.

While Count Kamensky was gaining the upper hand over Klingspor, Vlastov and Rüdiger were operating with equal success. The latter, pursuing Fieandt with a squadron, after two skirmishes at Kelviä [Kälviä] and Alacander [*sic*], reached Gamlakarleby hot on the heels of the Swedes; having driven off a strong enemy detachment at Alt Källby [*sic*],⁵⁹ the squadron raced towards Oravais and destroyed all the bridges on Klingspor's line of retreat, after which they returned to Gamlakarleby. Through this manoeuvre, Rüdiger obstructed the Swedes' movements, who were marching from Oravais, and saved Vlastov's detachment, which could easily have been crushed by the forces under Fieandt from one side, and the Swedish *Fältmarskalk* from the other. When Klingspor, under pressure from Kulnev, reached Gamlakarleby, Vlastov was no longer there: he had retreated to Övervetil [*sic*, Nedervetil?].

57 Citation for the award of the Military Order medal. An officer of the Petrovsk Infantry Regiment and more than 10 wounded lower ranks lay within the lines.

58 *Генерал Я.П. Кульнев, павший геройскою смертью под Клястицами* [General Ya.P. Kulnev, who died a heroic death near Klyastitsy] 1812, St. Petersburg, folk edition.

59 At the same time, Rüdiger had taken one officer and 50 lower ranks prisoner (Lebedev, Short Biography).

On 9 [21] September, the hussar flankers from Kamensky's vanguard reached Gamlakarleby, where only the tail-end units of the Swedish rearguard remained; having defeated and scattered a strong picket stationed at the gatehouse, the hussars spread out through the town. Several enemy soldiers, having collected straw and oil, decided to set fire to the town, which, one way or another, was bound to fall into Russian hands. The Grodno men who had burst into Gamlakarleby were passing by just at that moment. Non-commissioned officer Kirpichek and private Kutsenko attacked the arsonists and, having laid them low, saved one of the most prosperous towns in Finland from the flames.⁶⁰ Once the infantry had closed up, Silin went onwards: at Kronoby he caught up with a squadron from the *Nylands lätta dragonregemente*, drawn up in battle order. The Grodno men, carried away by their success, rushed at the *Nylands* men and put them to the sword. After a short but heated fight, the dragoons gave way, leaving behind several wounded and dead, including one officer.⁶¹

The pursuit continued, but the enemy army was melting away like spring snow. On 12 [24] September, once Kulnev's vanguard had reached the Swedish fortified position at Lochteå, trumpets began to sound in the entrenchments and an officer with a white kerchief appeared on the trench parapet: the Swedes requested a truce. On 17 [29] September, a temporary cessation of hostilities was signed in Lochteå: the Russians remained in Gamlakarleby, while the Swedes retreated to Himango [Himanka]; an exchange of prisoners between both armies immediately took place. The Grodno Regiment was relocated 15 *versta* [10 miles] from Gamlakarleby, but thereafter the squadrons were reassigned to other places: Grothuß's to Kerijärvi [*sic*], Kulnev and Silin to Jakobstad; Rüdiger remained in Gamlakarleby.

The heroes of Finland, in tatters, bearded and covered in whatever clothing came to hand, were difficult to identify as the formerly glamorous Grodno Hussars; pelisse and dolman were rarely preserved intact, boots were worn out, and shakos were a long distant memory. We remained around Gamlakarleby for more than a month while the regiment recovered somewhat from its efforts: the only occupation was outpost service. Our officers often visited the enemy camp from Gamlakarleby, while the Swedish officers often came to see 'Kulnev's hussars': neither they nor we could grandly host their guests, but feelings of empathy developed between the opponents, a kind of military brotherhood based on mutual respect, and comradely conversation served as a more effective attraction than luxurious dinners. The receptions mostly consisted of serving vodka and playing cards, which was how the men whiled away the long autumn evenings during the truce.

During this entire period there was never a clash or misunderstanding that might have marred the good, friendly relations that existed between the Swedish officers and the Grodno Hussar Regiment.⁶²

60 Awards citation.

61 Awards citation.

62 The truce concluded between Count Kamensky and *greve* Klingspor concerned only the northern forces; in the south, however, operations continued until November. Informing the commander of the Vemo coastal detachment, Major Lüders, of the truce concluded by Count Kamensky, Prince Bagration wrote in his own hand: 'A truce has been concluded between General Kamensky and General Klingspor, but it is not yet known whether the King will want to conclude one with us. For these important reasons, we must use one man to inform them on his own behalf about the discussion of a truce and to warn them not to mess us around. It must be said that I am strong and that I have new regiments and am a threat to them such that they leave us alone, but all this must be done very skilfully and, moreover, we must station the pickets as carefully as possible so that they cannot exploit the deceit and cannot make a landing under the guise of a truce. If a *parlementaire* were to be sent from them with a letter, do not let him into the corps, but stop him at the screen, take the letter and send him back, saying that the response will be sent soonest. Maintain extreme and active alertness day and night, and upon their first movement towards the coast, go as quickly as possible to the commanders at the location of the anticipated landing (we owe the communication of this interesting letter from Prince Bagration to the courtesy of *Rittmeister* von Lüders of the Lifeguard Ulands, the grandson of our venerable veteran. This letter was not included in the sources for the history of the 1808-1809 campaign by General Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky).

CHAPTER 5.

Operations by the squadrons under Lüders and Hirsch; actions at Lemo and at Kettarsund, the actions at Lokalax and Helsing. - Termination of the armistice in the north. - The state of the regiment on the resumption of hostilities. - Kulnev and Fuchs. - The actions at Kalajoki and Pyhäjoki. - Operations by Rüdiger's squadron. - The second truce. - The Olkijoki Convention. - The regiment's stay at Uleåborg in November 1808. - The regiment's return to Helsingfors. - Parade in this city. - Preparations for the Åland expedition. - The ball in Åbo. - Reconnaissance of the islands by Major Lüders. - Skirmish on the island of Semlingen. - Enemy forces on the Åland islands. - Arrival of the detachment at Åland. - Skirmishes on Ben, Lemland and at Frebenebye. - Capture of the Swedish rearguard by the hussars. - Conquest of the Åland archipelago. - Preparations for the expedition to the Swedish coast. - Kulnev's orders. - Crossing the Gulf of Bothnia. - Skirmish at Grisslehamn. - The occupation of this town. - The dangerous situation of the regiment in Grisslehamn. - Kulnev's return to Åland. - Awards. - The conclusion of peace. - The state of the regiment after the war. - The regiment's settlements for provisions in 1808-1809. - The impression left by Kulnev in Finland. - Memories of Kulnev by D. Davydov and the poet Runeberg. - Duels in 1809. - 'The campaign across the sea.'

The Swedes, having occupied the Åland Islands, repeatedly attempted to provide assistance to the rebellious population along the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia throughout 1808. Landings on the Finnish coast were being prepared both in Åland and in Sweden itself; the Russians could only oppose them with the detachment under Major General Baggovut, that is, several battalions, a handful of Cossacks and the squadrons under majors Hirsch and Lüders. The latter maintained outposts on the shores of the Gulf of Bothnia, whose duty was to monitor the coast and notify the force of approaching ships. Outposts were located in Åbo (Major Hirsch's) and in Nystad (Major Lüders'); the main posts were in Stremna [*sic*], Pikis [Piikkiö], Helsing, Kettarsund [Ketarsalmi], Jarvenna [*sic*], Masku and Lokalax [Lokalahti].¹ In early [mid] June the Swedes fitted out two expeditions:² one at Umeå, for a landing at Vaasa, the other to Fasta Åland, under the command of General Vegesack, for an attack on Åbo. The former was repulsed by General Demidov, but caused a raging rebellion in this part of Finland, the latter landed on the coast at Lemo [Lemuntie] on 7 [19] June, 22 versta [15 miles] from Åbo. Our outpost stationed on the shore under Lieutenant Zhitkov, immediately informed Colonel Vadkovsky, the commandant of the city of Åbo, about the enemy approach, and retreated towards the city after a firefight. Vegesack, having landed at eight o'clock in the morning, also marched on Åbo behind the hussars. General Baggovut, having learned what was going on in good time, hurried to engage the enemy, calling in Hirsch's squadron along the way, which he ordered to halt east of Åbo. Hirsch received new orders at 12 o'clock: he was to march to the battlefield in order to support an infantry attack, but when he arrived at Lemo, the Swedes were retreating quickly towards their fortifications built on the shore. The Grodno men struck the enemy flank and increased the chaos in their ranks, but upon reaching the entrenchments, the squadron was engaged with fierce fire, under the cover of which the Swedes managed to board their ships.³ The cavalry casualties in this action were insignificant; there were no killed in the squadron; Lieutenant Zhitkov was among the wounded.

From 8 [20] June until mid [late] July there were no attacks from the sea. On 29 July [10 August], Lüders' squadron, stationed in Masku after the battle at Lemo, was transferred to Nystad. On 8 [20]

1 Prince Bagration's War Diary.

2 Minor landings were repulsed by Major Lüders' outposts on 22 and 24 May [3 and 5 June] at Nystad and Sudholm [*sic*, Sundholm?] (service records for *Stabs-Rittmeister* Verzhbitsky and Major Lüders: St. Petersburg Gazette (in German) 16 [28] June 1808, No. 48).

3 Suchtelen, *Précis*.

August, in view of alarming intelligence of armed peasants assembling, this squadron was sent first to Rogdaikirke [*sic*], and then to Pigam [*sic*, Pukholma?] Island, in order to pacify the population. Upon returning to Nystad, on 20 August [1 September], Lüders was entrusted with the command of the Virmo [Mynämäki] and Vemo [Vehmaa, between Virmo and Kettarsund] coastal detachments.⁴

On 4 [16] September, a new attempt was made to land at the Kettarsund headland, but the hussar warning posts, with the help of approaching infantry, defeated the Swedish landing and forced them to retreat back out to sea. On 5 [17] September, hussar outposts and patrols, monitoring the coastal area, noticed a mass of boats sailing in the direction of Helsing. The boats sailed to the headland and landed a force of 2,600 men, under the command of Lantingshausen, not far from the Varappia [*sic*, Varanpää?] church. The landing force quickly moved along the road towards Lokalax; General Choglovkov moved to intercept them with half of Lüders' squadron and two battalions. The hussars were sent ahead in order to show an intent to attack, and fixed the enemy until evening, until the infantry arrived. The skirmishing continued until nightfall; at dawn on 6 [18] September, Prince Bagration arrived, one of whose first orders was to send Lüders' squadron on a flanking manoeuvre, with the aim of cutting the enemy off from the sea. This movement by the cavalry, threatening the enemy rear, decided the matter: the Swedes immediately formed up in columns and began to retreat to their ships. Lüders saw that he would not have time to block the enemy line of retreat and raced towards the Swedes. Their defeat was total: the landing party barely reached their boats and disappeared, leaving behind a mass of dead and wounded.⁵

This failed landing attempt was not to be the last. Angered by the events at Lemo and Lokalax, the Swedish King decided to land all the units from Åland in order to seize Åbo and lend a hand to the national uprising. This detachment was placed at the disposal of Baron Boije, who landed at Helsing on 14 [26] September. Our pickets under *Portepée-Junker* Krammer and non-commissioned officer Yesaulenko, informed Prince Bagration in good time and, without losing sight of the enemy, began to fall back from the shore without exchanging fire with the Swedes.⁶ Having linked up with other outposts, the pickets had their first skirmishes at Vias [*sic*] and at Järvenoja, where they tried to slow down the enemy advance, but the Swedes quickly moved forward and occupied Vartsari [*sic*] and Järvenoja with two columns. Prince Bagration marched out to face them; the outposts scattered along the seashore were drawn in and by the evening of that same day the squadrons under Lüders and Hirsch were already standing with the outposts forwards of our force. 15 [27] September was spent in vanguard skirmishes, in which the Grodno men stationed on the right flank at Vias, did not take part; on 16 [28] September a general battle took place. Our hussars were sent to envelope the Swedes with the right column and after a four-hour march found themselves to their rear. Boije, who was already coming under pressure from Russian infantry to his front, saw that his line of retreat was under threat and, having put his rearguard at risk, began to retreat to the ships. The commander of the cavalry, Lüders, took advantage of this moment: as soon as the enemy reached a small plain between the villages of Yarpil [*sic*] and Egais [*sic*], the Grodno men monitoring them, quickly wheeled around and attacked the Swedes. This successful and unexpected blow from the Grodno men turned the retreat into a complete rout: the enemy, who had been returning fire until then, abandoned everything; the road was strewn with weapons, scattered cartridges and projectiles, and, finally, with fleeing men seized with panic and fear. Boije halted before reaching the coast, but he was unable to hold back the onslaught by the hussars and infantry; and this halt only partially protected the boarding of his units onto their ships. En route and along the shore, during the chaos that occurred after the attack, we captured: a flag, 15 officers, 350 privates, five guns and a lot of vehicles.⁷ The regiment lost just four killed; among the six wounded

4 Prince Bagration's War Diary.

5 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, History of 1808. Action at Lokalax, Military Science Archive No. 1642.

6 Citation for the award of the Military Order medal.

7 The action at Helsing, Military Science Archive, No. 1642; Suchtelen, *Précis*; Major Lüders' service record; Rescripts for 1809; Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, p. 261.

were privates Prikhotka and Ponomarev, who had distinguished themselves that day.

King Gustav IV Adolph arrived at Helsing in his yacht during the defeat of Boije's detachment, but could not remain on shore, since the fires in the village of Helsing threatened the destruction of the entire flotilla and his own ship. The unfortunate Monarch then realised that there was no longer any hope of taking control of the Baltic coast by means of landings and that Finland was irrevocably lost to Sweden.

Our regiment was generously rewarded by the Emperor for our actions against with the landing force: Major Lüders received the Order of St. George 4th class; Lieutenant Zhukov was awarded a Golden Sabre, Lieutenant Ilinsky 2nd and Cornet Brunner received the Order of St. Anne 3rd class, while Lieutenant Davydov (Prince Bagration's aide-de-camp) won the Order of St. Vladimir 4th class. At the same time, Kulnev was awarded the Order of St. George 3rd class, for the actions at Oravais and Kuortane, while Rüdiger received the Order of St. George 4th class, for the actions at Karstula and Gamlakarleby.⁸ The lower ranks were awarded 12 George Crosses [Military Order medals].

Let us now leave the squadrons under Prince Bagration and turn to operations by Count Kamensky, who had established himself at Gamlakarleby. In St. Petersburg, the Committee of Ministers, to whom the Commander-in-Chief had reported on the truce he had concluded, did not accept Count Buxhöwden's reasoning and reported this to the Tsar, who was abroad. On 7 [19] October, Supreme Orders were issued to resume military operations in order to speed up the end of the war. When the order to end the truce arrived in Gamlakarleby, the *rasputitsa* [muddy season] was in full swing and we were in a most unenviable situation in the north. The delivery of provisions and the evacuation of the numerous sick was particularly difficult due to the poor state of the transport routes, and in Gamlakarleby there was neither enough space nor assistance for the sick.

During the truce, Count Kamensky's detachment, which included most of the Grodno Regiment, was reinforced by another squadron from our regiment (Colonel Davydov's own, under the command of *Rittmeister* Nikora), which arrived from Russia in September, along with Colonel Tursky's other two squadrons.⁹ During the truce, all five squadrons occupied the outposts ahead of the army facing the Swedish vedettes. The Swedish cavalry, or, strictly speaking, the Savolax Dragoons [*sic, Karelska lätta dragonkåren*], were commanded by Captain Fuchs at the time, a brave, cheerful and straightforward man. He managed to become friends with all our officers, especially with Kulnev, whom he visited often. Fuchs found the fearless Yakov Petrovich to his liking, and if the former could get tobacco (there had been no tobacco for a long time, they were smoking hops), rum or another outpost delicacy, he either sent it to Kulnev via a dragoon, or brought it to our pickets himself. Fuchs, like Kulnev, revelled in being eccentric and never wore the blue jacket and round iron helmet that served as the uniform of the Swedish dragoons, preferring a downy cap and frock coat to his uncomfortable uniform. Fuchs' cap was famous in our outposts, which allowed him to visit the detachment without hindrance, just as the Savolax men knew Kulnev's red headdress, as he often visited his friend. The hussars fraternised with these dragoons to such an extent that they later exchanged fire with them only when it was necessary to fire warning shots for their temporary friends to mark the beginning of an offensive.¹⁰

8 Major Rüdiger did not immediately receive the cross he had earned. When he occupied Uleåborg with a squadron, in November, at the head of Kamensky's detachment, the Commander-in-Chief, dissatisfied with this operation, placed Rüdiger under investigation and removed him from command of the unit. In 1809, Kamensky took command of the army in Umeå. Having summoned Rüdiger, he asked him to forget Count Buxhöwden's injustice and, having kissed our brave and active fellow soldier, he personally pinned the St. George's Cross to his pelisse (from Lebedev, *Memories of the Commander of the Guards and Grenadier Corps*).

9 Five squadrons were with Kamensky following the truce, one with Tuchkov, two with Prince Bagration and two with Wittgenstein (*Rittmeister* Kurilov's and *Rittmeister* Domeyko's) (ten-day reports for the Army of Finland).

10 F. Bulgarin, volume 5, p. 196.

Thus the months of September and October passed; only on 15 [27] October was Major Silin sent to Orip [*sic*] to pacify the rebellious peasants, since the terms of the armistice did not extend to this area. On 20 October [1 November], military operations resumed between the detachments under Count Kamensky and Klingspor, and Count Kamensky advanced towards Himango. The Swedes retreated before our flankers, destroying bridges as far as Kalajoki, where they halted across the river in fortified positions. They were followed by Rüdiger's squadron, which, on 27 October [8 November], having defeated the enemy tail-end pickets four *versta* [2⅔ miles] from the position, pursued them as far as the high ground of the position itself.

An assault was scheduled for the following day, for which the following orders were issued: Kulnev's vanguard was to fix the enemy frontally with Grothuß's and Nikora's squadrons; Colonel Erikson's detachment was to envelope the Swedes' left flank with Silin's squadrons and to that end was to move to the right along the Kalajoki river; Count Kamensky was to follow Erikson's flanking detachment himself with the remaining units and Rüdiger's squadron. In adopting this plan of action, Count Kamensky had anticipated crossing over frozen swamps, but his hopes were far from fulfilled: the cold had not severe enough to freeze the swamps and soon the entire detachment found itself waist-deep in muddy water. In the course of eight hours we covered the five *versta* [3½ miles] along the Kalajoki road to Piotis [Pitkäsenkylä], where the crossing was to take place. The hussars proceeded dismounted because the horses could not carry them through the swamps; the men dragged themselves through the half-frozen tundra, their feet numb from the cold, while their heads were burning, and sweat was pouring down their faces.¹¹ Eventually, having crossed the Kalajoki river and driven in the enemy pickets, we got behind the enemy position. The Grodno men raced forwards and cleared the ground ahead of isolated outposts and patrols for the infantry. The appearance of the detachments under Erikson and Count Kamensky behind the enemy made it easier for Kulnev to advance from the front, for which purpose he had already built a bridge under enemy fire and begun a cannonade. Having noted the first signs of an enemy retreat, Kulnev moved forward. Having fired several volleys, from which *Rittmeister* Nikora was mortally wounded and Kulnev suffered a contusion to the leg, the Swedes retreated towards Siikajoki.¹²

On 2 [14] November, at Pyhäjoki, the enemy halted once more. Kulnev, who continued to command despite his contusion, positioned himself in front of the enemy position, while Count Kamensky went outflanking with the main body and two squadrons of Grodno men. But now the cold was helping the Russians: the river was covered with a thin crust of ice, they spread straw on it, laid planks and poured water on them. The ice creaked and shifted underfoot, but we managed to cross safely. The horses, however, were not led over the planks, rather, having cut through the ice, they were unsaddled, herded in and swam; the hussars walked across the tread-way, while the saddles were transported in boats. At Pyhäjoki, just as at Kalajoki, the Swedes did not wait for the attack and retreated. From Pyhäjoki, Major Rüdiger was sent to Vihanti with a squadron in order to establish communications with General Tuchkov 1st; this decisive and brave officer, through a rapid strike, took the entire detachment in the town by surprise and, having sent the prisoners to Count Kamensky, occupied Brahestad. Continuing to operate against the left flank of the enemy main force, Rüdiger took part in the capture of Uleåborg on 19 November [1 December]. The latter was contrary to the wishes of the Commander-in-Chief, who, being dissatisfied with this operation and not daring to turn his anger on Count Kamensky, placed Rüdiger under investigation 'for exceeding the instructions given to him.' Several months later, once Kamensky had taken command of the entire army, he demanded that Rüdiger be restored to his command, returned his lost rights to him, and personally pinned the St. George Cross to his pelisse.¹³

Kulnev's advance reached Siikajoki, where we had halted at the beginning of the campaign, before

11 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky.

12 Two hussars were killed at Kalajoki. *Rittmeister* Nikora died of wounds received that same day.

13 Colonel Lebedev, Memories of the Commander of the Guards and Grenadier Corps.

our reverses in April. The Swedish generals, seeing that the last hopes for a successful outcome of the war had disappeared, decided to enter into negotiations with Count Kamensky. A new disaster befell the unfortunate Swedes at that time: a thaw had set in and a raging storm broke up the ice on the Siikajoki river which demolished the remaining bridge - the only line of retreat for the enemy. Because this was happening during negotiations, Kamensky did not exploit these circumstances that had put the Swedish army in such a hopeless situation.

On 7 [19] November, a truce was concluded which has become known to history as the Olkijoki Convention. The Swedes retreated to the northern border, leaving us with some of their sick soldiers and stragglers, whom the enemy army were unable to treat or evacuate. Our vanguard, with the compassion inherent in Russian soldiers, gave every possible assistance to the latter; the hussars shared their meagre provisions with them, smoked horse meat and dark hard-tack as solid as Finnish boulders.

Having reached Uleåborg, in accordance with the terms of the convention, the Grodno squadrons were stretched out in outposts along the Kemi river [Kemijoki]; the rest of the units bivouacked behind them. The hardest period of the campaign had arrived. The days were already cold and foggy in August, it rained frequently; in October the frosts had begun and by November winter was in full force. At 66 degrees north the fierce wind burned like fire: there was nowhere to escape from the cold and wind, every breath of which burned the skin on one's face. In the bivouacs, the duty officers had to go around the sleeping men and rouse those who were showing signs of frostbite. The worst thing was to be stationed in the outposts, without fires, in terrible cold, in exposed locations. It was vital to protect oneself from the wind with cut down fir branches, propped in the form of a fan, and dance, that is, hop from one foot to the other all night, swinging one's arms.¹⁴ Nobody had worn uniform for some time, the remains of their old clothes had rotted on their backs, everyone was wrapped in rags found along the way; there was an extreme shortage of footwear.

Our squadrons, however, did not stay long on the Kemi. Firstly, Silin's squadron set off and was sent to Tavastehus, and then, in early [mid] December, the rest were drawn back together at Åbo; the squadrons under Hirsch, Lüders, and Kurilov were summoned to Helsingfors. On 20 December [1 January 1809], all 10 squadrons were assembled in General Baggovut's Nyland [Uusimaa] Corps.¹⁵

On 3 [15] December, the Commander-in-Chief held a review in Helsingfors of the units that had conquered all of Finland in nine months. The pitiful appearance of these heroes moved the old General deeply; ragged, pinched faces, poorly dressed wounds, served all too eloquently as proof of everything that they had endured during the campaign. The following day, he wrote in an order-of-the-day: 'After the army has endured 10 months of toil for the conquest of Finland, our banners are finally fluttering on the most distant borders of Sweden...' Gratitude was expressed to all ranks, from the generals to the last soldier, for the courage of the former; the diligence and determination of second and for the bravery of the latter.¹⁶ Count Buxhöwden was replaced as Commander-in-Chief by General Knorring in early [mid] December. Following an inspection, on 14 [26] December, he ordered the Grodno Regiment to go to the old Finnish border via Kimen [*sic*], where they would be able to improve the compliment of regimental horses, but by that time Prince Bagration had already sent the squadrons under Kirilenko, Kulnev, Lüders, Grothuß and Hirsch to the islands lying off the coast near Åbo, so that only the second battalion, that is, the remaining five squadrons, set off for the Russian border.¹⁷ These squadrons were soon transferred to the Rebolj

14 F. Bulgarin, volume 5.

15 Ten-day reports for the Army of Finland. The 10 squadrons of the Grodno Hussars consisted of: nine field officers, 47 subalterns, 99 non-commissioned officers and 963 privates.

16 Orders for the Active Army dated 4 [16] December (Military Science Archive, No. 1643).

17 Reports to the Minister of War dated 18 and 31 December [30 December 1808 and 12 January 1809] (Military Science Archive, No. 1672).

churchyard, Olonetsk Governorate, while the first five took part in the famous Åland and Grisslehamn expeditions.

At the end of 1808, the entire Finnish mainland was in the hands of Russian forces, but the Swedish flag was still flying on the Åland Islands; Åland, recaptured from us by the enemy, would have been a constant threat to our coast. An independent corps was assigned to seize this last bastion of Swedish rule on Finnish soil, the command of which was entrusted to Prince Bagration. Command of the battalion from the Grodno Regiment was entrusted to Kulnev, who was immediately summoned from Helsingfors to Åbo. Yakov Petrovich arrived just in time for the ball hosted by the corps commander for the city's residents. Having put on a smart uniform, he hurried to Bagration's quarters, where raucous music was playing and the dancing had long since begun. As soon as Kulnev entered the hall, all those dancing stopped, those sitting stood up from their seats, and the whole company crowded around him. The elders of the city approached the eminent hussar with expressions of gratitude for preserving the peace and property of the population in those parts of Finland where he had been in command, while the rest hastened to greet the hero of Kuortane, Siikajoki and Oravais.¹⁸ This ovation given to our fellow soldier, at a time when the war was not yet over and the Finns were still in a hostile mood, proves how much respect Kulnev enjoyed even then, not only as a commander, but also as a private individual. During this ball, Major Lüders, who, like almost all officers of the Grodno Regiment, was with the corps commander that evening, was entrusted with preparing the proposed campaign.

On 27 December [8 January 1809], Major Lüders went to the island of Sudsila [*sic*] and Vartsala [Pohjois-Vartsala] with a squadron in order to gather intelligence on the enemy; Stabs-Rittmeister Vishnevsky was sent to Tövsala [Taivassalo] with a platoon on a similar mission. From the intelligence collected from the population, Lüders was convinced that the enemy were located on the Kumlinge Islands and Fasta Åland; the patrols sent there could not reach the shore, since the ice was still very thin and could not support mounted men.¹⁹

On 3 [15] January, 1809, Lüders reported that the Swedes were on Åland in great strength, that the villages on many islands had been completely burned down, and that the population, by order of the King, were beginning to evacuate to Fasta Åland; on 8 [10] January, Lüders' reports were even more detailed: our hussars had managed to determine the Swedish forces on each island precisely; their headquarters were in Jomala, the *gardesregemente* in Hammarland, the remaining islands were occupied by more or less strong detachments, the listing of which was submitted by Lüders.²⁰

The Grodno Regiment's outposts were positioned facing the enemy on the islands of Enklinge and

18 Complete Works of Denis Davydov; Military Science Archive, No. 1642.

19 Prince Bagration wrote to Major Lüders on 31 December [12 January 1809]: 'I propose to Your Excellency, that once the straits freeze, you send strong patrols from the cavalry units entrusted to you to the Islands of Åva, Brändö, and Torsholma, Björkö and Lappo, and on to Kumlinge when possible, in order to have reliable intelligence on whether the enemy really have razed these islands and whether they have a vanguard outpost on Kumlinge. Do not engage in any kind of combat with them under any circumstances. Take all possible precautions such that these patrols sent by you are not cut off by the enemy and to that end have reserves and warning pickets. In the event that the enemy makes to attack these patrols, then retreat to the previous locations on Vartsala Island. Try to bring some ordinary person to me from those Islands who could have detailed information about the enemy on Fasta Åland. Report everything to me as quickly as possible by courier. I am sending you one hundred silver roubles from funds for unforeseen expenses for spies; send two or three of them in such a way that none knows anything about the others. I am confident that you, as an experienced and courageous hussar officer, will take prudent measures to provide me with reliable intelligence on the enemy without exposing the command entrusted to you to any risk. Issue orders to be gentle with the population, but not to put trust in them and to be careful at all times. Spread rumours that a corps of 35,000 men is concentrating near Åbo, that the Russians do not intend to go to Åland, but if they do go, they will defeat them.' (from the collection of *Rittmeister* von Lüders).

20 Major Lüders' reports from the Grodno Hussar Regiment to Prince Bagration, dated 28 December 1808 [9 January 1809], 3 and 8 [15 and 20] January 1809. The latter was sent to the Tsar (Military Science Archive, No. 1679 and No. 1642).

Seglinge. The latter was attacked on 16 [28] January, but the attack was repulsed by the hussars; on 17 [29] January, a whole detachment of 800 men commanded by *Överste* Schulzheim, having sent an entire squadron of cavalry against the outposts, circled around Seglinge, with the aim of cutting off the Grodno men. Lüders, realising the enemy intent, retreated to Enklinge. Having reached this island behind us, the Swedish cavalry rushed at the hussars, but the latter countered the onrushing enemy with a swift attack: the Swedes were defeated and turned about, leaving *gardesregemente Kornett* Montgomery in our hands. Following the attack, Lüders immediately retreated to the island of Björkö, because the dragoons had been followed up by Schulzheim's infantry, against whom he could not compete.²¹

It was evident that a stubborn defence was being prepared on Åland; while we had a corps concentrating in order to take the islands, then General Döbeln had 6,000 select troops and 4,000 armed peasants for its defence, whom the King had ordered to hold the archipelago at all costs.²² Döbeln had managed to fortify all the advantageous positions, burned all the villages and concentrated all the units he had onto Fasta Åland, and therefore was completely ready to engage the Russian force.

For his part, Bagration, having positioned his units in closed quarters, waited until the ice on the Delet [Teili] *ffjärd* could withstand the weight of cavalry and artillery for the attack. Our squadrons had been stationed in the villages of Järvis, Medelby, Kittuis, Saverkeit, Pargas [Parainen] and S:t Mårtens [Marttila], since February, while Grothuß's squadron held the island of Gudsala [*sic*, Houtsala?];²³ each of them sent out the required number of outposts in turn, in order to protect the coast of the Finnish mainland from enemy surprise attack. During this pause, footwear, which the soldiers desperately needed, was finally delivered from Russia, as well as some new uniforms; until then, many had wrapped their feet in rags, due to a lack of boots.²⁴

The entire detachment assigned to take the islands was initially divided into two columns: the first, under Major General Shepelev (colonel-in-chief of the regiment), was to include, among others, the squadrons under Grothuß and Lüders (a combined force of 100 men); the second, under Kulnev with the squadrons under Hirsch and Kirilenko (numbering 122 men); the squadrons' assembly area was designated on Kumlinge. A few days before the campaign, this plan was amended: it was decided to hand all the cavalry over to Kulnev, and to begin the advance on the morning of 1 [13] March. Yakov Petrovich's orders were brief: 'Be bright and cheerful on the march - despondency is typical only of old women. Upon arrival at Kumlinge, a glass of vodka, porridge with meat, shelter and a bed of spruce. A good night!'²⁵ At five o'clock in the morning on 1 [13] March, the Grodno men set off for Kumlinge and set up bivouacs along the main post road. The fences and the remains of a windmill were used as fuel by the detachment that arrived after the hussars, who occupied the entire gloomy and deserted island. Here the entire occupation corps was divided again into five columns: Grothuß's squadron was assigned to the first column under General Tuchkov 3rd; General Sazonov's second column had Lüders' squadron attached; General Demidov's third had Hirsch's squadron; while Count Stroganov's fourth had Kirilenko's squadron, with Kulnev at its head.

Kulnev made first contact with the enemy on the island of Beno [*sic*] on 3 [15] March at five o'clock in the afternoon. The hussars from the three columns were in the vanguard, and seeing the enemy, went to envelope the Swedes, but the latter hastily retreated to Fasta Åland. The Grodno men raced after them and pursued them into a forested defile, where infantry volleys stopped the hussars' onslaught.²⁶ On 4 [16] March, the cavalry from the four columns were ahead of the

21 General Knorring's report to the Tsar, dated 7 [19] April 1809 (Military Science Archive, No. 1679).

22 The King's rescript to General af Tibell, dated 6 March new style - Suchtelen, *Précis*.

23 On 17 [29] January, Kulnev assumed command of the cavalry himself, that is, the squadrons located at Åbo.

24 The winter campaign in the Åland islands (Military Science Archive, No. 1680); F. Bulgarin's memoirs.

25 Regimental Orders, dated 28 February [12 March] 1809 (Complete Works of Denis Davydov).

26 One hussar was severely wounded and several horses killed in this clash.

detachment invading Åland and occupied the sector from Högbolstad to Kastelholm, sending patrols forward and to the right; Kirilenko's squadron hurried towards Lemland towards the far end of the archipelago, with the aim of cutting off the enemy's route to Sweden. Thus all the squadrons, maintaining communications with each other, reached Hednäs [*sic*]; at Skagtorn [*sic*] manor they found four guns and a gunboat with a falconet. Kulnev, who was marching with Kirilenko's squadron, caught up with a small rearguard near Lemland, which had fortified itself on the shore. Some of the hussars detached and moved to the flank, while others went straight towards the earthwork. The enemy began to open fire, but, concerned at being trapped by the hussars outflanking them and by Hirsch's squadron, which was passing in the distance, they withdrew from their position and began to retreat quickly. Hirsch and Kirilenko charged at the Swedes simultaneously, who fled, leaving Kulnev with two guns, a gunboat with six falconets and six transport vessels with three guns.²⁷ After this action the hussars immediately marched after the enemy towards Bengtsböle. On 5 [17] March, the pursuit continued in a similar order, that is, four columns went across Fasta Åland, while the fifth circled around the archipelago from the south. Grothuß's squadron pursued along the main Eckerö road together with the Cossacks, while the others marched level with them either side of the road. At Frebbenby, the hussars attacked the enemy rearguard on the ice, which offered little resistance to the Grodno raid, who took around 400 prisoners and captured a Colour from the *Södermanlands regemente*. A little further on, the hussars picked up five large calibre cast-iron cannon from a position abandoned by the Swedes.²⁸

The retreat by the Swedes was carried out in noteworthy order: the cavalry went ahead, clearing the route, behind them came the infantry, formed in large squares; there were rearguards as a keep, mostly of individual battalions. The last of these was Colonel Engelbrechten's battalion from the *Södermanlands regemente*. Hirsch caught up with this battalion at Signilskär, but being too weak to overwhelm them, he offered to take Engelbrechten's surrender to the Russian vanguard; at the same time Hirsch requested assistance from Grothuß. Engelbrechten, of course, declined the offer and, having formed square, continued his retreat. Lüders and Grothuß, meanwhile, hurried towards Hirsch, while Kulnev, who had by then reached Hammar-Udde [*sic*], moved towards Signilskär in order to isolate the *Södermanlands* men. At 10 o'clock in the morning, all three squadrons linked up and surrounded the Swedish battalion halted in square, awaiting the attack. Lüders took to the right to attack the flank, Grothuß to the left, while Hirsch himself was to strike frontally at the Swedes. As soon as the squadrons began to trot towards their prey, bayonets suddenly rose and white handkerchiefs began to wave from the square: Engelbrechten asked that they at least grant them free passage, without bloodshed: he was aware he was disadvantaged by the delay, which was increasing the distance between him and the main body, but at the same time he pointed out to Hirsch that three squadrons could never break through his ranks. Hirsch flatly refused to let the Swedes pass and, taking the range a second time, gave the signal to attack.

At that time, Kulnev was approaching with Kirilenko's squadron through the skerries. Yakov Petrovich realised that the venerable Engelbrechten was outraged by the idea of surrendering an entire battalion to 120 hussars, and decided to ease the veteran's conscience. He ordered the Swedes who had recently been taken prisoner to be brought forwards and, having formed them up on the ice, ordered them to move slowly towards the Swedish column. The blizzard conditions deceived Engelbrechten into mistaking the prisoners for Russian infantry, and he eventually laid down his arms. The colonel, 14 officers, their chaplain, 18 non-commissioned officers, and 442 lower ranks, who had formed the rearguard of the Swedish army, were taken prisoner; the entire casualties to our regiment consisted of three wounded hussars.²⁹

27 Suchtelen, *Précis*; Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, History of 1808-1809.

28 Colonel Khatov, The winter campaign in the Åland islands (Military Science Archive, No. 1680); Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky; Suchtelen, *Précis*. Four hussars were wounded and several horses killed at Frebbenby.

29 Suchtelen, *Précis*; Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky; Colonel Khatov (Military Science Archive, No. 1680); Åland expedition (Military Science Archive, No. 1679).

Whether Engelbrechten ever learned of Kulnev's ruse is unknown, but the Swedish colonel's critics were too magnanimous to reveal the truth to the grizzled warrior.

Hirsch and Lüders, having made a sweep as far as the Swedish coast after this action, returned to Signilskär: their horses were so tired that they could barely move their legs. The patrols sent out in the morning rounded up around 50 straggling soldiers from the *Kronobergs regemente* and several *Livgardet till häst*, in addition to a mass of weapons and gunpowder caissons. On Signilskär, in addition, we captured a small provisions magazine and destroyed an optical telegraph station.³⁰

The Åland Islands had finally been conquered without much difficulty. On Fasta Åland, those Grodno men captured on patrol, as well as the pickets taken at the action at Alavo were released; among them was Lieutenant Sineokov, the first Russian officer to land on the islands back in 1808.

Almost at the same time as the occupation of the Åland Islands, on 4 [16] March, preliminary negotiations began between generals Döbeln and Knorring about concluding peace, but the former could not undertake anything decisive without authority from Stockholm. Seeing that the war was dragging on for too long and would drag on even longer during negotiations, the Minister of War, Count Arakcheev, presented the Tsar with a plan for an expedition to the Swedish coast, the purpose of which was to gather intelligence on enemy intentions and to spread concern for the security of the capital. Kulnev was selected as executor of this mission, and was to go from Signilskär to Grisslehamn across the Ålands hav sea with the Grodno Hussars. General Knorring's orders stated:³¹

'His Imperial Majesty, having particular confidence in the choice of units, which I have the honour to command, has destined them to accomplish a famous feat, for which there is no precedent in history: we are to cross the icy mass of the frozen sea, such that, by invading central Sweden itself, we shall force the enemy to sue for peace and return swiftly to our beloved fatherland. I am certain that with such beneficial intentions from your Tsar, you will overcome all obstacles with diligence; in this expedition, the honourable officers and soldiers will have to work hard, but it is unsurprising for the Russian army to triumph over nature itself, out of love for their Monarch and the glory of the armed forces.'

On the night of 6 to 7 [18 to 19] March, Hirsch's, Grothuß's and the colonel-in-chief's squadrons, having been assigned to the campaign, assembled on Signilskär; Major Hirsch took command of them.³² Before they departed, Yakov Petrovich issued a famous order, preserved for posterity:

'God is with us! I shall be leading you, Prince Bagration is behind you. At two o'clock in the morning, assemble at the mill. The march to the Swedish coast shall crown all our efforts. Honour and immortal glory are the true reward of these waters! Have two *charka* [250 millilitres] of vodka per man, a piece of meat and bread and two *garnets* [6.56 dry litres] of oats with you. The sea holds no fear for those who trust in God. Get some rest, comrades!'

At three o'clock in the morning Kulnev set off from Signilskär. The extremely cold but calm weather favoured the detachment, which marched cheerfully and briskly across the frozen surface of the sea. The long, snake-like column stretched across the vast crystal plain, dotted here and there with granite outcrops, filling the dead silence of the ice with their battle songs. The detachment moved along in the fresh tracks made by the recently passing Swedes: the Cossacks and flankers went in front, followed by the Grodno men and Ural *Sotnia*; an hussar platoon made up the rearguard. The way was marked by heavy baggage, fragments of weapons, cartridges, knapsacks and ammunition abandoned by the enemy during their retreat. Although the ice was strong, there

30 Major K.F. Lüders' descendants still have a small brass plaque that belonged to the Signilskär station destroyed by the hussars.

31 Military Science Archive, No. 4418.

32 There were 72 men in Hirsch's squadron and 50 men each in the *Leib*-Squadron and Grothuß's. Sh.R. Nazimov was commanding the colonel-in-chief's squadron.

were holes in places in its snow-white surface, harbingers of an imminent breach, which had to be guarded against, especially at night: this was partly the reason for the slowness of the cavalry advance before dawn. The accumulated ice of the Ålands hav was crossed in the course of eight hours and eventually the black cliffs of the Swedish coast emerged from the fog in the distance. A thunderous hurrah greeted them from Kulnev's detachment!.The Swedish pickets stationed by the shore could not comprehend the meaning of this often heard cry, the accompaniment to every blow from Russian soldiers: officers and jägers stood-to on the shore and saw the head of the Russian column's vanguard on the endless white plain. The Swedish jägers moved a *versta* [$\frac{2}{3}$ miles] away from the shore and opened fire. Kulnev, who had galloped up, quickly surveyed the enemy positions and deployed his forces: the Cossacks formed a loose screen, behind them, 200 paces away were the Grodno squadrons in a single wave; the Ural men remained in reserve. Having formed the detachment, Kulnev gave the signal with the cry: "God is with us!" and the entire detachment rushed forward. The Grodno men attacked frontally, the Cossacks enveloped the Swedish flanks and rear: the enemy were driven back in an instant and pursued to the rock-strewn shore, behind which the defeated jägers hid from sabres and lances. Kulnev had 86 prisoners fall into his hands; a mass of wounded and dead lay on the ice, staining the snowy surface of the bay with blood.

The Swedes, meanwhile, consolidated behind the coastal cliffs, rocks and trees. Seeing the impossibility of seizing control of the shore by brute force, Kulnev brought up the Ural men, excellent marksmen, and sent them to drive the enemy jägers out of the forest located at the entrance to the bay. Some of the hussars formed up in a single rank, while the rest formed a column, and dismounted thus giving the detachment the appearance of being more numerous, which was also facilitated by the unevenness of the ice in these places. Yakov Petrovich, having reorganised the detachment, sent a *parlementaire* to the commandant of the town of Grisslehamn (*Överste* Friederici) demanding the surrender of the town to the 'Russian vanguard.' Friederici knew of Kulnev by reputation, and he was familiar with this commander's reckless valour and courage: having no reason to doubt that other units were following the hussars, he sent *Överste* Schulzheim to tell Kulnev that the town would surrender. The squadrons immediately concentrated and occupied Grisslehamn, from where on that same day Kulnev sent the following dispatch to Prince Bagration: 'Thanks be to God - the honour and glory of the Russian army on the shores of Sweden. I am singing in Grisslehamn with the army: We praise Thee, God!'³³ Thus, Arakcheev's plan was completely successful, thanks to Kulnev: the Russian detachment was in Sweden, 100 *versta* [67 miles] from Stockholm. The squadrons set up a bivouac on the main road, sending patrols into the interior of the country; that same evening, the appearance of 'Kulnev's Hussars' on Swedish soil became known in the capital.

The detachment's situation, however, was extremely dangerous and was becoming worse every hour for two reasons: the first was that the Swedes could at any moment send such forces against it that it would not be able to defend itself; the second was a change in the weather. There were severe frosts until 6 [18] March, but on 7 [19] March, in the evening, a thaw began and gentle rain was falling on a southerly wind. With such winds and a thaw the ice would break up very easily, and the unreliability of the ice made the presence of the weak detachment in Sweden extremely dangerous; in the words of one contemporary author, 'it was like the situation of a wolf caught in a dog kennel: they would simply seize him with their own jaws.' Kulnev sent Cornet Glebov to General Knorring with a report on the detachment's situation and prepared to engage any threat that could be repelled. The response arrived on 8 [20] March; Yakov Petrovich was ordered to return to Signilskär immediately. The squadrons returned to Åland at six o'clock in the evening with great difficulty. The sea had opened up in some places and the ice crust across the bay was cracked everywhere; there were places on the way back that had to be bypassed by moving around three *versta* [two

33 Prince Bagration forwarded this typical dispatch to the Tsar (report dated 7 [19] March, Military Science Archive, No. 1672).

mile] in another direction. Having made a halt in Signilskär, the Grodno men arrived in Frebbensby by the morning of 9 [21] March, having completed a march that seemed unthinkable with the loss of just four men.³⁴

When the Emperor was informed of the expedition, awards poured out from his generous right hand: Kulnev was granted the rank of major general and received the Order of St. Anna, 1st class, Hirsch receive the Order of St. George, 4th class; *Rittmeister* Grothuß, *Stabs-Rittmeister*: Nazimov and Dyatkov, lieutenants: Escher, Apukhtin, Ilinsky, Ilokhovo, cornets: Romasenko, Nalyotov, Brenner, Stokolenko, Zaborovsky and Glebov, who all took part in the Grisslehamn expedition, were nominated for awards; *Junker*: Beckmann, Gutjahr and Krammer were commissioned as officers. In memory of this feat, all ranks serving in the detachment were awarded specially minted silver medals to be worn on a blue ribbon, and, in addition, the lower ranks were awarded two silver roubles per man.³⁵

Upon returning to the Finnish coast, Kirilenko's squadron was left in General Demidov's corps on the Åland Islands, while the others were transferred to Prince Bagration's corps in Åbo. At that time, the guns were still thundering in the far north and blood was being shed in Finland and Sweden, but for the Grodno Regiment, which had endured one of the most difficult campaigns of this century on its shoulders, the two-year war had ended. The regiment began to be reconstituted, the squadrons of which now, despite the minor combat losses, could not form five-files formation [per platoon]. The regiment did not reach such a state in 1814, after three-years of campaigning and the loss of more than 1,000 men, nor did it reach such a state in 1831, when a third of the regiment was lying in various hospitals from raging epidemics. The reason for such terrible losses of manpower and horses in the war of 1808 to 1809 were cold, wounds, deprivations of all kinds, diseases, infections and... our intendency service; of all these evils, the worst was the cold - the only deprivation to which the soldier could not get accustomed in the Finnish War. Convoys often rushed from St. Petersburg, but they were of little help to the regiment: they were either captured by Swedish partisans, or the sacks turned out to be full of junk.³⁶ A veteran of this war stated: 'The provisioning officials were happy when the Swedes captured their magazines, because they thus avoided all the checks, audits and reports. The cavalry horses had been completely weaned off eating hay, and even pasture was not always available.'³⁷ Soldiers and officers either bought their own food or ate fungi almost exclusively and died of dysentery. On 11 [23] May 1809, the Commander-in-Chief submitted accounts for provisions and forage to St. Petersburg: Colonel Gorgoli's squadron (*Rittmeister* Grothuß's) was owed 16,837 roubles 26 kopecks, the others presented claims for 11,853 silver roubles and 7,496 roubles 77 kopecks in banknotes, in addition to a separate account of the provisions not received;³⁸ all these accounts were checked by the authorities and found to be completely correct: the accounts showed what had been lost to, and captured from, the enemy everywhere. Many officers fed the men and horses entrusted to them at their own expense during their excursions, and had to bring their complaints to the attention of their superiors so that the refunding of cash spent, promised by the contemporary intendant's office, would be honoured by its officials.³⁹

This was the situation in which the regiment found itself during the war, when a soldier, in the words of the poet Runeberg:

34 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky; Colonel Khatov; Suchtelen, *Précis*; the Tsar's rescript to Kulnev; *Деяния русских полководцев* [The Feats of Russian Commanders]; Alexander I and his Contemporaries.

35 This medal, awarded to the Grodno participants to the tune of 191 copies, has now become a numismatic rarity. On the obverse is the monogram A I, while on the reverse: *За переход в Швецию. 1809 г.* [For the march into Sweden. 1809]. One copy of this medal was held in the collection of the Library of the General Staff.

36 F. Bulgarin, volume 5.

37 F. Bulgarin, volume 5.

38 Cases regarding assets and liabilities.

39 Lieutenant Matlen's report; Cases regarding assets and liabilities.

Frozen to the bone and starving,
Yet victorious in suffering.

However, there was not a single complaint from the Swedes or Finns about our hussars. The honesty of the commanders in this regard has become legendary in the conquered lands. The famous Finnish poet Runeberg recalls, for example: around Tammerfors bread was being baked for the Swedish army. Having learned of this, Kulnev sent hussars who captured 400 *pud* [6.5 tonnes] of baked bread. Whereupon the contractor complained to Yakov Petrovich that he had not received any money from the Swedish government. Kulnev, despite the fact that the bread could have been taken free of charge, immediately gave him all the money he had on him, and issued a receipt for the rest.⁴⁰

At the end of 1809, the regiment received reinforcements from Russia⁴¹ and the squadrons increased somewhat; by 1810 they still did not exceed seven files per platoon.

The actual combat losses of the regiment from 1808 to 1809 were as follows: one officer and 46 lower ranks killed or died of wounds; 13 officers and 62 lower ranks wounded; one officer⁴² and 26 lower ranks taken prisoner or missing in action.

The number of those who died from disease in hospital and during the campaign is unknown; among these was the first regimental commander of the Grodno Hussar Regiment, Stepan Matveevich Bibikov. Having fallen ill after the action at Ömossa, Colonel Bibikov never recovered and in October, to the general grief of the regiment, the honest worker to whom the regiment owed some of the glory acquired in 1807 passed away. The regiment, having learned of the terminal decline of his health, asked the dying man's brother, Lieutenant Bibikov 2nd, to pass on the regret and sympathy of all his fellow soldiers to their regimental commander. During the entire period of Bibikov's illness and until Colonel Shau took over the regiment on 27 November [9 December] 1809, the Grodno men were commanded by their senior field officer Colonel Davydov.

Upon the regiment's return from Åland, during its time in Åbo, many changes and events took place within the regiment: firstly, the regiment bade farewell to two comrades who had gained considerable fame in the war with the Swedes: Colonel Anselm de Guibours and Yakov Petrovich Kulnev, reassigned to the Army of Moldova. The former was not a unit commander in the regiment, since he arrived quite late and, in addition, was not very familiar with the Russian language. He had distinguished himself with the Grodno men at Ömossa and Lappfjärd, for which he received the Order of St. George, a Golden Sabre and twice received Monarch's Commendations,⁴³ and thereafter, as the leader of a raiding detachment, in Count Shuvalov's corps, at Torneå. He was an intelligent man of extraordinary courage, loved by his comrades for his cheerful nature, which never gave in to discouragement under any circumstances. His most important military exploits were: in May 1808, on the island of Kimitoön [Kemiönsaari], and then at Umeå in 1809, where Anselm was the only representative of the Grodno Regiment in Count Kamensky's corps. Count Buxhöwden was on the island of Kimitoön in May 1808, and Anselm, who had come to the Headquarters on official business, dined with the Commander-in-Chief. While everyone was sitting at the table, the Swedes, 1,200 strong, landed troops not far from the Commander-in-Chief's quarters. Anselm secured himself within the building with 20 privates and delayed the enemy, giving Count

40 Runeberg, Ensign Ståhl's Tales.

41 In June and October (monthly returns for 1809).

42 Lieutenant Sineokov.

43 Besides Anselm, the following also received Supreme Commendations: colonels Tursky, Shepelev, Bibikov and Davydov; majors Hirsch, Lüders and Silin; *Rittmeister* Grothuß and Kirilenko; Stabs-Rittmeister Kempfert; lieutenants Escher 2nd, Ilinsky 2nd and Nabel; cornets Apayshchikov, Kusovnikov and Glebov. Colonel Shepelev, during the course of the war, was promoted to major general and was also awarded the Order of St. Anne, 1st class (from service records).

Buxhöwden time to escape, and repelled every attack until Russian reinforcements arrived.⁴⁴ This action brought immediate fame to our comrade in arms; subsequent battles confirmed the opinions that had formed regarding Colonel de Guibours. When Count Kamensky was appointed commander-in-chief of the Army of Moldova, he asked the Tsar for permission to take Major General Kulnev and Colonel Anselm with him from the Grodno Regiment. Both of them distinguished themselves on the Danube in the campaign of 1810, but Anselm did not return to the regiment; Kulnev, however, arrived back in 1811, as the colonel-in-chief of the Regiment.

Yakov Petrovich left a legacy in Finland that any military leader would envy. His personality became legendary among the Finns, who still sing 'hussar general' songs about the Russian. Numerous legends and stories about Kulnev portray him not only as a 'destroyer of forces' as Zhukovsky called him, but, above all, also as a gentle, kind and noble soldier who knew how to win and who, in his time, knew how to be simply a man. In these manifestations of national poetry, in the verses concerning Kulnev, one does not see fear or hatred towards him, one sees affection. The famous Finnish poet Runeberg dedicated several heartfelt lines to the memory of our regimental hero in *Ensign Ståhl's Tales*, which, coming from the Swedish side may serve as the best characterisation of Yakov Petrovich Kulnev:

You should have seen his features!
There still hangs on many a hearth
Among the paintings of its kind,
The image of bearded mirth.

Come in closer, and then you see
The smile under the fur,
A glance, so open, warm and mild,
The soul of Kulnev precisely.

Such was his way, when he charged,
His sabre swung, cutting air,
But they say all this was changed,
On his return to rest.

Covered in his sheepskin coat,
Seen moving from farm to farm,
Lingering as a friend and guest,
Wherever he thought it best.

Barclay, Kamensky, Bagration,
To every son of Finland known,
And fierce combat was the norm
Wherever they might come.

But Kulnev was to us unknown,
Until the flame of war was lit,
Then like a storm at sea he came,
Scarce expected before he struck,

As lightning burst forth from the sky,
So novel and yet so mighty,
And was felt and not forgotten
From that first blow he struck.

44 I.P. Liprandi, notes on *Воспоминания Вигеля* [Memories of Vigel], p. 28; service records of Colonel Anselm de Guibours; Suchtelen, *Précis*.

They had fought throughout the day,
Tired Swedes and Russians alike.
They happily thought that all was done,
And sweetly slept at peace.

But as they lay in the bosom of sleep
And dreamed of forests gold and green,
A sentry shouted: "Stand to arms!"
And Kulnev stood before them.

And yet the Finnish army whole
Could not a soldier find,
Who did not hold old Kulnev dear
As if a brother in arms.

In his true light it is most sure
Old Kulnev was good as gold;
Some blame him now for liking his drink,
This was the fault of his heart;

His arm has long since fallen numb,
He died in battle, sword in hand,
Yet all around his glory lives on,
Lighting up his native land;

Now wherever they speak his name,
You hear "the brave" is said;
The Brave, a glorious name indeed
From a grateful nation!

(Extracts from Runeberg's *Koulneff*).⁴⁵

The Finns' sympathy for Kulnev was based on his courtesy, good nature and concern for their property. The robbery of placid locals drove him to such distraction that it was necessary for his true friends to ask him to refrain from cruel treatment of the culprits following the initial outburst of anger. Our officers and soldiers sincerely loved Yakov Petrovich despite his excessive severity towards the slightest violation of the laws of war. There was no mercy for those who committed offences: menacing orders, evil ridicule and reprimands rained down on such unfortunate subordinates, inspired by his caustic, sarcastic mind and often made service under his command simply unbearable.⁴⁶ But at the same time, his good nature and care for provisioning and for the soldiers' necessities earned him the love of everyone in his detachment. He stated: 'A soldier must be pure in honour, and in order to be entitled to restrain him from stealing someone else's property, he must not be in need anything: a hungry belly will not listen!' For the officers, Kulnev was an excellent comrade off duty, a cheerful and intelligent conversationalist, a devoted friend, capable of sacrificing everything for every fellow soldier, the type of hussars that Denis Davydov sang about.

In the Finnish campaign he showed himself to be a remarkable vanguard commander, tireless, vigilant and possessing the highest ability to immediately and correctly assess the advantages of the ground and the enemy position. Kulnev was the first rise in the bivouacs and the last to lay himself down. He liked to say: 'Do I not have the strength to let the army rest!' And indeed he slept little:

45 This translation, first published in the *Severnaya Pchela* in 1861, was kindly communicated to us along with other details about Kulnev by the author and well-known expert on Swedish literature, V.I. Golovin, who translated, among other things, Runeberg's poems about the war from 1808 to 1809, and Ensign Ståhl's Tales [my translation was taken from Runeberg's original in Swedish].

46 Denis Davydov, *Memories of Kulnev*.

‘He put on his uniform when the war began and took it off once peace was concluded.’⁴⁷ At night, after a difficult march, the tall, stooped figure of Yakov Petrovich would emerge in the vanguard screen as he did the rounds of the outposts, and woe then to anyone overcome by fatigue! Every Swedish soldier knew Kulnev and everyone was terribly afraid of the ‘hussar general’ whose very name became ‘a bad omen’ for the enemy.⁴⁸ As a person, Kulnev was somewhat reminiscent of Suvorov: he had similar quirks, similar eccentricities, but Kulnev’s oddities came from a cheerful sense of entitlement and from the unique, genuine originality of his character. His orders are especially reminiscent of the famous commander’s utterances in their concise style and typical brevity of expression of thought. Of these orders, the following have been preserved:

19 [31] January 1808. The cooks are to rise an hour earlier. After resting, washing, praying to God, comrades to your porridge! At first light - groom the horses; having eaten their oats - saddle up. No time to waste on pointless meetings, the head does not wait for the tail. Tomorrow we march. The headquarters will be at Kinovaysky church.⁴⁹

20 January [1 February] 1808. Whomsoever does well - tomorrow is a rest day, and God will grant better things ahead, where honour and glory are to be found. The headquarters will be in Krasny, where there should be two days of rest.⁵⁰

9 [21] June 1808. Immediate readiness to move. Do not send men away anywhere, give them strength with a strong porridge. A lot of provisioning officials have galloped up, demand everything from them that should be issued, and if they do not issue it, report to me. You cannot assume the stage length, you will go 100 *versta* [67 miles] if you go 30 [20 miles].⁵¹

In appearance, Kulnev was tall, thin and somewhat stooped; large eyes and an aquiline nose, a dark face framed by a black moustache and thick side-whiskers were the distinctive features of the physiognomy of our second colonel-in-chief.⁵² He was always dressed in uniform and wore simple soldier’s cloth. He always had a riding crop in his hand, which often served as his weapon. Despite his outward simplicity, Yakov Petrovich was a completely genteel man, had received a very serious education and excellent upbringing; this is how all his contemporaries, including Runeberg, portray him. The latter told Ya.V. Grot⁵³ that Kulnev, while at a ball in Jakobstad, had danced with the daughter of the merchant Roos; at the end of the dance, he asked this lady to take off her shoe and, having poured champagne into it, drank to her health in one gulp. This made a strong impression in the ‘hussar general’s’ favour, whom the Swedes honoured and entertained in every town. Perhaps this toast was the reason for Runeberg’s criticism of Kulnev, that he ‘loved hops’ while Yakov Petrovich, according to Davydov, ‘was not content with drinking, as were the hussars of that time.’

In May 1809, Kulnev left Finland for the Army of Moldova, accompanied to the border by all the officers from the regiment in the Nyland Occupation Corps. Yakov Petrovich’s own squadron was taken over by *Stabs-Rittmeister* Nabel.

The tedious existence in Finland continued until the beginning of 1810 and had its usual consequences: drunkenness, gambling and incessant duelling with swords. Although operations in the south of Finland were over, because it was still wartime, the authorities began to regard these peacetime diversions very strictly: Cornet Kolychev, who had called out Major Olshevsky and wounded him in the arm with a sabre, was arrested in February and sat in pre-trial detention in the

47 D. Davydov.

48 Bjoerlin, *Finska Kriget*; Runeberg, *Koulneff*.

49 Military Science Archive, No. 1647.

50 Military Science Archive, No. 1647. See Appendix VII for a facsimile of this Order of the Day.

51 Military Science Archive, No. 1642.

52 F. Bulgarin.

53 Ya. Grot’s papers, *Переезды по Финляндии* [Journeys Through Finland].

Sveaborg fortress until March 1813, until he was demoted to private by order of the Court Martial; Prince Drutskoy-Sokolinsky was imprisoned in the fortress in July for a similar offence and was released only in December 1811, at the request of Kulnev, but with loss of promotion rights or nominations for awards. This punishment, according to a submission by Colonel Rüdiger, was pardoned to the young officer only on 27 September [9 October] 1813 for distinction shown in 19 actions. When Prince Drutskoy died in 1816 as a lieutenant, his peers were lieutenant colonels and colonels and were hung with decorations. The most severe punishment for a duel, but this time with pistols, was suffered by Cornet Kazakevich, who killed his squadron commander, *Rittmeister* Zakrevsky: he was deprived of all social rights and exiled for life with hard labour.⁵⁴

In February 1811, the regiment finally left Finland and settled in the vicinity of Fellin [Viljandi], Livonia Governorate, where they were tasked with guarding the coast. Many officers who had served in the 1808 to 1809 campaigns left the regiment due to illness and wounds received in Finland; among them were the following distinguished personalities: Colonel Davydov, majors Lüders and Hildebrand, *Rittmeister* Domeyko, *Stabs-Rittmeister* Portsev, cornets Escher 2nd and Apayshchikov; eight officers were transferred to the Finland Garrison Battalions that were being raised, mostly as company commanders.

Despite the departure of many heroes of the Finnish campaign from the regiment and the three-year campaign from 1812 to 1814, where the regiment suffered almost incredible losses, the memory of the Swedish war has survived the years and has reached our day in the form of traditions and legends. The story of ‘the march across the sea’ passed down from generation to generation by lower ranks, in a distorted form of course, is known to many of the current lower ranks of the regiment as the most heroic feat accomplished by their forefathers. This ‘march across the sea’ in reality was the easiest of the regiment’s missions in the Finnish war, yet in the men’s minds it has overwhelmed every episode from the campaign; for the soldiers, the march across the Gulf of Bothnia with Kulnev has become the entirety of the war of 1808 to 1809.

Perhaps the old hussars kept silent about the difficult times they had gone through, preferring ‘the march’ which was more relatable to the listeners, to descriptions of the arctic campaign, scurvy, dysentery and every kind of hardship from which soldiers were dying. ‘The march’ was something gratifying, a bright page in our regimental history, a successful undertaking without bloodshed or loss, and ‘the march’ has remained an eternal legend, before which Siikajoki, Kuortane, Karstula, Alavo and Helsinge have faded into oblivion.

Back in the 1820s, there was a song about this crossing of the Gulf of Bothnia, now long-forgotten, that ended with the words:

... There you go, brothers, how you marched
Across the ice to the Swedish coast,
How you defeated the foe,
How you took Grisslehamn...⁵⁵

54 Service records and regimental monthly reports (Moscow Branch of the Miscellaneous Archive).

55 Passed on by N.I. Mikhailov from an interview with a veteran of the Grodno Regiment. The remaining words of this song are unknown.

CHAPTER 6.

Major General Shepelev leaves the regiment. - The new colonel-in-chief, Yakov Petrovich Kulnev. - Command of the regiment from 1810 to 1815. - Preparations for the Patriotic War. - The beginning of the campaign. - The action at Wilkomierz (Dziewaltów). - The regiment's movements until 3 [15] July and Kulnev's reconnaissance. - The action against General Saint-Geniès' brigade, at Druya. - Capture of a French convoy near Druya. - Skirmish near the village of Volyntsy. - Participation of the regiment in the Battle of Klyastitsy: outflanking the French position at Klyastitsy; pursuit of the enemy to Sivoshina; ambush at Boyarshchina; covering the retreat of the vanguard by the regiment to Golovchitsy; protection of the horse artillery. - Death of the regiment's colonel-in-chief, Yakov Petrovich Kulnev. - Memories of Kulnev. - Lieutenant Tsitlyadzev's achievement. - The action at the town of Svolny. - The first awards for 1812. - The First Battle of Polotsk: Lieutenant Mishkovsky's achievement; attacks by the squadron under Dyatkov, Lieutenant Colonel Silin and *Rittmeister* Kempfert. - Retreat to the village of Beloe. - The action at this village. - Reconnaissances in August and September. - The advance towards Polotsk. - The Second Battle of Polotsk: the attack by Rüdiger; the rescue of Count Wittgenstein surrounded by the enemy; the rescue of the St. Petersburg *Opolchenie*; the capture of two French squadrons and a Croat regiment. - The storming of Polotsk. - The participation of the regiment in the storming. - Regimental Priest Father Ovchinnikov and doctors Saveliev and Erzdorf.

In May 1811, Kulnev returned from Turkey, having been appointed colonel-in-chief of the Grodno Regiment, replacing Shepelev, who was discharged from service due to illness. Shepelev, not without regret, left the regiment he had raised, which he had led into battle so many times in recent years; for their part, the Grodno men retained the fondest memories of him. Everyone was saddened for the gentle, efficient colonel-in-chief, who did not have a single ill-wisher in his regiment, not a single man who had sought redress due to injustice or excess severity. Fate, however, would bring Shepelev back, reunited with his native Grodno Regiment at the end of 1812.

After Bibikov's death, Colonel D.I. Schau of the Yelisavetgrad Hussar Regiment was appointed regimental commander. Colonel Schau did not command the Grodno men for long: having joined the regiment in February 1811, he fell dangerously ill in May, and in November he resigned, having stayed with his unit for no more than five months. From this time until 1815 there was no regimental commander: this appointment was temporarily held in turn by almost all senior field officers during the three years of campaigning: Rüdiger, Olshevsky, Nabel, Hirsch, Bruzin, Silin and Prince Ipsilanty, supervised by the colonel-in-chief.¹ In 1811, during Kulnev's colonelcy, the latter personally dealt with the regiment's administration, with Rüdiger's assistance; later, that is, once the Patriotic War was underway, the commander's duties, became redundant with the presence of the colonel-in-chief: the regiment was in action every day, therefore there was no time to deal with dressing the ranks, while the young soldiers who replenished the regiment had been sent from Russia practically ready for service.

The year 1812, a bloody and memorable year for the regiment, found the Grodno men in Fellin. By that time, the friendly relations between Russia and France, which had begun after the Peace of Tilsit, were already greatly undermined. Postwar, Napoleon frequently began to violate the terms of the treaty of 1807; and the refusal to accept the continental system in relation to neutral powers by Emperor Alexander served as a pretext for the war for which France had long been preparing. Seeing Napoleon's preparations and the bringing of his army to a state of war, the Tsar decided to take defensive precautions. Among the directives from the Government, on 10 [22] November 1810, a decree was issued that in hussar regiments, within the two-battalion composition, only eight

1 From the records for 1812, 1813 and 1814.

squadrons were to be sent on campaign, while the remaining two, with the designation 'replacement' were to be left in their permanent quarters in order to replenish the active units.

In early 1812 the regiment was transferred to Telsche [Telšiai],² Kovno [Kaunas] Governorate and were quartered around the town in the villages of Iloki [Ylakiai], Zherany [Žarėnai], Plotiny [Plateliai], Vorny [Varniai], Kalvarija [Žemaičių Kalvarija], Olsiadi [Alsėdžiai] and Sałanty [Salantai]; the remaining two squadrons commanded by Major Hirsch, went to Riga, where they became part of the active army reserves. As soon as the Grodno Regiment had settled into its new positions, Kulnev took advantage of their proximity to the border to inspect the future theatre of military operations with all the officers. All the most important locations on the border had been studied and there was no place to their front that the hussars had not become familiar with.

In early [mid] May, in view of alarming rumours about a French invasion, Kulnev received instructions from Major General Kakhovsky, the divisional commander, which ordered the regiment, in the event of a sudden enemy offensive in great strength, not to engage them in combat, but to retreat to the Rossieny [Raseiniai], delaying them where possible; General Kakhovsky added: 'but if the enemy dares to desecrate the inviolability of our borders with forces not too superior, then, relying on Your Excellency's well-known discretion, I am confident that you will punish them for such insolence.'³ In order to deliver packages and acknowledge receipt of orders as quickly as possible, these same instructions ordered Kulnev to establish express mail posts from all forward outposts as far as Telsche and onwards to the corps headquarters; envelopes were to be carried at a normal pace, assuming five *versta* [3½ miles] per hour, while 'two quills' [двумя перьями] 'as quickly as possible.' Upon receiving these orders, the squadrons were immediately concentrated at Telsche, holding the Jurburg [Jurbarkas] road, and were positioned in such a way that they could reach the assembly area in Niemexen [Nemakščiai] at full readiness within 36 hours.⁴ Outposts were established all along the Prussian border by the cavalry in the Kovno Governorate, and consequently from our regiment, moreover, whose patrols were constantly scurrying around the vicinity of Telsche and Jurburg.

On 16 [28] May, there was a breach between France and Russia. It found all the forces of the Empire, although mobilised, over-extended along the western border. The Grodno Regiment, which formed part of I Infantry Corps (Count Wittgenstein's), was assigned to the vanguard under Major General Yakov Petrovich Kulnev, located in the town of Jurburg. On 24 May [5 June], an order was received that four squadrons were to be in Niemexen and the remainder in Batoki [Batakliai], but new orders followed, according to which this movement was cancelled: the entire regiment was transferred to Widulken [Viduklė], with one battalion ordered to assemble in Cheykishki [Čekiškė] in the event of an alarm, while the other was in Hoyragel [Ariogala]; the latter joined General Berg's detachment (*corps de bataille*).⁵ Kulnev wrote to Rüdiger:

'Order all squadrons to be at immediate readiness to move, so that they leave all their junk behind, that is, do not bring rags and foot-cloths with them. Disperse the trumpeters to their squadrons, but do not leave the music - take the music in my carriage. Make arrangements in Telsche such that you can abandon Telsche forever, but do not inform anyone of this. I hope that we will be attacked soon, but for Christ's sake do not mention this to anyone. Farewell.'⁶

2 In May, at the request of Yakov Petrovich, the regiment was transferred to Telsche. The regiment's strength in eight squadrons was: 36 officers, 80 non-commissioned officers, 1,033 combatant lower ranks, 25 trumpeters and 1,110 war horses (Military Science Archive, No. 1922 and No. 1857).

3 Log of Outgoing Documents (Military Science Archive, No. 1869), orders for Kulnev dated 7 [19] May.

4 Military Science Archive, No. 1857 and Kulnev's report No. 135, dated 20 May [1 June].

5 Quartering arrangements (Military Science Archive, No. 1922).

6 Kulnev's letter to Rüdiger dated 24 May [5 June] (Military Science Archive, No. 1647), the last few lines were in French.

Late May and early June [early to mid June] passed in this state of anxiety. On 11 [23] June, the *Grande Armée* finally crossed the Neman river via three bridges built near the city of Kovno, and at two o'clock in the morning Napoleon's leading units crossed the Russian border. The die was cast: the Patriotic War had begun. The hussar pickets calmly fell back from the river, keeping an eye on the enemy columns that were quickly forming up on the bank. The news of this event immediately reached Kulnev, from where, several hours after the crossing, in accordance with their instructions, a courier was already rushing to the corps headquarters 'as quickly as possible.'⁷

In accordance with the adopted plan, Count Wittgenstein immediately ordered the entire corps to retreat towards Vilna [Vilnius] via Wiłkomierz [Ukmergė] and Selok [*sic*]; the protection of the corps was entrusted to Kulnev, in whose rearguard were *Rittmeister* Kempfert, Dyatkov, Nazimov and Ilinsky, under the overall command of Lieutenant Colonel Silin.

Kulnev withdrew from Hoyragel towards Zheimy [Žeimiai], as the enemy were entering Jurburg; the entire corps, spread out over a large area, were drawing together towards Wiłkomierz by forced marches.⁸ On the morning of 16 [28] June, a patrol under Cornet Glebov of the Grodno Regiment discovered the enemy seven *versta* [4 $\frac{2}{3}$ miles] from Dziewałów [Deltuva] and immediately reported the foe's advance to Count Wittgenstein in Wiłkomierz. The corps commander sent *Rittmeister* Kempfert to face the advancing column with a squadron from the Grodno Regiment and a *Sotnia* of Cossacks, in order to reconnoitre their intentions and strength. Kempfert, who had closed up to the enemy, raced into the attack, crashed into some of the French cavalry and, having defeated them, on Kulnev's orders began to retreat through the forest towards his rearguard. Kulnev, making the most of the arrival of several horse artillery pieces, placed them in position, under escort by the Grodno Hussars. As soon as the enemy column, which had no artillery with it, emerged from the forest, it was pelted with canister shot from the horse artillery and some were thrown back into the forest in great disorder, while others scattered in all directions, pursued back to their infantry lines by the Grodno squadrons. By one o'clock in the afternoon the enemy had resumed their advance in six columns towards Dziewałów, but were rebuffed a second time by the rearguard infantry.

Once Kulnev had been informed that the main body had managed to cross the Swenta [Šventoji], he gave the signal to retreat: our regiment was assigned to shield the retreat, and flankers were scattered towards the enemy side, under the command of *Stabs-Rittmeister* Ostrogradsky, lieutenants Belyavsky and Postels. The squadrons deployed behind the flankers.

Near Wiłkomierz, once our infantry had managed to occupy the left bank of the river, the squadrons moved to attack. Both battalions dashingly attacked the enemy infantry and, having driven them back a *versta* [$\frac{2}{3}$ miles], began to cross in their turn under covering fire from the jägers.⁹ This was the Grodno Regiment's first clash with the French in the Patriotic War and the first blood shed in defence of Russian territory. In the action at Dziewałów, *Rittmeister* Kempfert, who 'held back the enemy with great courage and energy'¹⁰ at the beginning of the battle, was wounded by a bullet in the leg; despite his wound, Kempfert took part in a charge and remained with the squadron until he fell bleeding from his horse. Ten hussars were killed, two were wounded.

Of those who distinguished themselves in this action, Kulnev gave a particularly laudatory appraisal of Cornet Lizogub, about whom he wrote:

'Being constantly at my side, I employed him to real advantage, because, not being able to issue orders everywhere in person, it calmed my soul issuing them through this young and

7 The colonel-in-chief's aide-de-camp, Cornet Lizogub of the Grodno Hussars reported the French invasion.

8 Kulnev's report to Count Wittgenstein, dated 12 [24] June (Military Science Archive, No. 1855).

9 Count Wittgenstein's letter to the Minister of War (Military Science Archive, No. 1646).

10 Count Wittgenstein's report to the Tsar (Military Science Archive, No. 1776); Citations for awards for the action at Wiłkomierz.

efficient officer, and if military talents must wait their turn for promotion, then his qualities will remain hidden and will have no opportunity to emerge...'

In addition to Lizogub, every squadron commander and the above-mentioned flanker commanders were nominated for awards.

Following the Dziwałtów or Wilkomierz action, the regiment, continuing to follow the corps, as it retreated towards Sołoki [Salakas]; On 28 June [10 July], they crossed the Druya river with the rearguard; on 29 June [11 July], they moved up the left bank of the Dvina and halted opposite the Drissa fortified camp. During the entire period of this movement there were no skirmishes with the French, although the patrols stayed in contact with the enemy and several times large reconnaissance patrols had been sent out from the regiment along the left bank of the river (on 27 June [9 July], one squadron under the command of Prince Yashvili and others). There were no larger detachments; it was only on 25 June [7 July], that three squadrons from General Berg's detachment were sent to Dünaburg [Daugavpils], under the command of Major General Replin, in order to escort and protect convoys. These squadrons successfully rejoined the regiment on 30 June [12 July] in Pridruisk [Piedruja].¹¹ Count Wittgenstein, wishing to obtain reliable intelligence on enemy strengths and intentions, shielded behind the high ground at Druya, ordered the bridge opposite Drissa to be rebuilt on the night of 2 to 3 [14 to 15] July and instructed our colonel-in-chief to carry out a reconnaissance-in-strength the following day. On the morning of 3 [15] July, Kulnev and his vanguard crossed the river and sent Cossacks forward to scout out the area, followed by the Grodno Regiment, under Rüdiger's command. The Cossacks drove the French outposts from Druya and pursued them towards Onikszty [*sic*], where eight enemy squadrons were stationed. The Cossacks engaged them and continued the battle until Rüdiger arrived with his hussars.

Having learned that a French brigade was located in Onikszty, Rüdiger headed directly towards this village with the first battalion. The French, meanwhile, having noticed the Russian flankers, came out at a trot to engage them and chased them to the sandy hills where Rüdiger was waiting. The four squadrons of the first battalion, at a given signal, raced at the gallop at the enemy, drove them off with an attack to the front and flanks and pushed them back to the village of Litishki [*sic*], where the French rallied and reformed into four columns. There was a deep and steep-sided ditch in front of Litishki: behind it the enemy cavalry were positioned on the high ground.

Rüdiger then split them into three elements: Silin was to approach the ditch and high ground frontally, while behind him, in a chessboard formation, were the squadrons of the second battalion - Grothuß's, Nabel's, Davydov's and Ilinsky's, assigned to attack the flanks. General Saint-Geniès, commanding the French brigade, initially intended to resist Silin's four squadrons, but seeing that other hussar squadrons were racing towards his flanks behind the sandy hills, he turned about. Rüdiger and Silin crossed the ravine and moved after him, while the other battalion quickly outflanked the French. At Litishki, Saint-Geniès reformed his two regiments, the *11e chasseurs à cheval* and *10 Pułk Huzarów*, into line and dismounted some of the *chasseurs à cheval*, who opened fire on Silin's advancing battalion. Kulnev finally gave the signal for the decisive attack: thick dust rose across the entire sandy plain and the earth shook under the hooves of 2,000 horses. The Grodno squadrons surrounded the French and prevented the enemy regiments from finding any line of retreat: the enemy tried to rush towards the Dvina, but *Rittmeister* Grothuß had trapped their left flank, where Saint-Geniès himself was standing. The latter was knocked from his horse by Cornet Glebov, and surrendered to the young officer. Glebov offered Saint-Geniès his own horse, and led him out of the melee, not without difficulty: several Frenchmen, noticing the capture of their general, rushed to save him, but were cut down by *Junker* Kavelin, and non-commissioned officers Worms and Tomilov.¹² The clash of sabres and pistol shots mingled with the cries of those who,

11 Log of Outgoing Documents No. 96 and No. 97. Until 1 [13] July, one squadron held an outpost on the road between Pridruisk and the corps quarters in Gorbačova. They were relieved on 1 [13] July.

12 Count Wittgenstein's most humble reports (Military Science Archive, No. 1858).

having been knocked down, fell under the hooves of galloping horses; French curses and Russian oaths exchanged by the combatants resounded across the sandy plain, and only by these cries, in the swirling dust, could the fighters identify their own and their opponents. The French, overwhelmed and hacked to pieces by the Grodno Hussars, whose encirclement was becoming ever tighter, tried to fight back here and there, having gathered in groups, but squadron after squadron was crushed, and the enemy brigade, eventually defeated, after desperate resistance, raced away in disarray in the direction of the village of Chernevo.¹³

The entire road from the bank of the Dvina was strewn with corpses for a distance of 15 *versta* [10 miles];¹⁴ 144 men and three officers,¹⁵ in addition to General Saint-Geniès, remained in our hands. The total enemy losses amounted to 300 men; the wounded lay on the battlefield and were later picked up by the regiment, which had captured the brigade's trains that day and all General Saint-Geniès' correspondence including very important documents.¹⁶ Kulnev, having learned that significant enemy forces were heading towards Druya, but that there was no infantry between this place and Chernevo, at 11 o'clock in the morning led the regiment towards the Drissa camp.

The cavalry action at Druya cost us: Colonel Silin, *Stabs-Rittmeister* Ilinsky (gunshot), lieutenants Postels, Mishkovsky and Kusovnikov, and 58 lower ranks wounded or with contusions; 11 hussars and 35 horses killed. The Corps Chief-of-Staff, General Dovre [d'Auvray], wrote (in the War Diary):

‘This fine cavalry action, in which the Grodno regiment gave the first example of the brilliant conduct which would distinguished them throughout the campaign, cost us 12 killed.’¹⁷

Upon reporting this first victory for the Russian army over the French, the regiment was awarded three medal of distinction [Military Order medals] for each squadron;¹⁸ the action at Druya projected its hero, Lieutenant Colonel Rüdiger, in particular, revealing in him the abilities and talents of Kulnev's future successor.¹⁹ One modest hero is mentioned among those nominated for awards for this action - Regimental Auditor I.S. Petrov, whose name is thereafter found in every list of outstanding ranks for the regiment from 1812 to 1814. Being underemployed throughout the duration of the campaign, Petrov voluntarily became Kulnev's orderly, and after his death, Rüdiger's. During attacks and skirmishes, this ad hoc aide-de-camp transmitted orders under the most terrifying fire, following his colonel-in-chief closely, with the same composure with which he carried out his adjudication duties. Repeatedly wounded, Petrov left the regiment in 1816, having taken part in all the actions in which the Grodno Hussars distinguished themselves, where, as is

13 Count Wittgenstein's report to the Tsar (Military Science Archive, No. 1775).

14 Bogdanovich, History of the War of 1812, volume 1, p. 123-124 [English translation by P.G.A. Phillips].

15 Captain Mate, Lieutenant Doki, Cornet Talle.

16 Count Wittgenstein's dispatches to the Grodno Hussars; General Bismarck, Thoughts on cavalry tactics.

17 ‘*Cette belle affaire de cavalerie dans laquelle la régiment de Grodno donna les premières preuves de la conduite brillante qui le distingua pendant tout le cours de la campagne nous couta 12 tués.*’ D'Auvray, *Précis de op. milit. du I Corps*.

18 Letter to Count Wittgenstein from the Minister of War, dated 19 [31] July (Military Science Archive, No. 1855).

19 Major General Kulnev wrote in a report to Count Wittgenstein on this action: ‘The defeat was inflicted on two enemy regiments: *11e chasseurs à cheval* and *10 Pulk Huzarów*. In addition to those taken prisoner, of whom I am enclosing a list, the entire road is strewn with corpses all the way to Chernevo. In addition to those taken prisoner, 47 men died of wounds in Druya, and many, due to the lack of carts, were left on the road. I am duty bound to recommend to Your Excellency the especially valiant Rüdiger, who commanded the Grodno Hussar Regiment entrusted to me, to whom I owe this glorious and complete victory, and if the authorities take this outstanding feat into account, then I consider it a great justice to reward the worthy and brave Lieutenant Colonel Rüdiger instead of me, without whom I could not have achieved this complete victory.’ From Major General Kulnev's report No. 284, dated 3 [15] July. Count Wittgenstein added in his report to the Tsar: ‘This worthy and brave Lieutenant Colonel shows great potential to develop into a good and reliable leader upon promotion.’ (Military Science Archive, No. 1858).

evident from the citations, this official, with his composure, bravery and selflessness, often set an example for his combatant fellows.

Following the action at Druya, Kulnev's vanguard moved to Baliny on 5 [17] July, while I Corps was ordered to remain near Drissa, operating between the Dvina and Novgorod and covering Riga. In the event of having to retreat, they were ordered to withdraw towards Pskov via Sebezh.

At the commencement of his operations against Marshal Oudinot, in view of rumours of an intended French crossing of the Dvina, which would sever I Corps' communications with St. Petersburg, on 13 [25] July, Count Wittgenstein ordered Kulnev to prevent the enemy operation with a spoiling attack at Jakobstadt [Jēkabpils]. As early as 6 [18] July, Rüdiger had tried to distract the enemy with a feint attack at the Tovasha estate with four squadrons, but the weak strength of the cavalry detachment did not draw the attention of the French; the second battalion was busy maintaining outposts in Pridruisk, Gorbačova and Krasław [Krāslava] and could not help the former.²⁰ This dispersal of the regiment was the cause of constant complaints from Kulnev, who in many reports to Count Wittgenstein asked for the Grodno Hussars to be released from maintaining outposts and convoy escort duties.²¹ On 13 [25] July, all the squadrons were finally concentrated and Kulnev, having sent several patrols out in order to find the enemy, crossed the Dvina at Leonpol with both battalions. On the morning of 14 [26] July, part of the regiment attacked a convoy in the vicinity of Druya, escorted by a force of 1,500 men, who fled after a successful charge by the Grodno Hussars. The convoy, together with several ammunition caissons, two officers and 450 lower ranks, fell into the hands of the hussars, who presented them to the corps headquarters;²² another patrol captured an outpost near the village of Chernevo.²³

On 14 [26] July, Kulnev returned to the right bank of the Dvina, and on 16 [28] July, having crossed the Drissa river, he clashed with enemy cavalry and Corbineau's division, who were shielding Macdonald's movements. Our flankers, who were at the head of Kulnev's detachment, five *versta* [3½ miles] from Volyntsy, ran into the French near the village of Filipovo, whose cavalry, consisting of 8 *Pulk Ulanów* and 7e and 20e *chasseurs à cheval*, pushed our flankers back, but halted upon seeing the mass of Grodno Hussars debouching. Kulnev, having summoned up [the replacement] squadron of Lifeguard Hussars and several *Sotnia* of Cossacks from Platov 4th's regiment, threw his two battalions at the French. The impact at close quarters was all the more successful because the enemy did not have time to get their horses to full gallop: 12 French squadrons were defeated by ours and driven back to the village of Volyntsy, where the enemy halted and rallied. There would be no decisive clash near this village, but isolated skirmishing continued until late in the evening; at night the French cavalry retreated along the Polotsk and Disna roads, having lost three officers, a doctor and 167 lower ranks.²⁴ These prisoners brought the number of French captured by the regiment, between 3 to 17 [15 to 29] July, to 10 officers and 2,000 lower ranks.²⁵

During these events, Oudinot had occupied Klyastitsy, advancing towards St. Petersburg. Count Wittgenstein decided to fix the Marshal at this village, to which end on 17 [29] July, he moved from Rasitsy through Kokanovichy with his entire corps, sending Kulnev ahead from Volyntsy towards Sokolishche. Kulnev quickly marched to the Svolna river with the vanguard and, having moved his detachment across the river on a fragile bridge near this village, set off for Sokolishche via

20 Dovre, *Précis*.

21 Reports dated 6, 8 and 11 [18, 20 and 23] July.

22 Operations by the regiment in the campaigns from 1812 to 1814 have been described from the Notes or War Diaries given to the regiment by Count Wittgenstein. This document, signed by the Count and stamped with his seal, was kept in the regiment's treasury box-cart.

23 Kulnev's report No. 298, dated 14 [26] July.

24 Kulnev's reports No. 299 and No. 300, dated 16 [28] July (Military Science Archive, No. 1855 and No. 49585).

25 War Diary.

Yakubovo on 18 [30] July.

While Kulnev, having been delayed by the difficult crossing, was halted near the Svolna, Oudinot, had reached Klyastitsy in person at 11 o'clock in the morning and having no intelligence on the Russian forces, settled his corps in bivouacs near this location, under the protection of an infantry regiment placed on the Sebez road from Legrand's division, pushed up to the village of Yakubovo. Meanwhile, the Grodno Regiment, which had been at the head of the Kulnev's detachment the entire time, halted at the village of Olkhovoe [*sic*], sending two squadrons to the village of Yakubovo (lying ahead of Klyastitsy) in order to scout the village. These squadrons (Major Nazimov's and *Stabs-Rittmeister* Ilinsky's) crossed the forest, through which the main road runs, and approached the village at the trot. In Yakubovo the French evidently were not expecting to be attacked, but when the flankers appeared, the drums sounded the alarm and men rushed to their weapons. According to local legend, the negligence was such that Marshal Oudinot was calmly shaving by the window and was one of the first to notice the blue hussars emerging from the forest in the distance. Upon being engaged with volleys, the squadrons retreated to the Olkhovoe forest; at this time, the infantry from Kulnev's vanguard, moving up behind the Grodno Hussars, were already forming up at the edge of the forest in battle formation to attack Yakubovo.

The famous three-day action at Klyastitsy had begun. Kulnev, who had galloped to the forest exits, formed his battalions and led an attack on the village with his entire force; the Grodno Regiment were left as a reserve to the left of the Klyastitsy road. Hand-to-hand combat, first in front of Yakubovo, then in the village itself, began to flare up with terrifying ferocity and lasted with varying fortunes until 11 o'clock in the evening; single shots crackled here and there until late into the night.

The Grodno Hussars, just as Doumerc's French cuirassiers, were unable to take an active part in the fighting around Yakubovo due to the nature of the terrain. It was only at seven o'clock in the afternoon, as Oudinot was attacking the 25th Jäger Regiment, stationed in the centre of the position, with all his might, that two squadrons - it was impossible to deploy more - were transferred to the right side of the main road in support of the jägers. The role of the hussars on 18 [30] July was limited to this support, limited attacks and flank protection. Count Wittgenstein arrived in the evening with the formations of I Corps. The hussars, relieved by fresh regiments, were sent to the left wing with orders to prevent any attempts by French cavalry patrols to pass through the forest to the flanks of the Russian position.

At dawn on 19 [31] July, the Russian infantry began their offensive. Their bravely conducted attacks made it possible to seize the houses in the village, and then the manor house,²⁶ which was defended by the French with particular tenacity. Witnessing this initial success, Count Wittgenstein brought General Kozachkovsky up from the reserves, who was to be supported by the first battalion of the Grodno Regiment; on the left flank, the remaining squadrons manoeuvred between the forest and the end of the enemy line, simultaneously protecting their units from being outflanked.

The French, driven out of Yakubovo, retreated in good order towards Klyastitsy and fortified themselves on the right bank of the Nishcha river in a fairly strong position in front of the village. The new French locations were very convenient for defence: there was a river to their front, not deep, yet not fordable, commanding high ground and, finally, houses behind which significant forces could be concealed. The only bridge across the Nishcha, which could have been used to attack their positions, was under fire from French batteries and marksmen ensconced in the buildings in the village of Klyastitsy.

Count Wittgenstein, who was pushing the enemy back from Yakubovo itself, decided to take control of the village, but, not wanting to expose his units to crossfire during a frontal attack on the

²⁶ This house, just as was the estate at Klyastitsy (Vitebsk Governorate, Polotsk *Uezd*) belonged to Member of the State Council and Active Privy Councillor P.P. d'Ubri [Oubril].

Klyastitsky bridge, he tried to force Oudinot to abandon his impregnable position by outflanking it. To that end, Kulnev, who was stationed not far from the village of Gvozdovo (400 *sazhen* [933 yards] from Klyastitsy) with the Grodno Regiment, was ordered to find a crossing over the Nishcha river a little upstream of Gvozdovo and prepare a flanking movement by Russian units. The colonel-in-chief descended to the Nishcha, but it turned out that due to the swampy nature of the banks at this point, there was no way to ford the river, so he had to look a little further, about a 100 *sazhen* [230 yards]. As soon as a suitable place was found, Kulnev pushed into the water himself, crossed the Nishcha and began to form his squadrons up on the French right flank.²⁷

Oudinot was watching the cavalry movements from afar. Having learned that the Russians were setting up a crossing at Gvozdovo, he realised that he would not be able to hold out in Klyastitsy: whereupon he gave the order to set fire to the bridge and began to prepare to retreat. At that moment, Russian troops attacked the enemy from two directions: from the front, the infantry raced across the burning bridge and attacked, while on the flank, our colonel-in-chief began his attack. Having been driven out of the village, Oudinot hastily abandoned Klyastitsy and pulled his columns back along the Polotsk road. This was exactly what Kulnev had been waiting for. As soon as the leading units had emerged onto open ground, all eight squadrons chased after the French.

The exhaustion of the Russian troops after the fighting forced them to halt not far from Klyastitsy; Kulnev was sent after the enemy with the Grodno Hussars, elements of the Riga and Yamburg dragoon regiments and one battalion from 14th Division; his entire artillery consisted of four horse artillery pieces. The colonel-in-chief was ordered to drive the defeated Oudinot as far as possible but not to engage in serious combat before the main body could reach him, that is, until eight

o'clock the next day. Yakov Petrovich pressed on after the enemy throughout the evening, who, abandoning many vehicles and prisoners along the way, crossed the Drissa river at Sivoshina and settled down near the village of Boyarshchina by nightfall.²⁸ Facing them, on the right bank of the Drissa, Kulnev set up his bivouacs: the infantry were absolutely unable to go any further, and the cavalry horses, blown from the charges and clashes, urgently needed rest.

On 20 July [1 August], having roused his detachment before dawn, the impatient Kulnev crossed the Drissa and halted, waiting for the appointed hour for the attack, but as soon as the sky was completely light, our colonel-in-chief, carried away by the success of the previous day, with the courage and passion that constituted the defining features of his character, decided, contrary to the instructions issued to him, to press on. The road that Kulnev took, that is, from Sivoshina to Boyarschina, stretches along a slight elevation among swamps overgrown with scrub and small woods; it is a long, narrow, almost straight embankment in a boggy swamp, a defile of sorts ending with high ground at Boyarschina. Kulnev's vanguard set off along this road at four o'clock in the morning on 20 July [1 August]. Cossacks led the way, followed by echelons of cavalry and infantry. As the Cossacks began the climb towards Boyarshchina, they were caught in a crossfire from enemy artillery stationed on the high ground near this village, and were driven back. Kulnev, believing that the enemy were only trying to win some time and delay his advance through skirmishing, sent the rest of his cavalry up with four horse artillery pieces in order to support the Cossacks. As they emerged from the forest, the squadrons moved forward at the trot, while the guns, turning off the road into a small clearing, opened fire on the enemy position, on the crest of which French troops, hitherto unnoticed, began to appear. The situation was becoming extremely grave: ahead was a narrow causeway, along which it was only passable in threes, while it was overgrown with scrub on either side and there was no space to turn around. As soon as the Russian

27 This moment is depicted in Hesse's famous painting, the Battle of Klyastitsy, a copy of which was presented to the regiment by G.L. Essen.

28 During the pursuit, a huge number of prisoners, ammunition caissons and carts were captured (Brief Biography).

column closed in, the skilfully camouflaged batteries sited on the commanding high ground suddenly opened fire on the troops crowded on the causeway, while the French *chasseurs*, having made their way stealthily through the marshy forest, approached the road from both sides and began shooting at the horsemen at close quarters. Musketry began to crackle on all sides: the cavalry had been ambushed. Three horse artillery pieces had been knocked out before they could recover, the Cossacks, swept away by small-arms fire, retreated as one, while from behind, from near Sivoshina, the infantry, unaware of what was happening in the defile, pressed en masse against the stunned cavalry.

The colonel-in-chief realised then the full horror of the situation. Rallying his men, he tried to break through, but he needed to clear the front in order to attack. Ahead of him, the dead, the wounded, and the bodies floundering in the mud blocked the narrow road; getting around the wreckage was out of the question: the horses in the nearby swamp could barely move at a walk. Kulnev sent for heavy guns from General Sazonov, who was following him, but it was too late; the entire column was in full retreat. Some of the company, hurrying to get back across the Drissa, managed to reach the bridge, while others were tipped into the river when the vanguard reached the banks. Kulnev feverishly brought the rest of his force into order: eight horse artillery pieces that had reached the scene were already positioned on the high ground behind the river at Sivoshina, while the Grodno Regiment was assigned to protect them. Then he shouted to Rüdiger: “see, this is worse than at Oravais!” Indeed, Marshal Oudinot, against whose entire corps the vanguard was now struggling, decided not to let Kulnev’s small detachment off the hook. Part of his force, which had crossed the Drissa before the Russians, were already outflanking the vanguard position, while a deep column was moving forward along the causeway towards the position.

Once Kulnev had seen the enemy on his flank, he galloped to the Grodno Hussars and, in a desperate, hoarse voice, shouted: “Victory or death... for the Tsar and for the Fatherland... Friends, follow me!” Led by Kulnev and Rüdiger, the Grodno Regiment dashed forwards and crashed into the outflanking French column with the entire mass of its squadrons. Neither at Friedland nor in the Finnish war had the hussars carried out such an attack: the nervous excitement resulting from what they had experienced in the Sivoshina swamps, the sight of comrades who had fallen victim to an ambush, the places where they had suffered defeat, put the men into an indescribable rage; one of the guidons was dropped twice with non-commissioned officers killed carrying it in this terrible carnage; Lieutenant Grothuß 2nd, brother of the squadron commander, a youth full of life and strength, had cut deep into the midst of the French, was stabbed by bayonets and fell onto the fallen enemy corpses, dying in the attack; *Stabs-Rittmeister* Ilinsky 1st sustained several wounds to the chest and legs, and was felled by a broadsword blow, being saved from death only by the courage of non-commissioned officer Zhalily. The hussars, who had leaped into the French battalion squares with Kulnev, advanced further and further, clearing the position of Oudinot’s pursuing units...

But the vanguard, still under enemy pressure, were forced to continue their retreat once more; the regiment returned with great difficulty, leaving Cornet Prince Vadbolsky captured and in enemy hands;²⁹ the horse artillery pieces were withdrawn from their positions and the hussars were again entrusted with saving the detachment. A dense screen of flankers spread out from the Grodno Regiment, holding back the infantry onslaught with frequent counter-attacks, but beyond Sivoshina, Doumerc’s cavalry appeared on our flank. Noticing the horse battery’s weak escort, they rushed toward the guns, and the clash with the Grodno Regiment began anew. Eventually, even this attempt was repulsed by the response from the hussars, the cuirassiers were driven back, and the regiment, forming the rearguard of Kulnev’s detachment, continued its challenging retreat.

Saddened and distraught, Kulnev got off his horse and walked with the tail-end ranks of the

²⁹ On 5 [17] August, there was a request regarding Prince Vadbolsky, whom many believed had been killed, but the *chef d’état-major* of the French *2e Corps* informed Rüdiger that said officer was in captivity and had been surrounded and taken by French cavalry during an attack, as witnessed by General Legrand.

regiment together with Rüdiger. Having halted to issue orders, Kulnev was approaching one of the guns when a random round shot severed both his legs above the knee. Rüdiger, spattered with the hero's blood, caught the unfortunate colonel-in-chief, who, with his dying words, said to the hussars rushing to him: "Friends... save the Fatherland! Do not give up an inch of ground... victory awaits you!" Then, turning to his old comrade-in-arms, F.V. Rüdiger, and pointing to the St. George's Cross: "Take it off... do not let the enemy know that they have killed a Russian general!" These were the colonel-in-chief's last words. The body of the brave and honourable victim was picked up by the hussars and carried to the infantry column where the infirmary wagons were located.

Meanwhile, Doumerc's cuirassiers, driven back by the regiment, were quick to return. Rüdiger was the first to spot the enemy: he turned to the hussars and called in a loud, energetic voice, pointing to the approaching squadrons: "Brothers, we shall avenge our commander!" The regiment did not answer, but as one man, needing no words of command, they rushed towards the armoured men. The enemy, racing towards the battery, were welcomed by sabres, driven back and cut down by the regiment; there was no quarter for anyone, indeed, the men were deaf to anyone asking for mercy: all humanitarian feeling had been extinguished in them. A pile of enemy corpses, a multitude of galloping, riderless horses - this was the regiment's response to the call from its commander.

Count Wittgenstein had long since departed Klyastitsy when Kulnev's protegee, Cornet Lizogub, galloped in with news of what had happened. Having taken up positions at Golovchitsy, the Count engaged the enemy between the Nishcha river and this village. The regiment, exhausted by the fighting it had been involved in, was no longer able to endure the onslaught of the advancing French corps; upon arriving in Golovchitsy, they were transferred to the reserve by order of Count Wittgenstein.³⁰ There they got to witness the complete defeat of the French vanguard, which repeated the same errors that had destroyed Kulnev. On 16 [28] August, in reporting to the Tsar about the Klyastitsy victory, the corps commander wrote:³¹

'Having placed heavy and horse artillery pieces in the defiles, the fearless General Kulnev strove to hold the enemy back with the Grodno Hussar Regiment and the rest of the artillery, as the foe dashed with their entire corps towards our vanguard in order to destroy it. Having received the unpleasant news of this very unexpected event, I immediately moved up with the front and support lines, having learned on the march that the brave Major General Kulnev had been killed by round shot and that, despite the resistance of the Grodno Regiment, the enemy were getting closer and closer...'

Having learned of the defeat of his vanguard at Golovchitsy, Oudinot retreated towards Polotsk at dusk.

The three-day battle from 18 to 20 July [30 July to 1 August], known to history as the Battle of Klyastitsky and for which the regiment later received the honorific title the Klyastitsky Regiment, cost them dearly: during these days they lost: colonel-in-chief Major General Kulnev and Lieutenant Baron Grothuß 2nd killed; *Stabs-Rittmeister* Ilinsky 1st, Lieutenant Gutjahr (by gunshot) and Cornet Smorodsky, badly wounded; and Cornet Prince Vadbolsky taken prisoner. Killed and badly wounded lower ranks reached 22 in total, and 43 horses were lost; there were a great many suffering contusions or other light wounds.

The Battle of Klyastitsy was the first victory of Russian arms over French forces, and news of the outcome of this action quickly spread throughout Russia. Kulnev's heroic death, a man of the

30 Bogdanovich, History of the Patriotic War of 1812; Dobre, *Précis*; Most humble report No. 26; I.P. Mikhailov's dispatches; Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Alexander I and His Contemporaries; The Life of the Valiant Major General Kulnev; Regimental War Diary; Colonel Lebedev, Memoirs of Count Rüdiger; V.V. Krostovsky, History of the Yamburg Regiment; Complete Collection of Worthy Anecdotes from the wars of Russia and France, volume 1, St. Petersburg, 1814; *Kurze Biographie des Grafen von Rüdiger*.

31 Count Wittgenstein's report to the Tsar, dated 16 [28] August (Military Science Archive, No. 1848).

highest degree of popularity and to whom the wars of 1808 to 1810 brought a special, characteristic fame, gave this battle even more significance. On the day the news of the Klyastitsy victory reached the capital, the opera *Old Christmastide* was being performed at the theatre. When the actress Sandukova, playing Nastasya, finished singing *Glory to God in Heaven, Glory!* she approached the footlights and slowly began to sing in a quiet, trembling voice:

“Glory to the brave General Kulnev,
Who laid down his life for the Fatherland. Glory!”

The entire theatre burst into tears along with the singer.³²

None of his comrades blamed Kulnev for the defeat between Sivoshina and Boyarshchina: the unfortunate man paid with his life for his ardour. When the colonel-in-chief was buried in Sokolishche, the corps formed up in full force to pay their last respects to the hero: the hussars laid their beloved commander to rest, over whose grave the regimental priest, Father Ovchinnikov, delivered a short but heartfelt sermon: ‘everyone wept, many were sobbing bitterly’³³ as the Pastor finished his eulogy.

Kulnev left no fortune: he was very poor and had given everything he earned through his service to his elderly mother. As Kulnev always told his fellow soldiers: ‘I live like Don Quixote, a knight-errant of mournful appearance; no pale, no estate, but you are most welcome: necessity is the mother of invention. I shall treat you to whatever God has provided.’³⁴

He was adored by the regiment, whose needs he never forgot, but his main concern, his hobby-horse, was the soldier’s food: one of his first Orders-of-the-Day to the vanguard,³⁵ which remains in original among Count Rüdiger’s papers, begins with the statement: ‘One well-fed soldier is better than ten lean ones...’ In memory of Kulnev’s death and the Battle of Klyastitsy, the soldiers composed a song that they sang throughout the Napoleonic Wars; it ended with the verse:

Our great man was lost,
By rogues Kulnev was killed,
And yet you paid the cost:
With butchery were billed.
How many fellows will you miss?
Your ranks thinned by the score,
How many felt the sabre’s kiss?
And bayonets wounded sore!³⁶

It was not just his subordinates, but all his contemporaries that paid due tribute to the memory of their colonel-in-chief: Napoleon hastened to inform France ‘that General Kulnev, one of the most distinguished (*très distingué*) Russian light cavalry officers, has been killed at Drissa.’³⁷ Zhukovsky sang of him in the verses of *The Singer in the Camp of Russian Warriors*, while Yakov Petrovich’s captives, Löwenhielm and Saint-Geniès, upon learning of his death, spread glowing appraisals of the valiant hero everywhere.³⁸

Immediately after Kulnev’s funeral, a kind of monument was quickly erected from stones, which was later replaced by a large permanent gravestone. The spot where Kulnev was killed is still known to Klyastitsy residents, who remember the death of the ‘famous general’ there.³⁹ Lieutenant

32 M.I. Pylyaev, *Theatre in 1812 (Istorichesky Vestnik, September 1883).*

33 Mikhailov’s dispatches.

34 Bogdanovich, *Patriotic War*, volume 1, p. 249.

35 Military Science Archive, No. 1647.

36 Wessel and Albrecht, *A Collection of Soldiers’ Songs*, St. Petersburg, 1875.

37 *12e Bulletin de la Grande Armée* (Military Science Archive, No. 1765).

38 Denis Davydovich.

39 Kulnev was killed in the very area of the Vitebsk Governorate where he had been born. He was born in 1763 and

Grothß's body rests next to his colonel-in-chief.

After Kulnev's death, command of the regiment passed to Lieutenant Colonel Fyodor Vasilievich Rüdiger, a brave, decisive and efficient officer. Although the appointments of colonel-in-chief and commander remained vacant, Rüdiger carried out both duties until October, whereupon he was confirmed as colonel-in-chief of the Grodno Regiment by Supreme Orders; as mentioned previously, we had no regimental commander until the end of the campaign.

On 21 July [2 August], the regiment became part of the vanguard commanded by Major General Helffreich sent after the retreating enemy. The vanguard, having reached Beloe, halted, sending reconnaissance patrols out towards Disna, Polotsk and Nevel. Meanwhile, Count Wittgenstein, having received intelligence on Oudinot's retreat beyond the Dvina and the appearance of Macdonald's corps at Dünaburg, transferred his corps from Sokolishche to the village of Rasitsy, from where he could turn against one or the other of the French marshals; Helffreich's vanguard, meanwhile, moved from Beloe towards Pokaevtsy, which they reached on 26 July [7 August], sending Lieutenant Colonel Rüdiger to the village of Volyntsy with four squadrons of the Grodno Regiment in order to monitor the Drissa river from that village as far as Sivoshina. At that time, Oudinot, who had been reinforced by a Bavarian corps (Wrede's), stationed in Beshankovichi, had already decided to go on the offensive towards Svolna and to change the hitherto unsuccessful course of events through this movement.

While Rüdiger was marching toward Volyntsy, strong detachments from the four remaining squadrons of the Grodno Regiment were sent out in all directions in order to take prisoners; the most remarkable sweep was carried out by Lieutenant Tsitlyadzev (with a patrol of 13 hussars), who, having encountered 40 Frenchmen in the vicinity of Drissa, attacked them and took them all prisoner; then, having forded the Dvina, they attacked a convoy transporting grain, escorted by 160 men with two officers, and captured both the convoy and the escort, losing only one hussar.⁴⁰ These prisoners revealed that the (Bavarian) *6e Corps* had arrived to assist Oudinot. At the same time, Rüdiger, who was near the village of Volyntsy with four squadrons, reported that strong enemy patrols had appeared on the left bank of the Drissa, some of which he had scattered. On 28 July [9 August], one of his squadrons reconnoitred the entire area north of the Drissa river, between the villages of Volyntsy, Kokanovichi and Tobolka, while on 29 July [10 August], in accordance with Count Wittgenstein's orders, Rüdiger's detachment rejoined the main body near the village of Kokanovichi, bringing their prisoners - 250 lower ranks and one officer.

On 30 July [11 August], General Dobre (temporarily commanding I Corps due to the illness of Count Wittgenstein), puzzled by the strange inaction of the French, who had crossed the Svolna and halted on the right bank of this river, ordered Helffreich to carry out a reconnaissance-in-force. They discovered that the French main body was on the left bank of the river, while on ours there was only cavalry and a small detachment of infantry occupying the village of Ostry-Konets and the

educated in the Land Cadet Corps, from where he was commissioned as a lieutenant in the Chernigov Infantry Regiment in 1785. In that same year, transferred to the St. Petersburg Dragoon Regiment, he took part in the Turkish War in 1789. After spending a year in the Pereyaslav Horse-Jäger Regiment, upon the disbandment of this regiment, Kulnev was transferred to the Sumy Hussar Regiment as a *Rittmeister* and went to form the Grodno Regiment in 1806 with his squadron from the Sumy Hussars.

40 General Bogdanovich, volume 1, p. 258; Major General Helffreich's report, dated 28 July [9 August]; War Diary; Count Wittgenstein's report No. 19 to the Tsar: 'Among those 400 prisoners I mentioned (in report No. 18), 200 were taken by Lieutenant Tsitlyadzev of the Grodno Hussar Regiment, sent on patrol with one non-commissioned officer and 12 privates, who, seeing 40 Frenchmen on this side of the Dvina, near the town of Drissa, swiftly charged them and, having disarmed them all, took them prisoner; then, having forded to the far side of the river, they attacked a convoy under escort from 160 men, and also swiftly charged them, disarmed them all and took them prisoner, along with two officers, while one hussar and two war horses were wounded. The decisive and courageous actions by this officer have prompted me to petition Your Imperial Majesty to grant him the Order of St. George, 4th class.' (Military Science Archive, No. 1858).

Svolna estate. These units were stationed with their backs to the river, having two bridges half a *versta* [583 yards] from each other for communications with the rest of the force. Dobre moved Rüdiger forward, supported by Platov 4th's Cossacks, in order to attack the enemy. The Grodno Regiment was split into three columns: Silin advanced frontally towards Svolna with four squadrons in two waves: in the first were *Stabs-Rittmeister* Ilinsky's and Lieutenant Zaborovsky's squadrons, in the second were *Rittmeister* Dyatkov's and Kozodaev's squadrons; the second column of two squadrons, commanded by *Rittmeister* Nabel, went towards the enemy right flank; *Rittmeister* Grothuß went towards the enemy left. Small mounted patrols had been sent out ahead of the regiment commanded by cornets Kusovnikov, Krammer, Vitkovsky and Worms, in order to harass the enemy and draw them out of the village. Lieutenant Glebov's screen of flankers advanced behind the individual horsemen. Alerted to the Russian horsemen, the French cavalry moved forward and began to deploy their columns, but as soon as all their squadrons emerged from behind the buildings, Rüdiger ordered the trumpeters to sound the charge. The enemy, not anticipating an attack on their flanks, rushed towards our centre with all their strength, which, consisting of two waves, was able to withstand the French shock action. A sweeping cavalry clash ensued. The heavy cuirassiers might have had the upper hand in an attack on the centre, but Rüdiger's skilful manoeuvres quickly changed the situation: as soon as the two opposing lines closed towards each other, the flanking columns under Nabel and Grothuß raced toward the wings of the French cuirassiers and isolated them through their attack. The cumbersome heavy cavalry, unable to repel the attack on their flanks, were checked, driven back and saved only thanks to the canister fire from the French batteries stationed on the river bank, which kept our pursuers at bay. General Dobre, who had been following the progress of the battle the whole time, moved the artillery and infantry of the vanguard forward at this point. They took up positions on the high ground near the village of Pozharishche, facing the Svolna estate; six squadrons of the Grodno Regiment provided protection for the battery, while two squadrons were sent to the left flank, commanded by *Rittmeister* Grothuß. The enemy holding the Svolna estate, were driven out of the buildings and thrown back to the river itself, but the left wing, directed towards the village of Ostry-Konets, was halted by the fire from French batteries.

On the right flank, the jägers, carried away with their success, ran across the bridge hot on the enemy's heels and spread out along on the left bank of the river: Doumerc's cuirassiers, who had crossed the Svolna after their defeat, counter-attacked these daredevils and forced them to retreat back across the river. At the very moment that the cuirassiers, pursuing the infantry, raced past the estate, Rüdiger, who was standing behind the buildings, charged at them in turn. Taken in the flank, the stunned armoured men - familiar to us from the Battle of Klyastitsy - tried to turn back to the bridge, but it was too late: Russian grenadiers had managed to occupy the houses closest to the bridge and engaged the defeated cuirassiers with volleys, only a small number of whom managed to break through to the bridge. Most remained on the field of battle, some, having jumped their horses into the river, drowned in the Svolna.⁴¹ Several hussars, including lieutenants Glebov and Mishkovsky, galloped onto the bridge behind the cuirassiers and pursued them onto the left bank of the Svolna; on the bridge, in full view Rüdiger, Glebov cut down and killed a senior field officer from the defeated cuirassier regiment.⁴²

After the attacks described, the fighting continued until nightfall, but the regiment played no further part in it. Oudinot retreated towards Volyntsy after dark. In the battle on the banks of the Svolna, Lieutenant Colonel Silin (a sword cut to the head) and Cornet Yenakiev (a sword wound in the chest) were wounded; 15 lower ranks and 55 horses were hors de combat. For the actions at

41 'The enemy cuirassiers suffered especially, having been engaged by the Grodno Hussar Regiment, which had particularly distinguished itself in this action.' Count Wittgenstein's report No. 18 to the Tsar (Military Science Archive, No. 1858); General Bogdanovich, volume 1, p. 261; Helffreich's report dated 30 August (Military Science Archive, No. 1858).

42 Military Science Archive, No. 1922.

Dziewałów, Druya, Klyastitsy and Svolna, the Tsar awarded the regiment 33 Military Order medals; lieutenant colonels Rüdiger and Silin and *Rittmeister* Grothuß were awarded the Order of St. Anne, 2nd class; the Order of St. Vladimir 4th class was awarded to Colonel Silin, Major Olshevsky, *Rittmeister* Grothuß, Kempfert, Ilinsky 1st, Nazimov and Ilinsky 2nd. *Rittmeister* Nabel, *Stabs-Rittmeister* Davydov, Kozodaev, Ostrogradsky, lieutenants Zaborovsky and Glebov received Golden Sabres; Lieutenant Tsitlyadzev received the Order of St. George 4th class; lieutenants Gutjahr, Mishkovsky, Krammer and Cornet Lizogub received the Order of St. Anne 3rd class. Moreover, for distinction at Klyastitsy, Rüdiger was promoted to colonel.

After the action at Svolna, the regiment was divided: four squadrons were assigned to Colonel Vlastov's vanguard and four to Major General Helffreich's detachment; the former moved to Sivoshina via Klyastitsy in order to threaten the enemy right flank; the latter moved to Volyntsy. Oudinot retreated to Polotsk without giving battle, where his advantageous position allowed him to await Count Wittgenstein's approach. The Count intended to attack Polotsk and drive the enemy back beyond the Dvina.

The French, having arrived at Polotsk, positioned themselves with their backs to the city: Legrand's division and part of Corbineau's cavalry brigade were on the right bank of the Polota River, the Bavarian corps with the rest of Corbineau's cavalry were on the left bank of the river, behind the Spas estate; The remaining units had crossed the Dvina and taken up positions on the high ground on the left bank. The enemy positions were not particularly advantageous for defence, but the city, surrounded by ancient fortifications, offered the potential for a strong repulse to the Russian forces. On 5 [17] August, both vanguards emerged from the forest onto open ground stretching in front of Polotsk and were engaged with heavy fire from every French battery. Upon receiving intelligence on the enemy dispositions, Count Wittgenstein formed his corps up between the Dvina and Polota rivers parallel to the French; four squadrons of the Grodno Regiment stood behind the left flank of the forward battle line - near the Prismenitsa Manor, while the other four squadrons were in the second line.

At seven o'clock in the morning, the Russian units advanced. The battle continued with varying fortunes throughout the day, and by the night of 5 to 6 [17 to 18] August, the outcome was in the balance. On that day, the Grodno Hussars, like almost all the cavalry units stationed near Polotsk, took no part in the battle. Some of the French army reserves had crossed to the right bank of the Dvina before dawn on 6 [18] August. Upon the arrival of these reinforcements, the enemy units committed to the battle line were almost 1½ times stronger than Count Wittgenstein's corps. Both French corps, commanded by Marshal [*sic*, *Général de division*] Saint-Cyr, were concentrated mainly in the Polota river valley. At five o'clock in the morning, every enemy battery opened fire and, following the crashing salvoes, columns of French infantry went on the attack. At this point, three squadrons from the Grodno Regiment were stationed on the left flank, near the Prismenitsa Manor, in Colonel Vlastov's detachment; four more squadrons had been placed under the command of General Balk, the cavalry component commander on the right flank on the Ropna to Polotsk road; one (Lieutenant Mishkovsky's) was on the extreme left flank and was guarding the ford on the Polota, seven *versta* [4⅔ miles] from Polotsk.

The French began their offensive with an attack on the Prismenitsa Manor. They were engaged with fire from Russian infantry while the squadrons from Vlastov's detachment charged into the enemy flank, disrupted their fighting formation and forced them to retreat beyond the Polota.⁴³ Some time later, the enemy renewed their attack and this time, supported by deadly fire, forced Vlastov to retreat to the edge of the forest. This retreat put Lieutenant Mishkovsky's squadron, guarding the extreme left flank on the Polota river, in great danger: Vlastov, wanting to spare them, sent two battalions of grenadiers to assist. While they were on the march, the enemy sent three

43 Stabs-Rittmeister Yakimov was badly wounded in this attack.

squadrons of cuirassiers against Mishkovsky, keeping the hussars distracted with cavalry skirmishes and preventing them from retreating, while the enemy also sent a strong detachment of infantry and cavalry to get behind the grenadiers sent to Mishkovsky. The grenadiers, attacked from behind, broke out with difficulty and returned to the detachment, while the Grodno Hussars began to retreat, but, upon entering the forest, they were halted by enemy infantry, who opened heavy fire on them. Lieutenant Mishkovsky, finding himself cut off, did not lose his composure: he ordered an attack and dashed toward the enemy surrounding him in a double ring. After a desperate fight, the squadron cut its way through to the remaining squadrons from Vlastov's detachment, suffering heavy losses.⁴⁴

Towards midday, the French cavalry, preceded by their artillery, on the orders of Marshal Saint-Cyr, moved against the Russian centre, where, following the retreat of other units, only one infantry regiment remained in the front line. General Balk, observing the enemy cavalry movements, took two squadrons of cuirassiers, one of dragoons and *Rittmeister* Dyatkov's squadron from the Grodno Regiment from the right flank and, riding to the right in threes, raced to cut off the French *chasseurs à cheval* (Corbineau's brigade). Having changed front on the move, these squadrons cut into the enemy column and drove it back onto the Bavarian battery, whose crews, not daring to open fire on the cavalry of both sides rushing towards them, were cut down by us at their guns. Two guns were driven away, while another 15 were left behind due to the impossibility of dragging them away, but all were spiked before leaving. The chaos caused by this bold attack was extraordinary, and Marshal Saint-Cyr himself, who was riding in a cart because of a wound, was ridden down by the fleeing cavalry and almost fell into the hands of the pursuing Russian cavalymen. In this attack, which caused terrible confusion throughout the entire French corps, this valiant Grodno squadron lost all its officers:⁴⁵ Dyatkov and Cornet Shostakovsky were killed by sabre blows, while Lieutenant Neelov, having received several wounds, was later picked up half-dead on the battlefield by his hussars who were looking for him.

On the extreme right flank, where three squadrons were located under Lieutenant Colonel Silin, the enemy moved an entire infantry brigade against the two jäger battalions defending this area, supported by 12 squadrons under General Castex (*chasseurs à cheval*). Overwhelmed by these enormous forces, the jägers began to retreat, but the enemy success was short-lived: Russian horse artillery dashed forwards along the Disna road and halted the infantry with their well-aimed fire, while Silin from one side and Kempfert from the other raced towards the French cavalry.⁴⁶ The *chasseurs à cheval* were driven back and scattered by the dashing attack by the Grodno Hussars and the pursuit by the combined squadrons. General Bogdanovich wrote:

‘This brilliant attack not only stopped the advance by Merle's infantry, but stunned Doumerc's cuirassier division into inaction, which had been standing to their right, and facilitated the success of the attack by the Combined Cuirassier Regiment preventing the enemy from persistently pursuing the troops of our centre.’⁴⁷

Darkness was falling. All Russian units were retreating towards Ropna, occupying the edge of the forest near the Nevel road. In the early hours of 7 [19] August, Helffreich's vanguard (four squadrons) took up positions behind the Ropna defile, while Vlastov's detachment took up positions at Arteikovichi. This marked the end of the First Battle of Polotsk.⁴⁸ The next day, and from 7 to 9

44 Count Wittgenstein's report to the Tsar, dated 30 August [11 September].

45 This was reported to the Tsar.

46 Count Wittgenstein's report No. 33 to the Tsar dated 30 August [11 September].

47 History of the Patriotic War, volume 1, p. 276.

48 ‘This battle was the most brutal and bloody of all the others, where almost every field officer and subaltern had the opportunity to repeatedly demonstrate extraordinary feats of courage’ (Count Wittgenstein's letter to Arakcheev, dated 1 [13] September); N.F. Dubrovin, *Отечественная война в письмах современников* [The Patriotic War in Contemporary Correspondence]).

[19 to 21] August, the main forces retreated, shielded by the rearguards, which, on 9 [21] August, were reunited at Beloe. Elements from these detachments and four squadrons were included in the *corps-de-bataille* (main body), while the other four squadrons, under Rüdiger's personal command, were included in the rearguard under Colonel Vlastov.

On the morning of 10 [22] August, Vlastov began to withdraw, but, having been attacked by a Bavarian division under Fürst Wrede, he decided to repel the enemy. He halted forwards of the Beloe Manor and deployed into positions. Wrede seized the manor and led a major attack on the Russian right flank. Lieutenant Colonel Silin was sent to counter the envelopment with two squadrons. They charged the leading column, driving it back toward the buildings. Supported by infantry, the hussars pursued the Bavarians into the forest, where the latter disappeared. On the opposite flank, Rüdiger defeated a column that was enveloping the left wing, with the other two squadrons. Defeated by infantry in the centre, driven back and ridden down by hussars on the flanks, Wrede, who had not expected such resistance, retreated towards Gamzelevo. Pursued by the energetic Rüdiger, the Bavarians retreated with such haste that the hussars captured one gun and took some 120 prisoners.⁴⁹ This was the last action in August. Saint-Cyr remained in fortified Polotsk, moving the vanguard to Gamzelevo; the Russian rearguard was stationed facing him, at Beloe Manor.

The French, just like the Russian army, were short of provisions and forage, and this was the main reason for the inaction of the belligerents in Belorussia until October. The cavalry on both sides were sent out to forage; like the enemy, we had been suffering from an extreme shortage of oats since July,⁵⁰ what with the difficulties in finding enough transport, and the poverty of the region, the cavalry had fallen into an extremely pitiful state. All this notwithstanding, from the day of the action at Beloe until 6 [18] October, the Grodno Regiment delivered 30 officers and some 5,000 lower rank prisoners to Count Wittgenstein's Main Duty Room, captured by the hussars in skirmishes during patrols and foraging expeditions.⁵¹ In addition to the foraging that kept the regiment busy until the Second Battle of Polotsk, the Grodno Hussars were entrusted with preparing Count Wittgenstein's offensive movement towards Polotsk through reconnaissances.⁵²

Our losses in August and September in skirmishes and during excursions were quite significant: we lost about 50 men, who, together with the five officers (*Rittmeister* Dyatkov and Cornet Shostakovsky killed, *Stabs-Rittmeister* Yakimov, lieutenants Goloviev and Neelov badly wounded) and 52 lower ranks who were hors de combat from the first Battle of Polotsk (6 [18] August), had significantly weakened the regiment. Rüdiger had asked several times after the Klyastitsy action for the active unit to be reinforced by sending 100 hussars and 150 horses from Major Hirsch's replacement squadrons,⁵³ but these reinforcements could no longer be sent, because the replacement squadrons themselves were engaged in operations around Riga. Eventually, on 3 [15] October, among the units sent to assist Count Wittgenstein, 250 men arrived from St. Petersburg as reinforcements for the Grodno Regiment.⁵⁴ They were immediately distributed around the squadrons, which thus achieved nine files per platoon before the second battle of Polotsk.

On 3 [15] October, the guerilla war was called off. The Grodno Regiment was divided: one battalion joined Major General Balk's vanguard, the other joined Major General Vlastov's vanguard. The former were assigned to move on Polotsk via Yurovichi, while the latter, in order to distract the enemy, were ordered to proceed along the right bank of the Polota river, maintaining

49 Count Wittgenstein's report No. 39 to the Tsar.

50 Kulnev's reports from June and 16 [28] July (Military Science Archive, No. 1855).

51 This total was confirmed by Count Wittgenstein in the Regimental War Diary.

52 *Rittmeister* Kempfert's report dated 17 [29] September (Military Science Archive, No. 1855), among others.

53 Rüdiger's report No. 776 (Military Science Archive, No. 1833); At Polotsk and up to 6 [18] October, the regiment lost 259 horses (War Diaries).

54 General Bogdanovich, volume 2, p. 293.

communications with Balk's vanguard.⁵⁵ Two days later, on 5 [17] October, the vanguards began to move. At Yurovichi, the hussar flankers encountered enemy infantry defending the bridge over the Polota river. Having driven away the infantry, General Balk crossed the bridge and moved after the enemy towards Polotsk, sending a squadron of Grodno Hussars and Cossacks forwards to pursue the French. These units, as they were pushing back the infantry, encountered *chasseurs à cheval* coming to their aid, killed 40 men on the spot and took 22 men prisoner, including one officer.⁵⁶ Major General Rodionov 2nd, commanding the pursuers, drove the enemy back 10 versta [6 $\frac{2}{3}$ miles] from the village of Yurovichi, while Vlastov, moving from Beloe to Ropna, having pushed the French back, positioned himself within cannon range of the enemy fortifications.

An attack on Saint-Cyr's position was planned for the morning of 6 [18] October, for which it was first necessary to drive the French out of the forest on the left bank of the Polota. General Balk was entrusted with this mission. Balk sent Colonel Roth down the Polota river with two squadrons of Grodno Hussars and an infantry regiment, another detachment moved to the left of Valova lake, while the remaining two squadrons went further left with the Cossacks through the bushes, near the Gramy to Polotsk road. Rüdiger, as part of Colonel Roth's column, began the action: leading his men towards the enemy cavalry (8 *Pulk Ulanów* and 20e *chasseurs à cheval*), which had moved against the infantry of the centre, and through a successful attack on their flank, he forced both regiments to retreat, but, having in turn come under effective fire from the guns in a bridgehead, set up by the Bavarians on the river Strunne [north of lake Valova], he had to return to the detachment. At the same time, on the extreme left flank, Major General Rodionov initially drove off four squadrons of *chasseurs à cheval*, and then three squadrons of cuirassiers sent to assist the *chasseurs*, with his two hussar squadrons and Cossacks, taking an officer and 16 privates prisoner during these attacks.⁵⁷

Count Wittgenstein, who arrived on the battlefield at 11 o'clock in the morning, wishing to inspect the dispositions of Saint-Cyr's troops, went forward along the Vitebsk road with the Kaluga Infantry and Lifeguard Combined Cavalry regiments, along the banks of the Dvina. Noticing the separation of this small detachment from the other units on the left flank, Saint-Cyr, hoping to cut them off, sent eight squadrons from 8 *Pulk Ulanów* and 20e *chasseurs à cheval* against them. Some of them dashed towards the Kaluga Infantry from the flank, others towards a battery on Major General Rodionov's left wing. The corps commander, as soon as he saw the enemy movements towards the artillery, spurred his horse on and dashed towards the already captured battery with his escort. Count Wittgenstein was in great danger: on the one hand, the enemy squadrons that had attacked the Kaluga men were rushing towards him, from the other, came those who had captured the guns. But the regiments were keeping a close eye on their beloved commander: the three Lifeguard squadrons raced to engage the first, while Nabel attacked the second with two squadrons of Grodno Hussars: the Count, already encircled by enemy horsemen, was rescued, the *chasseurs à cheval* and *Ułani* were driven off and the captured guns were retaken by this attack.⁵⁸

Fighting was already raging along the entire line; the Russians and French understood the significance of this action and fought ferociously: in the Battle of Polotsk, for I Corps, as well as for Saint-Cyr's force, the question was being decided: to be or not to be. In the evening, some of the enemy cavalry, having captured a battery stationed near Valova lake (27th Light Artillery Company

55 With Vlastov: four squadrons with two field officers, 12 subalterns, 45 non-commissioned officers and 467 privates. With Balk: four squadrons with two field officers, eight subalterns, 45 non-commissioned officers and 468 privates (Military Science Archive, No. 1922, returns on fighting strength for 4 [16] October).

56 Major General Rodionov 2nd's report dated 14 [26] October (Military Science Archive, No. 1922).

57 Major General Rodionov 2nd's report No. 1536.

58 Count Wittgenstein's report No. 83 to the Tsar. Nabel also contributed to an attack by the Riga Dragoons, which, being very weak, were at risk. The Combined Cuirassier and Lifeguard Combined Cavalry regiments charged at the enemy attacking the Riga Dragoons from one side, while two squadrons from the Grodno Regiment attacked from the other.

- 16 guns), dashed towards 6th Group of the St. Petersburg *Opolchenie* [militia] that had arrived shortly before. Two squadrons (under Rüdiger), having witnessed this scene from afar, raced to the rescue of the *opolchenie*. Having attacked the rear of the squadrons that had cut into the infantry like furies, Rüdiger drove them onto the bayonets of the infantry, where, seeing no way out, two enemy squadrons surrendered with all their field officers and subalterns.⁵⁹ In the centre of the general deployment: at the Prismanitsa Manor, where Vlastov's vanguard was located, things were going just as well. The enemy, at this point, had begun to retreat towards the city, but three Swiss regiments, of which two were from Candras' brigade, together with *3e régiment de chasseurs d'Illyrie* [Croats], went to engage Vlastov without orders and pushed him back. Colonel Sazonov's infantry, which had arrived to help, held off Candras' onslaught, while our four squadrons attacked the enemy flanks; after a brief skirmish, the isolated Croat regiment laid down their arms before Major Grothuß, commanding the Grodno battalion, and surrendered to the hussars.⁶⁰ By nightfall, the enemy, defeated at all points, had retreated back to the city. The Grodno Regiment attacked the French six more times during the retreat, escorting them under attack as far as the line of fortifications, where the high parapets delayed the cavalry pursuit.⁶¹ The encroaching darkness brought the regiment's actions to an end on the glorious but bloody day of 6 [18] October.

On the early hours of 7 [19] October, the French units remaining in their fortified positions received orders to move in an orderly manner towards the city. This was caused by news of the approach of Count Steinheil's corps along the left bank of the Dvina, which was moving to get behind the French. Saint-Cyr's troops slowly began to withdraw from their positions. By evening, all of the Marshal's forces were already under the city walls, where the French planned to hold out until their forces were safely on the left bank of the Dvina.

Count Wittgenstein decided to storm Polotsk at two o'clock in the morning, wanting to link up with Steinheil quickly and at any cost; the attack was to be carried out by two columns: Rüdiger's and Vlastov's. Our regiment, which, of course, joined the column under its commander, was divided into two elements: on foot, made up of volunteers, and mounted. The former were intended to march with the St. Petersburg *Opolchenie*, while the latter were immediately behind them, at full strength. The assault began at a quarter past two in the morning. In the silence that replaced the roar of guns and the crackle of musketry, drums began to beat, and the dark lines of Russian columns dashed towards the ravine of the Polota river, beyond which rose the brightly lit, burning city.⁶² Our detachment on foot, together with the *Opolchenie*, hacked down the palisades and broke into Polotsk over heaps of enemy corpses; behind them, as soon as the bridge had been taken by the infantry, the mounted element of the regiment raced in. The squadrons dashed towards the street leading to the Dvina (later Kostelnaya Ulitsa), to where the fleeing French were crowding. The crush was terrible - everyone was trying to get through to the larger bridge, and the running men and galloping horsemen became mixed into one chaotic mob illuminated by the red glow of the fires. As the hussars burst into this mass, an indescribable panic gripped the enemy: the press towards the Dvina became even stronger. More of them were trampled and crushed by their own men than fell from the blows of Russian sabres and bayonets... At the bridge, the Grodno Hussars managed to capture one gun and several ammunition caissons, which the French did not have time to transfer to the left bank; many prisoners fell into our hands. During the assault, the regiment was

59 Regimental War Diary.

60 General Bogdanovich, volume 3, p. 124.

61 War Diaries.

62 Polotsk had been set on fire by Russian shells that were lobbed into the city in the evening. The town itself, in which Saint-Cyr defended himself, was well prepared for defence: it was surrounded by a double palisade and a deep ditch. There was only one wooden bridge across the Polota, which adjoined the entrance to the city, was cut through an ancient, high curtain wall. The wall completely surrounded the city and was protected by interlocking fire from batteries and marksmen. The Russians burst in from two directions: along the St. Petersburg and Vitebsk roads (*Voenny Sbornik*, 1885, No. 2, Polotsk).

greatly assisted by its familiarity with the city's topography, since back in 1807, during their stay in the Vitebsk Governorate, the hussars had been stationed in Polotsk more than once, and the shrewd blocking of every street leading to the Dvina bridge greatly contributed to the regiment cutting off the tail of the enemy rearguard.⁶³ The fighting ceased at one o'clock in the morning of 8 [20] October: Polotsk, strewn with corpses and weapons, bloody and in flames, had been seized by Wittgenstein's force. The fighting from 6 to 8 [18 to 20] October, or Second Polotsk as the soldiers called it, had cost the regiment dearly: the following were lost during these days: *Stabs-Rittmeister* Ilinsky 2nd (squadron commander) and Zdroevsky were killed; the wounded included majors Grothuß (by sabre) and Nabel, *Stabs-Rittmeister* Krammer (bullet in the shoulder), Teygert (canister shot to the head) and Davydov, Lieutenant Zaborovsky (round shot), cornets Shenne (canister shot), Stepanov (bullet to the leg), Koshke (by sabre) and Divlet-Kildev (by bullet). Lower rank casualties numbered 85; 155 horses were lost.

The next day, following Count Wittgenstein's ceremonial entry, a thanksgiving service for the victory and a memorial service for their slain comrades were held in the cathedral. All those who distinguished themselves in both Polotsk battles were generously rewarded, upon presentation of regimental lists to the Tsar, but few regiments were so showered with awards as ours: five Orders of St. George and 40 Military Order medals were distributed to the bravest members of the regiment.⁶⁴ In addition to those ranks named below, representing almost the entire available cadre of officers from the Grodno Regiment, Count Wittgenstein, at Rüdiger's request,⁶⁵ did not omit the Chaplain Ovchinnikov and the doctors I.I. Saveliev and E.I. von Ertzdorf, who had distinguished themselves repeatedly during the campaign. The regimental chaplain, beloved and respected by the regiment, was a venerable old man, who would not part from his flock during the entire war, no matter how much fire the regiment had to endure, encouraging the men before battle, giving them parting words of comfort before death. In the fighting between 18 and 20 July [30 July and 1 August], Father Ovchinnikov drew particular attention to himself through his fearlessness when the hussars were defending the horse artillery pieces entrusted to them under a hail of bullets, as they emerged from the Sivoshina defile, surrounded by the enemy. Standing near the battery, despite the danger, the Chaplain, raising his golden crucifix aloft in his old hands, blessed the soldiers, many of whom he was destined never to see alive again.⁶⁶ No less worthy of posterity's remembrance are Staff Doctor Saveliev, a participant in the Finnish War, and his deputy, Ertzdorf. Both doctors were overwhelmed with work at the beginning of the campaign; often under fire on the days of battle, they delivered their treatment with a selflessness remarked upon by Count Wittgenstein. Once an action was over, these worthy professionals walked around the battle site every time, seeking out those perhaps forgotten wounded who had been listed as missing in action in the war diary. 'Through their self-sacrifice, honest, gentle care of the wounded, and bravery' Rüdiger reported, 'they earned the gratitude of the entire regiment.'⁶⁷

63 During the assault, the Grodno Regiment, having broken in first, blocked the streets leading to the bridge, thereby stopping the entire crowd from making their way to it to save themselves (War Diary).

64 Colonel Rüdiger - Order of St. George 3rd class; majors Nabel and Grothuß, *Stabs-Rittmeister* Teygert, lieutenants Mishkovsky and Count Keller (Count Wittgenstein's aide-de-camp) - Order of St. George 4th class; *Rittmeister* Kempfert and Nazimov, *Stabs-Rittmeister* Yakimov, Lieutenant Golofiev and Cornet Beckmann - Golden Sabres; *Rittmeister* Kozodaev and Novosiltsev, *Stabs-Rittmeister* Krammer, lieutenants Maekovsky, Mishkovsky, Panyutin, Ostrogradsky, Lizogub and Glebov, Cornet Traubenberg - Order of St. Vladimir 4th class; *Stabs-Rittmeister* Novosiltsev, *Rittmeister* Nabel, Lieutenant Colonel Silin - Order of St. Anne 2nd class; lieutenants Kondratovich, Tsitlyadzev, Mostanov and Beckmann, cornets Sysoev, Petrovsky, von Shenne, Verzhbitsky, Worms, Glebov, Vitkovsky, Diblev-Kildeev, Stepanov, Pokhodun and Shcherbakov, and Auditor Petrov - Order of St. Anne 3rd class.

65 Colonel Rüdiger's reports dated 28 July [9 August] and 20 October [1 November] (Military Science Archive, No. 1833).

66 Colonel Rüdiger's reports dated 28 July [9 August] and 20 October [1 November] (Military Science Archive, No. 1833). Due to the absence of his service records in the Moscow Archives, the Christian name and patronymic of Father Ovchinnikov have not reached us.

67 One of the doctors from the Grodno Regiment was wounded twice, by gunshot and sabre, during the action at

On 8 [20] October, the regiment spent the entire day resting from their labours under the walls of ruined Polotsk.

Chashniki while he was evacuating the wounded (report by N.I. Mikhailov).

CHAPTER 7.

Pursuit of Saint-Cyr's corps. - Skirmishes at Pustynniki, Kamen, and Voron. - The Battle of Chashniki. - Pursuit of Marshal Victor. - Operations by Lieutenant Mishkovsky's squadron at Smoliyantsy; defence of the town of Pochaevitsy. - Skirmishes at Belaya Tserkva, Borisov (Major Nazimov's squadron), Chereya, and Batury. - Battle of Borisov. - Capture of Partouneaux's division. - Crossing of the Berezina river by the French rearguard. - Capitulation of the Bavarian cavalry at Vileyka. - Occupation of Vilna. - Skirmish at Szyrwinty (Major Nazimov's squadron). - The regiment in Major General Diebitsch's detachment: operations behind Marshal Macdonald's corps. - Isolation of the Prussian contingent from Napoleon's army and the regiment's participation in this event. - The regiment in the detachment under Major General Shepelev: the occupation of the town of Labiau and the action near this town. - The occupation of Königsberg. - Skirmishes near Elbing and Dirschau. - Operations by Major Hirsch's reserve squadrons at Riga. - Battles at Ekau and Dahlenkirch. - Clashes with the Prussian cavalry. - Actions at the customs house and at Janiszki. - Losses in Major Hirsch's squadrons. - Where did the regiment particularly distinguish itself in 1812?

On 9 [21] October, Rüdiger swam across the Dvina downstream of Polotsk with two squadrons and Rodionov 2nd's Cossacks and closed up to the French positions. The sight of Russian cavalry on the left bank of the river forced Saint-Cyr to withdraw his force the full stage from the Dvina to Ushachi without a fight.

On 10 [22] October, Rüdiger moved towards Ushachi with all the squadrons from his regiment and caught up with the enemy rearguard, consisting of 24 squadrons, near the village of Pustynniki [*sic*].¹ Having joined forces with the Cossacks under Rodionov 2nd and Platov 4th, the hussars charged at the French, defeated them and drove them back as far as Ushachi, that is, a distance of 15 *versta* [10 miles]. In this bold skirmish, we lost Major Kempfert, the first member of the regiment to shed his blood in the Patriotic War (at Wilkomierz), and 10 lower ranks. The trophies from this action were four officers and 150 privates taken prisoner by the regiment.²

The regiment halted in Pustynniki; Lieutenant Mishkovsky's squadron was sent after the retreating enemy, in the direction of the village of Kamen. This young officer attacked the rearguard on 13 [25] October and took three officers and 140 lower ranks prisoner. His flankers halted three *versta* [two miles] short of Kamen, having encountered a strong enemy. Mishkovsky decided to wait until a squadron of Riga Dragoons, which was proceeding behind, joined him and then, having received this reinforcement, he attacked the French once more, killing two officers and 40 privates on the spot and cleared the village of stragglers. Mishkovsky rounded up 220 prisoners in the village of Kamen, and on 14 [26] October, he safely returned with them to the detachment.³

The regiment, meanwhile, had reached the village of Voron on 13 [25] October and, on 14 [26] October, had a second skirmish with six squadrons of French cavalry near this village. The enemy had already begun to lose heart after the battle of Polotsk, as a successful outcome to the war became more doubtful for them. The French cavalry rarely withstood a second attack by our squadrons and in this action, as at Pustynniki, were driven off by the first strike by Rüdiger, the *chasseurs à cheval* scattering along the Lepel road.⁴ Upon reporting this to Prince Iashvili, who was in command of the vanguard, he ordered the regiment to push the enemy cavalry out of this town.

1 Rüdiger's reports dated 12 and 13 [24 and 25] October (Military Science Archive, No. 1855).

2 War Diary.

3 Major General Alexeev's report dated 21 October [2 November] (Military Science Archive, No. 1922) and Lieutenant General Iashvili's report dated 15 [27] October (Military Science Archive, No. 1855).

4 War Diary. Between 12 and 15 [24 and 27] October, the regiment lost 43 hussars and 82 horses killed or wounded.

The Grodno Hussars enveloped Lepel from three directions, forcing the rearguard to retreat towards Chashniki, but, carried away by the pursuit, were engaged not far from this place by lethal cannon and small-arms fire. Rüdiger withdrew his squadrons outside the killing zone and informed the corps commander of the French deployment at the well-fortified Chashniki position.

On 18 [30] October, the vanguard units under Prince Iashvili closed in and halted in front of the village of Chashniki until the main body arrived. The battle was expected to be significant and bloody, since the combined corps under Saint-Cyr and Victor, taking advantage of the numerical superiority of their forces, had decided to put an end to Wittgenstein's success. The French were positioned between the town and a small forest, with their rear and right flank towards the Lukomka river; their reserves were stationed behind the river. On the morning of 19 [31] October, the vanguard began the offensive: the Grodno Hussars on the right flank, facing the forest, were sent forward and drove off a cavalry column covering this wing, while the infantry pushed the French centre back.⁵ Legrand's division, having arrived on the battlefield from Bocheikovo, gave the enemy the opportunity to restore their original position, and the fighting began to flare up again. Noticing that the infantry in the centre of the French line were being redeployed behind the cavalry column, Rüdiger led the Grodno Hussars into the attack for a second time. The regiment split and attacked the enemy cavalry in two waves, which they drove back, but, carried away by the pursuit, raced on towards the infantry. Here we were faced with a reverse: having gone too far, the regiment came under crossfire from enemy infantry and canister fire from several batteries. Had the hussars' attack been supported, they would have managed to disorder the infantry, but without the assistance of other units, the regiment was unable to achieve this. Having recovered two guns captured by the French, the Grodno Hussars returned to the reserve, where they remained until the end of the battle. The casualties from these two attacks were not minor: Lieutenant Colonel Silin had his arm severed by round shot and the unfortunate man was carried from the melee unconscious from blood loss; the following were wounded: majors Grothuß (by canister shot), Nabel and Novosiltsev, *Rittmeister* Vietinghoff, *Stabs-Rittmeister* Kusovnikov and Lieutenant Mostanov (canister shot to the shoulder). The killed and badly wounded lower ranks numbered 38 and 58 horses were lost.

Chashniki was occupied by Russian forces in the evening, and Victor, having crossed the Lukomka river, retreated towards Senno. vanguards were sent after him from Count Wittgenstein's corps: along the Senno road, to the village of Aksiontsy and the Vitebsk road, to Boyare; these two vanguards were under the overall command of Major General Alexeev. A third (under Major General Harpe) was sent through Bocheikovo towards the town of Beshankovichy to reconnoitre the sector between the first two vanguards and the Dvina river. The Grodno Regiment joined the detachments under Major General Alexeev, with the exception of Lieutenant Mishkovsky's squadron, which, due to a change in the operational plan, was to reinforce General Harpe's vanguard and go with him to Vitebsk via Staroe Selo. This young officer brilliantly upheld the honour of the Grodno Regiment in this detachment: on 26 October [7 November], having approached Vitebsk along the right bank of the Dvina, he crossed to the near side of the river and moved towards the Smolensk road, while General Harpe's infantry were driving the French out of the city. Finding himself across the enemy's line of retreat, Mishkovsky hid behind some buildings and began the wait for an appropriate moment to attack. As soon as the retreating column appeared on the road, he took the enemy by surprise, striking them in the flank, defeating them and capturing the commandant of Vitebsk (Colonel Shevurd [*sic*]), two officers and several lower ranks, whom he delivered to Rüdiger on 28 October [9 November], when he returned to the regiment.⁶

General Alexeev, having the remaining seven squadrons from the Grodno Regiment, occupied the village of Slidzy [Slidtsy] and positioned his outposts facing the vedettes of the enemy corps. On 25 October [6 November], Victor's cavalry (commanded by General Fournier), consisting of 2,000

5 General Bogdanovich, volume 3, p. 138; Dobre, *Précis*.

6 Major General Harpe's report No. 45, dated 28 October [9 November].

horse,⁷ attempted to drive off our outposts. Rüdiger, holding the Pochaevitsy manor, informed an infantry battalion and a platoon from a horse artillery battery of this, who engaged the enemy cavalry with heavy fire. Halted by the firing, Fournier, not knowing what strength he was dealing with, decided to move closer, but once his horsemen reached the manor, they were driven back by a charge from the hussars who struck from the flanks and rear simultaneously. Fournier retreated in disarray towards the village of Chereya, leaving five officers and about 500 lower ranks taken prisoner. The regiment pursued as far as the village of Lukoml, where Marshal Victor, arriving with several regiments, checked the hussars.⁸ After this skirmish, Rüdiger returned to Slidzy, having lost 15 men and 18 war horses; we remained in Slidzy until 1 [13] November.

On 1 [13] November, on the orders of General Dovre, Rüdiger sent three squadrons of the Grodno Regiment to Smoliyantsy, while he moved towards Lukoml himself with the rest, from where, according to rumours, the enemy had departed. Having arrived at the village, the Grodno Hussars attacked the tail end of the rearguard, from which they took 300 men prisoner, and followed the duc de Bellune's force [Victor's]. A note from General Alexeev, received on the march, that the latter had been forced to abandon Aksiontsy and withdraw to Khrabrovo [*sic*] obliged Rüdiger to abandon the pursuit and return to Pochaevitsy, so as not to be cut off.⁹ The Grodno Hussars withdrew their outposts to Slidzy once more, sending strong patrols towards Lysna [*sic*] and Koltany [*sic*]. Three squadrons were sent to Chashniki, despite Rüdiger's objections that his detachment needed support, as it had constantly been scattered,¹⁰ and had only returned on that same day, and participated with other cavalry units in the action at the village of Smoliyantsy, independently of the regiment.

The French, in the meantime, had decided to drive Count Wittgenstein out of Chashniki and, on 1 [13] November, began to concentrate their forces at this point. The attack on the village of Smoliyantsy began at 11 o'clock. It was held by the Russian vanguard, and then, as the main body came up, fighting broke out between all of Count Wittgenstein's units and the combined corps under Oudinot and Victor. At the sound of the first shots, Rüdiger assembled the squadrons in Pochaevitsy in order to shield the main body from being outflanked from the direction of Chereya. Oudinot's corps was deployed facing him, but two battalions from 5th Division arrived in time and helped the regiment to defend the village: for five hours we were battered by the Marshal's artillery, which reduced the buildings of Pochaevitsy to rubble; the French attacked several times, but as the dispatches stated 'the valiant Grodno Regiment rendered these attempts futile.'¹¹ The operations by the three squadrons on the right flank, forwards of the Lukomka river, were just as successful:¹² a mass of heavy cavalry was sent to oppose our cavalry on this wing, which had to descend from the high ground, cross a stream and attack our squadrons. The night of 1 to 2 [13 to 14] November was freezing and after the autumn rains there was black ice. While the French cuirassiers were cautiously crossing the stream, our squadrons wheeled aside and the menacing muzzles of the battery we had been masking suddenly appeared before the armoured men distracted with the awkward crossing. The French had hardly set foot on the bank when canister shot pelted down on them while the squadrons moved at a trot around the enemy flanks. The French horses, weakened by hunger and not shod with spiked shoes, were unable to carry out the charge; spurred on by their riders, they slipped and fell, such that the cuirassiers had only one option - to turn back. Pursued by our squadrons, the armoured men took heavy casualties and sheltered behind the infantry columns.

In the actions at Pochaevitsy and Lukoml, in which the regiment lost 50 men and 44 horses, Major Olshevsky, *Rittmeister* Vietinghoff, Stabs-Rittmeister Davydov and Ostrogradsky, lieutenants

7 Rüdiger reported 4,000 horse.

8 War Diary; Dovre, *Précis*; Rüdiger's report (Military Science Archive, No. 1922).

9 Rüdiger's report dated 1 [13] November; Dovre, *Précis*; Dovre's dispatches (Military Science Archive, No. 1922).

10 In all his reports, Rüdiger complains of the difficulty of maintaining the outposts when the regiment was scattered.

11 Dovre, *Précis*.

12 Colonel V.V. Krestovsky, History of the Yamburg Ulan Regiment.

Maekovsky, Glebov and Worms particularly distinguished themselves.

Victor retreated along the road to Chereya with his entire corps, while Marshal Oudinot's force followed him. The Russian forces remained in their previous positions after the battle; it was only on 3 [15] November that the regiment moved to Khrabrovo and then on to Aksiontsy, leaving two squadrons at Slidzy, under *Rittmeister* Vietinghoff's command. The latter, on 4 [16] November, were attacked by the enemy emerging from Lukovo [*sic*], but, having repelled the attack, continued to hold their outposts until the arrival of Lieutenant Colonel Stolypin with the Yamburg Dragoons, who relieved the Grodno Hussars.¹³ During this action, *Rittmeister* Vietinghoff was wounded for a second time.

After the Battle of Smoliyantsy, Count Wittgenstein went on the offensive, but there were no major actions, and in the numerous vanguard skirmishes that took place in November and December, the Russian units always had the upper hand. The factors for this advantage were mainly the complete collapse of morale in the French army after the latest defeats and a complete lack of provisions and forage on the enemy side. Their cavalry, with their exhausted horses, could no longer fight off the pressing Russian cavalry, which, although meagre, still had forage; their convoys were intercepted, while reconnaissance and patrol duties became unimaginable for the French. On 8 [20] November, Victor began his retreat to Chereya. Upon linking up with General Harpe's vanguard, the regiment encountered the enemy at Belaya Tserkov [2½ miles north-east of Chereya], but as soon as the French, stationed near this village, saw the hussars emerging from the scrub, they took advantage of the darkness to abandon their position and retreat further towards the village of Bobr.¹⁴ Rüdiger immediately sent a squadron under Major Nazimov after them, catching up with the enemy rearguard and supply trains by dawn on the road towards Bobr. Having requested another squadron as reinforcements, Nazimov harassed the tail of the column moving towards Borisov, capturing 100 wagons, 218 prisoners, and more than 100 head of cattle on their way to Victor's corps.¹⁵ Setting off that same day with six squadrons, Rüdiger engaged enemy cavalry at Starozhitsy [eight miles east of Kholopenichi] and drove them back towards Batury, where a French infantry division under Daendels was located. General Harpe, informed of this, directed two squadrons to the left of the village, and two towards Batury frontally, forwards of which French skirmishers were deployed. Four of the squadrons instantly attacked the skirmishers from two directions, while the other three raced towards the enemy cavalry. The double attack was successful: the skirmishers were swept away by the hussars, who flooded into the village hot on the heels of the fleeing men. The vanguard, which had just arrived, completed what the Grodno Hussars had started, while the squadrons, having linked up, pursued the broken cavalry almost as far as Borisov itself.¹⁶ In the latter two actions, at Chereya and Batury, while pursuing the enemy, the regiment took five officers and 900 lower ranks prisoner; we lost 21 men and 17 horses.¹⁷

In pursuing Daendels, defeated at Batury, the regiment arrived in Sary Borisov, on the banks of the Berezina river by the evening of 14 [26] November. Fierce fighting ensued between the vanguard infantry and Victor's rearmost units covering the crossing by their army. The Cossacks rushed in *lava* formation towards the left wing holding the plateau in front of the bridges, but were halted by Delaitre's cavalry brigade on this flank; the latter, carried away by their successful counter-attack and pursuit, missed our seven squadrons, which were moving to outflank them at that time. Upon noticing the Russian hussars to their rear and on the flank, the French turned about, but it was too late: our attack charged home, the entire brigade scattered, taking some of the infantry from their

13 Rüdiger's and Stolypin's reports dated 5 [17] November. *Rittmeister* Vietinghoff died soon after from wounds received.

14 Rüdiger's report dated 9 [21] November; Count Wittgenstein's report to the Tsar (Military Science Archive, No. 1775).

15 Major Nazimov's report dated 12 [24] November.

16 Major General Harpe's report dated 12 [24] November.

17 War Diary.

left wing with it. One gun, a mass of vehicles and prisoners fell into the hands of the hussars. We learned from the prisoners that General Partouneaux's division were located near Borisov and had not yet managed to cross the Berezina.

When Count Wittgenstein was informed of this, he positioned Vlastov's vanguard at the Sary-Borisov manor in order to block the division's line of retreat, while moving the Grodno Hussars and Cossacks forward to engage the enemy. At the same time, the corps commander sent *Rittmeister* Kochubey to General Partouneaux with the demand that they lay down their arms. The French general detained our *parlementaire* and decided to break through to Studyanka at all costs, where the main body was located: despite attacks by the hussars and Cossacks, he continued his movement towards Sary-Borisov. Here he ran into Vlastov's detachment. The French desperately charged at the Russian infantry, but their attack was unsuccessful; rebuffed from the front and outflanked by Seslavin's *opolchenie*, they attempted to advance downstream, past the vanguard's right flank. The squadrons from the Grodno Hussar Regiment had been brought along the river bank, and had already regrouped at this location. Seeing that there was no way to link up with Victor's force, Partouneaux entered into negotiations, during which, suddenly rushing forward, he once again attempted to break through to Studyanka with several hundred men. But Rüdiger thwarted him once more: as soon as the general moved, our squadrons deployed their columns and advanced toward him at a trot. Partouneaux was forced to lay down his arms.¹⁸

Five generals, 240 officers and 8,000 men were lost that day from Napoleon's *Grande Armée*.

After this, the regiment went to Studyanka at the head of the vanguard, where Marshal Victor's rearguard were crossing the Berezina. The scene that the hussars encountered was truly horrific: as soon as our horse artillery company fired a salvo from its 12 guns, everyone on the bank rushed in disorder towards the bridges; those with horses knocked down those on foot blocking their way, carriages and wagons were crushing people. Wanting to get to the far bank as quickly as possible, the soldiers hurried to cross the bridges, now serving as a target for artillery, but the crossing became more and more difficult: from the pressure of the mass, no one moved, they simply crushed each other, and the bodies of the wounded and dead, the carts, the guns accumulated on the bridge deck to such an extent that it was impossible to go either forward or back. Once the last ranks saw that the crossing was becoming almost impossible, an indescribable panicked fear took hold of the soldiers: they had to break through by force of arms in order to clear a path through their own. Everyone surged forward. A terrible bayonet fight ensued, with one man pushing another off the deck into the dark waters of the Berezina; horses, both draught and riding, reared and threw their riders, who, having fallen, never rose again. The ammunition caissons, detonated by shellfire, flew into the air, increasing the fear in these people, whose only human emotion was the instinct for self-preservation. The crashing noise, shouts, oaths and curses drowned out the measured, rolling roar of the guns and the frequent musket volleys that were heard on both banks of the river. At the sight of this mass of humanity swarming over the bridge, killing each other, throwing people off the decking into the water, defending themselves with bayonets and rifle butts, it seemed as if these were enemies fighting to the death, not comrades, not sons of the same homeland, not soldiers of one and the same army.

On the bank, the spectacle was even more horrific. Everything from the army rear areas was here: intendancy personnel, sutlers, women, stragglers, the sick and wounded. Nobody had been caring for these latter for a long time: abandoned to their fate by everyone, hungry and cold, half-naked officers and soldiers wandered like shadows. Everyone had one desire, one feeling - to warm up, because these unfortunate people, numbed by the cold,¹⁹ who were entering their death throes, were practically 'in no condition to take food.'²⁰ Barely covered with rags, the remains of uniform, tatters

18 Rüdiger's biography; Alexander I and his Contemporaries; War Diary; General Bogdanovich; *Kurze Biographie*.

19 The frost was extremely severe, and the snowstorm that arose on 14 [26] November made the cold even worse.

20 Gyuilsdorf's [*sic*, Gülsdorf?] papers (Military Science Archive, No. 4398), 'We often see prisoners die immediately

from women's dresses and priestly vestments, with shift, wild eyes expressing everything that these unfortunates had endured, they looked more like animated corpses than living beings. When the bridges, set on fire by Russian shellfire, went up in flames and those remaining on the bank lost their last hope of crossing to the far side, terrifying despair replaced their previous morbid indifference. Everyone who still had their wits about them rushed to the burning bridges, trying to cross, despite the fact that on the far side there would still be the same torment, the same hunger, the same unbearable cold. Many threw themselves into the water, but, caught among the ice floes, which their frozen hands could not grasp, the victims were forever lost to this world. Some perished on the bridges in the flames, and those who no longer had the strength to rise, silently, sadly and mournfully, watched the tail of the rearguard with a kind of envy, as, far beyond the river, they disappeared beyond the snowy plains towards a distant, almost forgotten homeland.

By evening there were 20 degrees of frost, and the Berezina was so clogged with corpses that it was possible to cross them on foot from one bank to the other.²¹

On the banks of the Berezina, the rich heart of our soldiers' noble nature spoke out: as soon as the regiment reached the water, the hussars, moved by a feeling of compassion, hastened to share their black hard-tack with the unfortunate wounded. 'We did not want the gold they offered us: it had been stolen, not earned, and there was quite a bit of church gold' the veteran soldiers stated, 'we gave them our bread out of pity: they had nothing to eat for a long time, they had been hungry for so long and were utterly miserable.'²² The Berezina river marked the end of the existence of Napoleon's army in the Patriotic War, and its onward retreat looked more like a rout than a strategic movement. The French tried to hold off the Russian forces more than once with a despairing defence, like a wounded animal pursued by hunters, but the efforts of these legendary brave troops were not crowned with success and the pursuit, which began at the Berezina, could have only one ending under the walls of Paris...

On 18 [30] November, after the French crossing, the regiment joined the detachment under Major General Count Orlov-Denisov, who was sent to pursue the French retreating along the Vilna road. On 22 November [4 December], at Vileyka, the regiment caught up with the remnants of Wrede's Bavarian corps. Their cavalry, which were to the rear, retreated towards the infantry, but four of our squadrons, outflanking the cavalry, drove them back to the right of the village, while the rest attacked the Bavarians from behind. The enemy horses were so exhausted that they were unable to gallop; the Bavarians, being attacked from two directions, after a fierce fight laid down their arms in numbers twice as large as our hussars.²³ The regiment's casualties at Vileyka consisted of 22 lower ranks and Lieutenant Glebov (wounded in the ribs by a sabre) who were hors de combat during the attack.

After this action, the regiment was left in Kurzhenets [Kurenets], not far from Vileyka.²⁴ The next day, Major General Borozdin arrived and assumed command of the detachment, and the pursuit continued with renewed vigour. On 24 November [6 December], two squadrons (Major Nazimov's) were sent forward from Narochna under the command of Colonel Sukhozanet; having crossed the Viliya, one headed towards Dyunashovo in order to harass Fürst Wrede's corps, while the other went to Voronyany. Both squadrons were to rendezvous at Vorona.²⁵

after a good meal. As soon as a soldier fell, his comrades would undress him before he died, so they could use his clothes...'

21 Engineer General Förster. The crossing of the Berezina and the situation of the French army are described in particular detail in the Gyulsdorf papers, from whom we borrowed some of the information for the above.

22 As reported by N.I. Mikhailov.

23 War Diary - 'Not far from this place (Vileyka), the remnants of the Bavarian corps (numbering some 8,000), having been attacked by this small detachment, abandoned all their cavalry without exception, who were destroyed by the Grodno Hussar Regiment.'

24 *Précis*; Count Orlov-Denisov's report No. 314, dated 22 November [4 December].

25 General Borozdin's report No. 7, dated 25 November [7 December] (Military Science Archive, No. 1855).

Colonel Sukhozanet moved quickly towards Vilna; in Zarechye [Užupis] he captured five guns that the enemy were about to drag away, and entered Vilna hot on the heels of the rearguard at the same time as Colonel Tettenborn's detachment. The impression made by the appearance of the Russian cavalry in this city was terrifying: the French, mostly stragglers, raced towards the exits, hurrying to catch up with their regiments, but the majority were rounded up in the streets by the hussars and the detachment under Colonel Tettenborn. Generals Lefebvre and Zajaczek were among the prisoners.²⁶ During the pursuit, several hundred infantrymen put up some resistance: they formed square and placed two guns and several ammunition caissons in the centre, and began to retreat towards Szyrwinty [Širvintos]. Nazimov deftly attacked them from two directions, cut into the square and captured the cannon. The enemy scattered and ran towards Szyrwinty, pursued by sabre blows.²⁷ Nazimov went no further: Kutuzov and Chichagov's forces were converging on Vilna; our squadrons returned to Rechki [*sic*], from where Count Wittgenstein intended to begin operations against Macdonald's corps, which was moving toward Königsberg.

At this time, Marshal Macdonald was in command of the Franco-Prussian forces operating around Riga and was in a hurry to link up with the other remnants of the former *Grande Armée* outside Russia's borders. Count Wittgenstein assigned General Diebitsch to block his movements with the Grodno Hussar Regiment,²⁸ Cossacks, six guns and 100 infantrymen on carts. Diebitsch accomplished a feat without bloodshed that ultimately changed the course of events and the outcome of this campaign with this detachment: he completely isolated Yorck's corps from the rest of the French army and thereby facilitated the defection by this general and his force to the Russian side.

The regiment, with Diebitsch at their head, set out from Rossieny on 9 [21] December, passed Koltyniany [Kaltinėnai] and, on 10 [22] December, halted at Laukuva, 140 *versta* [93 miles] from the enemy corps. Having no intelligence on the direction taken by Macdonald, Diebitsch assumed that the most likely route for the Marshal would be via Memel [Klaipėda] to Königsberg. This forced him to continue moving towards Schaulen [Šiauliai] and Wornie [Varniai] in order to sever Macdonald's route across the Kovno Governorate. On 12 [24] December, a patrol finally informed him that the enemy rearguard was holding Waigau [Vaiguva]; this prompted Diebitsch to fall back to Koltyniany once more in order to operate on Macdonald's flank during the latter's retreat towards the Neman. Having assembled his force near this village, Diebitsch was unaware that behind the rearguard of this enemy leading echelon were the Prussian corps under Yorck and Kleist (with a strength of more than 10,000 men), burdened, it is true, by huge supply trains, but which could in any event provide assistance to the rearguard. The situation of the Russian detachment was becoming extremely dangerous: separated from friendly forces by a considerable distance, they risked being crushed by the superior numbers among which they found themselves. Once he had been made aware of the threat he was facing, Diebitsch, letting the French rearguard pass, boldly selected a position across the road and stationed his small detachment there. Outposts were set up all around the detachment, since an attack from the direction of the passing French rearguard was possible as soon as the cannonade began; marksmen were scattered here and there, and the hussars, taking advantage of the concealing terrain, would have to be everywhere, serving as a screen for the main force across the enemy line of sight. Having arranged his units, Diebitsch sent an officer to General Kleist with a proposal to either lay down his arms or enter into negotiations with the commander of the Russian vanguard; in addition to everything else, the *parlementaire* announced in Diebitsch's name that the Prussian column had been cut off by significant Russian forces.

General Kleist would not give a direct answer, citing the absence of Yorck, who was supposed to be

26 General Borozdin's report No. 14, dated 30 November [12 December].

27 War Diary - The squadrons lost 18 men. Lieutenant Baretz was among the wounded.

28 The strength of the regiment in Diebitsch's detachment has been given as follows: four field officers, 16 subalterns, 40 non-commissioned officers, 654 privates (Minutes on military operations, Military Science Archive, No. 2056).

arriving in the evening: all Diebitsch learned from this response was that he would not have to deal with a strong rearguard, as he had assumed, but with both Prussian corps. In the evening, a meeting did indeed take place between Diebitsch and Yorck, but it was indecisive: Diebitsch pointed out to York several times that, lacking cavalry, the Prussians were in danger of losing their supply trains, which would fall into the hands of our cavalry, and pointed out the destruction of Napoleon's army and the benefits for Prussia of an alliance with Russia. Yorck responded evasively and the two generals parted without concluding any agreement. Once he had returned to the detachment at 10 o'clock in the evening, Diebitsch took every defensive precaution, in case Yorck decided to use force of arms in order to proceed: the hussars stood in front of the village on full alert, the Cossacks on the flanks, and the guns on the high ground to the left of Koltyniany.

At three o'clock in the morning, shots rang out at the outposts, and then the sound of horses' hooves could be heard. Rüdiger jumped on his horse and, sounding the alarm, led the regiment to the place from which the gunfire had been heard. Having deployed the squadron, he sent the hussars towards an enemy cavalry patrol, which, engaged unexpectedly by gunfire, had halted in bewilderment in front of the village. It turned out to be a French patrol carrying a letter from Macdonald to General Yorck; the patrol was also supposed to find out whether the rumours that had reached the Marshal about the presence of an enemy detachment behind his rearguard were true. All the lower ranks of the patrol were rounded up by the hussars,²⁹ but the officer saved himself in the darkness and galloped back without fulfilling the main objective of the mission assigned to him. Everything fell quiet again, the hussars returned to the village and the night passed without the expected attack by Prussian troops.³⁰

Yorck advanced throughout the next three days and, on 16 [28] December, reached Tauroggen [Tauragė], while Diebitsch retreated before him, shielded by the hussars and settling down each night in fighting positions. This uncertainty about the relationship between his detachment and the Prussians finally wore out Diebitsch's patience: in Tauroggen he demanded a categorical answer from Yorck. After much hesitation, on 18 [30] December, a new meeting took place between the generals, at the end of which the conditions for the defection of the Prussian contingent from Napoleon's army were drawn up.

It is difficult to determine exactly what prompted the cunning old Yorck to agree to Diebitsch's terms. Whether consent was extracted under duress or voluntarily, whether the Prussian general realised that he was isolated or whether the old man foresaw Napoleon's future fate is unknown. By signing the Convention of Tauroggen, Yorck was accepting responsibility for an act that could be both good and evil for his fatherland: evil, because, although driven out of Russia, Napoleon's will was not utterly broken and the outcome of the war was far from decided. If Russian armed force had failed, what would have been the fate of Germany, which was even then still at the complete disposal of the autocratic *Empereur*? As for whether Yorck considered himself in a hopeless situation, this assumption is not only possible, but quite plausible: Diebitsch's strength was unknown to the Prussian general and the disposition of his detachment in positions was so cleverly thought out that not once during the three-day offensive were the Prussian patrols able to find out what units they were dealing with.³¹ Besides Diebitsch blocking his path, Yorck probably knew that Count Wittgenstein's corps was 30 *versta* [20 miles] from Tauroggen, Shepelev was in

29 Dobre, *Précis*; The report to the Tsar dated 30 December [12 January 1813] stated: 'A strong cavalry patrol sent to establish communications with Yorck, having driven away the Cossacks, was engaged by the Grodno Hussar Regiment.'

30 That night, nine hussars were wounded and eight horses were killed.

31 Belmont, *Graf Diebitsch* (Dresden, 1830). Overall, little has been written about the reasons for the defection of the Prussian force by either German or most of our historians. Yorck was repeatedly asked to defect from Napoleon by Essen and Paulucci, the Riga governors, but the Prussian general always responded evasively (see J. Eckhardt, *Yorck und Paulucci*). The defection itself was received sympathetically by the Prussian troops, but at the same time it was wounding to their pride (see Wickede, *Ein deutsches Reiterleben*; Schliemann and others).

Schillupischken [Shilovo], and the Cossacks were behind him.

Diebitsch's bold actions nevertheless changed Prussia's previously hostile relations with Russia, reduced French forces by 16,000 men, and provided the Russian troops with reliable and brave allies. The participation of the Grodno Regiment in these events was marked by the following lines from Count Wittgenstein:³² 'The separation of Macdonald's corps from Yorck's Prussians can be credited to the courage of this regiment (the Grodno Hussars), who stationed themselves between them, and there, having compensated for the small troop strength of both corps with bravery, tipped the balance of indecision of the latter, so to speak, into accepting an alliance with us.'

Having completed business with Yorck, Diebitsch quickly moved to link up with Wittgenstein, on 15 [27] December he had seized Tilsit, where, after a minor action, the regiment captured several ammunition caissons and, on 20 December [1 January 1813], caught up with Macdonald for a second time at Skaisgirren [Bolshakovo]. During the pursuit, some 500 lower ranks were taken prisoner.³³ That same evening, the Grodno Regiment was detached from Diebitsch's command and handed over to Major General Shepelev at his personal request; to the general joy of the hussars, they were once again reunited with their beloved former regimental colonel-in-chief.

The regiment's first action under Shepelev's command was at Labiau [Polessk]. Setting out at night, the Grodno flankers caught up with an enemy column (a brigade under generals Bachelu and Grandjean) in the forest, not far from the village of Groß Baum [Sosnovka]. Rüdiger was riding with these horsemen, and sent Shepelev a request for infantry, then upon their arrival a firefight began. As the French began to emerge from the edge of the forest, they were engaged with canister by the horse artillery and attacked by the hussars from the flank. The disordered brigade hastily retreated towards Labiau in utter disarray, escorted as far as the town by the blows of our eight squadrons.³⁴

The assault of Labiau was postponed until the following day: the onset of darkness prevented the detachment from continuing its successful operation. At dawn, just as on the previous day, Rüdiger blocked the adversary's line of retreat, while the infantry raced in to drive the enemy out of the building with fixed bayonets. At 10 o'clock the French evacuated Labiau and emerged onto the Königsberg road, where they intended to take up positions: the artillery rode forward, heading under escort by two companies towards the slopes behind which Rüdiger had concealed his squadrons; the infantry proceeding behind them. Having waited for the right moment, Fyodor Vasilievich gave the signal to attack: the Grodno Hussars wheeled around in an instant and charged at the enemy column, crashing into it and driving it back onto the bayonets of the Russian jägers, who were already emerging from the town. *Rittmeister* Kozodaev captured three guns, 510 men surrendered to the detachment, and the 20 Russian officers and 40 lower ranks who were prisoners of the brigade were released in this action.³⁵ The rest of the French column tried to hold out at Teig [*sic*], but, caught between two fires and attacked once again by Rüdiger, they hastened to retreat towards Königsberg, having lost about 1,500 men at Labiau and in the hussars' pursuit to Königsberg.³⁶

On 23 December [4 January 1813], the regiment stood outside Königsberg. At midnight, the hussars, together with Rodionov 2nd's Cossacks, attacked the enemy outposts surrounding the city and, pushing them back to the walls, attacked the French a second time. The outposts began to fall back into the city. Noticing this, Rüdiger pounced on those who had not yet managed to escape and, bursting into the city alongside them, controlling the streets with such speed that the enemy, on sounding the alarm, abandoned the city almost without a fight.³⁷ A mass of ammunition caissons,

32 War Diary; Count Wittgenstein's dispatches.

33 Communiqué from the Most Humble Report.

34 Shepelev's report No. 3 to Count Wittgenstein.

35 Count Wittgenstein's report to the Tsar.

36 Count Wittgenstein's report to the Tsar; Military Science Archive, No. 1922.

37 Shepelev's report dated 24 December [5 January 1813].

wagons, heavy guns and baggage carts were abandoned during the retreat: the disorder in Napoleon's army had reached such a state and the attack was so unexpected that three generals and 1,300 lower ranks (besides 8,000 sick and wounded) surrendered to the vanguard.³⁸ Having occupied Königsberg, the Russian forces were greeted with open arms by the population of the ancient capital of Prussia: throughout the entire day of the regiment's stay within the walls of this city, the residents vied with each other in treating and honouring the hussars.³⁹

The regiment followed the enemy from Königsberg to Elbing [Elbląg], where, after a short skirmish, they defeated the rearguard there, taking two officers and around 300 lower ranks prisoner. Having crossed the Passarge, the hussars had passed through Friedland and Landsberg to Braunsberg [Braniewo] and Dirschau [Tczew]; on 31 December [12 January 1813], the remnants of the *Grande Armée* crossed the Vistula.⁴⁰ The Patriotic War was at an end, the enemy had been driven beyond Russia's borders, but the struggle with the dire foe, which neither his failures in 1812 nor the defection of his allies had broken, was to continue for a long time.

Leaving the active squadrons of the regiment at Dirschau on 31 December [12 January 1813], we shall now turn to operations by the two reserve squadrons sent to Riga under the command of 'the outstanding Major Hirsch.'⁴¹

A 15,000-strong corps had been formed from reserve squadrons and battalions in order to defend Riga, to which, as was assumed during the discussions for operational planning, Napoleon would not fail to send part of his army. Our two squadrons, which remained in the Sesvegen manor following the regiment's departure from Telsche, were also included in this corps, entrusted to the Riga Governor, General Essen.

These assumptions turned out to be correct: when the French crossed the Russian border, Macdonald's corps, which was intended to occupy the Ostsee Governorates [Livonia, Courland and Estland], was split: Grawert's division (later Yorck's) marched on Riga, while the Marshal moved towards Dünaburg. On 26 June [8 July], Grawert entered Mitau [Jelgava], from where he began his operations against Riga: on 27 June [9 July], Prussian patrols were sent along all the roads leading to the city, and at the end of the month [mid July], Grawert moved up behind the patrols himself. General Löwis was sent from Riga with eight battalions and a small detachment of cavalry, which included Hirsch's squadrons, to engage the Prussian division. The first clash between Löwis and Grawert took place at Eckau Manor [Iecava] on 7 [19] July, and ended unsuccessfully: Löwis, outflanked by the enemy, had to conduct a fighting withdrawal and retreat to Krusenhof [Krūzmuīža], under the protection of the cavalry.⁴² The Prussians occupied the banks of the Misa river and established outposts from Dahlenholm [Doles Sala] island to Yumverhof [*sic*, Jumprava?]. From that day on, operations were limited to skirmishes and firefights between our pickets and the Prussian patrols.

On 10 [22] August, with the Prussian force stretched out between Schlock [Sloka] and Dahlenkirchen [Dole], Essen attempted to push them back; the left of the three columns sent on this mission was to attack the enemy right flank at Dahlenkirchen and Eckau. The squadrons of the Grodno Regiment were attached to this column. Having forded the Dvina onto the left bank of the river, the column dashed in to storm the strong enemy fortifications, while the hussars raced towards the Prussian cavalry defending the guns. In this action, where the Prussian cavalry were defeated, despite their numerical superiority, Lieutenant Firks was wounded in the head with a sabre

38 Shepelev's report dated 24 December [5 January 1813]; War Diary.

39 Kutuzov's letter to Count Wittgenstein dated 28 December [9 January 1813] (Military Science Archive, No. 2056); the Field Marshall's report to the Tsar.

40 In the latter actions the casualties were as follows: at Labiau, 52 men (Major Nazimov and Stabs-Rittmeister Beckmann were wounded); at Elbing, 11 men; at Königsberg, five men.

41 This epithet was applied to Major Hirsch by Count Wittgenstein in almost all of his reports.

42 In this action, Lieutenant Gine of the Sumy Hussar Regiment, attached to the Grodno Regiment, was taken prisoner.

and, having fallen from his horse, was taken prisoner.⁴³ Through an extreme effort, the enemy cavalry managed to drag away their guns during their retreat, which almost fell into the hands of the hussars, and withdrew into the forest.⁴⁴ After the Battle of Dahlenkirchen, Essen withdrew his troops to Riga, where they remained until 13 [25] September. From that day onward, the hussars occupied the outposts in the vicinity of Kirchholm [Salaspils].

Skirmishes and cavalry clashes with enemy horsemen occurred daily. The most significant clashes between the Grodno Hussars and Prussian dragoons were: 14 [26] September at Dahlenkirchen, 15 [27] September at the Eckau Manor, 17 and 18 [29 and 30] September at the village of Stalgen [Staļģene], 19 September [1 October] at Garusen [Garoza];⁴⁵ Cornet Kleevsky was slightly wounded in the former. From 24 September to 4 October [6 to 16 October], the hussars occupied outposts near the Tatur mill; On 5 and 6 [17 and 18] October, at the customs house, they successfully attacked the infantry and contributed to the capture of the Prussian fortifications by units from the Riga Corps. Cornet Krasovsky especially distinguished himself by being the first to jump into the earthworks, but was seriously wounded in the back with a bayonet.⁴⁶ In this action, the enemy managed to surround our precocious squadrons and put them in an almost hopeless situation. The selfless courage of our men, however, saved them from certain captivity: having lost their commander, Colonel Count Podgorichanin, who had only just been appointed,⁴⁷ the squadrons cut their way out.

From 6 [18] November to 5 [17] December, the Grodno Hussars occupied outposts from Bersemünde [Bērzmente] to Planinei [*sic*]. In December, when the main body of Napoleon's *Grande Armée* was already in full retreat, Macdonald and the Prussians had to consider how to get away from Riga before Russian forces reached the border. Yorck, who had assumed command of the Prussian corps, made his move in the early [mid] December; General Löwis was sent after him with a detachment, which included Hirsch's squadrons.⁴⁸ The first clash between them took place near Janishki [Joniškis]: as the enemy, driven out of this village by Russian infantry, came out onto the Schaulen road, the Grodno Hussars raced into the attack. The Prussians formed square several times in order to engage the onrushing hussars, but Hirsch, at the head of his squadrons, tested the human wall of the square each time.⁴⁹ The attacks continued until the infantry arrived: once they had, Hirsch was ordered to go and rejoin his regiment, which he did on 20 December [1 January 1813].

The activities of the regiment's replacement squadrons are eloquently shown in the statistics of their losses and trophies: they took eight field officers and subalterns and 645 lower ranks prisoner in skirmishes and actions and captured a magazine with 4,000 *chetvert* [23,000 bushels] of flour.⁵⁰ Their losses consisted of two officers (Count Podgorinchani and Lieutenant Dolgovo-Saburov, who died of his wounds) and 77 lower ranks killed, seriously wounded, or missing in action.⁵¹ The captured cornets Baron Firks and Kleevsky were later freed by the regiment.

43 War Diary; Service records of regimental officers, 1816.

44 Essen 1st's report to the Tsar, dated 12 [24] August.

45 War Diary.

46 Service records of regimental officers, 1816.

47 Count Podgorichanin was commanding the squadrons due to Hirsch being ill.

48 After action report by Löwis dated 7 [19] December 1812; *Précis*; General Löwis' war diary (Military Science Archive, No. 2056).

49 Lieutenant Dolgovo-Saburov was mortally wounded in this action.

50 War Diary.

51 War Diary. Awards for all ranks of the replacement squadrons were as follows: Major Hirsch - Golden Sabre and Order of St. Vladimir 4th class; Cornet Kleevsky - Order of St. Anne 3rd class; Cornet Engelhardt - Monarch's Commendation; eight lower ranks received the Military Order medal. Non-commissioned officer Pryatnov distinguished himself at Eckau and was promoted to *Portepée-Junker* (General Löwis' citations, Military Science Archive, No. 1894).

The extent to which the regiment had suffered in the 1812 campaign can be seen from the fact that, despite the raising of two new squadrons to replenish the Grodno Hussar Regiment,⁵² on 27 December [8 January 1813], it was reformed with a six-squadron establishment (with one replacement squadron), replacing the previous ten-squadron establishment.

In concluding our description of the operations and exploits of the Grodno Regiment during the Patriotic War, as a summary we can only add Rüdiger's proud response to Count Pahlen to the question: where did the Grodno Hussars particularly distinguish themselves in 1812? "In that year, Your Excellency" the colonel-in-chief replied "the regiment particularly distinguished itself between Wilkomierz and Dirschau on the Vistula!"

52 Supreme Directed Decrees to the Minister of War dated 5 and 29 November [17 November and 11 December], No. 194 and No. 366. For the last actions of 1812, on 31 October, Colonel Rüdiger was appointed colonel-in-chief of the Grodno Regiment and was awarded the Order of St. Anna, 2nd class, with diamonds; lieutenant colonels Silin, Nazimov and Grothuß also received this Order; *Rittmeister* Kozodaev received the Order of St. George 4th class; Stabs-Rittmeister Teygert, lieutenants Mostanov, Kochubey 1st and Kusovnikov received the Order of St. Vladimir 4th class; Stabs-Rittmeister Ostrogradsky received the Order of St. Anne 2nd class; *Stabs-Rittmeister* Krammer, lieutenants Kochubey 1st and Kusovnikov received Golden Sabres; all ranks participating in the war were awarded a silver medal with the image of the All-Seeing Eye (Supreme Manifesto dated 5 [17] February 1813), and the regiment, as will be described below, was awarded silver trumpets.

CHAPTER 8.

1813. - Night attack at Dirschau. - The regiment at Danzig. - The state of the regiment at the beginning of 1813. - The march on Berlin. - Occupation of that city. - The action at Beelitz. - The regiment in General Kleist's detachment. - The action at Halle. - The Battle of Lützen. - General Kleist's attitude towards the regiment. - Prussian officers in the Grodno Regiment. - The battles of Bautzen and Reichenbach (8 to 10 [20 to 22] May). - The regiment's losses in these battles. - The skirmish at Jauer. - The state of the regiment after the Battle of Bautzen. - The armistice. - The Provisions Tariff of 1813. - Resumption of hostilities. - Action at Zehista. - Battle of Dresden. - Retreat to Reick. - Bivouac at Prohlis. - Retreat towards Altenberg. - Action at the village of Dohna: capture of two French squadrons. - Skirmishes at Gößnitz and Frohburg. - Action at the town of Borna. - Battle of Leipzig. - Storming of the city. - Advance to the Rhine. - The regiment at Strasbourg. - Action at Hohenheim. - Reinforcements reach the regiment. - Consolidation of a six-squadron regiment into four squadrons.

The negotiations that began after the unsuccessful French campaign of 1812 in Russia were not destined to end with favourable results. Understanding the advantages of his position and supported by the contributions collected from the defeated nations and the fear that the long-term success of French arms inspired in Europe, Napoleon was able to continue the war against an exhausted and impoverished Russia. Moreover, the war would not be taking place on Russian soil, but in Germany, where, despite the German people's hatred for the French yoke, almost all the princes were unconditionally submissive to Napoleon's will. Events, however, would not vindicate the calculations of the powerful *Empereur des Français*: the defection of Yorck, and all the Prussian formations following his corps, brought Russia not only an ally in the form of the Prussian army, but also the sympathy of Germany; consequently, from the beginning of 1813, Russian troops no longer had to fight on hostile soil, but on the territory of a people who looked upon them as liberators.

On the first day of the new year [13 January 1813], a new campaign began: the war for the liberation of Germany.

On 1 [13] January, the regiment bivouacked near Dirschau. In the early hours of 2 [14] January, the remnants of Bachelu's division reached this location; the division was retreating from Marienburg [Malbork] toward Danzig to join Macdonald's corps and encountered the hussar outposts stretched between Dirschau and Neuteich [Nowy Staw]. Having learned of the approach of this column, Shepelev concentrated the Grodno Hussars at Dirschau and moved the infantry forward with two horse artillery pieces towards Neuteich in order to engage the enemy. The night was dark, it was impossible to make out objects lying several steps ahead, and Bachelu was incidentally advantaged by this. Instead of going towards Neuteich, as Shepelev had anticipated, he turned sharply near Dirschau and headed into the gap between Grothuß's squadron, which formed the end of the left flank, and the remaining units of the Grodno Regiment. Grothuß, despite the darkness, realised that he was cut off and, without giving it a second thought, crashed into the French column from the right flank with a loud hurrah, on unsaddled horses, while Rüdiger raced at them from the left. Bachelu, attacked from two directions by cavalry whose strength was unknown to him, sped up his advance towards the Vistula and left the town of Dirschau. Pursued by the hussars and occasional shots 'for luck' from the horse artillery pieces, the French division crossed the frozen river and disappeared behind Schöneck [Skarszewy]; only Major Olshevsky was sent after them with two squadrons. The French retreat was so hasty that they left 200 prisoners and about 130 killed and wounded,¹ but this skirmish cost the regiment dearly. Our losses consisted of two officers wounded

¹ See the papers left after the death of Major General Harting (Military Science Archive, No. 1786); Shepelev's report to Count Wittgenstein, dated 19 [31] January (Military Science Archive, No. 2056).

(Major Davydov, with a bullet to the leg and *Stabs-Rittmeister* Kochubey 1st with a contusion), 18 wounded hussars and seven dead. *Stabs-Rittmeister* Tsitlyadzev, Cornet Shenne and about 20 lower ranks were missing in action.² Whether all of the latter fell into the hands of the French is unknown: some of the lower ranks captured by the enemy later rejoined the regiment, having escaped from French captivity, some, mostly wounded (including Lieutenant Tsitlyadzev), returned only in 1814 after the conclusion of peace; the rest disappeared without a trace.³

After this action the regiment moved to Groß-Zünder [Cedry Wielkie, 12 miles north of Dirschau], and on 8 [20] January to Herzberg [Miłocińska, one mile east of Borgfeld]; on 10 [22] January they joined the corps blockading the fortress of Danzig.⁴ On that same day, Major Olshevsky returned to the regiment, having pursued Bachelu's division together with *Rittmeister* Dedenev. Olshevsky had 'prevented this division from joining Macdonald through well planned and decisive attacks on the enemy'⁵ and brought back 238 prisoners, but had been unable to free the captured hussars.

On 10 [22] January, the regiment began to relax under the walls of Danzig. The duties of the Grodno Regiment, located in Traust [*sic*] and St. Albrecht [Św. Wojciech] (later in Mügenthal [*sic*, Müggau?]), that is, in the centre of the blockade line,⁶ were limited to maintaining several pickets and patrols ahead of the outposts. In the event of a sortie, the regiment was supposed to delay the enemy onslaught with counter-attacks and, if possible, cut them off on the flanks.⁷ Nothing happened until early [mid] February; there were no combat losses, but mortality from rampant disease and deprivation, as can be seen from the battle reports, was quite significant.⁸ The main deprivation was the lack of warm clothing and footwear, which had worn out during 1812, and the officers were in even worse conditions in this regard than the lower ranks: their dolmans and pelisses were so frayed that many had no cords left at all; and with no opportunity to replace their uniforms, the officers were literally walking around in rags. When the Emperor learned of the officers' situation and saw the heroes of Klyastitsy, Polotsk and dozens of battles, he was deeply moved by the plight of the hussars. An order was immediately issued to deliver cloth from Russia and to re-equip the lower ranks; the officers were provided with uniforms and greatcoats free of charge and were given six-month's pay, not deducted from their salary.⁹

From early [mid] February, the Grodno Regiment joined Prince Repnin's vanguard, and from 2 [14] February, began continuous reconnaissances of the area between Danzig and Küstrin [Kostrzyn nad Odrą]. The patrols sent over long distances so fatigued the regiment that Prince Repnin, whose cavalry consisted only of the Grodno Hussars, had to call on the Cossacks so as not to completely weaken his regular cavalry.¹⁰ Count Wittgenstein, having received reports on this, immediately reinforced the vanguard with Rebrikov's and Platov's Cossack regiments and at the same time ordered Prince Repnin to move to Landsberg an der Warthe [Gorzów Wielkopolski]. The regiment left Danzig on 9 [21] February, occupied Landsberg on 13 [25] February, and halted near the fortress of Küstrin, occupied by a French garrison, on 14 [26] February.¹¹ Repnin surrounded the city with Cossacks, supported by the Grodno Hussars, whose squadrons occupied the surrounding

2 War Diary.

3 Lieutenant Shenne returned to the regiment in January 1814.

4 Dispositions for the blockade of Danzig (Military Science Archive, No. 2109).

5 Shepelev's report dated 19 [31] January. 46 horses were lost.

6 In General Alexeev's vanguard. On 11 [23] January, the following were present with General Alexeev in the regiment: three field officers, 24 subalterns, 48 non-commissioned officers, 18 trumpeters, 370 privates; detached with Colonel Eckeln: one field officer, four subalterns, eight non-commissioned officers, one trumpeter, 50 privates (General Alexeev's fighting strength report, Military Science Archive, No. 2056).

7 General Alexeev's dispositions (General Alexeev's fighting strength report, Military Science Archive, No. 2056 and No. 1786).

8 Twenty lower ranks died at Danzig.

9 G. Czartoryski, The Lubny Hussars, compiled from the memoirs of a veteran of the wars of 1812-1814.

10 Prince Repnin's report No. 131, to Count Wittgenstein, dated 8 [20] February (Military Science Archive, No. 2056).

11 Prince Repnin's report dated 14 [26] February (Military Science Archive, No. 2056).

villages; Repnin, without instructions himself, asked for further orders from the corps commander.¹²

On the evening of 14 [26] February, the Count's reply arrived: at dawn on 15 [27] February, leaving the Cossacks at Küstrin, the regiment crossed the Oder by pontoon bridge at the small town of Güstebiese [Gozdowice], and approached Berlin on 19 February [3 March]. Marshal Murat [*sic*, Eugène de Beauharnais], who was in the Prussian capital at the time, decided to abandon the city at the first sight of the Russian vanguard's horsemen, as it was impossible for him to hold. On the night of 19 to 20 February [3 to 4 March], they set off along the Wittenberg road, leaving a rearguard in the capital commanded by General Grenier; the latter was ordered to evacuate Berlin no earlier than dawn. Meanwhile, General Grenier had already agreed with the Prussian Government Commission to surrender the city gatehouses to the *Bürgerwehr* at midnight on 20 February [4 March], on condition that Russian troops would not be allowed into Berlin until the morning. But as soon as the defences of the city had passed into the hands of the citizens, they informed Prince Repnin (who had stationed mounted pickets under the walls of the capital) of the French departure, and at six o'clock in the morning on 20 February [4 March], the vanguard ceremonially entered the capital, amidst the joyful cheers of the people. At 11 o'clock that same day, two squadrons of the Grodno Regiment were sent after the enemy retreating along the Wittenberg Highway; the remaining squadrons remained in Berlin along with the remaining Russian vanguard units.¹³ In Berlin, the King of Prussia inspected the regiment and, having assembled the officers, said that he had heard a lot about the bravery of the Grodno Hussars in 1812, and expressed the hope that in the new campaign they would show themselves worthy of their resounding glory.¹⁴ The regiment did not stay in the Prussian capital for long: on 22 February [6 March], the hussars were sent to Spandau to take up posts with the Russian detachment blockading the fortress. The Grodno Regiment remained there until 5 [17] March.¹⁵

At this point, Marshal Murat [*sic*, Eugène de Beauharnais] had managed to assemble about 40,000 men in Magdeburg and forwards of the city on the right bank of the Elbe. Despite the imbalance of forces, Count Wittgenstein decided to attack in order to open communications between the corps under Blücher and Wintzingerode. While the units were concentrating for this mission, the Grodno Regiment was called up from Spandau in order to reinforce the field force and was added to the detachment under Lieutenant General Berg, who was monitoring Magdeburg. On 24 March [5 April], the Coalition forces moved towards this fortress and by four o'clock in the afternoon a cannonade had opened up along the entire seven *verst* [4²/₃ mile] sector between Zeddenick and Gommern. Berg's corps joined forces with General Borstel's Prussian detachment at Vehlitz, and jointly attacked the enemy occupied village. The lead battalion of the vanguard, having crossed the Ehle river, was preparing to reform into column for an attack to the right of the embankment, but at that moment several squadrons of French *lanciers* and *chasseurs à cheval* appeared on their right flank from the villages of Zeddenick and Möckern. The battalion managed to form square and, having engaged the cavalry with a volley at a range of 50 paces, scattered them, some being driven back to Vehlitz, some across the river, towards the village of Leitzkau. The Grodno Hussars, who were approaching at that time, seeing the enemy cavalry, counter-charged them and, taking the *chasseurs à cheval* in the flank, drove them back onto the Prussian *Königin Dragoner*, who were debouching from the forest. This attack was so swift that the enemy regiment was completely destroyed: 'the remaining eight field officers and subalterns and 400 lower ranks surrendered to the hussars surrounding them.'¹⁶ Cornets Trautman and Pavlovich were wounded in this action, 15

12 Prince Repnin's report No. 214, dated 15 [27] February.

13 Repnin's report No. 184, dated 21 February [5 March] (Military Science Archive, No. 2056).

14 *Kurze Biographie des Grafen von Rüdiger*.

15 War Diary. The regiment was under the temporary command of Lieutenant Colonel Olshevsky due to Rüdiger being ill. Rüdiger returned to the regiment in March (Military Science Archive, No. 2052).

16 War Diary; Count Wittgenstein's reports (Military Science Archive, No. 1775); *Bericht über das Gefecht bei Veglitz* (Military Science Archive, No. 2061); Plotho, volume 1, p. 64.

hussars were killed, 25 were wounded, 60 horses were lost, but the regiment had saved the column from the cavalry and significantly facilitated the capture of the mill and the village of Nedlitz by the infantry.

In the evening, when the fighting was over, Berg's detachment crossed the Elbe at Roßlau and settled near Dessau. From that day on, the main mission of our regiment was reconnaissances of the Wittenberg road. The town of Wittenberg had been heavily reinforced with French troops, who, having felled the forest near Seegrehna for palisades, were transporting timber to Wittenberg. Lieutenant Gutjahr, who had almost reached the town itself with a half-squadron on 30 March [11 April], came across one of these convoys, overwhelmed it, dispersing or capturing most of the escort; the timber being prepared for removal near the village of Seegrehna, was burned by the hussars.¹⁷

On 1 [13] April, the regiment was moved up to Alsleben [five miles north-west of Könnern] and sent towards Calbe in order to support Colonel Rudolfi's column, as part of Major General Helffreich's detachment. Having joined forces with General Yorck's force in Bomberg [*sic*, Bernburg?] on 5 [17] April in order to repel an enemy force approaching from Eisleben, Helffreich took up positions at Groß Rosenberg [5½ miles east of Calbe], placing the Grodno Hussars in the villages of Lödderitz and Rajoch [five miles north-west of Aken], but the French did not attack him and, on 7 [19] April, Helffreich moved on to Köthen [eight miles south of Aken]. On 12 [24] April, on Count Wittgenstein's orders, Helffreich's detachment was disbanded: the infantry returned, and the Grodno Hussars joined the vanguard of Prussian General Kleist, who was defending the crossings over the Saale river near the city of Halle.

The French attack on this location was not long in coming. On 16 [28] April, Marshal [*sic*, *général de division*] Lauriston led an attack on the bridgehead fortifications built near this city, but after capturing the fortifications, the French were unable to cross, as the wooden bridge deck had been set on fire by the Prussians during their retreat. Before the assault on the *tête-de-pont*, the hussars, stationed just downstream of the city, had carried out a series of brilliant attacks on the flank of the advancing French and delayed the enemy columns' advance through their charges; when Lauriston retreated to Merseburg, Rüdiger followed him with his squadrons, which, over the next two days, monitored the Marshal's [*sic*, General's] movements toward Leipzig.¹⁸ The French had directed all their forces towards this city and at dawn on 20 April [2 May], they occupied Lützen, which prompted Count Wittgenstein to give battle near this town without further delay before the unification of enemy forces could be completed.

Kleist received orders at Leipzig only to go into action if the fighting had escalated and, in the event of a reverse, to take the Dresden road towards Wurzen, destroying all the bridges behind him; the remaining corps were to advance on Lützen.¹⁹ Events, however, turned out somewhat differently: Napoleon, having no intelligence on Wittgenstein's intentions, continued his advance towards Leipzig, while Lauriston, at 10 o'clock in the morning, had already engaged Kleist with a strong cannonade at Lindenau. Thus, as the fighting was starting at Lützen, Kleist, who was supposed to support the other corps, had been attacked by superior French forces and was forced to evacuate Leipzig. The Grodno Regiment, stationed on the Markranstädt road by General Kleist, held the position entrusted to them against the attacks of the enemy infantry with desperate charges, but our six weak squadrons were unable to hold the overwhelming French masses back for long. As Kleist was executing his orders, beginning the retreat through the Lindenau defile, he galloped up to Rüdiger and, firmly squeezing the colonel-in-chief's hand, ordered him to hold Lauriston's units

17 Lieutenant Gutjahr's reports to the Chief-of-Staff of I Corps, dated 29 and 30 March [10 and 11 April] (Log of Incoming Documents, Military Science Archive, No. 2105).

18 The Grodno Hussars lost four men killed and 14 wounded at Halle, while nine horses were killed (War Diary).

19 Count Wittgenstein's dispositions, dated 19 [21] April, Log of Outgoing Documents, No. 728 (Military Science Archive).

back with his hussars at all costs until the artillery and infantry had passed. This was becoming the critical moment: the French, having concentrated all their batteries, began to smash the entrance to the defile with crossfire, while the infantry mowed down the ranks of the hussars crowded in front of them with volleys. At Lindenau, seeing that there was only one hussar regiment at the defile into which almost all of Kleist's force had disappeared, Lauriston sent several squadrons against them. The French cavalry came forward at a trot and, wheeling into formation, raced towards the Grodno Hussars, who, manoeuvring under the murderous fire of the guns in order to make it difficult for the enemy batteries to aim, greeted them with their sabres. A heated battle ensued. The French cavalry, attacked on the left flank by two squadrons under Lieutenant Colonel Nolken and frontally by Rüdiger, were driven back and scattered. This unsuccessful attack, which Lauriston had believed would destroy the defenders of the defile, not only failed to break the regiment, but also prevented the French artillery from firing, from which the hussars' casualties would have been incomparably greater: we lost one officer (Lieutenant Tomilov), 24 hussars and 22 horses killed. Most of those rendered hors de combat that day were wounded by canister shot and bullets, while the number of those injured by cold steel was extremely small.²⁰

Having given the detachment time to withdraw, Rüdiger began to retreat through the defile. Having joined the rearguard, the exhausted Grodno Hussars continued to proceed behind Kleist's units throughout the corps' retreat to Wurzen.

Count Wittgenstein wrote of the regiment's participation in the Battle of Lützen:

Covering the retreat through the Lindenau defile under fierce crossfire from the batteries, the Grodno Regiment was once again attacked by the enemy, but here too, without losing the least of their proper order, they repelled them and showed their fearlessness of the encroaching threat, which alone saved the entire force, as was attested by General Kleist himself.²¹

This statements from the Prussian general regarding the bravery and capabilities of the regiment was highly valued by our ancestors, as an impartial tribute of respect to the courage of the Grodno Hussars from a foreigner. From then on, Kleist (in whose detachment the regiment, following Lützen, took part in the Battle of Bautzen) spoke especially well of the Grodno Regiment, always greeted any of the regiment's officers he encountered, and presented all the officers to the King Prussia for the award of the *Orden Pour le mérite*. Following the epic battles of Bautzen and Leipzig, when the regiment, having lost many officers, had to replenish their numbers by promoting *Wachtmeisters*, many Prussian nobles and officers from Kleist's detachment, thanks to Kleist's appraisals, began to ask to be enrolled in the ranks of the blue hussars (*die blauen husaren*); thus, the following were selected: Münster, Klotsch, Reuß, Kleist (the general's nephew), Walther, Klugen, Graf Keller (Fyodor Fyodorovich's brother, who had joined the army back in 1812), Baron Brunner and others. All these officers and *Junkers* repeatedly distinguished themselves in the ranks of the regiment, and many of them died in the numerous battles of 1813-1814; the only inconvenience was the complete lack of understanding of the Russian language by foreign officers, which required them to pronounce the words of command simultaneously in Russian and French. This inconvenience, however, was compensated by their qualities, conscientiousness, even punctilious attitude to service and the proven courage of these officers, with whom both superiors and subordinates soon got along. With the lower ranks, due to the quick wits of the Russian soldier, the foreign officers communicated in phrases that were half Russian, half German - good will and gestures completed what was impossible to express in words (during the campaign, the soldiers had become accustomed to speaking German).²² For those officers, who for the most part were familiar

20 From Mikhailov's dispatches.

21 War Diary; According to the rolls, there were 897 men in the six squadrons at Lützen (Military Science Archive, No. 1786).

22 From Mikhailov's dispatches.

with languages, the matter presented no difficulties.²³

On 21 April [3 May], General Kleist retreated to Mühlberg on the Elbe, in view of the Coalition forces crossing this river. He was followed by Lauriston's corps, moving through Zwenkau. On 28 and 29 April [10 and 11 May], Kleist continued his march through Großenhain towards Königsbrück, and on 30 April [12 May], having passed through Kamenz, the detachment finally reached Bautzen, near where it had been decided to fight a pitched battle; having reached this city, the regiment with the rest of the units in General Kleist's detachment settled near the village of Burk. Upon arrival at Bautzen, the Grodno Hussars were sent to reconnoitre the area around the city and beyond the village of Klix; other units of the Coalition army remained inactive until 8 [20] May, awaiting Napoleon's attack. At that time, the *Empereur des Français* was completely unaware of the locations of the Coalition army, which explains the slowness of his movements, which required five days to concentrate a 100,000 strong army over a distance of sixty *versta* [40 miles]: Napoleon received the first intelligence on the location of the Coalition forces no earlier than 6 [18] May. In the meantime, the Coalition, between 4 and 8 [16 and 20] May, had occupied and fortified two positions: a forward position along the river Spree, and a main position to the east of Bautzen. The weakest point in the selected position was near the village of Niedergurig, where the banks of the Spree, due to their gentler slopes compared to other places, allowed for the possibility of envelopment. This point on the right flank of the 12 *versta* [eight mile] position was entrusted to Kleist's detachment, as were the crossings at Malsitz and Nimschütz; the detachment was ordered, depending on the progress of the action, to attack either the flank or the rear of the enemy and, in the event of a reverse, to retreat towards Weißenberg.²⁴

In carrying out its mission, the Grodno Regiment vigorously reconnoitred Napoleon's direction of forces: on 5 [17] May, their patrols had already encountered French cavalry patrols and began vigilantly monitoring their movements. On 6 [18] May, a squadron sent to Klix had a skirmish with a patrol of *Chasseurs à Cheval* and discovered that the main body of one of the French corps was holding the village of Quatitz; two other squadrons were conducting their reconnaissances in the vicinity of Gothamelde [*sic*, Guttau?], on the extreme right flank of the Coalition army's position.²⁵ The prisoners taken by the hussars revealed that the French were moving along the Dresden road in two large columns and that the *Empereur* had announced to them 'that an action was planned near Bautzen, in which the Coalition army would be destroyed.'²⁶

The day of one of the greatest battles of the Napoleonic Wars was upon us and the bloodiest battle in our regimental history. On the morning of 8 [20] May, at 10 o'clock, salvoes began from the enemy batteries and almost simultaneously with the opening of the cannonade, the French moved to attack. The Grodno squadrons, having returned from reconnaissance the day before, had assembled at Niedergurig, that is, on the right flank of Kleist's detachment, and were stationed behind the village, along with four horse artillery pieces. Once the enemy offensive began, as was to be expected, the main attention of the French was directed to the sector of the position entrusted to Kleist: this point became the target of attack from two columns. One column crossed the Spree and

23 Many officers from the Grodno Regiment were seconded as interpreters to detachments whose commanders did not speak foreign languages: Cornet Engelhardt served under the famous Colonel Bedryaga, Brzezinski under Kleist.

24 In addition to the Grodno Regiment, General Kleist's detachment included the following units: Russians; Major General Vlastov with 23rd and 24th Jägers; Major General Roth with 25th and 26th Jägers; 21st Battery Company and six guns from 23rd Horse Artillery Company. Prussians; *Colbergisches Infanterie* (three battalions); 2. *Ostpreußisches Infanterie* (one battalion); *Ostpreußisches Jäger* (two companies); 1. *Schlesisches Husaren* (two squadrons); 2. *Schlesisches Husaren* (two squadrons). Bogdanovich, volume 1, p. 248-249; Plotho, *Beilagen*.

25 Rüdiger's reports to the Army Chief-of-Staff dated 6 [18] May; War Diary (Military Science Archive, No. 2057). On 6 [18] May, one squadron was requested to be placed at the disposal of Prince Volkonsky, Chief of the General Staff, but Count Wittgenstein asked that the hussars be left in General Kleist's detachment, where they were performing important duties (Barclay de Tolly's notes and letter to Count Wittgenstein).

26 General Kleist's report to Barclay de Tolly.

attacked the left flank of the detachment, the other (Bertrand's) moved towards the bridge at Niedergurig, which they managed to cross. At the latter location, the enemy infantry attack ended in failure. The squadrons from the Grodno Regiment, having emerged from behind the formation, wheeled around on the move and charged so swiftly at the French that some of the enemy were driven into the river, others over the bridge, which was reoccupied by Prussian infantry. Having scattered Bertrand's column, the hussars returned to their previous position.

At 12 o'clock, three squadrons were detached from the right wing to the left in order to monitor the flank that Marmont's force were putting under pressure.²⁷ When these squadrons arrived at the scene, they found the units stationed there in a critical situation: following a successful close-quarter battle, the French had managed to capture an 18 gun battery, which was being protected by Prussian infantry, and the French were advancing forward decisively, pushing the *Ostpreußisches Infanterie* back. Witnessing the sorrowful scene of the defeat of this element of Kleist's detachment, the squadrons under lieutenant colonels Olshevsky, Nabel and Nazimov simultaneously raced towards the victors, cutting down the French who were dragging the artillery away and recaptured the battery. This attack was carried out so swiftly and unexpectedly that not a single gun was spiked by the enemy; the commander of the infantry regiment, a lieutenant colonel and 150 lower ranks, cut off by the hussars, laid down their arms and surrendered to the Grodno Regiment.²⁸

The other three squadrons remaining on the right flank under the command of Major Hirsch, for their part, rendered a no less important service to Kleist's detachment. One of the enemy battalions had already enveloped the extreme right flank of the position and was threatening the Prussian skirmishers with an attack on their rear and flanks. Hirsch charged them. The French battalion, composed of young soldiers, were caught in the flank and attempted to form several small, separate squares in order to repel the charging hussars, but it was too late: some of the French, scattered by our horsemen, managed to run towards their lines in disorder, those that scattered in the opposite direction was pursued by the Grodno Hussars and fell into the hands of the hussars and infantry reserves.

While the skirmishes just described were taking place in Kleist's detachment, the Russo-Prussian forces, attacked by superior numbers, were being forced to retreat into the main position. Kleist's 5,000-strong detachment, which had held back the 12,000-strong corps under Marmont and Bertrand all day, also began its movement toward the main position at eight o'clock in the evening, on Count Wittgenstein's orders. The Grodno Regiment, having deployed a screen of flankers, covered Kleist's retreat to the village of Litten, where the Coalition detachment halted.

The battle began again on the morning of the following day, but Kleist, transferred to Preitz, where he remained for the entirety of 9 [21] May, took no part in it. The regiment's activities were limited to monitoring the flanks of their detachment and chasing off the encroaching enemy cavalry patrols. In the afternoon, the regiment and its detachment retreated to Belgern, and at dawn on 10 [22] May, moved to Wurschen, covering the retreat of the Coalition force. The rearguard, which included the Grodno Hussars,²⁹ stubbornly held back the enemy onslaught at Kotitz, Weißenberg and Reichenbach. The regiment was in action against Walther's *cavalerie de la Garde*, sent by Napoleon to reinforce the vanguard at the latter village. This cavalry charged at the Russian 20th and 4th Jägers, who were on the left flank, but at the same time Rüdiger, monitoring the enemy movements,

27 General Sicard's brigade and two Württemberg battalions.

28 In the History by General Bogdanovich we read: 'According to Vaudoncourt, the commander of the Russian battery stationed forwards of Bautzen was killed and the guns were captured by the French. This statement is unfounded: the Coalition forces did not lose a single gun in the battle of Bautzen' (1813, volume 1, chapter 10, footnote 11). It must be assumed that Vaudoncourt is referring precisely to the battery that, having been taken by the French, was recaptured by the hussars. The events of the Battle of Bautzen are presented according to the War Diary, witnessed by Count Wittgenstein, and supplemented with information from the works by General Bogdanovich, Mikhailovsky, Plotho, Aster and others.

29 General Kleist's letter; War Diary.

led our six squadrons against the French. This support for the infantry arrived just in time. Just as the enemy closed in on the Russian jägers, the Grodno Hussars struck them from behind, trapping the French cavalry between the infantry's bayonets and the hussars' sabres. Through this coordinated attack, the cuirassiers were defeated, although our squadrons could not even be compared with their numbers, and the 4th Jäger Regiment, surrounded by the enemy, were freed from the cavalry that had put them under pressure.³⁰ Following this action the rearguard continued its retreat to Görlitz and onwards beyond the Neisse river.

The Battle of Bautzen and the Reichenbach action cost the regiment dearly: we lost many officers, Kulnev's comrades-in-arms from the Finnish campaign and the Patriotic War. Between 80 to 10 [20 to 22] May, there were 22 officers seriously wounded or killed; 85 lower ranks were hors de combat; 183 horses were lost.³¹ These numbers, given the six-squadron establishment, are sufficiently eloquent to require no further comment. Among those killed were: Colonel Gorlenko, Lieutenant Colonel Baron Grothuß, Major Mishkovsky, Lieutenant Barets; cornets Zurmühlen, Stoffregen, Vilon and Ratlev; the wounded included: lieutenant colonels Nabel (bullet in the back), Nazimov (bullet in the arm), Major Hirsch (lance wound), *Rittmeister* Predaevich, *Stabs-Rittmeister* Zaborovsky, Glebov (bullet to the head) and Worms (shattered leg), Lieutenant Kavelin, cornets Firks (in the left arm), Gromkau, Reuß, Trautman, Samson von Himmelstern (sword wound to the head) and Verzhbitsky.

On 15 [27] May, Count Wittgenstein's army, continuing its retreat, moved towards Jauer [Jawor], sending the Grodno Regiment from there for reconnaissances in the direction of the enemy. Flankers were deployed ahead of this vanguard, who, approaching the village of Klein Rosen [Rogoźnica], discovered the outposts of an enemy detachment. Having pushed these outposts back, the flankers were engaged with shots from the enemy infantry bivouacked behind their outposts. Rüdiger attacked them with three squadrons, after which he retreated to Friedeberg [Dobromierz], being unable to engage in more serious combat with such a strong enemy.³² At dawn on 18 [30] May, Rüdiger carried out a reconnaissance-in-force towards Jauer with the entire regiment, but, in accordance with the instructions given to him, did not launch an attack: this reconnaissance merely revealed that about 12,000 French troops were concentrated near the town. By evening the regiment was positioned in outposts facing the enemy vedettes.³³

On the night of 18 [30] May, by order of the corps headquarters, two squadrons were detached to Bolkenhain to occupy a special post in that village; this deployment of almost half the regiment placed 300 of our hussars, who were guarding the peace of the Coalition army without any support, face to face with thousands of enemy. Rüdiger wrote to Count Wittgenstein the following morning: 'In order to monitor the enemy, it is vital to add light cavalry to the detachment entrusted to me. The Grodno Hussar Regiment, as Your Excellency is well aware, due to their disordered state, is now becoming steadily even more exhausted due to continuous outpost duty, so I humbly ask Your Excellency to attach some Cossacks to us.'³⁴ This was Rüdiger's first complaint about the regiment's suffering in 1813; until then, the colonel-in-chief had limited himself to requests that headquarters not disperse the squadrons, but now, when little by little the ten-squadron regiment had reached the point of extreme exhaustion and was literally melting away, Rüdiger decided to highlight the condition of the unit he commanded. Count Wittgenstein, who until his death never ceased to sympathize with the Grodno Hussars, heeded the chief's request: on the same day, both squadrons returned to Friedeberg.

Three days later, an armistice was concluded between the warring parties, suspending hostilities

30 War Diary.

31 Of whom 38 were killed and 47 badly wounded.

32 Four hussars were killed and nine injured at Jauer, while 21 horses were lost (War Diary).

33 Rüdiger's reports dated 17, 18 and 19 [29, 30 and 31] May. War Diary (Military Science Archive, No. 2061).

34 Rüdiger's report dated 19 [31] May (Military Science Archive, No. 2061).

until 8 [20] July. The hussars were transferred from Friedeberg, where they had been monitoring Jauer, to cantonment quarters between Reichemberg [*sic*] and Friedland [Mieroszów]. The regiment remained there until early [mid] June.

The armistice was essential for both sides. The daily attrition had so disordered the Grodno Regiment that by the end of May, its six squadrons could barely muster a little over 450 horsemen. The reinforcements sent from Russia were far from sufficient: two squadrons were raised at the end of 1812 to reinforce the regiment, 200 men arrived at the end of March [early April] and 150 in April - they reconstituted the regiment somewhat, but so many men were lost in all the actions from January to June that the arrivals could not make good the losses.³⁵ Besides combat losses, mortality from disease increased daily: from the very beginning of 1813, the regiment knew no other overnight accommodation than the frozen ground of the bivouac in full view of the enemy, no other position every night than at the outposts, and illnesses resulting from nervous exhaustion, cold, and fatigue completed what combat had begun.

The regiment's stock of horses suffered particularly both from enemy action and the intense workload. The procurement of horses for the campaign was done by sending remounts from Russia, capturing enemy horses and purchasing them in Germany. Those acquired by the latter method were of such quality that they attracted the attention of Count Wittgenstein, and when he learned that many of them had been bought by Rüdiger with his own money, the Count reported on this to the Tsar. On 11 [23] May, His Majesty deigned to issue orders, 'in view of the circumstances, according to which the purchase was not only necessary, but also very useful for the service, the money used for the purchase was to be refunded, unlike other regiments, from extraordinary funds'³⁶ while the colonel-in-chief received a commendation.

No less important was the issue of provisioning, which, given the difficulties in transporting rations and fodder from Russia, had required the establishment (on 16 [28] February) of a Tariff of Allowances.³⁷ According to an agreement with the Prussian authorities, Russian troops were to receive food supplies in kind from the population in quantities determined by the tariff. Upon arrival in a village or town, the regiment would present a formal demand listing the officers and lower ranks and received food and forage in exchange, in accordance with the agreed regulations. The standard unit for food issued to officers was the 'soldier's ration' which consisted of two *funt*, 19 *lot* [one kilogramme] of bread, 13 *lot* [166 grammes] of meat, one *garnets*, one *chast* [3.4 dry litres] of groats and $\frac{1}{8}$ *shtof* [153 millilitres] of wine. The following rations were supposed to be issued: to the colonel-in-chief - five rations, to colonels (not regimental commanders) - four rations, lieutenant colonels - $3\frac{1}{2}$ rations, majors - three rations, *Rittmeister* and Stabs-Rittmeister - $2\frac{1}{2}$ rations, lieutenants and cornets - two rations. Officers were granted the right to share the table of their hosts, by agreement with the latter; in this case, the hosts received the rations corresponding to their rank. The ration of fodder for officers' horses and war horses consisted of $3\frac{1}{2}$ *garnets* [11.5 dry litres] of oats and 10 *funt* [four kilogrammes] of hay; if there was a shortage of one or the other, a ration of oats could be replaced with two *garnets* four *chast* [seven dry litres] of barley, and the hay ration with two *garnets* [6.56 dry litres] of oats or one *garnets*, 14 *chast* [4.8 dry litres] of barley. In extreme cases, the Tariff allowed the issuance of 10 *funt* [four kilogrammes] of chopped straw sprinkled with two *funt* [820 grammes] of flour as a substitute for hay. Thus, Russian units received forage and provisions in kind directly from the local population, without having to wait for intendancy convoys, which arrived quite seldom due to delivery difficulties.

35 See Military Science Archive, No. 1786, No. 2056 and no. 2059. On 9 [21] July, two more squadrons arrived in order to fill the ranks of the Grodno Hussar Regiment (along with reserve squadrons from other regiments), under the command of Colonel Lobri (returns on the arrival of various squadrons to reconstitute Count Wittgenstein's army, Military Science Archive, No. 2056).

36 The Chief-of-Staff's report No. 642 to Count Wittgenstein, Military Science Archive, No. 2061.

37 Tariff for Count Wittgenstein's army, Military Science Archive, No. 2056.

In mid [late] June, the Grodno Regiment, which had been monitoring the enemy corps remaining in Jauer via their outposts, joined the vanguard under comte Saint-Priest and was transferred towards the town of Gottesberg [Boguszków-Gorce] on the Bohemian border. The squadrons were stationed at cantonment quarters near this town, setting up a screen of outposts each day on the high ground near village of Güstebiese [*sic*]; the regiment remained at Gottesberg until the resumption of hostilities.³⁸

On the night of 29 to 30 July [10 to 11 August], beacons blazed along the entire line of outposts of the Coalition army - this was the signal for the end of the armistice and patrols were immediately sent forward with the aim of discerning French intentions as quickly as possible. During the morning of the following day the regiment crossed Bohemian border, passed through Budin [Budyně nad Ohří] on 7 [19] August and entered Saxony on 10 [22] August. On that same day, the Grodno Hussars joined the vanguard of Count Wittgenstein's column, commanded by General Roth. Moving further along the Dresden road, at five o'clock in the evening the vanguard came into contact with units under Claparède and Lhéritier, holding the village of Zehista, near Peterswald

[Petrovice u Chabařovic]. A firefight broke out between General Roth's infantry and the enemy, during which Rüdiger, seeing that the ranks of the jägers were wavering under pressure from the French columns, launched four brilliant charges. Major Novosiltsev's squadron bypassed the enemy right flank along a small ravine that skirted the French wing and broke through between their rear and the village. Once Novosiltsev had seen that the remaining squadrons of the Grodno Regiment had emerged from the forest facing the left flank, he raced towards the reserves. Attacked unexpectedly from the rear and flank, the enemy were so confused that they immediately fell back and retreated to Pirna, without even trying to destroy Novosiltsev's handful of hussars.³⁹

On 11 and 12 [23 and 24] August, Roth's vanguard, in accordance with the plan adopted by the Coalition, continued its advance towards Dresden and, on 13 [25] August, approached this city, the defence of which had been entrusted to one of Napoleon's best marshals, Saint-Cyr, the former defender of Polotsk. The Grodno Hussars spent the night of 13 to 14 [25 to 26] August in bivouacs near the Großer-Garten, together with the Sumy Hussars, who had just recently been assigned to the vanguard. At first light the units began to deploy to their positions, but the attack on the city outskirts by Count Wittgenstein's force did not take place until four o'clock in the afternoon. As soon as the cannonade opened, the Grodno Regiment, which was at the head of Roth's detachment, charged, one squadron after another, at General Lhéritier's dragoons, who had advanced recklessly. The dragoons were broken by the hussar attack on their left flank and thrown back in disorder beyond the Großer-Garten, but, having recovered behind their lines, they were quick to return once more; the Grodno squadrons were drawn up facing them. Both masses collided with a terrific shock, the dragoons and hussars fought fiercely for several minutes, but although the enemy had a significant advantage in numbers, the advantage remained on our side once more: the dragoons little by little began to wheel their squadrons back and finally retreated to the suburbs. The regiment were not in contact with them again near Dresden. The regiment's operations on 14 [26] August were limited to the clash with the dragoons: the main assault was scheduled for 15 [27] August; the hussars remained in their previous positions in Roth's vanguard beyond the Großer-Garten near Grünwiese until the following morning.

The advance by General Roth's detachment began at dawn. The infantry deployed behind the villages of Blasewitz and Gruna, which they held, while the Grodno and Lubny Hussar Regiments, left in the second line, supported the attack. In the clash that took place between General Roguet's

38 Returns for the deployment into cantonment quarters (Military Science Archive, No. 2052 and Dispositions (Military Science Archive, No. 2058). The regiment was transferred away from Jauer, because the district was acknowledged as neutral.

39 War Diary; Count Wittgenstein's report No. 192 to Barclay, dated 12 [24] August (Military Science Archive, No. 2064). We suffered eight hussars killed, 11 men wounded and lost 51 horses at Zehista.

force and Roth's detachment, only three of our squadrons, assigned to the right wing under the command of Major Hirsch, took part. They raced through the intervals between battalions and attacked a French battery north of the Pillnitz road. The endless rain that was falling at the time concealed the beginning of our hussars' advance; when the covering force, consisting of several French squadrons, saw the Russian cavalry, they hurried to the artillery's rescue, but it was too late: before their horses could raise a gallop, they were driven back onto the guns and scattered, leaving one officer, about 300 privates, and three cannon in the hands of the hussars.⁴⁰ The prisoners were in review order, the officer was in full dress uniform fit for a ball. Each, encouraged by Napoleon's speech at Dresden, went into battle as if to a celebration: "If they find me dead on the battlefield today" the French officers said, "then when they throw me into a common pit they will say that I was a jolly good fellow!" Indeed, fortune smiled on the French that day: despite the calm resilience of the Russian infantry and the sweeping and successful cavalry attacks, the Coalition were forced to retreat from Dresden, the entire environs of which were drenched in Russian blood. General Roth retreated to Seidnitz, and then further to Reick.

As Roth was driven out of Seidnitz by four regiments from Roguet's division (*4e ligne, 8e ligne, 9e ligne* and *5e voltigeurs*), Napoleon himself arrived at this location. An infantry detachment had moved out of Reick to defend the embankment and ditch [Landgraben], onto which the French line regiments were pouring; the *voltigeur* regiment, meanwhile, was advancing from the eastern side of the village in order to attack our jägers in the flank. One of the enemy battalions, having detached from the rest, turned too far to the left and passed not far from the place where the hussars were stationed, protecting the horse artillery. The Grodno and Lubny Hussars, on a word of command from General Melissino, the colonel-in-chief of the Lubny Regiment, raced to engage the battalion. The battalion immediately formed square, but were scattered by the hussars attacking them and were almost entirely cut down: their losses consisted of 11 officers and 300 lower ranks; unfortunately, Count Melissino was mortally wounded in the attack.⁴¹

After the French captured Reick, the infantry retreated to Torna, while the Grodno Regiment moved behind Prohlis with the horse artillery. In Reick, just as along the entire line of retreat of Roth's detachment, every step of the ground was defended by Russian units with a courage worthy of a better result. All combat arms defended themselves in combination, round shot and canister mowed down the ranks of fighters, but the retreat was carried out in perfect order, as French military historians have testified. The regiments were terribly exhausted, physically and morally: the heavy feeling that accompanies any retreat after an unsuccessful operation was mixed with a sense of some kind of undefined anger in some, or apathy in others. The weather conditions contributed significantly to this mood. It had been raining since morning, and by evening the wind had picked up and the downpour was lashing our faces. The soldiers, soaked to the bone and under the weight of two days of combat, were faced with a vision of all the horrors of war: the bare chests of corpses littered the mud, along with the wounded begging for help; gun limbers, damaged guns, and ammunition caissons littered the entire area from Dresden to Prohlis. Every now and then, corpses of those who had died after the battle were carried out from the bivouac, and everyone's senses had become so dulled that the loss of a brother in arms evoked neither sympathy nor regret in the living.⁴² The following were killed in action at Dresden: Colonel Bruzin and 16 lower ranks; those

40 War Diary.

41 General Bogdanovich, History of the War to Liberate Germany [English translation by P.G.A. Phillips]. Some historians, including General Bogdanovich, attribute this attack to the Lubny Regiment alone; German historians that attribute it to our hussars in 1813, were Aster, Wagner, and Richter. However, Plotho writes that the battalion was routed by the Grodno, Lubny, and Silesian Hussar Regiments. We believe it more likely that the attack was carried out by the Lubny and Grodno regiments. Count Wittgenstein issued the following statement regarding the Grodno Regiment: 'At the village of Prohlis, this regiment destroyed an infantry column of some 800 men, of which 250 men with eight field officers and subalterns survived and were taken prisoner' (War Diary).

42 History of the Lubny Hussars; Bogdanovich, volume 2, chapter 28; N.I. Mikhailov, Dispatches 'The dead were not even counted when the battle ended: men were exhausted and lying in the mud, next to the dying and the dead.'

wounded were: Lieutenant Colonel Ipsilanty (whose arm was severed by round shot), *Rittmeister* Fermor (canister shot in the back), *Stabs-Rittmeister* Lizogub (round shot to the left leg) and Verbitsky (shell fragment to the head), Lieutenant Smorodsky (bullet to the leg), Cornet Brunner (severe contusion) and 16 hussars.

Having buried their dead, the regiment moved to Dippoldiswalde on the following morning, passed through Elend on 17 [29] August, and reached Falkenhain on 18 [30] August. Serving as the rearguard during the retreat of the Coalition forces, the Grodno Hussars maintained the reputation they enjoyed in the Russian army, defending their artillery during the day from pursuit by French cavalry and infantry, and at night, protecting the rest of the detachment at the outposts. 'Despite fierce enemy infantry fire' Count Wittgenstein wrote regarding this stage, 'this regiment protected the retreat of the force in the Bohemian Mountains and, by its steadfastness alone, saved our artillery from the enemy.'⁴³ The retreat continued to Altenberg.

While Wittgenstein's corps was retreating towards the Eger [Ohře] after the reverse at Dresden, news suddenly arrived of the victory at Kulm. This was the foremost successful action by Russian armed forces against the triumphant French troops since the beginning of 1812, and the joyful news of this battle, which was supposed to reverse the previously unfavourable course of events, significantly encouraged the dejected Russian troops. In our regiment, which had witnessed Lützen, Bautzen, Dresden, where neither fortitude nor desperate courage could save us from defeat, the victory at Kulm restored faith in success and hope for better days.⁴⁴

On 24 August [5 September], the Grodno Hussars joined Lieutenant General Count Pahlen 3rd's vanguard, and the following day moved from the village of Gerben [*sic*] towards Dohna. Near this town the vanguard was engaged by Napoleon himself and, despite the tenacity of the 2nd Grenadier Division, had to retreat to Zehista. Several attacks carried out by the regiment could not stop the enemy advance, but they delayed its initial onslaught and gave the infantry the opportunity to make the difficult retreat in perfect order. Near Dohna, the hussars launched their final attack. The French *14e hussards*, who had shadowed us right to the town walls, intended to crush the skirmishers scattered at the division's rear and advanced toward them at the trot, but the Grodno Hussars forestalled the enemy: through a coordinated attack, one of our battalions (Lieutenant Colonel Olshevsky's) cut into the column of *14e hussards* and drove them back, while the other, under Rüdiger's personal command, having got behind their wing and shouldered their way in, cut off the two flanking squadrons. Sixty men with four officers were our trophies of this action;⁴⁵ Lieutenant Shcherbakov was killed during the course of the fighting, *Stabs-Rittmeister* Beckmann and 24 hussars were wounded.

In late August [early September], the Coalition resumed their offensive. Following a skirmish at Zehista on 1 [13] September, the Grodno Regiment, forming the vanguard of Count Wittgenstein's left column, was sent to Hinter-Tellnitz [Telnice]. At Oelsen they joined the force under the Prinz von Württemberg for a joint attack on the enemy, who was holding positions at Breitenau, but took no active part in the action that took place at Hellendorf on 3 [15] September. Throughout the duration of this action, the regiment, remaining on the right flank of Pahlen's vanguard, limited themselves to guarding the sector of the position entrusted to them, against which, however, there were no attempts by the enemy. Following this battle, the Grodno Hussars were transferred to the head of the Pahlen's vanguard,⁴⁶ moving along the Altenburg road.

43 War Diary.

44 The regiment did not take part in the Battle of Kulm, but had several representatives in this action, including Major Kochubey 1st, who received a Golden Sabre 'for valour.'

45 Bogdanovich, 1813, volume 2, 'Two squadrons of *14e hussards* were completely wiped out by the Grodno Hussars'; War Diary; Plotho, volume 2, p. 192.

46 The vanguard consisted of: Grodno Hussars, Sumy Hussars, Ilovaisky's Cossacks, Prussian *Neumärkischen Dragoner*, 14th Infantry Division and 10 guns (Plotho). General Nikitin shows: Grodno Hussars, Sumy Hussars,

On 24 September [6 October], Count Pahlen, taking the Grodno Hussars, Cossacks with horse artillery with him, moved forward from Zwickau towards Gößnitz; the dragoons and infantry followed the first echelon. At Gößnitz, the Cossack flankers marching at the head of the column came across an enemy patrol, which, after a short firefight, retreated to the village. The prisoners captured at the time explained that Prince Poniatowski was stationed in Altenburg with part of his corps, while other units were located between this town and Frohburg, mainly near Windischleuba.⁴⁷ Count Pahlen, having received this intelligence, stopped forwards of Gößnitz in the forest near Ehrenberg, sending Count Wittgenstein a report of what he had observed. In the afternoon, troops began to emerge from the enemy held village, probably sent to reconnoitre the surrounding area. These troops, having sent four squadrons of dragoons and lancers ahead, moved towards Zehma, that is, straight towards the forest where the vanguard was located. Meanwhile, having covertly positioned two squadrons of the Grodno Regiment, supported by the Sumy Hussars, at the edge of the forest, Pahlen waited for the enemy to approach. The ambush was a perfect success. As soon as the French squadrons reached the edge of the forest, the Grodno Hussars hidden within instantly made an oblique turn and charged the enemy. The attack was all the more successful because the enemy were advancing in a column and could not form line: the squadrons, driven back by the blow to their flank, scattered in the direction of their infantry and retreated to the village together with them.⁴⁸ Two officers and 20 privates were taken prisoner by the Grodno Hussars in this action.

The next day the vanguard was sent through Schmölln towards Altenburg to prevent the enemy from crossing the Elster river. At three o'clock in the morning, the French set out from Altenburg and moved towards Frohburg. Upon receiving word of this from the outposts, Count Pahlen moved to intercept the French and, having occupied Windischleuba with infantry, directed one battalion of Grodno hussars towards Treben on the enemy's line of retreat, and the other, supported by infantry, towards Frohburg.⁴⁹ The first battalion (Major Nabel's) had only a minor skirmish with the enemy and returned to the regiment that same day, while the second had a fierce fight under the walls of Frohburg. This battalion, which was under the command of the colonel-in-chief himself, came across a significant enemy detachment (5,000 infantry, 12 squadrons and six guns), which had been tasked with masking the movement of a strong column from Rochlitz to Borna. The French, who were unaware of the strength of Rüdiger's detachment, opened fire on our scattered flankers, wanting to push them away from Frohburg, but the hussars, having deployed their squadrons, dashed towards the nearest enemy battalion at full gallop and, having driven it off, delayed the advance of the detachment for precisely two hours with attacks, that is, until the arrival of the Prussian force sent by General Zieten in support. Having confirmed the arrival of Rüdiger's fresh reinforcements, the French retreated to Frohburg. Rüdiger and the Grodno Hussars took up positions near Borna.

Meanwhile, Marshal Murat, concerned for his communications with Leipzig, withdrew his entire force from Rochlitz and Frohburg and took up positions at Gestewitz [near Eula]. This movement was shielded by Prince Poniatowski through a show of force by his light cavalry, which, according to Napoleon, was considered the best cavalry in the French army. At Borna, Prince Poniatowski, who was under pressure simultaneously from the forces under Zieten and Count Pahlen, sent ten squadrons of lancers with two guns along the main Leipzig highway against the latter's vanguard. The lancers, trotting out onto the road, wheeled their columns and raced towards the nearest dragoon regiment. The dragoons rushed to meet them, while Rüdiger, changing front on the move, charged towards the enemy's flank and forced them to divide their forces. The enemy cavalry, threatened from the front by dragoons and attacked from the flank by Rüdiger, had to abandon the battlefield after a desperate fight and retreated to the village of Cröbern, so as not to be completely

Lubny Hussars, Chuguev Ulans and 7th Horse Artillery Company.

47 *Journal d. Avant-Garde d. Gr. Wittgenstein, geführt v. Lieut. v. Luetzow* (Military Science Archive, No. 2129).

48 *Journal d. Avant-Garde d. Gr. Wittgenstein, geführt v. Lieut. v. Luetzow* (Military Science Archive, No. 2129).

49 *Journal d. Avant-Garde d. Gr. Wittgenstein, geführt v. Lieut. v. Luetzow* (Military Science Archive, No. 2129).

cut off. In two skirmishes, between Frohburg and Borna, where the regiment had clashed with the elite cavalry under Murat and Poniatowski, the regiment lost nine hussars killed; among the 12 wounded were Stabs-Rittmeister Loshkarev, cornets Rüdiger and Kisten (bullet wound to the left arm); 45 horses were hors de combat.⁵⁰

The day of the Battle of Leipzig was approaching, one of the most momentous battles in the history of humankind. Marshal Murat, who had retreated to Leipzig following the series of unsuccessful skirmishes with the Coalition, eventually decided to give battle near this city in anticipation of Napoleon's arrival. Behind him came Count Wittgenstein's corps in several columns; the rest of the Coalition forces were headed towards the city from all sides. The Grodno Regiment, as part of Count Pahlen's (left) column,⁵¹ moved towards Magdeborn on 1 [13] October and by evening had positioned themselves behind the high ground opposite Wachau.

On the morning of 2 [14] October, the regiment moved further to Auenheim, where they halted once more. Here word was received that Ilovaisky's Cossacks, stationed on the flank, were being attacked by a large enemy force at Markkleeberg. Count Pahlen sent Rüdiger to their aid with the Grodno Hussars, supporting these reinforcements with nine squadrons of Prussian *Landwehr* cavalry. The regiment were on the left flank and found the enemy pushing Ilovaisky from his position; the Cossacks evaded the charges by the closed masses of French cavalry, sometimes charging at the enemy with yells, sometimes retreating from them, scattering across the plain as the French gathered their squadrons for the attack. As soon as the hussars arrived at Markkleeberg, the captain's demeanour changed. While pursuing the Don Cossacks, the French had not noticed the approach of the Grodno Hussars and negligently exposed the flank of their squadrons towards Rüdiger's detachment. Our first attack drove back the French, but their second line moved to the rescue of the defeated enemy; a bitter struggle began between them and Rüdiger's detachment. The hussars, the *Landwehr* and the French were all mixed together, the metallic clang of crossed sabres, the thud of broadswords against Cossack pikes, the shouts and neighing of horses merged with the drawn-out whoops of Ilovaisky's horsemen. It was a battle of individual combat yet in large numbers: several men would fall back, regain the necessary momentum, and furiously charge the enemy again. During one of these minor charges, Lieutenant Barets was killed. Blow followed blow: inspired by their initial success, the Grodno Hussars beat off every attack until the battle at Lieberwolkwitz, on the opposite flank of the battle line, ended.⁵²

The weather was hot; the previous cold night had forced them to don pelisses, yet in the morning the sun beat down on the combatants. There was no time to change clothes; the hussars, constrained in their movements by heavy clothing, cursed their beautiful coats, while many were saved from dangerous sabre cuts by the pelisse that day. Fortunately for Rüdiger's small force, which would ultimately have to yield the battlefield to an enemy five times stronger, the 3rd Cuirassier Division came to the rescue at Markkleeberg; with their arrival, the French cavalry, ceasing their attacks, quickly rallied behind their infantry lines occupying the high ground.

The infantry soon replaced the cavalry. The French advanced significant masses of infantry, but they were forced to retreat to their previous positions, upon being caught in the crossfire of the Prussian batteries. From that moment on, the battle on our left flank ceased, although the cannonade continued until late into the night; one of the last cannon salvos wounded *Rittmeister* Krammer of the Grodno Regiment with a head contusion and killed several hussars.

On 3 [15] October, both sides held their positions. In both camps they were considering courses of

⁵⁰ War Diary.

⁵¹ Count Pahlen's column consisted of the Grodno Hussars, Sumy Hussars, Lubny Hussars, Chuguev Ulans, 7th Horse Artillery Company, *Neumärkischen Dragoner*, *Ostpreußisches Kürassiere*, *Schlesisches Uhlanen* and *10. Reitende Batterie*. The Grodno Regiment had 600 men at Leipzig.

⁵² Von Luetzow.

action for the impending battle, the outcome of which was to be decisive for both armies. At seven o'clock on 4 [16] October, salvoes began from the French positions and, following the opening of fire, all the Coalition units moved forward. The Grodno Regiment, exhausted from the fighting at Markkleeberg, was tasked with protecting the horse artillery supporting Prince Gorchakov's infantry assault on Liebertwolkwitz forwards of the Universitäts Waldungung. This mission turned out to be far from easy: under murderous crossfire from the French batteries, which wiped out the entire crew of the 6th and 7th horse artillery companies, the Grodno Hussars stood level with them and remained there until the silenced guns, deprived of officers, men and horses, no longer required protection. As soon as any of the crew were out of action, a hussar would dismount and go to help to work the guns: many of the members of our regiment killed at Leipzig did this, performing the duties of artillerymen. The 6th and 7th companies were relieved by two Prussian batteries, but they too were forced into silence; because our regiment had thus become redundant here, it was brought back behind the village of Güldengossa, where Count Pahlen's entire cavalry was assembled by nightfall.

The fourth day of the battle of Leipzig (5 [17] October) began with an attack on the village of Probstheide, which was well fortified and stubbornly defended by the enemy: the village of Probstheide was the key to the Leipzig position and the French generals, as well as the generals from the Coalition forces, were aware of this. On this day, the Grodno Regiment, as with all of Pahlen's cavalry, did not take part in the battle and remained in reserve until dusk.

The penultimate but decisive day of the battle was upon us. The weather was clear after several rainy days, and the troops marched well and cheerfully. In the distance one could see the unfortunate city brightly illuminated by the sun and about to become the victim of all the horrors of an assault. The Tsar himself stood on a hillock and, as the units of infantry and cavalry passed by him, he encouraged the army with short but heartfelt phrases: "Lads, you have fought like heroes these days" the Emperor said among other things, "be merciful today. The Tsar asks this of you!"⁵³ Pahlen, who had roused his cavalry from their bivouacs at six o'clock in the morning, took up his positions in front of Meusdorf, between the Leipzig road and the village of Zuckelhausen, serving as a link between the columns under Barclay and Bennigsen.⁵⁴ The Grodno Regiment stood there, covering their front with a dense screen of flankers, until two o'clock in the afternoon. Meanwhile, Bennigsen's infantry, having departed Zuckelhausen, had advanced too far forward; several squadrons of General Sébastiani's French cuirassiers had concentrated facing them, and with whom the enemy simultaneously sought to conceal their withdrawal from Holzhausen. Rüdiger, never one to miss an opportunity, moved forward: ignoring the fierce fire directed at them from French batteries stationed at Probstheide, the Grodno Hussars charged at the cuirassiers and simultaneously at the retreating infantry. The hussars did not manage to isolate the latter, but the cuirassiers, upon whom six squadrons fell, were driven back and pursued to their infantry columns. The regiment was so carried away by this pursuit that they rode far into the enemy lines and came upon a battery, two of whose guns were captured by *Rittmeister* Ostrogradsky; the rest were spiked and their horses slaughtered by the Grodno Hussars.⁵⁵ In this action, non-commissioned officer Gruzenko, a tall, bearded Malorussian [Ukrainian], particularly distinguished himself; he was the first to dash into the battery and killed an officer and several gun crew members on the spot. When the regiment began to fall back, Gruzenko, noticing that one of the guns was still serviceable, calmly left the

53 Ploto, *Relation der Gefechte bei Leipzig*.

54 The vanguard consisted of the Grodno Hussars, Sumy Hussars, Chuguev Ulans, Grekov's Cossacks, Ilovaisky's Cossacks and General Röder's Prussian cavalry (Regarding the Battle of Leipzig, Military Science Archive, No. 2159).

55 Barclay de Tolly's diary; Ploto, volume 2; *Journal der Avant-garde*; General Bogdanovich; War Diary; Count Wittgenstein: 'Securing Count Bennigsen's cavalry on the right flank, which had been pushed back by a strong enemy, three times the Grodno Regiment renewed the most decisive, stubborn attacks and finally drove the enemy behind the batteries, from which *Rittmeister* Ostorgradsky took two cannon.'

squadron and returned to the battery alone; having spiked the cannon and shot the remaining living horse, this brave non-commissioned officer was catching up with his unit at a trot when several enemy horsemen pounced on him. Gruzenko was not disconcerted by this: having waited for the first, he knocked him from the saddle with one blow of his sabre and continued to withdraw, slowly, under a hail of bullets; the remaining cavalymen did not dare attack the lone hussar.

The village of Probstheide was taken by nightfall and the French retreat to Leipzig began. Throughout the night 6 to 7 [18 to 19] October, stationed in the outposts forwards of Zuckelhausen, our hussars harassed the enemy hurrying to shelter behind the city walls.

Before first light, Count Wittgenstein's leading units set off through Probstheide towards the outskirts of Leipzig (Sandtor), while other Coalition units were directed to other gates and entrances. After a stubborn and bloody defence by the French, who mistakenly blew up the bridge on the Elster (the army's only escape route), Leipzig was taken by storm. In the battles of 2, 4 and 6 [14, 16 and 18] October in which the enemy lost four marshals and 17 generals killed or wounded, in addition to 37 captured, the Grodno Regiment suffered enormous losses: Lieutenant Colonel Baron Nolken, Lieutenant Berents, cornets Pepel, Trautman, Piotrovsky and Topelius were killed; *Rittmeister* Krammer and Ostrogradsky, lieutenants Essen and Mostanov, cornets Dymsha and Skrydlevisky (head contusion), were badly wounded; 51 lower ranks were hors de combat (23 killed and 27 wounded), 131 horses were lost. Our regiment suffered especially from artillery fire on 4 and 6 [16 and 18] October: there were relatively few wounded by cold steel, and most of those out of action were from contusions or hit by cannon projectiles.

For the brilliant participation of our unit in the campaign of 1813, and in the Battle of Leipzig in particular, the regiment was awarded badges on its shakos with the inscription: *за отличие* [for distinction], a rare award at that time.⁵⁶ Many officers and lower ranks, in addition to Russian Orders,⁵⁷ were awarded the *Pour le Mérite* cross; the Prussian King personally pinned the latter Order on the chest of Lieutenant Postels, when Rüdiger sent him with a report.

The defeat at Leipzig put an end to the period of French victories that had begun with the Battle of Lützen. The pursuit of Napoleon began on 7 [19] October. On 11 [23] October, the Grodno Regiment, riding hot on the enemy's heels, arrived at Buttelstedt via Pegau, Stößen, and Eckartsberga, with Pahlen's vanguard. Then, on 14 [26] October, bypassing Weimar, after minor skirmishes with French cavalry, they reached Erfurt and Gotha. At Meiningen, on 18 [30] October, the regiment received orders to take the shortest route to the Rhine; the whole of November was spent on this march. In early [mid] December, the Grodno Hussars were accommodated in Isingen and in the surrounding villages, but soon, due to the poverty of the population, who were unable to feed the cavalry, the regiment was reassigned to the town of Rastatt for quartering.⁵⁸ Having reached this town ahead of the regiment, Rüdiger found all the surrounding villages occupied by the Lifeguard, and therefore the villages of Durmersheim, Kwitsheim [*sic*] and Ötigheim were allocated

56 30 May [11 June] 1814.

57 Awards for the Battle of Leipzig were: Major General Rüdiger - Order of St. Anne, 1st class with diamonds; *Rittmeister* Ostrogradsky - St. George, 4th class; Stabs-*Rittmeister* Sysoev, Lieutenant Colonel Olshevsky, *Rittmeister* Tulubiev, Lieutenant Olshevsky 2nd - Golden Sabres; lieutenants Golofeev, Engelhardt, Stabs-*Rittmeister* Kondratovich - St. Vladimir, 4th class; Lieutenant Colonel Nabel - St. Anne, 2nd class with diamonds; *Rittmeister* Aderkas, Loshkarev and Stabs-*Rittmeister* Gutjahr - St. Anne, 2nd class; Stabs-*Rittmeister* Sineokov, cornets Voitov, Skrydlevisky, Dymsha, Ecks, Pustovoyt, Marchenko, Klein, Bobryshev - St. Anne, 3rd class. For the preceding battles of Bautzen, Dresden and Lützen: Major General Rüdiger - Order of St. Anne, 1st class; lieutenant colonels Olshevsky and Nazimov - St. George, 4th class; Stabs-*Rittmeister* Kondratovich and Lizogub - Golden Sabres; Lieutenant Colonel Nolken - St. Anne, 2nd class with diamonds; Lieutenant Colonel Prince Ipsilanty, Stabs-*Rittmeister* Maekovsky, Ilpisky 1st, Kochubey 2nd - St. Anne 2nd class; *Rittmeister* Aderkas, Stabs-*Rittmeister* Worms, cornets Baretts and Verzhbitsky - St. Vladimir, 4th class; Cornet Rüdiger 2nd, Lieutenant Postels, cornets Baretts and Klein - St. Anne, 3rd class; seconded lieutenants Zhori and Skoropatsky - St. Vladimir, 4th class.

58 War Diary; Count Pahlen's report to Wittgenstein, dated 6 [18] December; Distribution of forces for 1813 (Military Science Archive, No. 2059).

to the Grodno Regiment until the Lifeguard regiments left Rastatt.⁵⁹ The hussars were accommodated in closed quarters in order to maintain the outposts set up along the banks of the Rhine from Mannheim to Kehl. The river was entrusted to detachments under Rüdiger, Nabel and Selifontiev; in Hagenau [Haguenau], beyond the Grodno Hussars, Count Pahlen was stationed with the Chuguev Ulans and Badenese dragoons. Facing our outposts from the left bank of the Rhine, the river was guarded by outposts of French *Gardes d'honneur* and elements of the Strasbourg [Straßburg] garrison, under the overall command of General Saint-Sulpice. The outposts were supported by a detachment of *Gardes d'honneur* and 100 men from the *18e régiment de dragons*, who had previously been holding Hagenau.

On 22 December [3 January 1814], Count Pahlen ordered Rüdiger to conduct a reconnaissance towards Wanzenau [La Wantzenau] and to reach Strasbourg if possible. Immediately, the outposts were drawn together at Herlisheim [Herrlisheim], halfway between Fortlouis and Strasbourg, and a vanguard consisting of *Rittmeister* Klotsch's squadron was sent forward.⁶⁰ The squadron encountered and drove off three platoons of enemy cavalry that had been sent out from Kilstedt [Kilstett] on patrol: part of this half-squadron was captured by the hussars, the other part hastily took cover in Gambsheim, where there were five squadrons of *Gardes d'honneur* and two companies of infantry. Having reached Klotsch in good time, Rüdiger sent patrols towards Strasbourg and, having arranged horse relays for liaison with other observation detachments, returned to Hagenau. Intelligence received from patrols confirmed statements by the prisoners that Wanzenau was held by 2,000 cavalry and infantry.⁶¹

Reconnaissances of the Strasbourg area continued daily: in the early hours of 24 December [5 January 1814], a patrol sent with Lieutenant Babst had a significant firefight near Saverne [Zabern]; while another, on the road to Strasbourg, captured an outpost monitoring the Saverne road and took one officer and 14 other ranks from the *6e régiment de dragons* prisoner.⁶² On 25 December [6 January 1814], having assembled the squadrons of the Grodno Regiment, Rüdiger closed up towards Wanzenau once more and captured four guns. As soon as the hussar flankers appeared, the enemy, numbering 1,000 infantry and 500 cavalry with four guns, evacuated the town and retreated to Hoenheim [Hœnheim]. The colonel-in-chief marched after them and, having reached the new French location, divided the Grodno Regiment into four elements for an attack on the town, which were to simultaneously encircle Hoenheim from all sides. 'With a successful and swift attack, albeit with a weak but daring force' Rüdiger blocked every street and forced the enemy to retreat in disorder towards Strasbourg. The detachment commander, several officers and about 70 privates were cut down on the town's streets; two officers and about 60 lower ranks surrendered.⁶³ This was the last action in 1813. From 26 December to 9 January [7 to 21] January 1814, the regiment was stationed near Strasbourg, participating in the blockade of the fortress and continuing their surveillance along the left bank of the Rhine. As a result of Rüdiger's repeated complaints, the burden of outpost duty was shared between the Grodno Hussars and the newly arrived, recently raised, Baden *Dragonerregiment*,⁶⁴ under the overall command of Prinz Eugen von Württemberg.⁶⁵

59 Rüdiger's report to Count Wittgenstein, dated 13 [25] December (Log of Incoming Documents).

60 Fortlouis is 32 *versta* [21 miles] from Strasbourg.

61 Pahlen's report to Count Wittgenstein and Rüdiger's report to Count Pahlen dated 23 December [4 January 1814]; War Diary (Military Science Archive, No. 2059); Count Pahlen's report dated 25 December [6 January 1814] (Military Science Archive, No. 2059).

62 Pahlen's report to Count Wittgenstein.

63 Rüdiger's report from Wanzenau, dated 25 December [6 January 1814]; War Diary. In this action the regiment lost nine men; Lieutenant Puslovsky was among those wounded.

64 Instructions for Rüdiger, No. 760, No. 1030 and No. 1041, Log of Outgoing Documents (Military Science Archive, no. 1773).

65 Four squadrons were with Rüdiger and held outposts along the Rhine as far as Strasbourg; two squadrons with Cossacks, forming Pahlen's left flank, held the road from Hagenau to the fortress. The right flank (of Sumy Hussars and Chuguev Ulans) was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Nabel from the Grodno Hussar Regiment

At this time, reinforcements of recruits and horses reached the regiment from Russia, and a depot was established in Hagenau (under the command of Major Shelikh-Osipov) for the impending campaign, from where, throughout 1814, the regiment would receive horses and men as they completed training.⁶⁶

At the end of 1813, the six-squadron Grodno Regiment was reduced to a four-squadron establishment: the regiment's strength, the numbers on the rolls, did not exceed 434 men.⁶⁷ The rest of the men lay in hospitals, where they died from wounds or diseases, or had covered the bloody path of the Russian army with their corpses from Dirschau on the Vistula to the French border.

(Pahlen's report to Wittgenstein, among other documents).

66 Returns signed off by Count Wittgenstein (Military Science Archive, No. 2301).

67 Report on the composition of the force, signed off by Barclay de Tolly. In the distribution of forces (Military Science Archive, No. 2083) however, 489 men were shown. By early [mid] January, the regiment had been replenished to five squadrons with a strength of 492 men (Military Science Archive, No. 2059).

CHAPTER 9.

1814. - The New Year on the Rhine. - The advance on Nancy. - The action at the town of Valleret. - The skirmish at Montier-en-Der. - The regiments' movements up to the end of January [early February]. - The French night raid on the bivouacs at the village of La Lande. - The regimental reconnaissance between Romilly and Pont-sur-Seine. - The Battle of Bar-sur-Aube. - The action at Laubressel. - *Stabs-Rittmeister* Rybalkin. - The Battle of Troyes (action at La Malmaison). - The 'Klyastitsy.' - The action at Saint-Aubin. - The regiment in the outposts. - The Battle of Arcis. - The offensive towards Paris. - The mood of the troops in March 1814. - The Battle of Fère-Champenoise. - The regiment in front of Paris. - The entrance into Paris. - The pursuit (towards Fontainebleau) of Marmont's corps. - The conclusion of military operations. - 'The little grey general.' Into cantonment quartering. - The composition of the regiment in 1814. - The return journey from France to Russia. - The march-route. - The Provisioning Tariff. - Crossing the Russian border. - A review of the regiment's combat operations in the campaigns of 1812 to 1814. - The regiment's losses in the three-year war. - Decorations. - Nomination for the St. George Standard.

Despite the exploits and bravery of the French army, the fortune that had smiled upon Napoleon until then, changed completely in October and his situation had begun to become hopeless. Having rejected the terms offered to him by the Coalition in Frankfurt, the brilliant commander continued raising armies to prolong the conflict, even though France, like Germany and Russia, was demanding rest and peace after the long period of bloody wars.

New Year 1814 found Russian forces on the border and our regiment was located in the vicinity of Strasbourg, yet there had been no skirmishes or firefights between the *Gardes d'honneur* and our hussars since Christmas. On 1 (13) January, Despite the difficult military situation, everything in the regiment's quarters took on a festive air; people congratulated each other and exchanged New Year's wishes, which, before the start of the new war, left a rather sad impression: everyone's imagination was involuntarily transported to their distant homeland, recalling previous years spent in the circle of relatives or friends, and the encompassing atmosphere became even gloomier. Battle-hardened officers and soldiers, who had witnessed all the disasters and horrors of war, were despondent on this day; many wept, and 1 [13] January, which had begun in triumph, ended in a somewhat sombre mood. "*Bonne année!*" the French shouted from the other bank, having learned that the Russians were celebrating the New Year on this day, but this greeting, sincere or mocking, found no echo on the right bank of the Rhine.¹ "Congratulations, fiends!" the hussars cursed, and again the soldiers' imaginations, skipping through Lützen, Bautzen, Dresden, beneath which rested comrades who had not lived to see this day, and crossed the Russian border to those home villages where the bells were ringing, the people were rejoicing and feasting...

The campaign began on 9 [21] January.² On 7 [19] January, Rüdiger had been ordered to leave the Baden Dragoons and Cossacks at Strasbourg and advance to join Count Pahlen with the Grodno Regiment and two guns from 23rd Horse Artillery Company at Lunéville, via Saverne and Sarrebourg. On 10 [22] January, the regiment was in Sarrebourg and, reached Toul via Lunéville and Vézelize, on 14 [26] January, where they came under the command of the Prinz von Württemberg. At Toul, after a five-day march, the regiment was given a rest day in order to re-shoe its horses; on 15 [27] January, the hussars transferred to Nancy, and on 16 and 17 [28 and 29] January they again moved through Toul to Joinville, from where they were directed along the Saint-Dizier road in order to establish communications with General Yorck's column, which was

1 Reported by N. Mikhailov.

2 While stationed on the Rhine, the regiment was reinforced with one squadron made up of recruits. This was the fifth since the beginning of the campaign: two arrived from St. Petersburg in October 1812, two in Silesia in 1813, the fifth from the depot established in Hagenau.

marching towards Vitry at the time.³ Only one squadron under Hirsch was detached in the direction of the town of Ligny to reconnoitre the area between Bar-le-Duc and St. Dizier, occupied by the enemy, and after completing this, rejoined the rest of his regiment.⁴

Meanwhile, Marshal Marmont, commanding the French *6e Corps*, having no intelligence on our forces, moved from Bar-le-Duc towards Joinville; on 17 [29] January, he turned right towards Wassy, leaving Legrand's division at Saint-Dizier. He sent his cavalry forward from Wassy in the direction of Valleret [eight miles north-west of Joinville] in order to reconnoitre the strength of the Russian force, with orders to attack all Coalition units moving towards Wassy and Saint-Dizier, wherever possible. The French cavalry, consisting of 800 men (according to Koch)⁵ or 1,900 men (according to Bernhardt)⁶ of Doumerc's division, passed Valleret and halted outside the town, uncertain which direction to take to achieve their objective. Rüdiger, having learned of the approaching enemy cavalry from the flankers, concealed his five squadrons on a reverse slope and placed two guns, which were with the detachment, on the crest protected by 100 Cossacks. Upon the sounding of a signal, the hussars attacked the enemy from three directions, who, repulsed by the blow and bombarded by the artillery, fled in disarray towards Fays [five miles south-east of Rachecourt]. Unable to rally at this place, the broken cavalry were pushed back to Wassy, where the pursuit by the Grodno Regiment ended.⁷ This successful operation, due both to French negligence in failing to take precautions against a surprise attack and to the swiftness of Rüdiger's strike, cost us just three men and 11 horses. To the entire regiment's sorrow Cornet Brzezinski died that same evening, having been mortally wounded.

The regiment remained under the walls of Wassy, monitoring enemy movements by means of patrols. On 18 [30] January, Marmont evacuated the town, leaving a small rearguard, which was scattered by Rüdiger. For the pursuit of the enemy, the colonel-in-chief took the Grodno Hussars, two squadrons of Sumy Hussars and two guns from his detachment and attacked a French column at Montier-en-Der.⁸ The enemy infantry, taken by surprise, fled into the forest, while the cavalry was thrown into such disarray by the attack that they left 23 ammunition caissons, 40 wagons and three forges in the hands of the hussars. The infantry, in the grip of panic, were pursued into the forest by the Grodno Hussars, who took a colonel, six officers and 180 lower ranks prisoner.⁹ The scattered column retreated towards Belliancourt [*sic*]. Rüdiger followed them, but, once on the Vitry road, he received orders not to lose contact with of the enemy cavalry, to establish communications with Yorck's detachment moving along the left bank of the Marne, and to assist the latter in his operations on Vitry. This forced the colonel-in-chief to leave the infantry and artillery at Montier-en-Der, as they would have delayed the move due to the poor condition of the roads, and he quickly turned towards Larzicourt [9½ miles south-east of Vitry], where the Prussian cavalry was waiting for him. The regiment, which had moved across to Gigny [nine miles south of Vitry] on 20 January

3 Count Wittgenstein's instruction No. 29 to Rüdiger; Dispositions for 13 [25] January; Colonel Teslev's report to the Prinz von Württemberg, dated 14 [26] January; Count Wittgenstein's instructions No. 57, and No. 63, dated 16 [28] January; War Diary, Count Wittgenstein's papers (Military Science Archive, No. 1773).

4 Correspondence from the unit commanders of the Army of Bohemia (Military Science Archive, No. 2309). Hirsch's reconnaissance, as can be seen from subsequent operations by the Coalition army, was of considerable importance, especially for Blücher's column.

5 Frédéric Koch, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de la campagne de 1814*.

6 Theodor von Bernhardt, *Denkwürdigkeiten aus dem Leben des Grafen von Toll*. Count Wittgenstein reported 2,000 men.

7 Rüdiger's report dated 17 [29] January (Military Science Archive, No. 2309); War Diary. In this action, the *Junker* brothers of Count Keller particularly distinguished themselves and were promoted to officers for their bravery.

8 War Diary. Rüdiger's detachment had consisted of five squadrons of Grodno Hussars and a *Sotnia* of Cossacks and was reorganised. The Cossacks were detached, and two squadrons from the Sumy Hussar Regiment were attached in exchange. Plotho, volume 3, p. 132, also states that Rüdiger's detachment (from 18 [30] January) included a brigade of infantry, four squadrons of Sumy Hussars and six guns.

9 War Diary; Rüdiger's report dated 19 [31] January (Military Science Archive, No. 2309). At Montier-en-Der the regiment lost six hussars and 15 horses hors de combat.

[1 February], waited for Count Pahlen's vanguard to come up from Margerie [12 miles north of Brienne], with whom they linked up the following evening. On the morning of 21 January [2 February], not far from Margerie, a small enemy cavalry detachment sent on reconnaissance was dispersed: this cavalry retreated towards Vitry, pursued closely by two squadrons of Grodno hussars.¹⁰

From 21 to 29 January [2 to 10 February] there were no clashes, and the regiment was transferred to the vanguard of Count Pahlen's column. On 29 January [10 February], approaching the town of Nogent, Pahlen captured the château of La Chapelle with his infantry and entered into battle with the force under Marshal Victor defending Nogent. After a long and unsuccessful battle in which the regiment was protecting the horse battery and did not take an active part, Pahlen, seeing the impossibility of taking the town by force, decided to blockade it: on the evening of 30 January [11 February], the detachment under Rüdiger's command¹¹ was directed to Pont-sur-Seine and Villenauxe [8½ miles north-east of Nogent] in order to envelope the French left flank, while the main body of Pahlen's column were to make one final attempt to storm the town. The attacks by Pahlen's vanguard from both these directions was crowned with success: in the early hours of 31 January [12 February], Nogent was occupied by Russian troops and Marshal Victor was driven back towards Provins after a stubborn defence.

Rüdiger's detachment was immediately sent to follow the enemy. The latter, having occupied Montpothier [6½ miles north of Nogent] and Sourdun, on the road from Nogent to Provins, quickly began to press upon the tail of Victor's corps and on the morning of 1 [13] February, halted under the walls of Provins. The cavalry under General Milhaud left the town with a force of 2,500 horse with four guns in order to delay the moves by our detachment, but as soon as the Grodno Hussars, who were at the head of the detachment, deployed their squadrons, the enemy cavalry, for some unknown reason, without engaging in combat, retreated back to Provins. Rüdiger immediately encircled the town with his squadrons and opened fire on the houses from the high ground near the Nogent road. The French, aware of the disadvantageous location of Provins, concerned that they would be cut off by superior forces upon the arrival of Russian infantry, hastened to abandon the town and continued their retreat. Attacked by the combined squadrons of Grodno Hussars and Rebrikov's regiment, the enemy column was thrown into such disorder during the departure from the town that en route to Nangis (about two *Meilen* [14 miles west]) they lost three officers and 150 lower ranks taken prisoner at the hands of the hussars, not counting the mass of those wounded and killed.¹² On 2 [14] February, Nangis was evacuated by the French, and was occupied by our colonel-in-chief.

In pursuing the enemy, however, Rüdiger's detachment advanced too far, and on 2 [14] February in the evening, continuing to press the cavalry driven out of Provins, Rüdiger halted at the village of La Lande [*sic*], between Chaumes [29 miles south-east of Paris] and Rozay [19 miles north-west of Provins], on the Paris road. The night was dark and a direct attack from the direction of the previously defeated enemy was considered impossible. In view of this assumption, the weary hussars, having set up outposts far ahead of La Lande, settled down in the village for the night. Fortunately for the detachment, the vigilant outposts were alert, since the enemy cavalry, which had infantry support following up, had decided to wipe out Rüdiger's weak vanguard that night. The French cavalry managed to approach the vedettes undetected thanks to the thick darkness, and rushed the guard screen, with whom they entered into combat. The squadrons stood to in order to

10 Count Wittgenstein's instructions No. 79 and No. 82; Log of Outgoing Documents (Military Science Archive No. 1773); Rüdiger's reports (Military Science Archive, No. 2309).

11 Grodno Hussars, two squadrons of Sumy Hussars, Rebrikov's Cossacks, three infantry battalions and two guns from 23rd Horse Artillery Company (Barclay de Tolly's dispositions and report, Military Science Archive, No. 1773; Plotho).

12 Rüdiger's War Diary.

rescue the outposts, but as soon as Russian commands and the clatter of horses were heard, the French hurriedly galloped away. In this case, justice demands acknowledgement for the remarkable steadfastness of the outposts, which, being attacked by masses of enemy, did not fall back. A retreat at this point and the regiment would have been surrounded by enemy cavalry under very unfavourable conditions, but the brave soldiers understood that, by retreating to the village, they would have led the enemy into the bivouacs and therefore decided to die in order to save their comrades, and to stay put.¹³ Indeed, the French, had intended to trigger a surprise trap on the whole hussar regiment, but, thanks to the darkness, did not know which direction to take and limited themselves to the destruction of a few unfortunate vedettes. On the night of 2 to 3 [14 to 15] February, during this enemy attack, 32 hussars and 25 horses were put out of action; among the missing were lieutenants Firks and Apayshchikov,¹⁴ who, as became known later, had been captured among the wounded at the outposts.¹⁵

Two days later, on returning to the vanguard under Count Pahlen, our regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Nabel (who replaced the ailing Rüdiger), was detached after dark to La Ferté-Gaucher [11 miles east of Coulommiers], to hold an independent outpost near this town, and therefore did not take part in the battle of Mormant [20 miles west of Provins], so disastrous for the force under Pahlen.¹⁶

On 9 [21] February, the Grodno Hussars returned to the vanguard once more and went to the town of Méry-sur-Seine [12 miles west of Arcis] with them, from where Pahlen was ordered to carry out a reconnaissance-in-force of Romilly-sur-Seine and Pont-sur-Seine. The vanguard cavalry moved towards Romilly in the morning, but, having encountered significant forces there under Marshal Oudinot, withdrew to Châtres [14 miles west of Arcis]. This reconnaissance-in-force, the purpose of which had been to discover the enemy strength and intentions, convinced the Commander-in-Chief, Prinz Schwarzenberg, that the French main force was facing him, which is why he withdrew the majority of his units behind the Seine. This erroneous division of the army on the Seine was later to lead to the loss of Troyes, which preceded the battle of Bar-sur-Aube. Following the reconnaissance, our regiment, having destroyed the bridges on the river Seine, fell back to Villecerf [*sic*] and to Trannes [seven miles south of Brienne] on 13 [25] February; continuing the movement towards Langres on 14 [26] February, in accordance with the plan adopted at a Council of War, they reached Colombey-les-Deux-Églises [nine miles east of Bar-sur-Aube].

In this town intelligence was received of Napoleon's intention to attack the Army of Silesia (Blücher) and, at the insistence of the King of Prussia, further retirements were suspended. The following day, the Coalition army began operations to rescue Blücher, with Wittgenstein's corps left on the Langres road in order to hold Marshal Oudinot back, who at that time had already settled at Bar-sur-Aube.

At 10 o'clock in the morning on 15 [27] February, Wittgenstein's force was approaching Bar-sur-Aube in three columns. The Grodno Hussars together with the Sumy Hussars, Olviopol Hussars and Chuguev Ulans, and Rebrikov's, Ilovaisky 12th's and Vlasov's Cossacks formed Count Pahlen's column, and were to advance to Arrentières and onwards to the right of Arsonval, towards the Dolancourt bridge, that is, to envelope the French left flank, while the other two columns, those under Prince Gorchakov and the Prinz von Württemberg, were to attack the enemy frontally. 3rd Infantry Division were to proceed behind Pahlen's cavalry. The flank march proved to be difficult and too long, since Pahlen's cavalry had only covered half the designated route by evening; the battle was already drawing to a close by this time. Upon reaching the high ground overlooking Arsonval, Count Pahlen saw that at the cost of immense efforts and losses to take Bar-sur-Aube, the

13 As reported by N.I. Mikhailov.

14 Attached from the Moscow Cossack Regiment.

15 War Diary. Lieutenant Baron Firks was taken prisoner on two occasions and wounded three times.

16 General Pahlen's report to Count Wittgenstein, dated 4 [16] February and the War Diary.

majority of enemy units had crossed the Aube river, while the rest, some by swimming, some by bridges, were crossing to the far bank. Pahlen, following the proverb 'better late than never' did not miss the opportunity to strike a new blow at the enemy: having sited horse artillery pieces on the high ground, he sent the Grodno Hussars into an attack on the cavalry under General Saint-Germain, which were crowding the water's edge. The attack by the hussars, supported by cannon fire from the horse artillery companies, at a time when the enemy considered the battle to be completely over, was terrifying: some horsemen who were near the river, fired upon with canister shot and attacked by the Grodno Hussars, threw themselves into the water, others scattered along the floodplain near Ailleville, where they fell prey to the approaching Sumy and Olviopol hussars. Count Wittgenstein wrote regarding the battle at Bar-sur-Aube that: 'The enemy cavalry (at Ailleville) were thrown into such disarray by the Grodno Regiment, that, having saved themselves by swimming, they were spared from further defeat only by the darkness.'¹⁷ The fighting ended only at nightfall. *Rittmeister* Glebov particularly distinguished himself in this successful attack. Having swum across the river alongside the French, he pursued the routed enemy across the Aube with his squadron. The confusion and disarray in the enemy ranks were so great that no one thought to cut off this handful of brave but reckless hussars.

The next morning, the regiment, having rested in the enemy's previous bivouac, halted at Dienville [three miles south of Brienne], sending strong patrols out to Piney [10 miles west of Brienne] and Vendevre. On 17 February [1 March], at the head of Count Wittgenstein's force, they moved along the Vendevre road, which at that time was held by units under the French General Gérard. On the march, an intercepted dispatch from Macdonald was delivered to the Commander-in-Chief, from which it was revealed that the latter intended to march to Troyes via Bar-sur-Aube linking up with Oudinot there. As a result of this intelligence, which changed the plan of action once more, an offensive was launched by the Coalition in the direction of Troyes: Count Pahlen, on the basis of the disposition of 18 February [2 March], received orders, that upon contact with the French, he was to go around their left flank by moving towards Géraudot [11 miles south of Pougy] and Laubressel, thus supporting the frontal attack on the city of Troyes by the main force.

Pahlen set out for Laubressel at dawn on 19 February [3 March], but the envelopment was again mistimed: the vanguard arrived much earlier than the Coalition frontal attack on the enemy position could begin, and found the village still occupied by the reserve of the French corps. Leaving the greater part of the vanguard facing Laubressel, Pahlen went through Bouranton [2½ miles north-west of Laubressel] with the Grodno Regiment behind the enemy at Thennelières [five miles east of Troyes], where they found the French parks left unprotected, and took them, but they were unable to drag the guns away in full view of an advance by Roussel's cuirassier division and Saint-Germain's cavalry. The hussars, having slaughtered the artillery horses and spiked several cannon, attacked the supply trains and captured the ammunition caissons. General Gérard's carriage and baggage wagons were among the captured vehicles, Gérard himself barely managed to escape; more than 100 prisoners remained in our hands.

After this attack, once the cannonade had announced the beginning of the battle, the Grodno Regiment's operations behind enemy lines resumed. Noticing that our cuirassiers and infantry were advancing between Laubressel and Thennelières on a battery protected by French cavalry, the regiment moved forward at the trot. The French saw that large forces were moving towards them from two directions, and turning about, they raced to engage the hussars, but the regiment had already anticipated the enemy with their own attack. The clash between our squadrons and the French did not last long: concerned for their line of retreat and also fearing being surrounded, the enemy, driven back by the blow from the Grodno Hussars, hastily scattered towards the infantry, abandoning their battery, which had just been taken by the cuirassiers. In this attack, which left the regiment holding two officers and some 200 lower ranks prisoner, the Grodno Hussars lost *Stabs-*

¹⁷ Count Wittgenstein's war diary.

Rittmeister Rybalkin and several lower ranks killed.¹⁸ *Stabs-Rittmeister* Rybalkin was a recklessly brave man, who, thanks to his military achievements, had risen through the lower ranks to become an officer. He was genuinely loved by the regiment, which valued him as a soldier, comrade and human being, and his loss was felt by all his fellow soldiers. The name of the deceased, as a non-commissioned officer, *Wachtmeister* and officer, appears in every list of those who distinguished themselves in 1807-1808-1809, 1812, 1813 and 1814, and each promotion, each award was granted to him as the prize for a new feat. At Laubressel, carried away by the attack, the unfortunate man drove too far into the French masses: he was found dead with two bullets in his chest and his head severed.¹⁹

The Battle of Laubressel, which resulted in Macdonald and Oudinot retreating to Troyes, ended late in the evening. The regiment, having rejoined the vanguard, was pushed forward after the enemy and followed them towards this city.

At nine o'clock the next day, 20 February [4 March], the attack on the outskirts of the city of Troyes began and at 11 o'clock Saint-Parres was taken by the infantry. The French, after a stubborn defence, retreated into the city. Eventually, before nightfall, the enemy evacuated their last post and moved [north] towards Paris along the Châtres road. The Grodno Regiment, as with all of Count Pahlen's cavalry, took no active part in the fighting under the walls of Troyes: their role began only once General Kellermann's cavalry, pursued by the Bavarians, debouched in column-of-route at La Malmaison [seven miles north-west of Troyes]. Caught by the Bavarian cavalry, Kellermann tried to form battle line, but lost sight of Rüdiger, who had been following this detachment for a long time and had got around their flank. The French were still in column when our squadrons attacked with such speed that the enemy were literally scattered and, with two successive charges, were positively put to flight. With regard to the attack by the Grodno Regiment, Count Wittgenstein stated: 'After this glorious triple-charge, the enemy were driven off as if they were utter irregulars, not even having time to form a line, and here too the night put a stop the successful action.'²⁰ Indeed, the darkness prevented the regiment from completing Kellermann's defeat and the pursuit of his broken cavalry.

The regiment was in the village of Payns [7½ miles north-west of Troyes] overnight on 20 to 21 February [4 to 5 March], and by dawn they were on their way to Romilly [six miles east of Pont-sur-Seine], where they remained the following day. In Romilly, Count Wittgenstein visited us and, after greeting the regiment, he spoke at length with the officers, most of whom were known to him personally. The Grodno Regiment enjoyed the particular affinity of the famous general: until the day he died, Wittgenstein did not forget the hussars who had saved him from captivity at Polotsk and whom he had acknowledged back in 1809. There is even a legend that it was the Count, in memory of the first victory over the French, who initially called the Grodno Hussar Regiment 'the Klyastitsy' when greeting them. For a long time after Kulnev's death, Wittgenstein referred to the Grodno men as 'Kulnev's Hussars.' Perhaps it was later, remembering his glorious comrades-in-arms from the Patriotic War, that Wittgenstein shouted "Bravo the Klyastitsy!" to the regiment instead of the usual greeting.²¹ On that same day, upon issuing the disposition, the corps commander expressed the following vote of thanks: 'Thanks be to the Almighty and to you, brave warriors, for victory over the enemy. I hope in the future to find in you the courage and steadfastness of spirit that you have shown today, and I consider it a special pleasure and duty to bring your actions to the

18 War Diary.

19 This information regarding *Stabs-Rittmeister* Rybalkin was reported by N.I. Mikhailov and was verified by us using documents from the Archives. The surname of the deceased, as well as those of *Rittmeister* Dyatkov, cornets Shostakovsky, Omelyansky, Brzezinski and Gromkau, are placed on the plaques of the Cathedral of the Saviour in Moscow, but the dates of death are shown incorrectly. The names above, out of 30 officers from our regiment killed in the war of 1812-1814, seem to be the only ones who were awarded this honour.

20 War Diary.

21 Reported by N.I. Mikhailov.

attention of the Tsar.’²²

On 26 February [10 March], after a two-day rest, the regiment was sent to Pont-sur-Seine together with the Glukhov and Pskov [cuirassier] regiments for a reconnaissance-in-force. From the high ground at the village of Saint-Aubin [three miles south-east of Nogent], having moved away from the other regiments, the Grodno Hussars spotted a significant French force (infantry and cavalry with six guns), advancing towards Nogent. Having fired a salvo at the enemy column from two horse artillery pieces supporting the regiment, Rüdiger caught the enemy column with a surprise charge, who retreated, being unaware of how few hussars were present. A cavalry counterattack that followed was beaten off by the Grodno Hussars, who not only held the battlefield, but also prevented any offensive moves by the French for 10 hours. This resilience by Rüdiger baffled the enemy: after a long firefight, the victims of which were Lieutenant Gromkau and Cornet Omelyansky,²³ the French column turned about, still unaware of how insignificant the force was that they were up against.

From the day of this clash (at Saint-Aubin) until 4 [16] March, the regiment was stationed in the outposts forwards of Pont-sur-Seine; on 4 [16] March, the Grodno Hussars were detached from Pahlen’s vanguard and were placed at the disposal of Prince Shakhovskoy in order to support his advance on Saint-Nicolas [three miles north of Nogent]. The following day the regiment returned to the vanguard and took over the outposts from St. Martin to Léchelle [4½ to 6½ miles west of Provins], after relieving the Cossacks who in 1814 were usually entrusted with screen-force duties.²⁴ The regiment remained in the outposts until 6 [18] March, just two days, but these days did not pass without loss: Cornet Trushkovsky and four lower ranks were killed while on patrols. The total losses in the regiment over the past six days consisted of three officers and 13 hussars killed or died of wounds. By nightfall on 6 [18] March, by Supreme Command,²⁵ the outposts were drawn in and moved towards Provins.

At this time, a decisive blow against Napoleon’s army was being planned at Headquarters - the battle of Arcis. The fighting began at Arcis at nine o’clock in the morning on 8 [20] March. By this hour, the entire area in front of the city had been occupied by Coalition units, whose columns, under the cover of artillery and infantry fire, were deploying into battle formation. Our regiment, not having received a specific mission, was moved to the city of Troyes, from where, once the battle broke out, they were required (as were all of Pahlen’s cavalry) to head to Aubeterre [10 miles north of Troyes], on the road to Arcis, as pathfinders for I Corps. To the left of the regiment, in the direction of Plancy [nine miles west of Arcis], were the vanguards of the corps under Graf Nostitz and Bismarck. After passing the village of Prémierfait, our flankers noticed cavalry near Rhèges moving quickly from Méry towards Arcis: these were two regiments from Letort’s *Garde* division, which had remained behind and were ordered to rejoin the army. The vanguards from both columns immediately attacked the enemy from several directions: the Grodno Hussars from the left flank, the rest of the cavalry from the right and front. The French detachment, after a stubborn defence, was completely wiped out: of the thousands of men who had been in their ranks, very few managed to escape by fleeing towards Méry, the rest were cut down or taken prisoner. Some 200 men

22 Disposition No. 242 (Military Science Archive, No. 1773).

23 Died the following day. Lieutenant Gromkau was killed instantly.

24 War Diary.

25 The situation of Pahlen’s vanguard, at a considerable distance from other Coalition formations and face to face with Macdonald’s army, greatly worried the Emperor, as can be seen from Prince Volkonsky’s letter to Raevsky dated 6 [18] March: ‘This is to inform you that His Majesty, having received your report, is very concerned for the vanguard under Count Pahlen, having been left on the far side of the Seine, and has deigned to send two messengers to you, such that you are to transfer Pahlen’s vanguard to this side of the river this same night, via Nogent, since it will be difficult for them to cross at Pont-sur-Seine...’ See Bogdanovich’s History of the War in 1814, volume 2 [English translation by P.G.A. Phillips].

surrendered to the Grodno Regiment alone.²⁶ Following this action, the squadrons settled near the village of Rhèges, monitoring the banks of the Aube, and remained in this place until the morning of 9 [21] March, that is, the second day of the Battle of Arcis.

The regiment left their bivouacs very early the next day, and as soon as a triple cannon salvo gave the signal for battle, Pahlen attacked the enemy *cavalerie de la Garde*, but the latter, after a short fight, retreated in good order towards the Villette bridge. Count Pahlen then led his regiments against the infantry, which, upon seeing the Russian cavalry, immediately formed square. One of the latter became the target of a charge by the Grodno Regiment: the battalion, assembled on command, had surrounded themselves with a whole hedge of bayonets and, calmly allowing the hussars to come close, fired a volley at the onrushing squadrons. The infantry fire did not cause any particular damage to the regiment: the bullets whistled over the heads of the horsemen, several horses fell, but the terrifying shock of our impact broke the square and scattered the infantrymen in all directions. The attacks on squares presented no particular difficulties at this time as the infantry fire had an insignificant impact on the fighting: in two attacks on squares at Arcis and at Fère-Champenoise, where entire battalions were destroyed, the casualties were limited to a few impaled horses and bayonet wounds, mostly to the lower limbs of a rider's body. At Arcis, during the destruction of the infantry battalion, the regiment lost just three hussars killed, there were very few wounded, and only eight horses were maimed by bayonets, while the area all the way up to the outskirts of the city (about 200 *sazhen* [467 yards]) was strewn with trampled and gashed infantrymen. While pursuing the scattered battalion, Rüdiger received orders to reign in his squadrons and provide protection for an horse artillery battery on the Aubeterre road. The regiment remained there until the end of the battle.

The war was already approaching its long-anticipated end. The Coalition victories at Arcis, Troyes and Bar-sur-Aube had so weakened the French army that it became almost impossible for Napoleon to fight on. During the night of 12 [24] March, a meeting was held in Emperor Alexander's quarters in order to select the final operational plan.²⁷ The contents of intercepted letters from Paris, revealed the true situation in France, the depletion of the treasury, military and food supplies, everything that the great commander had been trying to conceal, and finally, the fellow-feeling with the Coalition: fatigue and a desire to end an aimless three-years of bloodshed. The general consensus of the council of war was to march on Paris. News of the Tsars' decision spread like wildfire among the troops, who saw this as the imminent end of the war. A certain weariness of the regime was already visible everywhere in the army's ranks, a kind of apathy that neither victories nor constant concerns for the future could stifle; everyone had one desire, one thought - to return swiftly to their homeland, to see their native country after a three-year absence. The War Diary, among the terse lists of actions and the names of those killed, the impression of the army's sentiments in March 1814 have been preserved: the officer who compiled the diary could not restrain his delight at the thought of the war ending: 'On this glorious, unforgettable day (13 [25] March), on which the decisive plan to march on Paris was put into action, our cavalry laid the foundations, so to speak, for the brilliant end of the war, a war that has been exhausting for so long!' Among the names of the battles and the names of the fallen, this lively phrase, scribbled down from the adjutant's pen, somehow particularly colours the thoughtful mood of the troops.

At dawn on 13 [25] March, Count Pahlen's vanguard set off towards Soudé-Saint-Croix [12½ miles west of Vitry], including the Grodno Regiment, as the head of the column under the Kronprinz von Württemberg, arriving at eight o'clock. The town was held by Marshal Marmont's troops. Upon learning of the approaching Coalition cavalry, the marshal formed his forces up on the high ground ahead of the town and, as soon as the vanguard columns appeared, engaged them with a deadly

26 War Diary. According to Bogdanovich, Pahlen's cavalry captured 160 men, including Lieutenant Colonel Lafitte. According to Koch and Vaudoncourt, they lost no more than 120 men.

27 In Châtillon.

cannonade. The Kronprinz and Pahlen decided to attack the French positions without delay: the first brigade of 1st Hussar Division was sent to envelope the left flank, the Chuguev Ulans and Cossacks went further to the right, while the guns of 23rd Horse Artillery Company, escorted by the Grodno Hussars, were positioned at the front. The Württemberg cavalry were directed around the right flank: the cuirassiers were stationed in reserve behind our regiment.

Marmont, however, was not going to give battle and began to retreat towards Sommesous, Count Pahlen followed him. Having reached the latter village, the marshal took up new positions, awaiting the arrival of Mortier, whom he had tasked to link up with his corps. At Sommesous, both sides limited themselves to an intense cannonade, which continued until midday. At 12 o'clock Marmont, and Marshal Mortier, who had joined him, realising the position they occupied was disadvantageous, retreated in a chessboard formation by the right in order to rest their flanks on the marshy streams. Count Pahlen then ordered the Grodno Regiment to attack. Under fire from a 30-gun battery, the hussars charged at Bordessoulle's cuirassier regiment, isolating their flank and driving the armoured men back. General Belliard, who was on the (enemy) left wing, rushed towards our left flank with the whole of Roussel's division with the aim of getting to grips with the blue hussars, but his dragoons, being attacked in turn by Russian cuirassiers, were thrown back behind Merlin's light cavalry division. In this melee it was difficult to distinguish between the regiments; the men were in a frenzy, and many, having crashed into the enemy ranks, did not notice that their units had long since fallen back. 'The Russian and French sub-units merged with shouts and yells from both sides; offering or receiving quarter was out of the question; no one could hear a thing and everyone was too busy striking out to be able to make out the enemy's words.'²⁸ After this attack, Pahlen went on the offensive once more: the French *8e régiment de chasseurs à cheval*, attacking in squadron column, held up the vanguard, but Pahlen, having dealt with the *chasseurs à cheval*, continued to pursue the enemy as they retreated from Sommesous towards Lenharrée. For seven versta [4½ miles] between these villages the terrain was literally covered with the bodies of men and horses; along this route we captured five French guns.

It was already nearly two o'clock. The enemy, who had seen nothing but cavalry for six hours, hoped, despite their enormous losses, to retreat in good order to Fère-Champenoise. At Connantray,²⁹ the marshals sent their infantry ahead, leaving the cavalry in the rearguard, but the latter, driven back by Pahlen's massed cavalry, disappeared behind the infantry squares. It was only then that the vanguard caught sight of the enemy infantry, which until now had been masked by cavalry regiments.

Pahlen quickly prepared for the attack. The Grodno Hussars took up position in the centre of the general battle line, with the Württemberg cavalry to their left and elements of the Sumy Hussars (two squadrons) to their right. The Kronprinz, as soon as his regiments had deployed their squadrons, rode up to Rüdiger and asked him to support the attack by his *Jäger-zu-Pferd*. The regiment, in unison with the Württembergers, on a general command from the Kronprinz, moved forward at the trot; the French formed square. "*Vorwärts Rüdiger!*" shouted the Kronprinz and both regiments raced towards the enemy side-by-side: the Grodno Hussars crashed into the central square and, cutting down anyone offering resistance, destroyed the infantry regiment. A gun, one general, six officers and 300 lower ranks were captured by the regiment.³⁰

To the enemy's credit, their resistance was worthy of a better outcome. The enemy infantry, for the most part, consisted of recruits led by veteran officers, nevertheless, the steadfastness and bravery

28 N.I. Mikhailov; Bogdanovich; War Diary.

29 Connantray-Vaufrey, lies on the main road from Vitry through Sommesous to Fère-Champenoise and 4½ versta [three miles] from the latter. Lenharrée is to the north and away from the route to Connantray. The pursuit of the French from Sommesous via Lenharrée and Connantray to Fère added 16 versta [11 miles].

30 War Diary; N.I. Mikhailov.

shown by the young soldiers fully deserved the praise that even German historians give them.³¹ To add to French frustrations, the weather had been terrible for three hours; a strong wind first whipped up thick dust, which was further worsened by cavalry movements, then torrential rain and hail began, which, together with the gunpowder smoke, made it impossible to distinguish objects several paces away. The infantry, with their flooded muskets, fought back with bayonets fixed and, of course, could not beat off a cavalry attack. Soon the regiments under Depreradovich and Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich completed what Pahlen had started. 'Artillery, cavalry, infantry all fled headlong towards Fère-Champenoise.'³² the enemy were not pursued, rather herded off as a scattered crowd, abandoning all their equipment and stragglers.³³ In the pursuit from Connantray to Fère, 40 guns were captured, 20 of which were taken by Count Pahlen's cavalry.³⁴ This battle, in which the regiment took such a glorious part with their four charges, greatly facilitated the conquest of Paris: never before in the series of wars from 1792 to 1814 had cavalry achieved such brilliant success.³⁵

For the Grodno Hussars, the fighting at Fère-Champenoise ended on the Sézanne road, that is, beyond Fère, but the regiment made no more attacks that day: after a four-*versta* [2⅔ mile] pursuit, the hussars were only in support for the attacks by Korff's and Vasilchikov's regiments on the French squares between Morains and Connantray. The regiment's losses were quite significant: in addition to Major Krammer, who suffered a serious head wound, they lost 18 hussars and 51 horses; there were quite a lot of wounded, mainly from the cavalry melees. By nightfall, once everything had calmed down on the battlefield, the regiment settled down for the night in the village of Linthes [seven miles west of Fère-Champenoise].

Immediately after the marshals had retreated to Courtacon [6½ miles south of La Ferté-Gaucher], Pahlen took the road towards Paris via Crécý-la-Chapelle [nine miles north-west of Coulommiers]. The vanguard arrived in Crécý on 15 [27] March, and reached Livry [2½ miles east of Bondy] at around midday on 16 [28] March, where the French had taken up positions hoping to delay the Coalition army. The enemy, enveloped on their right flank by the hussars and pushed back frontally, after a stubborn defence, retreated to Bondy and Paris. Pahlen followed suit: the infantry moved to the outskirts of Pantin and Romainville [4 to 4½ miles north-east of Paris], while the cavalry were left between these villages. On 17 [29] March, Paris was invested by the Coalition army.

The French began to prepare for a desperate defence of their capital: the city suburbs were fortified and everyone able to bear arms, both old and young, was called out to assist in the final effort to repel the Coalition. On 17 [29] March, the fighting began on the Romainville plateau, seized by Russian units, but the cavalry did not have chance to draw their sabres until two o'clock. During the battle, the regiment was on the high ground at Charonne, from where Paris was visible at a glance;³⁵ Everyone rejoiced at the thought that they were living through the last moments of the war and that with the capture of this city, the long-awaited return march would begin. At two o'clock in the afternoon, Pahlen led his regiments towards Montreuil, from where they began to threaten the right flank of the cavalry under Bordessoulle and Chastel, but the cuirassiers immediately retreated. From there, the Grodno Hussars were directed towards Vincennes in order to monitor the enemy

31 Aster; Widecke, *Ein deutsches Reiterleben*.

32 Koch, *Mémoires*.

33 War Diary.

34 Bogdanovich, 1814, volume 2; Barclay de Tolly's Diary.

35 Bogdanovich, 1814, volume 2, chapter 20.

35 On the high ground at Charonne they dismounted and Pahlen began to treat the senior officers to vodka and the snacks he had. They discussed what everyone would do once Paris was taken. The cannonade was roaring at the time, and the fighting was fierce. Rüdiger, in response to Pahlen's suggestions regarding his future residence in Paris, remarked that a bullet might ruin all his plans. Pahlen answered: "I believe too strongly in the predictions of the old Chukhna [Karelians] that an enemy bullet shall not touch me." answered Pahlen (see The Lubny Hussars in Bessarabia, 1875).

occupying the château, but as soon as they moved off, a French battery located at the Barrière du Trône moved forward and opened fire on the vanguard: it was the *École polytechnique* battery, whose staff consisted of veterans and student alumni. Count Pahlen ordered the 23rd Horse Artillery Company to respond to the battery, while the Chuguev Ulans were to attack, supported by the Grodno Hussars. The guns were captured, but it proved impossible to drag them away, since the artillery horses had mostly been killed; some of the crews were cut down or captured, while others were saved by French units coming to the rescue.³⁶ This battery (25 guns) was commanded by Major Evain and a graduate of the school, Michel Chasles, later a famous mathematician who was elected a member of the French *Académie des sciences* in 1851.³⁷

Despite their valiant defence, the French units retreated step by step before the Coalition, and one by one all the important points in front of Paris were taken by the infantry; the enemy began to withdraw from every position and retreated behind the walls of the capital. The last defensive point was Montmartre, and with the capture of the latter, all that remained was to lay down their arms: on 18 [30] March, the capitulation of Paris was signed.

Even with the fall of Paris, the war could far from be considered over: Napoleon, with the corps under Marmont and Mortier, was not yet utterly defeated. So long as the *Empereur des Français* stood at the head of the troops, it was impossible to count on a lasting peace, and the Coalition were well aware of this. The pursuit of the remnants of the French army retreating towards Fontainebleau began, and this pursuit was entrusted to the detachment under Count Pahlen. The vanguard were to enter the city in accordance with orders from headquarters, via the Barrière du Trône, cross the Seine over the pont d'Austerlitz and march along the *chaussée* towards Fontainebleau. The Grodno Regiment, at the head of the vanguard, was the first from the Russian army to pass through the capital (at nine o'clock in the morning on 19 [31] March): street life was in full swing, and our hussars repeatedly heard cries, odd for that time: 'Long live Alexander and the Russian army! Down with Napoleon!' On 22 March [3 April], Pahlen halted at Corbeil [20 miles south of Paris], facing the remnants of Napoleon's forces concentrated at Fontainebleau; meanwhile, negotiations regarding Napoleon's abdication were already underway in Paris, and orders had been issued not to engage in combat with the enemy until they were completed, unless absolutely essential. On 24 March [5 April], French units passed through our outposts in the direction of Versailles [11 miles west of Paris], but they were not intercepted by the Russian cavalry: this was *6e Corps* (Marmont's), which was defecting from the *Empereur*. By nightfall of that same day, Napoleon's envoys arrived at headquarters from Fontainebleau, and on the morning of 25 March [6 April], abandoned by his marshals and troops, the brilliant *Empereur des Français* signed the unconditional abdication of the throne and command of the army.

The hostilities were over.

The overthrow of Napoleon made a strong impression on our hussars. They could not believe that the man whose mere appearance on the battlefield swept armies along as the signal for renewed energetic blows, could have been abandoned by his troops. This abandonment of their commander, once his luck had failed him, was shocking to the minds of our soldiers, their spirit of devotion and loyalty. Not long ago, the distraught troops were encouraged by the cries of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" their hesitation ceased, and when the 'little gray general' as our hussars called him, walked along the lines, it seemed as if the assembled masses breathed the sole sentiment of boundless love for their master. For us, the name Napoleon was associated with the names of many of his victories, and the former idol of France, dislodged from his pedestal, became more elevated in the eyes of our soldiers than in the days of his greatness. Long after the French wars, the regiment kept the legend of Napoleon alive, and veterans, describing the numerous battles in which they had participated,

36 War Diary.

37 *Nécrologie de M. Chasles*, 1881.

liked to add the tale about how the French, once they had been defeated, abandoned and exiled their *Empereur*, how their troops had abandoned the 'little gray general.'³⁸

On 29 March [10 April], the regiment moved along the *chaussée* from Fontainebleau through Essonne and Issy and, on 30 March [11 April], halted at Poissy on the Seine, [16 miles] downstream of Paris; on 31 March [12 April], they shifted to Lavillettertre, not far from Chaumont (département de l'Oise), together with the Cossacks and 23rd Horse Artillery Company. Rüdiger was ordered to set up an observation screen along the borders of the département de l'Oise and the département de Seine-et-Oise and to have constant liaison to their right with Kleist's corps, and to their left with Major General Emmanuel's detachment:³⁹

'When occupying the forward screen, exercise caution in order to avoid any disagreements with the commanders of the French forward units; Russian troops are not to enter the *département* occupied by French units until such time as a precise demarcation line has been established, and they are to adhere strictly to the departmental boundaries.'⁴⁰

The regiment's provisions were to be obtained from the département de l'Oise, with the consent of the local *maires*.

The regiment remained in Lavillettertre until 26 April [8 May]. These summer quarters, in the best part of France, were excellent, and the hussars lived in harmony and friendship with the locals, as well as with the French units stationed 30 *versta* [20 miles] away. As for the local authorities, among the piles of every kind of complaint with which the latter bombarded the Russian military command, there was not a single one about the Grodno Regiment, and God knows how vociferous the *préfets*, *sous-préfets* and *maires* were in 1814!

In April, our prisoners were returned to us, the clothing and equipment, which had fallen into disrepair, was put in order, and awards were distributed.⁴¹ Under Rüdiger's energetic hand, the regiment, as far as its resources allowed, took on its former appearance: during the campaign of 1814, the officers and soldiers, having worn out the clothing issued to them at the beginning of 1813, went around the whole time in French uniform, and the squadrons, in terms of uniform, presented a vision of indiscipline that bordered on the ridiculous. It was not uncommon to see an hussar's dolman next to a lancer's tunic, an infantry coat side by side with a cuirassier's short

38 N.I. Mikhailov.

39 Disposition No. 327 for 30 March [11 April], Military Science Archive, No. 1773.

40 Disposition No. 327 for 30 March [11 April], Military Science Archive, No. 1773.

41 Awards for 1814 were: **Order of St. George, 4th class** - *Rittmeister* Glebov; **Order of St. Anne, 2nd class with diamonds** - Lieutenant Colonel Hirsch, majors Novosiltsev and Dedenev, *Rittmeister* Kochubey 1st, Major Krammer, *Rittmeister* Kochubey 2nd; **Order of St. Anne 2nd class** - Lieutenant Colonel Olshevsky 1st, Major Krammer, *Rittmeister* Kusovnikov and Golofeev, *Stabs-Rittmeister* Count Tolstoy, Lieutenant Engelhardt; **Order of St. Anne 3rd class** - lieutenants Engelhardt, Kavelin, Firks and Kleist, cornets Reuß, Walther, Pavlovich, Count Davidson, Krasovsky Yenakiev, Klugen, Graf Keller 2nd, Prince Lobanov-Rostovsky and Graf Keller 3rd; **Order of St. Vladimir 4th class** - *Stabs-Rittmeister* Tolstoy 1st, *Rittmeister* Aderkas, *Stabs-Rittmeister* Tolstoy 2nd, Schmidt and Penchelsky, lieutenants Brunner, Münster, Olshevsky 2nd, Kupfer 2nd, Postels, Kupfer 1st, Kavelin, Kleist, Cornet Kleist and *Rittmeister* Loshkarev; **Golden Sabres** - *Rittmeister* Panyutin, Aderkas, Klotsch, *Stabs-Rittmeister* Kondratovich, Penchelsky, Kleist, lieutenants Münster, Kupfer 2nd, Engelhardt; **Monarch's Commendations** (1812 to 1814) - colonels Davydov (four times), Nazimov, majors Krammer, Kempfert, Olshevsky, Grothuß, Kochubey, *Rittmeister* Loshkarev (five times), *Stabs-Rittmeister* Ilinsky 1st, Ilinsky 2nd (twice), Golofeev (twice), Worms, Verzhbitsky (four times), Maekovsky, Sinsokov, Lizogub, Kondratovich, lieutenants Predaevich, Zaborovsky, Postels, Mostanov, Kavelin and Prince Drutskoy, cornets Pokhodun, Brunner, Rybalkin, Shenne, Samson von Himmelstern, Kisten, Rüdiger 2nd, Skrydlevsky, Count Davidson, Kransfeld, Pavlovich (twice), Pustovoyt, Berch, Marchenko, Koshka, Graf Keller 2nd, Aksyuk, Graf Keller 3rd, Bobryshev, Novitskiy (formal listing, 1816 and other documents. This listing is incomplete). **Orden pour le Mérite** - Rüdiger, Nabel, Olshevsky, Hirsch, Nazimov, Krammer, Kochubey, Tulubiev, Ilinsky, Aderkas, Gutjahr, Postels, Klyugen, Engelhardt, Olshevsky 2nd, Kleist, Prince Drutskoy, Klein, Baron Firks, Rüdiger 2nd (formal listing, 1816 and 1817, Moscow Branch of the Archive of the General Staff).

tailcoat: here was a mixture of dress from every [French] troop type with which the regiment had encounters on the battlefield. Rüdiger tried to give all this clothing at least some type of uniformity, something reminiscent of the hussar uniform. The officers were almost indistinguishable from the lower ranks: the supply trains, having rarely reached their units in this campaign, were constantly getting lost, and after the long stages, items had mostly begun to rot from the humidity.

The absence of a regimental archive and the dearth of documents and sources do not allow us to expand on the account of the regiment's holdings of horses, their listed strength or general condition at the end of the 1814 campaign. All that can be gathered from the oral histories that have come down to us, was that they were in a terrible state: the countryside, already short of riding horses, could not remount the cavalry, especially at a time when Napoleon, through constant requisitions, had taken away everything that could be used to mount their cavalry and artillery; the depots could not meet the regiment's requirements. The last reports showing the combat strength and numbers of horses in the Grodno Hussar Regiment date back to January, that is, to the beginning of the third year of the war. Count Rüdiger's notes (*Kurze Biographie*) contain the only interesting information regarding the regiment's remounts: it turns out that during the 1812 to 1814 campaign, reinforcements arrived in the form of five newly raised squadrons, each with a strength of 179 horses; in addition, Rüdiger acquired more than 900 horses at various times. Despite this, by the end of the war the regiment's strength was calculated at four weak squadrons. As for health conditions in the regiment, no information about this subject has been preserved at all.⁴²

On 26 April [8 May], orders were received for the return of Rüdiger's detachment to Russia. The troops were ordered to set off on 28 April [10 May] via Clermont [28 miles north-east of Lavillettertre], to Compiègne [23 miles west of Soissons] and Noyon;⁴³ the march from the latter city was planned to begin on 1 [13] May. Considering the route of the march from central France to Russia to be of interest, we are showing it in full:⁴⁴

Date	Location	Date	Location
1 [13] May	Noyon	3 [15] July	Lieberose
2 [14] May	Rest day	4 [16] July	Guben [Gubin]
3 [15] May	Rest day	5 [17] July	Rest day
4 [16] May	Chauny	6 [18] July	Crossen [Krosno Odrzańskie]
5 [17] May	Saint-Quentin	7 [19] July	Denshtetkau [<i>sic</i>]
6 [18] May	Hirson	8 [20] July	Züllichau [Sulechów]
7 [19] May	Rest day	9-10 [21-22] July	Rest day
8 [20] May	Rest day	11 [23] July	Unruhstadt [Kargowa]
9 [21] May	Aubenton	12 [24] July	Wollstein [Wolsztyn]
10 [22] May	Fumay	13 [25] July	Rest day
12 [24] May	Dinant	14 [26] July	Grätz [Grodzisk Wielkopolski]
13 [25] May	Ciney	15 [27] July	Rest day
16 [28] May	Liège	16 [28] July	Stenschewo [Stęszew]

42 In 1814 the Regimental Staff-Doctor was Evgeny Ivanovich Klauyanig, assisted by F.I. Primerov.

43 Instruction No. 353 for Rüdiger, dated 26 April [8 May], Military Science Archive, No. 1773.

44 Dispositions for 31 May [12 June], 8 [20] June, 27 June [9 July], 8 [20] July (Military Science Archive, No. 1773; Log of Outgoing Documents).

Date	Location	Date	Location
17 [29] May	Aachen. Rested in Aachen until 27 May [8 June]. Inspected by Count Wittgenstein on 26 May [7 June].	17 [29] July	Posen [Poznań]
		18 [30] July	Pudewitz [Pobiedziska]
		19 [31] July	Gnesen [Gniezno]
		20 July [1 August]	Rest day
		21 July [2 August]	Trzemeszno
27 May [8 June]	Köln	22 July [3 August]	Kwieciszewo
28 May [9 June]	Siegburg	23 July [4 August]	Rest day
29 May [10 June]	Rest day	24 July [5 August]	Inowrocław
30 May [11 June]	Uckerath	25 July [6 August]	Gniewkowo
31 May 12 [June]	Weyerbusch	26 July [7 August]	Rest day
1 [13] June	Rest day	27 July [8 August]	Thorn [Toruń]
2 [14] June	Hachenberg	28 July [9 August]	Gollub [Golub-Dobrzyń]
3 [15] June	Langenkirch [<i>sic</i>]	29 July [10 August]	Strasburg [Brodnica]
4-5 [16-17] June	Rest day	30 July [11 August]	Lautenburg [Lidzbark]
6 [18] June	Königsberg	31 July [12 August]	Rest day
7 [19] June	Allendorf	1 [13] August	Soldau [Działdowo]
8 [20] June	Rest day	2 [14] August	Rest day
9 [21] June	Ziegenhain	3 [15] August	Neidenburg [Nidzica]
10 [22] June	Rest day	4 [16] August	Jedwabno
11 [23] June	Rotenburg	5 [17] August	Rest day
12 [24] June	Berg [<i>sic</i>]	6 [18] August	Ortelsburg [Szczytno]
13 [25] June	Mühlhausen	7 [19] August	Pietzkendorf [Piecki]
14 [26] June	Rest day	8 [20] August	Rest day
15 [27] June	Sondershausen	9 [21] August	Sensburg [Mrągowo]
16 [28] June	Frankenhausen	10 [22] August	Rastenburg [Kętrzyn]
17 [29] June	Rest day	11 [23] August	Rest day
18 [30] June	Artern	12 [24] August	Angerburg [Węgorzewo]
19 June [1 July]	Querfurt	13 [25] August	Darkehmen [Ozersk]
20 June [2 July]	Rest day	14 [26] August	Rest day
21 June [3 July]	Merseburg	15 [27] August	Gumbinnen [Gusev]
22 June [4 July]	Schkeuditz	16 [28] August	Stallupönen [Nesterov]
23 June [5 July]	Rest day	17 [29] August	Rest day
24 June [6 July]	Delitzsch	18 [30] August	Verzhbolovo [Kubartai]
25 June [7 July]	Düben	19 [31] August	Wilkowischken [Vilkaviškis]
26 June [8 July]	Torgau	20 August [1 September]	Rest day

Date	Location	Date	Location
27 June [9 July]	Rest day	21 August [2 September]	Pilwiszki [Pilviškiai]
28 June [10 July]	Herzberg	22 August [3 September]	Rest day
29 June [11 July]	Dahme	23 August [4 September]	Kovno [Kaunas]
30 June [12 July]	Lübben		

This route, due to the large number of units returning to Russia at the same time, was subject to several amendments, but it is presented here according to the corrections made by the corps headquarters staff in July and August.⁴⁵

During the journey, the troops were supplied with provisions by the landowners preparing dumps at the overnight halts, at the request of the quartering officers sent ahead. The quartering officers (field officers) entered into agreements with honorary commissars, elected by the local authorities: they were to present demands and issue receipts, but under no circumstances were to make requisitions or to self-authorise.⁴⁶ Food stores were to be kept ready in each quartering area in proportion to the number of men and horses housed there; provisions were distributed according to the number of required rations, in accordance with the Tariff drawn up by Count Cancrin. The daily rations or allowances for each man or horse were determined as follows (alternatives were at the landowners discretion):⁴⁷

Bread, rye or white - two *funt* [820 grammes]; or hard-tack - 1½ *funt* [480 grammes]; or flour - 1⅔ *funt* [680 grammes].

Cereals, or rice or millet - ¼ *funt* [102 grammes]; or peas, beans, lentils - ½ *funt* [205 grammes]; or potatoes and other vegetables - one *funt* [410 grammes].

Meat - ½ *funt* [205 grammes].

Vodka, beer or wine - one ration (vodka - ¼ *Kvarta* [*sic*]; beer - one bottle [615 millilitres]; wine - a half-bottle [307 millilitres]).

Salt - one *funt* [410 grammes] per month.

The daily rations for officers were:

Bread - two *funt* [820 grammes]; meat - two *funt* [820 grammes]; cereals - ¼ *funt* [102 grammes]; liquor, beer or wine: subalterns - one ration; *Stabs-Rittmeister* - two rations. Wine rations were not issued to other officers.

Forage rations consisted of: oats - two *garnets* and 10 *chast* [7.57 dry litres]; hay - 10 *funt* [four kilogrammes]; straw - two *garnets* [6.56 dry litres]. In the event of a shortage of hay or oats, it was permitted to replace one or the other, but on condition that six *garnets* [19.68 dry litres] of barley or rye were to be issued as a substitute for every eight *garnets* [26.24 dry litres] of oats; five *funt* [two kilogrammes] of hay could be replaced by one *garnets* and five *chast* [3.78 dry litres] of oats, or five *funt* [two kilogrammes] of chopped straw mixed with one *funt* [410 grammes] of flour. The following forage allowances were issued:

Colonel-in-chief, major-generals - for five riding horses and seven draught horses.

45 Count Wittgenstein's Log of Outgoing Documents (Military Science Archive, No. 1773). Modern place names are in square brackets.

46 Rules for the supply of troops on the return march, signed by Barclay, 7 [19] April, Diary of the Provisioning Department (Military Science Archive, No. 2334).

47 Appendix to the Rules for the supply of troops on the return march, signed by Barclay, 7 [19] April, Diary of the Provisioning Department (Military Science Archive, No. 2334).

Colonels (not regimental commanders) - for three riding horses and three draught horses.

Lieutenant colonels - for three riding horses and three draught horses.

Majors - for three riding horses and two draught horses.

Rittmeister and *Stabs-Rittmeister* - for two riding horses and two draught horses.

Lieutenants and cornets - for two riding horses and one draught horse.

Staff-doctors - for one riding horse and two draught horses.

Junior doctors and auditors - for one riding horse and one draught horse.

The large number of pack and riding horses were necessary for the officers' orderlies, since at that time they were assigned as follows: eight for the colonel-in-chief; six per colonel; four per lieutenant colonel; three per major; two per *Rittmeister*, *Stabs-Rittmeister* and staff-doctor; one each for other subalterns and officials. Forage rations for officers' horses were at the complete disposal of their hosts.

The regiment marched across Germany to Kovno, and from there to Rossieny.⁴⁸ Every man had but one thought, one burning desire: to get to their homeland as quickly as possible. Once the hussars crossed the borders of the Fatherland and heard the first word in their native dialect, the regiment, in full unanimity, as if moved by a single sentiment, took off their hats and crossed themselves. Many of these hussars, who had stoically endured everything that a soldier could endure, began to sob like children, and even the imperturbable *khokhol* [Ukrainians] secretly wiped away the tears streaming from their eyes down their tanned, bearded cheeks.⁴⁹

The activities of the regiment on campaign from 1812 to 1814, which we have briefly described in this work, are best summed by the following statistics, as attested by the corps commander, Count Wittgenstein.⁵⁰

‘During the war from 1812 to 1814, the Grodno Hussar Regiment was in 30 general and 50 vanguard actions, in which 11 enemy guns were captured on the battlefield (excluding those taken in towns), and 25 of our own guns that had been in enemy hands. Sixty ammunition caissons were captured.’⁵¹

Prisoners taken by this regiment (along with the two replacement squadrons under Major Hirsch that were in Riga in 1812) were: five generals; two colonels, 115 field officers and subalterns; 13,035 lower ranks, for a total of 13,157 men.

The regiment was engaged in the seizure of several large cities from the enemy.’

The regiment's losses (including the replacement squadrons) from 16 [28] June 1812 to 18 [30] March 1814 were:

48 Wounded and sick Grodno Hussars were left in hospital in Langres until they recovered (Instructions for Colonel Belogradsky). Officers who were injured or wounded received pensions, and the requests of those who were destitute and those invalided out due to wounds were ordered to be submitted to a Committee specially established for this purpose through Supreme Orders (Supreme Orders dated 18 [30] August 1814; Mikhailov, notes on the campaigns of 1813 to 1814).

49 N.I. Mikhailov.

50 War Diary.

51 F.V. Rüdiger was issued receipts each time guns were handed over that had been captured by the regiment (*Kurze Biographie*, p. 345).

	Generals	Field Officers	Subalterns	Lower Ranks
Killed	1 ⁵²	8	23	394
Wounded		14 ⁵³	36 ⁵⁴	585
Missing in action or taken prisoner			4	136
TOTAL:	1	22	63	1,115

1,952 horses were killed or died, 55 were missing.

During the three-year campaign, in addition to the honorific title of the Klyastitsky Regiment given to it later (in 1824), the regiment was awarded silver trumpets for the Patriotic War and shako badges with the inscription *за отличие* [for distinction] for 1813. For 1814, as can be seen from the Marks of Distinction for the Regiments of 1st Hussar Division dated 13 [25] August, 1815,⁵⁵ the regiment was nominated by the commander of I Corps, Count Wittgenstein, for the award of St. George Standards for their bravery. It is unknown whether Count Wittgenstein's nomination reached the Tsar: no trace of this document could be found in either the Moscow or St. Petersburg archives. Napoleon's return from the island of Elba, the necessity of beginning a new war against this restless commander, and other political events at that time absorbed everyone's attention, such that it is quite possible that Count Wittgenstein's nomination, postponed during this turbulent period, was subsequently forgotten.

It remains to be hoped that the Klyastitsky Regiment, in some future campaign, following in the footsteps of its ancestors, will decorate our old green standards with the white cross.

52 Kulnev.

53 Of these, two had their arms severed, two were wounded three times, and three were wounded twice.

54 Of these, seven suffered two wounds each. Rüdiger's biography lists the number of wounded officers from the Grodno Regiment as: 14 field officers and 38 subalterns.

55 See Military Science Archive of the General Staff, No. 1579. The document was unsigned. A note in the margin added: 'Supreme Approval has not yet been granted.' Rüdiger's brief biography, compiled from his memoirs, also mentions the nomination of the Grodno Regiment for St. George Standards for distinction in the Battle of Klyastitsy (*Kurze Biographie*).

APPENDIX I.

List of Colonels-in-Chief and Regimental Commanders.

Colonels-in-Chief:

1. *Flügel-Adjutant* Colonel **Shepelev** (23 June [5 July] 1806 to 12 [24] November 1810).
2. Major-General **Kulnev** (17 [29] January 1811 to 19 [31] July 1812).
3. Colonel **Rüdiger** (31 October [12 November] 1812 to 1 [13] January 1814).

Regimental Commanders:

1. Colonel **Bibikov** (5 [17] October 1806 to 26 October [7 November] 1809).
2. Colonel **Schau** (27 November [9 December] 1809 to 25 December 1811 [6 January 1812]).

From this latter date until 1 [13] June 1815, no regimental commander was nominated.

APPENDIX II.

Regimental Roll of Honour.

1807:

1. **De Salvert**, Lieutenant, killed at Mischenitz on 31 January [12 February].
2. **Nikora 1st**, *Rittmeister*, died of wounds.
3. **Von Escher**, Cornet, died of wounds.
4. **Korostovtsev**, Cornet, died of wounds.

1808 to 1809:

5. **Nikora 2nd**, *Rittmeister*, died of wounds.

1812 to 1814:

6. Baron **Grothuß 2nd**, Lieutenant, killed on 19 [31] July 1812 at Klyastitsy.
7. **Kulnev**, Major-General, killed on 20 July [1 August] 1812 at Klyastitsy.
8. **Dyatkov**, *Rittmeister*, killed on 7 [19] August 1812 at Polotsk.
9. **Shostakovsky**, Cornet, killed on 7 [19] August 1812 at Polotsk.
10. **Ilinsky**, *Stabs-Rittmeister*, killed on 8 [20] October 1812 at Polotsk.
11. **Zdroevsky**, *Stabs-Rittmeister*, killed on 8 [20] October 1812 at Polotsk.
12. Count **Podgorichanin**, Colonel, killed on 6 [18] October 1812 at Riga.
13. **Dolgovo-Saburov**, Lieutenant, died of wounds in 1812.
14. **Kempfert**, Major, killed on 12 [24] October 1812 at Pustynniki.
15. **Vietinghoff**, Major, died of wounds on 1 [13] November 1812.
16. **Tomilov**, Lieutenant, killed on 20 April [2 May] 1813 at Lützen.
17. **Gorlenko**, Colonel, killed on 8 [20] May 1813 at Bautzen.
18. Baron **Grothuß 1st**, Lieutenant Colonel, killed at Bautzen.
19. **Mishkovsky**, Major, killed at Bautzen.
20. **Barets**, Lieutenant, killed at Bautzen.
21. **Zurmühlen**, Cornet, killed at Bautzen.
22. **Stoffregen**, Cornet, killed at Bautzen.
23. **Vilon**, Cornet, killed at Bautzen.
24. **Ratlev**, Cornet, killed at Bautzen.
25. **Bruzin**, Colonel, killed on 15 [27] August at Dresden.
26. **Shcherbakov**, Lieutenant, killed on 24 August [5 September] 1813 at Dohna.
27. Baron **Nolken**, Lieutenant Colonel, killed on 4 [16] October 1813 at Leipzig.
28. **Berents**, Lieutenant, killed at Leipzig.
29. **Pepel**, Cornet, killed at Leipzig.

30. **Trautman**, Cornet, killed at Leipzig.
31. **Piotrovsky**, Cornet, killed at Leipzig.
32. **Topelius**, Cornet, killed at Leipzig.
33. **Rybalkin**, *Stabs-Rittmeister*, killed on 18 [30] February 1814 at Laubressel.
34. **Omelyansky**, Cornet, killed on 27 February [11 March] 1814 at Saint-Aubin.
35. **Gromkau**, Lieutenant, killed on patrol on 3 [15] March 1814.
36. **Trushkovsky**, Cornet, killed on patrol on 4 [16] March 1814.
37. **Brzezinski**, Cornet, killed on 17 [29] January 1814 at Valleret.

Lower ranks killed or died of wounds were as follows:¹

1807 - 81.

1808 to 1809 - 46.

1812 to 1814 - 394.

¹ Unfortunately, due to the complete absence of a Regimental Archive and monthly reports (for 1807 to 1808, 1812 to 1814) in the Archives of the General Staff, we are deprived of the opportunity to provide the surnames of the fallen lower ranks from the regiment in this Roll of Honour. We have had to limit ourselves to indicating the number of those who fell on the field of battle.

APPENDIX III.

List of Knights of the Order of St. George and officers awarded Golden Sabres.

St. George, 3rd Class:

Major General **Shepelev**, for the Swedish War (1808).

Major General **Kulnev**, for the Swedish War (1808 to 1809).

Colonel **Rüdiger**, for the assault of Polotsk (1812).

St. George, 4th Class:

Colonel **Bibikov**, for distinction at Friedland (1807).

Colonel **Gorgoli**, for distinction at Guttstadt (1807).

Major **Rüdiger**, for distinction at Gamlakarleby (1808).

Major **Lüders**, for the action at Lokalax (1808).

Lieutenant Colonel **Silin**, for the action at Siikajoki (1808).

Colonel **Anselm de Guibours**, for the action at Ömossa (1808).

Colonel **Tursky**, for distinction in 1809.

Major **Hirsch**, for distinction and the crossing of the Gulf of Bothnia (1809).

Stabs-Rittmeister **Ilinsky**, for distinction at Klyastitsy (1812).

Major Baron **Grothuß**, for distinction at Polotsk (1812).

Major **Nabel**, for distinction at Polotsk (1812).

Lieutenant Count **Keller**, for distinction at Polotsk (1812).

Stabs-Rittmeister **Teygert**, for distinction at Polotsk (1812).

Lieutenant **Mishkovsky**, for distinction at Polotsk (1812).

Lieutenant **Tsitlyadzev**, for the capture of enemy transport (1812).

Rittmeister **Kozodaev**, for the action at Labiau (1812).

Stabs-Rittmeister **Zaborovsky**, for distinction at Labiau and Dirschau (1812).

Lieutenant Colonel **Olshevsky**, for distinction at the Battle of Bautzen (1813).

Rittmeister **Ostrogradsky**, for distinction at the Battle of Leipzig (1813).

Lieutenant Colonel **Nazimov**, for distinction at the Battle of Bautzen (1813).

Rittmeister **Glebov**, for distinction at Bar-sur-Aube (1814).

Golden Sabres, with diamonds:

Major General **Shepelev**, for 1807.

Major General **Rüdiger**, for 1812.

Golden Sabres:

Colonel Shepelev	For 1807	Lieutenant Glebov	For 1812
<i>Rittmeister</i> Nikora	For 1807	Colonel Prince Ipsilanty	For 1812

Major Rüdiger	For 1807	Major Hirsch	For 1812
<i>Stabs-Rittmeister</i> Novosiltsev	For 1807	<i>Stabs-Rittmeister</i> Krammer	For 1812
Major Lüders	For 1807	<i>Rittmeister</i> Kochubey 1st	For 1812
<i>Rittmeister</i> Milkovich	For 1807	<i>Stabs-Rittmeister</i> Kochubey 2nd	For 1812
Lieutenant Colonel Kulnev	For 1807	Lieutenant Kusovnikov	For 1812
Colonel Gorgoli	For 1807	Lieutenant Golofiev	For 1812
Lieutenant Chechensky	For 1807	Lieutenant Olshevsky 2nd	For 1813
Colonel Bibikov	For 1807	<i>Rittmeister</i> Tulubiev	For 1813
Lieutenant Predaevich	For 1808	Lieutenant Colonel Olshevsky 1st	For 1813
Colonel Anselm	For 1808	<i>Stabs-Rittmeister</i> Lizogub	For 1813
Lieutenant Zhitkov	For 1808	<i>Rittmeister</i> Aderkas	For 1813
Major Silin	For 1808	<i>Rittmeister</i> Klotsch	For 1813
<i>Stabs-Rittmeister</i> Baron Grothuß	For 1808	<i>Stabs-Rittmeister</i> Sysoev	For 1813
<i>Stabs-Rittmeister</i> Davydov	For 1812	Lieutenant Gutjahr	For 1813
<i>Stabs-Rittmeister</i> Kozodaev	For 1812	<i>Stabs-Rittmeister</i> Klein	For 1814
<i>Stabs-Rittmeister</i> Ostrogradsky	For 1812	<i>Rittmeister</i> Kondratovich	For 1814
Lieutenant Zaborovsky	For 1812	<i>Rittmeister</i> Panyutin	For 1814
<i>Rittmeister</i> Kempfert	For 1812	Lieutenant Münster	For 1814
<i>Rittmeister</i> Nazimov	For 1812	Lieutenant Kupfer 2nd	For 1814
<i>Stabs-Rittmeister</i> Yakimov	For 1812	<i>Stabs-Rittmeister</i> Penchelsky	For 1814
Cornet Beckmann	For 1812	Lieutenant Engelhardt	For 1814
Major Nabel	For 1812	Lieutenant Kupfer 3rd	For 1814

The number of lower ranks awarded the Insignia of the Military Order were:¹

For the campaign of 1807 - 57 crosses.

For the war of 1808 to 1809 - 24 crosses.

For the war of 1812 to 1814 - 356 crosses.

For a total of 437 crosses.

This total of knights included: *Wachtmeister* Tomilov, Krylov and Shulga, non-commissioned officers: Poberezhnyuk, Ignatenko, Panchulov, Tsetrenko, Chizhanovsky, Poluyan, Vovchenko, Gorashchuk, Bunchuzhny, Yevdokimov, Bondyrev, Andreevsky, Suprunenko and Saveliev - for new distinctions, it was decided to issue full pay in the form of an additional salary. Also to non-commissioned officers: Ryzhkov, Portola, Chernyatin, Taran, Terekhov, Vininkov, Svidersky, Panchenko, privates: Pankratiev, Tkachenko, Bukhtoyar, Plesch, Rybalkin and Gasenko - for a second feat, another two-thirds pay of additional salary was determined.²

¹ According to the Listings of the Chapter of the Order.

² Until the 1850s, classes of Insignia of the Military Order did not exist; for a second feat, two-thirds of the salary was awarded, and for a third - full pay. Listed here are only the names of those lower ranks whose records survived in the General Staff Archives.

APPENDIX IV.

Chronological List Of Changes In The Composition And Designation Of Elements Of The Grodno Regiment.

1806, 13 [25] June. The Grodno Hussar Regiment was raised, consisting of five active squadrons with one replacement squadron, squadron establishment consisted of: one field officer, six subalterns, 149 lower ranks.

It was brought onto an establishment of two battalions, each with a strength of five squadrons, one being a replacement squadron, the regiment comprising: one general, four field officers, 63 subalterns, 1,461 lower ranks.

1810, 8 [20] November. The regiment was authorised to have 1,924 lower ranks and 1,432 war horses. 10 [22] November. The replacement squadron was disbanded.

1811, 28 June [10 July]. Due to a reduction in the number of hospital wagons, two men were reduced from the number of support personnel.

1812, 27 December [8 January 1813]. The regiment was to consist of six active squadrons with one replacement squadron. It was authorised to have 1,639 lower ranks and 1,254 war horses.

1814, 1 [13] September. The general's post (colonel-in-chief) was disestablished.

APPENDIX V.

List Of Changes In The Uniforms, Weapons And Equipment Of The Grodno Regiment From 1806 To 1814.

Uniform as at 13 [25] June 1806:

1. Dolman - dark blue with a light blue collar and cuffs, decorated with 15 white cords of silk (for officers) or Arras wool (for lower ranks). The cords for lower ranks were braided with red Arras wool. The buttons were white metal.
2. Pelisse - dark blue, of similar cut to the dolman, trimmed with astrakhan fur: white for privates, black for non-commissioned officers, grey for officers.
3. Breeches - white wool, short.
4. Overalls - grey wool, fastened with buttons.
5. Cloak - grey wool with flat buttons fastening at the neck. Standing collar with light blue piping.
6. Forage cap - dark blue with a light blue band.
7. Boots - standard hussar boots with tassels and spurs.
8. A black felt shako, six *vershok* [26.6 centimetres] high, with an attached visor and two ear-flaps. The shako had a doubled cord (*ketish-vetish*) with two tassels. The *ketish-vetish* were red with a touch of white, red tassels for privates, three-coloured [white, black and orange] for non-commissioned officers and officers. A white horse-hair plume, seven *vershok* [31 centimetres] high for privates, white with a three-striped top [black-orange-black] for non-commissioned officers, white with a three-coloured base for officers, red for trumpeters.
9. Sash - blue with white barrels and tassels.
10. Sabretache - dark blue, light blue toothed edging, white cords and monogram.
11. Sheepskin jacket.

Weapons and equipment:

1. Sabre - with steel hilt; leather scabbard in iron fittings; sword belt made of red leather.
2. Carbine - with a red leather case; a bleached deerskin shoulder belt; a brass buckle, hook and tip. A cartridge pouch made of red leather, silver plated for officers.
3. Pistols - with brass fittings (trumpeters were equipped with pistols without cartridge pouches, rather the holsters were fitted to hold six cartridges).

Their equipment also included 20 camp kettles per squadron and 16 hay scythes.

Hungarian saddle with holsters, bridle and bits.

1806, 1 [13] October: the lower ranks' sheepskin jackets were withdrawn.

2 [14] December: braids and curls were abolished for lower ranks; they were free to have their hair cut short, while generals and officers were free to wear their hair as they pleased.

1807, March: canes were abolished for non-commissioned officers and officers.

20 November [2 December]: in hussar regiments, cords were ordered to be of a single colour.

21 November [3 December]: the white breeches of the Grodno Regiment were withdrawn and in

their place they were ordered to have blue breeches with white (cord) trim.

1808, 20 November [2 December]: officers in undress uniform¹ were ordered to wear dark green trousers, replacing the previous blue ones.

1809, 4 [16] February: in order to ease the expenses for hussar officers, it was ordered that the dolman and pelisse with silver cords, which had been abolished in 1803 but eventually came back into use, be worn only for inspections and parades, and at other times they were to have those fitted with Arras cord.

8 [20] June: the plumage on general's bicornes (worn with the undress uniform) was abolished and the lace-loop for the cockade of the previous pattern was replaced with a new one, made up of four wide strips of metallic cord, of which the two centre ones were intertwined in the form of a rope.

20 October [1 November]: generals, field officers and subalterns of hussar regiments were ordered to wear epaulettes with the undress uniform.

In the same year they were issued dark green frock coats with cuffs and a collar like the dolman (light blue).

11 [23] November: all combatant ranks in hussar regiments were given shakos lower than the previous model, but with the same plume; the lace loops, cockade and cords were dark blue. Both chains, located on the front and back of the new shako, as well as the chin scales, were to be the same colour as the buttons (silver).

On that same date, changes were made to the cords on the cuffs of the pelisse and dolman. The side cords of the breeches were to join at the back. On the sabretaches, the corners and teeth were replaced by simple metallic lace. Trumpeters, in place of the previous capped shoulders, were given longitudinal white lace. The saddle cloth, like the sabretache, was ordered to be dark blue with light blue trim and monogram.

All hussar regiments were ordered to have new-style sabres (scabbards identical to those of the 1806 model; hilt with knuckle guard).

1810, 6 [18] June: carbines and pistols were ordered to be produced to a new pattern, both of the same calibre of 0.7 English inches.

1811, 23 September [5 October]: lower ranks were given new-style forage caps: the crown was the same colour as the dolman, while the band was the same colour as the collar.

11 [23] December: support personnel were issued new uniforms, identical to those established for support personnel from grenadier regiments.

1812, January: a new model of shako was approved, which superseded the 1809 pattern. Cap-cords and flounders to match the colour of the cords, chains and chin-scales to match the button colour (the plume was to be thin, straight and longer).

The collars of the pelisse, dolman, frock-coats and cloaks were ordered to be lower than before, closed, and fastened with hooks and eyes.

10 [22] November: firearms were withdrawn except for pistols and 16 musketoons per squadron.

29 November [11 December]: in order to reduce costs, officers of hussar regiments were permitted to have white embroidery on their uniforms instead of metallic silver. Cap-cords, flounders, sashes, tassels, as well as braid and embroidery on the saddle cloth were to be in white.

1814, 6 [18] April: officer's frock-coats were ordered to be single-breasted with nine flat buttons,

¹ The officer's undress uniform was double-breasted, without pocket flaps. The lining and piping were red. The collar and cuffs were of hussar pattern. A bicorne with a white plume was worn with undress uniform.

with a collar fastened with hooks and with piping (light blue) along the chest.

Undress uniform was completed with dark green trousers and boots with black tassels.

3 [15] May: insignia granted *за отличие* [for distinction] are ordered to be worn above the crown of the shako badge (the insignia granted in 1814 originally had the shape of a crescent. It was placed above the shako badge, which consisted of a shield topped with a crown. The shield featured a St. Andrew's star instead of the double-headed eagle; these eagles appeared on shakos much later).

20 May [1 June]: officers' former grey buttoned overalls were replaced with new ones, still grey, but with seam-stripes matching the colour of the dolman collar (light blue).

19 [31] August: similar overalls, but with leather inside legs, were issued to lower ranks, and breeches were only worn on parades.

15 [27] September: the regiment was ordered to have 1,120 carbines, and 112 rifled carbines instead of muskets. Both were to be worn on white shoulder belts with brass buckles, hooks, and tips.

APPENDIX VI.

The Grodno Regiment's Battle Honours.

The regiment was involved in the following actions, battles, and clashes:

1807:

31 January [12 February]: at Mischenitz.

24 May [5 June]: at Guttstadt.

25 May [6 June]: at Ankendorf.

26 May [7 June]: at Heilsberg.

2 [14] June: at Friedland.

1808:

9 [21] February: at Elimä chapel.

11 [23] February: capture of the villages of Muttom and Mörskom.

12 [24] February: at Kuuskoski.

24 February [7 March]: at Tavastehus.

28 February [11 March]: at Tammerfors and Lappfjärd.

4 [16] March: at the village of Gastilla [*sic*] and Kuopio.

9 [21] March: at Åbo.

10 [22] March: at Lappfjärd and Kristinestad.

15 [27] March: at Revolax and Vaasa.

20 March [1 April]: at Sundby.

4 [16] April: at Pyhäjoki.

6 [18] April: at Siikajoki.

7 to 8 [19 to 20] June: at Lemo.

12 [24] June: at Nykarleby.

26 June [8 July]: at Lappo.

29 June [11 July]: at Perho and Kalajoki.

2 [14] July: at Lappo.

28 July [9 August]: at Alavo.

4 [16] August: at Alavo.

7 [19] August: at Ömossa.

9 [21] August: at Virdois, Karstula and Lintulaks.

17 [29] August: at Lappfjärd.

19 [31] August: at Kuhalambi and Sarvik.

20 August [1 September]: at Kuortane.

21 August [2 September]: at Salmi.
22 August [3 September]: at Ylistaro.
25 August [6 September]: at Ömossa.
2 [14] September: at Oravais, Gamlakarleby and Kronoby.
5 to 6 [17 to 18] September: at Helsinge.
14 to 15 [26 to 27] September: at Lokalax.
25 October [6 November]: at Kalajoki.
19 November [1 December]: at Uleåborg.

1809:

3 [15] March: at Beno.
4 [16] March: at Lemland.
6 to 7 [18 to 19] March: expedition to the Swedish coast across the Gulf of Bothnia.
7 [19] March: at Grisslehamn.

1812:

16 [28] June: at Wilkomierz.
3 [15] July: at Druya.
8 [20] July: at Krusenhof.
13 to 15 [25 to 27] July: at Volyntsy.
18 to 20 July [30 July to 1 August]: at Klyastitsy.
26 to 27 July [7 to 8 August]: at Volyntsy.
30 July [10 August]: at Svolna.
5 to 6 [17 to 18] August: at Polotsk.
10 [22] August: at Beloe and Dahlenkirchen.
5 to 6 [17 to 18] October: at the customs house.
6 to 8 [18 to 20] October: at Polotsk.
13 [25] October: at Pustynniki.
14 to 16 [26 to 28] October: at Voron.
18 to 19 [30 to 31] October: at Chashniki.
26 October [7 November]: at Lukoml.
2 [14] November: at Smoliyantsy.
10 to 12 [22 to 24] November: at Chereya and Batury.
15 [27] November: at Borisov.
22 November [4 December]: at Vileyka.
30 November [12 December]: at Vilna.
11 [23] December: at Kołtyniany.

15 [27] December: at the liberation of Tilsit.
20 to 21 December [1 to 2 January 1813]: at Labiau.
27 to 28 December [8 to 9 January 1813]: at the liberation of Königsberg.
30 December [11 January 1813]: at Elbing.

1813:

1 to 2 [13 to 14] January: at Dirschau.
24 March [5 April]: at Vehlitz and Magdeburg.
16 [28] April: at Halle.
20 April [2 May]: at Lützen.
8 to 10 [20 to 22] May: at Bautzen and Reichenbach.
16 [28] May: at Häslicht [Kostrza] and Jauer.
10 [22] August: at Peterswald.
13 to 15 [25 to 27] August: at Dresden.
16 to 18 [28 to 30] August: at Nickern, Elend and Altenberg.
25 to 28 August [6 to 9 September]: at Gerben, Dohna and Zehista.
26 to 27 September [8 to 9 October]: at Frohburg.
28 to 30 September [10 to 12 October]: at Borna and Cröbern.
2 to 6 [14 to 18] October: at Leipzig.
25 December [6 January 1814]: at Stasbourg.

1814:

17 [29] January: at Valleret.
18 [30] January: at Montier-en-Der.
2 [14] February: at Sourdun.
4 [16] February: at La Lande.
15 [27] February: at Bar-sur-Aube.
19 February [3 March]: at Laubressel.
20 February [4 March]: at Troyes.
26 February [10 March]: at Saint-Aubin.
2 to 6 [14 to 18] March: clashes between St-Martin-Chennetron and Léchelle.
8 to 9 [20 to 21] March: at Arcis-sur-Aube.
13 [25] March: at Fère-Champenoise.
17 to 18 [29 to 30] March: at Paris.

APPENDIX VII.

Facsimile of Regimental Orders dated 20 January [1 February] 1808.

1808 года Января 20 Дня в полку
Примаше
Кому хорошо завтра днюшка, а боже
дась впереди лутше ит преобретати
Завсегда есть и снова — штабъ квар
тера 21-иши в Красное ит штабъ
быть Общественной разбивка
поуководитъ Кулевъ

20 January [1 February] 1808, to the regiment

Orders.

Whomsoever does well - tomorrow is a rest day, and God will grant better things ahead, where honour and glory are to be found. The headquarters will be in Krasnoe, on 21 January [2 February] where there should be two days of rest.

Lieutenant Colonel Kulnev.

APPENDIX VIII.

List of Officers Serving in the Grodno Hussar Regiment 1806 – 1814

1. **Shepelev 1st**, Dmitry Dmitrievich, *Flügel-Adjutant*, Colonel, Regimental Colonel-in-Chief. Joined 23 June [5 July] 1806. Appointed Colonel-in-Chief from being His Imperial Majesty's *Flügel-Adjutant*, later major general; 12 [24] November 1810, discharged from service, with uniform, due to ill-health.
2. **Chechensky**, Alexander Nikolaevich, Cornet. Joined 23 July [4 August] 1806. Selected from former lieutenants of the Nizhegorod Dragoons. Later *Rittmeister*; 9 [21] December 1811, discharged from service, with uniform, due to ill-health.
3. **Kamashev**, Nikolay Ivanovich, Major. Joined 27 July [8 August] 1806. Transferred from the Izyum Hussars. Retained this rank; 13 [25] January 1808, discharged from service, with uniform, due to wounds.
4. **Hirsch**, Ivan Khristyanovich, Major. Joined 27 July [8 August] 1806. Transferred from the Izyum Hussars. Later colonel; 15 [27] January 1815, appointed regimental commander of the Moscow Dragoons.
5. **Domeyko**, Nikolay Ivanovich, *Rittmeister*. Joined 27 July [8 August] 1806. Transferred from the Izyum Hussars. Retained this rank; 11 [23] November 1809, discharged from service as a major, with uniform, due to wounds.
6. **Von Lüders**, Karl Fyodorovich, *Rittmeister*. Joined 27 July [8 August] 1806. Transferred from the Izyum Hussars. Later major; 26 January [7 February] 1810, discharged from service as a lieutenant colonel, with uniform, due to ill-health.
7. **Filinov**, Grigory Filipovich, Lieutenant. Joined 27 July [8 August] 1806. Transferred from the Izyum Hussars. Later *Rittmeister*; 26 January [7 February] 1810, discharged from service as a major, with uniform, due to ill-health.
8. **Nortsev**, Ivan Fyodorovich, Lieutenant. Joined 27 July [8 August] 1806. Transferred from the Izyum Hussars. Later *Stabs-Rittmeister*; 11 [23] December 1808, discharged from service for absence from the regiment for a whole year.
9. **Baron Grothuß 1st**, Yakov Vasilevich, Lieutenant. Joined 27 July [8 August] 1806. Transferred from the Izyum Hussars. Retained this rank; 20 December 1815 [1 January 1816], removed from the rolls as killed in action as a lieutenant colonel.
10. **Sineokov**, Pyotr Vasilevich, Lieutenant. Joined 27 July [8 August] 1806. Transferred from the Izyum Hussars. Later *Rittmeister*; 7 [19] April 1815, transferred to the Nezhin Mounted Jägers as a captain.
11. **Kempfert**, Ivan Ivanovich, Cornet. Joined 27 July [8 August] 1806. Transferred from the Izyum Hussars. Later major, reported killed in action and removed from the rolls on 19 [31] December 1816.
12. **Prince Drutskoy-Sokolinsky**, Yakov Mikhailovich, Cornet. Joined 27 July [8 August] 1806. Transferred from the Izyum Hussars. Later lieutenant; 12 [24] November removed from the rolls, deceased.
13. **Kaverin**, Ivan Andreevich, Cornet. Joined 27 July [8 August] 1806. Transferred from the Izyum Hussars. Later Lieutenant; 26 January [7 February] 1810, discharged from service as *Stabs-Rittmeister*, due to ill-health.

14. **Shembel**, Ivan Petrovich, Cornet. Joined 27 July [8 August] 1806. Transferred from the Izyum Hussar Regiment. Later lieutenant, 28th April [10th May] 1809, discharged from service as a *Stabs-Rittmeister*, with uniform and a full salary pension, due to wounds.
15. **Yermolov**, Yegor Semyonovich, Cornet. Joined 27 July [8 August] 1806. Transferred from the Izyum Hussars. Later lieutenant; 13 [25] January 1808, discharged from service, with uniform and a full salary pension, due to wounds.
16. **Mishkovsky**, Zakhar Ivanovich, Cornet. Joined 27 July [8 August] 1806. Transferred from the Izyum Hussars. Later major, removed from the rolls as killed in action, according to regimental monthly returns for June 1813.
17. **Kulnev**, Yakov Petrovich, Major, Regimental Colonel-in-Chief. Joined 8 [20] August 1806. Transferred from the Sumy Hussars. Later colonel; 12 [24] December 1808, promoted major general; 16 [28] April 1809, appointed Colonel-in-Chief of the Belorussia Hussars. 17 [29] January 1811, reappointed Colonel-in-Chief of this regiment. Retained this rank, killed in action in 1812 at Klyastitsy.
18. **Kirilenko**, Fyodor Stepanovich, Lieutenant. Joined 8 [20] August 1806. Transferred from the Sumy Hussars. Later *Rittmeister*; 20 October [1 November] 1809, transferred to the Sveaborg Garrison Regiment as a captain.
19. **(Count) Rüdiger 1st**, Fyodor Vasilevich, *Stabs-Rittmeister*, Regimental Colonel-in-Chief. Joined 8 [20] August 1806. Transferred from the Sumy Hussars. Later colonel; 31 October [12 November] 1812, appointed Colonel-in-Chief. 27 November [9 December] 1816 appointed commander of 1st Hussar Division as a major general.
20. **Gukov**, Stepan Pavlovich, Lieutenant. Joined 8 [20] August 1806. Transferred from the Sumy Hussars. Later *Stabs-Rittmeister*; 13 [25] January 1808, discharged from service due to wounds, with a full salary pension.
21. **Von Escher 1st**, Karl Kasperovich, Cornet. Joined 8 [20] August 1806. Transferred from the Sumy Hussars. Later lieutenant; 31 July [12 August] 1807, died of wounds.
22. **Von Escher 2nd**, Ferdinand Kasperovich, Cornet. Joined 8 [20] August 1806. Transferred from the Sumy Hussars. Later *Stabs-Rittmeister*; 22 November [4 December] 1811, discharged from service as a *Rittmeister*, due to ill-health.
23. **Ostrogradsky**, Matvey Ivanovich, Cornet. Joined 8 [20] August 1806. Transferred from the Sumy Hussars. Later *Stabs-Rittmeister*; 30 December 1814 [11 January 1815], transferred to the Lubny Hussars.
24. **Hildebrant**, Yuly Fyodorovich, *Rittmeister*. Joined 8 [20] August 1806. Transferred from the Olviopol Hussars. Retained his rank; 10 [22] May 1809, discharged from service as a major, with uniform, due to ill-health.
25. **Nikora 1st**, Andrey Grigorevich, Lieutenant. Joined 8 [20] August 1806. Transferred from the Olviopol Hussars. Later *Rittmeister*, killed in action in 1807.
26. **Von Halbert**, Vasily Ivanovich, Lieutenant. Joined 8 [20] August 1806. Transferred from the Olviopol Hussars. Retained his rank; 9 [21] May 1807, transferred to the Reval Grenadiers.
27. **Belanovsky**, Agey Ivanovich, Cornet. Joined 8 [20] August 1806. Transferred from the Olviopol Hussars. Later lieutenant; 29 June [11 July] 1808, transferred to the Villmanstrand Garrison Battalion.
28. **Kakhnichevsky**, Ivan Fyodorovich, Cornet. Joined 17 [29] August 1806. Transferred from

- the Olviopol Hussars. Later lieutenant; 9 [21] May 1807, transferred to the Reval Garrison Regiment.
29. **Predaevich**, Semyon Konstantinovich, Cornet. Joined 17 [29] August 1806. Transferred from the Olviopol Hussars. Later lieutenant; 9 [21] May 1809, transferred to the Reval Garrison Regiment.
 30. **Nikora 2nd**, Lieutenant. Joined 17 [29] August 1806. Transferred from the Olviopol Hussars. Later *Rittmeister*; 10 [22] December 1808, removed from the rolls, died of wounds.
 31. **Tursky**, Leonty Aleksandrovich, Lieutenant-Colonel, Regimental Commander. Joined 7 [19] September 1806. Transferred from the Alexandria Hussars. Later colonel; 1 [13] June 1815, appointed Regimental Commander.
 32. **Olshevsky 1st**, Anton Danilovich, *Rittmeister*. Joined 7 [19] September 1806. Transferred from the Alexandria Hussars. Later lieutenant colonel; 23 May [4 June] 1816, released from service for family reasons as a colonel with uniform.
 33. **Milkovich**, Khristofor Yakovlevich, Lieutenant. Joined 7 [19] September 1806. Transferred from the Alexandria Hussars. Later *Rittmeister*; 27 January [8 February] 1808, discharged from service, with uniform, due to ill-health.
 34. **Kurilov**, Nikolay Ivanovich, Lieutenant. Joined 7 [19] September 1806. Transferred from the Alexandria Hussars. Later *Rittmeister*; 20 October [1 November] 1809, transferred to the Sveaborg Garrison Regiment as a captain.
 35. **Vishnevsky**, Ivan Prokofevich, Cornet. Joined 7 [19] September 1806. Transferred from the Alexandria Hussars. Later major; 3 [15] March 1816, removed from the rolls, deceased.
 36. **Yakimov**, Nikolay Fyodorovich, Cornet. Joined 7 [19] September 1806. Transferred from the Alexandria Hussars. Later *Stabs-Rittmeister*; 24 April [6 May], 1813, discharged from service as a *Rittmeister* with a full salary pension, due to wounds.
 37. **Kozodaev**, Pyotr Mikhaylovich, Cornet. Joined 7 [19] September 1806. Transferred from the Alexandria Hussars. Later *Rittmeister*; 7 [19] April 1815, transferred to the Dorpat Mounted Jägers as a captain.
 38. **Davydov**, Alexander Lvovich, Colonel. Joined 18 [30] September 1806. Transferred from the Chevaliergarde. Retained this rank; 11 [23] January 1810, discharged from service, with uniform, due to ill-health.
 39. **De Salvert**, Avgust Fyodorovich, Lieutenant. Joined 28 September [10 October] 1806. Selected from the 6th Jägers. Retained this rank; 14 [26] August 1807, removed from the rolls, killed in action.
 40. **Grevs**, Alexander Alesandrovich, Cornet. Joined 28 September [10 October] 1806. Selected from the commissioners of the 12th class of the Provisioning State. Later lieutenant; 13 [25] January 1808, transferred to the Chevaliergarde.
 41. **Bibikov 2nd**, Vladimir Matveevich, Cornet. Joined 28 September [10 October] 1806. From Portepée-Ensign of the Lifeguard Izmaylovsky Regiment. Later lieutenant; 20 September [2 November] 1811, discharged from service as a *Stabs-Rittmeister*, due to ill-health.
 42. **Bibikov 1st**, Stepan Matveevich, Colonel, Regimental Commander. Joined 5 [17] October 1806. Appointed regimental commander from His Imperial Highness Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich's Ulans. Retained this rank; 26 October [7 November] 1809, removed from the rolls, deceased.
 43. **Schmitt**, Semyon Ivanovich, Cornet. Joined 11 [23] October 1806. Selected as an ensign

- from the Kiev Mounted Jägers. Later *Stabs-Rittmeister*; 8 [20] January 1816, dismissed from service due to ill-health as a *Rittmeister* with uniform.
44. **Semenov**, Nikolay Alekseevich, Lieutenant. Joined 18 [30] October 1806. Selected from the Pskov Musketeers. Retained this rank; 7 [19] February 1807, removed from the rolls, deceased.
 45. **Teygert**, Pyotr Krestyankovich, Cornet. Joined 18 [30] October 1806. Commissioned from non-commissioned officer of the Chevaliergarde. Later *Rittmeister*; 5 [17] July 1816, removed from the rolls, deceased.
 46. **Ogarev**, Ilya Ivanovich, *Rittmeister*. Joined 19 [31] October 1806. Selected from 7th class of Commissioners of the Standing Commissariat. Retained this rank; 28 August [9 September 1807, transferred to the Volhynia Horse.
 47. **Gorgoli**, Ivan Savich, *Flügel-Adjutant*, Colonel. Joined 23 October [4 November] 1806. Transferred from the Lifeguard Semenovsky Regiment. Retained this rank; 24 September [6 October] 1811, appointed St Petersburg Senior Chief of Police.
 48. **Silin**, Vasily Mikhailovich, Major. Joined 30 October [11 November] 1806. Transferred from the Lifeguard Hussars. Later colonel.
 49. **Davydov**, Vasily Petrovich, Cornet. Joined 30 October [11 November] 1806. Selected as ensign from the 1st Marines. Later major; 28 June [10 July] 1817, dismissed from service due to wounds, as lieutenant colonel with uniform.
 50. **Zhitkov**, Nikolay Mikhailovich, Cornet. Joined 1 [13] November 1806. Commissioned from Junker in the Lifeguard Horse. Later lieutenant; 2 [14] June 1809, discharged from service as a *Stabs-Rittmeister*, with uniform and a full salary pension, due to wounds.
 51. Prince **Divlet-Kildeev**, Savely Martinovich, Cornet. Joined 6 [18] November 1806. Commissioned from Junker in the Lifeguard Cossacks. Later *Rittmeister*; 31 January [12 February] 1816, dismissed from service as a major with uniform due to wounds.
 52. Prince **Lyubomirsky 1st**, Aleksey Yakovlevich, Cornet. Joined 23 November [5 December] 1806. Selected as a Commander of the Order of St John of Jerusalem. In respect of his donation to the treasury on 10 [22] December 1806, transferred to the Lifeguard Hussars.
 53. **Kopiev**, *Stabs-Rittmeister*. Joined 30 November [12 December] 1806. Transferred as a lieutenant from the Lifeguard Garrison Battalion. Later *Rittmeister*; 20 October [1 November] 1809, transferred to the Sveaborg Garrison Regiment as a captain.
 54. **Ilinsky 1st**, Alexander Ilich, Cornet. Joined 20 December 1806 [1 January 1807]. Transferred as an ensign from the 1st Marines. Later *Rittmeister*; 15 [27] May 1822, promoted major on transfer to the Lubny Hussars.
 55. **Ilinsky 2nd**, Nikolay Ilich, Cornet. Joined 20 December 1806 [1 January 1807]. Transferred as an ensign from the 1st Marines. Later *Rittmeister*; according to a report of 19 [31] December 1816, removed from the rolls, killed in action.
 56. **Zaytsev**, Semyon Semyonovich, Cornet. Joined 1 [13] January 1807. Selected from the Mariupol Hussars. 9 [21] May 1807, transferred to the Riga Garrison Regiment as an ensign.
 57. **Novikov**, Alexander Petrovich, Lieutenant. Joined 1 [13] January 1807. Transferred from the Tiraspol Regiment. 28 November [10 December] 1807, discharged from service as a *Stabs-Rittmeister*, due to ill-health.
 58. **Aksentev**, Pyotr Fyoderovich, Cornet. Joined 1 [13] January 1807. Commissioned from Portepée-Junker in this regiment. Later lieutenant, 25 December 1811 [6 January 1812]

discharged from service due to ill-health.

59. **Zdroevsky**, Alexander Sebastyanovich, Cornet. Joined 1 [13] January 1807. Commissioned from Junker in this regiment. Later *Stabs-Rittmeister*; 20 December 1815 [1 January 1816], removed from the rolls, killed in action.
60. **Trifanovsky**, Ivan Ivanovich, Cornet. Joined 1 [13] January 1807. Commissioned from Portepée-Junker in this regiment. 9 [21] May 1807, transferred to the Riga Garrison Regiment as an ensign.
61. **Yelchaninov**, Pavel Ivanovich, Cornet. Joined 1 [13] January 1807. Commissioned from Portepée-Junker in this regiment. Retained this rank; 20 January [1 February] 1808, discharged from service as a lieutenant, due to wounds.
62. **Mostanov**, Alexander Grigorevich, Cornet. Joined 1 [13] January 1807. Commissioned from Junker in this regiment. Later *Stabs-Rittmeister*; 16 [28] January 1816, discharged from service as a *Rittmeister*, due to wounds.
63. **Akhtyrka**, Roman Fyoderovich, Cornet. Joined 25 January [6 February] 1807. Commissioned from Junker in this regiment. 29 June [11 July] 1808, transferred to the Rochensalm Garrison Regiment as an ensign.
64. **Belyavsky**, Ivan Ivanovich, Cornet. Joined 25 January [6 February] 1807. Commissioned from Junker in this regiment. Later *Rittmeister*; 14 [26] October 1819, transferred to the Borisoglebsk Ulans.
65. **Dombrovsky**, Vikenty Faddeevich, Cornet. Joined 25 January [6 February] 1807. Commissioned from Junker in this regiment. Later lieutenant; 11 [23] August 1809, transferred to the Shlisselburg Garrison Battalion.
66. **Korostovtsev**, Pyotr Stepanovich, Cornet. Joined 25 January [6 February] 1807. Commissioned from Junker in this regiment. 31 July [12 August] 1807, removed from the rolls, died of wounds.
67. **Smolensky**, Kaetan Vikentevich, Cornet. Joined 25 January [6 February] 1807. Commissioned from Junker in this regiment. Later lieutenant; 11 [23] August 1809, transferred to the Kexholm Grenadiers.
68. **Dematchenko-Romasenko**, Dmitry Nikitich, Cornet. Joined 25 January [6 February] 1807. Commissioned from Junker in this regiment. 18 [30] March 1810, discharged from service as a lieutenant, with uniform, due to wounds.
69. **Bogutsky**, Kuzma Osipovich, Cornet. Joined 25 January [6 February] 1807. Commissioned from Junker in this regiment. 7 [19] November 1807, removed from the rolls, deceased.
70. **Belli**, Cornet. Joined 25 January [6 February] 1807. Commissioned from non-commissioned guardians of the court stables. Retained this rank; 7 [19] February 1808, transferred back to the staff of the court stables department.
71. **Naletov**, Ivan Ivanovich, Cornet. Joined 4 [16] February 1807. Transferred as Auditor of this regiment. Later *Rittmeister*; 4 [16] September 1813, appointed to the Army Staff.
72. **Kusovnikov**, Alexander Petrovich, Cornet. Joined 4 [16] May 1807. Commissioned from Junker in this regiment. Later *Rittmeister*; 22 May [3 June] 1816, discharged from service as a major, with uniform, due to wounds.
73. **Samsonov**, Pyotr Vasilevich, Cornet. Joined 4 [16] May 1807. Commissioned from Junker in this regiment. Retained this rank; 23 April [5 May] 1809, discharged from service due to

unacceptable behaviour.¹

74. **Sukhinin**, Gavriil Ivanovich, Cornet. Joined 4 [16] May 1807. Commissioned from *Wachtmeister* in this regiment. Later lieutenant; 19 February [2 March] 1812, removed from the rolls, deceased.
75. **Sementovsky**, Ivan Antonovich, Cornet. Joined 4 [16] May 1807. Commissioned from *Wachtmeister* in this regiment. Later lieutenant, 23 October [4 November] 1811, discharged from service as a *Stabs-Rittmeister*; with uniform and status of an invalid, due to wounds.
76. **Nazimov 1st**, Yevgeny Petrovich, Lieutenant. Joined 20 July [1 August] 1807. Selected from the Lifeguard Horse. Later lieutenant colonel; 18 [30] March 1816, discharged from service as a colonel, due to wounds.
77. **Zakrevsky**, Martyn Ignatievich, Lieutenant. Joined 30 August [11 September] 1807. Transferred from the Grodno Garrison Battalion. Later *Rittmeister*; 9 [21] August 1811, removed from the rolls, deceased.
78. Prince **Meshchersky**, Andrey Sergeevich, Cornet. Joined 23 October [4 November] 1807. Commissioned from Junker in this regiment. Later lieutenant; 29 June [11 July] 1816, dismissed from service due to unacceptable behaviour.
79. **Korobka**, Grigory Gavrilovich, Cornet. Joined 23 October [4 November] 1807, from Junker in this regiment. 29 June [11 July] 1808, transferred to the Rochensalm Garrison Regiment as an ensign.
80. **Matlen**, Ivan Ivanovich, Cornet. Joined 23 October [4 November] 1807, from non-commissioned officer in this regiment. Later lieutenant; 28 February [12 March] 1811, released from service due to illness.
81. **Laptev**, Pavel Ivanovich, Cornet. Joined 23 October [4 November] 1807, from non-commissioned officer in this regiment. Later lieutenant; 31 December 1810 [12 January 1812], released from service due to illness.
82. **Apayshchikov**, Pavel Ivanovich, Cornet. Joined 23 October [4 November] 1807, from non-commissioned officer in this regiment. 28 February [12 March] 1811, released from service due to wounds.
83. **Poltavtsev**, Vasily Vasilievich, Cornet. Joined 23 October [4 November] 1807, from non-commissioned officer in this regiment. Later lieutenant; 21 November [3 December] 1811, released from service with uniform, due to wounds.
84. **Golofeev**, Sokrat Vasilievich, Cornet. Joined 23 October [4 November] 1807, from 1st Cadet Corps. Later *Rittmeister*; 6 [18] March 1824, released from service due to wounds, as a major with uniform.
85. Prince **Khvabulov**, Grigory Grigorievich, Cornet. Joined 23 October [4 November] 1807, from 1st Cadet Corps. Retained this rank. 6 [18] April 1810, removed from the rolls, deceased.
86. **Brenner**, Osip Ivanovich, Cornet. Joined 23 October [4 November] 1807, from Junker in this regiment. 18 [30] March 1810, released from service as a lieutenant due to ill-health.
87. **Maekovsky**, Vasily Matveevich, Cornet. Joined 9 [21] December 1807, from Junker in the Volhynia Ulans. Later *Rittmeister*; 1 [13] April 1816, released from service as a major with

¹ It is understood that the phrase ‘unacceptable behaviour’ refers to: drunkenness, violence, taking part in a duel, unauthorised absences and other misconduct, unbecoming of the honour of an officer. Unacceptable behaviour, and certification in the misconduct lists, entailed discharge from service and often reduction to the ranks.

uniform, due to wounds.

88. **Stokolenko**, Alexander Grigorievich, Cornet. Joined 26 December 1807 [7 January 1808], from Junker in this regiment. Later *Stabs-Rittmeister*; 26 April [8 May] 1816, released from service as *Rittmeister*, due to ill-health.
89. **Slavinsky**, Cornet. Joined 26 December 1807 [7 January 1808], selected from *Sotnik* of the militia; 24 December 1808 [5 January 1809], dismissed from service for failure to report to the regiment for a whole year.
90. **Nechaev**, Ivan Petrovich, Cornet. Joined 26 December 1807 [7 January 1808], selected from *Pyatidesyatnik* of militia. Later *Rittmeister*; 21 May [2 June] 1816, transferred to the Lithuania Ulans.
91. **Kovalevsky**, Vanifanty Fadeevich, Cornet. Joined 26 December 1807 [7 January 1808], selected from *Pyatidesyatnik* of militia. Later lieutenant; 5 [17] May 1816, transferred to the Voronezh Infantry.
92. **Shimansky**, Gerasim Ivanovich, Cornet. Joined 26 December 1807 [7 January 1808], selected from *Pyatidesyatnik* of militia. Retained this rank; 18 [30] May 1813, demoted to private for his remaining service for unauthorised absence from the squadron and unacceptable behaviour.
93. **Durnovo 1st**, Vasily Dmitrievich, Cornet. Joined 27 January [8 February] 1808, selected from *Pyatidesyatnik* of Novgorod Militia. 31 December 1810 [12 January 1811], released from service as lieutenant, due to ill-health.
94. **Kolychev**, Cornet. Joined 7 [19] February 1808, selected as militia adjutant. Retained this appointment. 29 March [10 April] 1813, for the personal discredit he had inflicted upon himself by cutting down Major Olshevsky with a sabre, he was demoted to private for his remaining service.
95. **Zaborovsky**, Vitsenty Antonovich, Cornet. Joined 7 [19] February 1808, as a Junker of this regiment. Later *Rittmeister*; 7 [19] April 1815, transferred to the Nezhin Mounted Jägers as a captain.
96. **Zernov**, Vladimir Pavlovich, Cornet. Joined 7 [19] February 1808, as a Junker of this regiment. 3 [15] February 1811, released from service as a lieutenant, due to ill-health.
97. **Astapov**, Yegor Ivanovich, Cornet. Joined 7 [19] February 1808, as a Junker of this regiment. 16 [28] June 1809, transferred to the Rochensalm Garrison Regiment as an ensign.
98. **Glebov**, Ivan Alexandrovich, Cornet. Joined 7 [19] February 1808, selected from *Pyatidesyatnik* of militia. Later major. 2 [14] January 1820, released from service with uniform, due to wounds.
99. **Plokhovo**, Sergey Nikolaevich. Joined 7 [19] February 1808, selected from *Pyatidesyatnik* of militia. Later lieutenant. 12 [24] December 1809, transferred to the Lifeguard Horse.
100. **Apukhtin**, Vladimir Petrovich, Lieutenant. Joined 7 [19] February 1808, selected from retired lieutenants. 26 January [7 February] 1810, released from service as *Stabs-Rittmeister*, due to ill-health.
101. **Peregudov**, Mikhail Semenovich, Cornet. Transferred 24 March [5 April] 1808, as ensign from the Courland Dragoons. 2 [14] February 1810, released from service as a lieutenant, due to ill-health.
102. **Anselm de Guibours**, Yakov Ivanovich, Colonel. Selected 19 [31] July 1808, from retired army staff. 14 [26] April 1809, promoted major general and reassigned to the army

staff.

103. **Von Spengan**, Cornet. Selected 7 [19] July 1808, from lieutenants in Prussian service. 16 [29] June 1809, transferred to the Friedrichshamn Garrison Regiment, as a lieutenant.
104. **Sinadeev**, Nikolay Andreevich, Cornet. Transferred 18 [30] July 1808, from Portepée-Junker of Izyum Hussars. 16 [28] June 1809, transferred to the Kexholm Garrison Battalion as an ensign.
105. **Dyatkov**, Vladimir Erastovich, Lieutenant. Transferred 22 July [3 August] 1808, from the Podolia Musketeers. Later *Rittmeister*; 17 [29] March 1813, removed from the rolls, killed in action.
106. **Lastovsky**, Foma Osipovich, Cornet. Selected 9 [21] August 1808, from *Sotnik*. Retained this rank. 23 March [4 April] 1812, dismissed from service for unacceptable behaviour.
107. Baron **Fersen**, Hans Reinhold, Cornet. Promoted 31 October [12 November] 1808 from Junker of this regiment. Retained this rank. 10 [22] January 1812, released from service due to ill-health.
108. **Postels 1st**, Sigismund Ferdinandovich, Cornet. Promoted 31 October [12 November] 1808 from Junker of this regiment. Later lieutenant; 17 [29] January 1816, released from service as *Stabs-Rittmeister* with uniform and invalid pension due to wounds.
109. **Nabel**, Andrey Andreevich, *Stabs-Rittmeister*. Transferred 11 [23] December 1808 as staff-captain from the Sevsk Musketeers. Later colonel; 15 [27] January 1815, transferred to the Lifeguard Mounted Jägers.
110. **Somov**, Vladimir Erastovich, Cornet. Transferred 21 January [2 February] 1809 as ensign from the Reval Regiment. Later lieutenant; 31 December 1810 [12 January 1811], released from service as *Stabs-Rittmeister*, due to ill-health.
111. **Krammer**, Lev Fyodorovich, Cornet. Promoted 12 [24] May 1809 from Portepée-Junker in this regiment. Later lieutenant colonel; 21 April [3 May] 1829, nominated as commander of the Ingermanland Hussars.
112. **Gutjahr 1st**, Karl Petrovich, Cornet. Promoted 3 [15] June 1809, from Portepée-Junker in this regiment. Later *Rittmeister*; 7 [19] April 1815, transferred to the Dorpat Mounted Jägers as a captain.
113. **Kondratovich**, Adam Mikhailovich, Cornet. Promoted 3 [15] June 1809, from Portepée-Junker in this regiment. Later *Rittmeister*; 2 [14] February 1819, released from service as a major due to ill-health.
114. **Kazakevich**, Vladislav Stanislavovich, Cornet. Promoted 3 [15] June 1809, from Portepée-Junker in this regiment. Retained this rank; 5 [17] March 1812, for unauthorised absence from his unit and insubordination against his superior, *Rittmeister* Zakrevsky, whom he shot, he was stripped of his rank and noble status and exiled forever with hard labour.
115. **Sultanov**, Zuran Osipovich, Cornet. Promoted 1 [13] September 1809, from Portepée-Junker in the Lifeguard Cossacks. 3 [15] February 1811, released from service as a lieutenant due to ill-health.
116. **Schau**, Dmitry Ivanovich, Colonel, Regimental Commander. Nominated 27 November [9 December] 1809, from the Yelisavetgrad Hussars. Retained this appointment; 25 December 1811 [6 January 1812], released from service due to ill-health.

117. **Nany**, Franz Petrovich, *Stabs-Rittmeister*. Selected 25 February [] 1810, from retired Yelisavetgrad Hussars. Retained this rank; 18 [30] April 1810, transferred to the Lifeguard Hussars as aide-de-camp to Lieutenant General Uvarov.
118. **Porokhovnikov**, Nikolay Petrovich, Cornet. Promoted 9 [21] May 1810, from Portepée-Junker in this regiment. 25 December 1811 [6 January 1812], released from service as a lieutenant due to ill-health.
119. **Tsitlyadzev**, Pavel Alexandrovich, Cornet. Promoted 9 [21] May 1810, from Portepée-Junker in this regiment. Later *Stabs-Rittmeister*; 12 [24] May 1815, transferred to the Lubny Hussars.
120. **Rybalkin**, Moisey Yemelyanovich, Cornet. Promoted 9 [21] May 1810, from *Wachtmeister* in this regiment. Later lieutenant; 10 [22] August 1814, removed from the rolls, killed in action.
121. **Smorodsky**, Vasily Mikhailovich, Cornet. Promoted 9 [21] May 1810, from non-commissioned officer in this regiment. Later lieutenant; 17 [29] January 1816, released from service as *Stabs-Rittmeister* with uniform and invalid pension due to wounds.
122. Prince **Vadbolsky**, Alexander Mikhailovich, Cornet. Promoted 9 [21] May 1810, from Junker of the Lifeguard Ulans. Later lieutenant; 6 [18] February 1816, released from service as *Stabs-Rittmeister* due to ill-health.
123. **Dolgovo-Saburov**, Alexey Stepanovich, Cornet. Promoted 9 [21] May 1810, from Junker of the Lifeguard Ulans. Later lieutenant; 16 [28] February 1816, removed from the rolls, died of wounds.
124. **Lvov**, Pyotr Petrovich, *Stabs-Rittmeister*. Transferred 29 June [11 July] 1810, from captain of 1st Marines. Later *Rittmeister*; 8 [20] November 1811, transferred to the Astrakhan Cuirassiers.
125. **Verzhbitsky**, Ivan Leontievich, Cornet. Promoted 6 [18] November 1810, from Junker in this regiment. Later *Stabs-Rittmeister*; 21 April [3 May] 1819, transferred to the Sumy Hussars on promotion to *Rittmeister*.
126. **Shcherbakov**, Gavriil Vasilievich, Cornet. Promoted 6 [18] November 1810, from Junker in this regiment. Later lieutenant; 19 [31] December 1816, removed from the rolls, killed in action.
127. **Petrovsky**, Grigory Ivanovich, Cornet. Promoted 6 [18] November 1810, from Junker in this regiment. Retained this rank; 22 November [4 December] 1811, released from service due to ill-health.
128. **Ivanenko**, Arkady Grigorievich, Cornet. Joined 2 [14] December 1810, from the Pages Corps. Retained this rank; 12 [24] March 1812, transferred to the Lifeguard Hussars as a cornet.
129. **Skrydlevisky**, Matvey Kasperovich, Cornet. Promoted 8 [20] May 1811, from Portepée-Junker of the Poland Ulans. 16 [28] January 1816, released from service as a lieutenant with uniform due to wounds.
130. **Konevsky**, Philip Semyonovich, Cornet. Promoted 8 [20] May 1811, from Portepée-Junker of the Poland Ulans. 23 October [4 November] 1811, released from service due to ill-health.
131. **Piotrovsky**, Iosif Stanislavovich, Cornet. Promoted 8 [20] May 1811, from Portepée-Junker of the Poland Ulans. Retained this rank; 20 December 1815 [1 January 1816],

- removed from the rolls, killed in action.
132. **Shostakovsky**, Stanislav Ivanovich, Cornet. Promoted 8 [20] May 1811, from Portepée-Junker of the Poland Ulans. Retained this rank; 17 [29] March 1813, removed from the rolls, killed in action.
 133. **Omelyansky**, Anton Stepanovich, Cornet. Promoted 8 [20] May 1811, from Portepée-Junker of the Poland Ulans. Retained this rank; 10 [22] March 1814, removed from the rolls, killed in action.
 134. **Krasovsky**, Osip Ivanovich, Cornet. Promoted 8 [20] May 1811, from Portepée-Junker of the Poland Ulans. 17 [29] 1816, released from service as a lieutenant with uniform and invalid pension due to wounds.
 135. **Klevsky**, Rudolf Pavlovich, Cornet. Promoted 8 [20] May 1811, from Portepée-Junker of the Poland Ulans. 7 [19] April 1815, transferred to the Moscow Dragoons as an ensign.
 136. **Berents**, Ivan, Cornet. Promoted 8 [20] May 1811, from Portepée-Junker of this regiment. Later lieutenant; removed from the rolls, killed in action.
 137. **Novosiltsev**, Sergey Sergeevich, Lieutenant. Selected 17 [29] June 1811, from the Corps of Engineers. Later Colonel; 15 [27] January 1819, nominated commander of the Borisoglebsk Ulans.
 138. **Von Shenne**, Nikolay Fyodorovich, Cornet. Transferred 20 November [2 December] 1811, from the Belorussia Hussars. 7 [19] April 1815, transferred to the St. Petersburg Dragoons as a lieutenant.
 139. **Lizogub**, Vasily Ivanovich, Cornet. Transferred 20 November [2 December] 1811, from the Belorussia Hussars. Later *Rittmeister*; 17 [29] August 1820, transferred to the Lifeguard Ulans.
 140. **Beckmann**, Fyodor, Cornet. Promoted 12 [24] December 1811, from Portepée-Junker of this regiment. Later *Rittmeister*; 30 December 1814 [11 January 1815], transferred to the Lifeguard Horse.
 141. **Vitkovsky**, Adam Leontievich, Cornet. Promoted 12 [24] December 1811, from Portepée-Junker of this regiment. Later *Stabs-Rittmeister*; 28 October [9 November] 1814, transferred to the Lifeguard Hussars.
 142. **Volylevich**, Franz Martynovich, Cornet. Promoted 12 [24] December 1811, from Portepée-Junker of this regiment. 6 [18] February 1817, released from service as a lieutenant due to wounds.
 143. **Neelov**, Pyotr Philipovich, Cornet. Promoted 12 [24] December 1811, from Portepée-Junker of this regiment. Later lieutenant; 31 May [12 June] 1816, released from service as *Stabs-Rittmeister* with uniform, due to wounds.
 144. **Barets**, Boris Fyodorovich, Cornet. Promoted 12 [24] December 1811, from Portepée-Junker of this regiment. Later lieutenant; 20 December 1815 [1 January 1816], removed from the rolls, killed in action.
 145. **Pichelstein**, Iosif Stanislavovich, Major. Transferred 22 March [3 April] 1812, from the Poland Ulans. 7 [19] June 1812, transferred to raise the 1st Ukraine Cossacks.
 146. Baron **Grothuß 2nd**, Cornet. Promoted 22 March [3 April] 1812, from Junker in this regiment. Later lieutenant; 20 December 1824 [1 January 1825], removed from the rolls, killed in action.

147. **Mezenkampff**, Yevgraf Yevstafievich, Cornet. Transferred 20 April [2 May] 1812, from the Sumy Hussars. Retained this rank; 25 March [6 April] 1813, transferred back to the Sumy Hussars.
148. Count **Keller 1st**, Fyodor Fyodorovich, Cornet. Promoted 20 April [2 May] 1812, from Junker in this regiment. Later lieutenant; transferred to the Lifeguard Hussars.
149. **Voeikov**, *Stabs-Rittmeister*. Selected 26 July [7 August] 1812, from Collegiate Assessor in the St. Petersburg *Opolchenie*. Retained this rank; 10 [22] January 1816, transferred to the Lifeguard Hussars.
150. **Sysoev**, Cornet. Promoted 14 [26] August 1812, from Junker of this regiment. Later *Stabs-Rittmeister*; 30 April [12 May] 1814, transferred to the Izyum Hussars.
151. **Pokhodun**, Ivan Kirilovich, Cornet. Promoted 14 [26] August 1812, from *Wachtmeister* in this regiment. Later *Stabs-Rittmeister*; 4 [16] November 1819, released from service with uniform, due to wounds.
152. **Kavelin**, Alexander Alexandrovich, Cornet. Promoted 14 [26] August 1812, from Junker in this regiment. Later lieutenant; 14 [26] May 1816, released from service as *Stabs-Rittmeister* due to ill-health.
153. **Worms**, Wilhelm Fyodorovich, Cornet. Promoted 14 [26] August 1812, from non-commissioned officer in this regiment. Later *Rittmeister*; 2 [14] January 1820, released from service as a major with uniform, due to wounds.
154. Count **Podgorichanin**, Lieutenant Colonel. Transferred 14 [26] August 1812, from the Sumy Hussars. September 1814, removed from the rolls, killed in action.
155. **Tomilov**, Alexander, Cornet. Promoted 14 [26] August 1812, from non-commissioned officer in this regiment. Later lieutenant; 20 December 1815 [1 January 1816], removed from the rolls, killed in action.
156. **Hochusen**, Georg Fyodorovich, Cornet. Promoted 17 [29] August 1812, from non-commissioned officer in this regiment. 1814 left the regiment, further details unknown.
157. **Stepanov**, Kharlam Ivanovich, Cornet. Promoted 17 [29] August 1812, from non-commissioned officer in this regiment. 9 [21] February 1817, released from service as a lieutenant with uniform, due to wounds.
158. **Kochubey 1st**, Arkady Vasilievich, Lieutenant. Selected 20 October [1 November] 1812, from *Kammer-Junker*. Later *Rittmeister*; 10 [22] October 1814, transferred to the Lifeguard Hussars.
159. **Olshevsky 2nd**, Franz Danilovich, Cornet. Selected 20 October [1 November] 1812 from 9th grade official of the Kronstadt Control Expedition. Later lieutenant; 24 January [5 February] 1816, released back into the Civil Service with his previous grade.
160. **Yelchaninov**, Ivan Kuzmich, Cornet. Promoted 21 October [2 November] 1812, from non-commissioned officer of the Lifeguard Hussars. 18 [30] April 1816, transferred to the Internal Guard as an ensign.
161. Baron **Vietinghoff**, *Rittmeister*. Selected 31 October [12 November] 1812, as retired major of the Mariupol Hussars. Later major; 2 [14] June 1813, removed from the rolls, died of wounds.
162. Baron **Engelhardt**, Anton Astafievich, Cornet. Promoted 19 November [1 December] 1812, from Junker in this regiment. Later *Rittmeister*; 10 [22] August 1820, transferred to the Lifeguard Mounted Jägers.

163. **Dedenev**, Alexey Yegorovich, *Rittmeister*. Selected 22 November [4 December] 1812, from 8th grade Secretary of the Interior Ministry. 4 [16] January 1818, released from service as a major with uniform, due to ill-health.
164. **Petrovich**, Ignaty Petrovich, Cornet. Promoted 28 November [10 December] 1812, from Junker in the Lifeguard Ulans. 11 [23] December 1816, released from service as a lieutenant due to ill-health.
165. Count **Davidson**, Mikhail Ivanovich, Cornet. Promoted 28 November [10 December] 1812, from Junker in the Lifeguard Ulans. 8 [20] January 1816, released from service as a lieutenant due to ill-health.
166. **Voitov**, Alexander Sergeevich, Cornet. Promoted 29 November [11 December] 1812, from non-commissioned officer in the Cavalry Training Squadron. 7 [19] April 1815, transferred to the Moscow regiment as an ensign.
167. **Aderkas**, Vasily Rodionovich, *Rittmeister*. Selected 3 [15] December 1812, as retired staff captain of the Moscow Dragoons. Retained this rank; 7 [19] April 1815, transferred to the Nezhin Mounted Jägers as a captain.
168. **Volk**, Ignaty Samoilovich, Cornet. Promoted 26 December 1812 [7 January 1813], from Junker in the Noble Cavalry Squadron. 9 [21] February 1817, released from service as a lieutenant due to ill-health.
169. **Lantsinsky**, Vasily Mikhailovich, Cornet. Promoted 26 December 1812 [7 January 1813], from noble in the Noble Cavalry Squadron. 16 [28] February 1816, released from service as a lieutenant due to ill-health.
170. **Samarsky**, Ivan Vasilievich, Cornet. Promoted 26 December 1812 [7 January 1813], from noble in the Noble Cavalry Squadron. 6 [18] February 1816, released from service as a lieutenant due to ill-health.
171. **Kisten**, Grigory Nikolaevich, Cornet. Promoted 26 December 1812 [7 January 1813], from noble in the Noble Cavalry Squadron. Later lieutenant; 16 [28] February 1818, released from service as *Stabs-Rittmeister* with uniform, due to wounds.
172. **Kochubey 2nd**, Cornet. Promoted 26 December 1812 [7 January 1813], from Junker in this regiment. Later *Rittmeister*; left the regiment, further details unknown.
173. **Shaula**, Pyotr Rodionovich, Cornet. Promoted 26 December 1812 [7 January 1813], from noble in the Noble Cavalry Squadron. Retained this rank; 26 April [8 May] 1817, removed from the rolls for long-term absence from the regiment.
174. **Trushkovsky**, Voitsekh, Cornet. Promoted 26 December 1812 [7 January 1813], from noble in the Noble Cavalry Squadron. Retained this rank; 20 December 1815 [1 January 1816], Removed from the rolls, killed in action.
175. **Novikov**, Vasily Petrovich, Cornet. Transferred 27 December 1812 [8 January 1813], as captain from the Villmanstrand Infantry. Later major; 20 January [1 February] 1820, released from service as lieutenant colonel with uniform, due to ill-health.
176. **Gorlenko**, Colonel. The exact date of his transfer is unknown. Retained this rank; removed from the rolls, killed in action.
177. **Walther**, Andrey Ivanovich, Cornet. Promoted 5 [17] January 1813 from *Wachtmeister* in the Lifeguard Hussars. Released from service on 14 [26] May 1816 as a lieutenant with invalid status due to ill-health.
178. **Shishkov**, Cornet. Promoted 5 [17] January 1813 from Junker in the Lifeguard

Hussars. Released from service on 6 [18] December 1813 due to ill-health.

179. **Pustovoyt**, Ivan Savich, Cornet. Promoted 5 [17] January 1813 from non-commissioned officer in the Lifeguard Hussars. Later a lieutenant; released from service on 2 [14] March 1819 as *Stabs-Rittmeister* with uniform, due to wounds.
180. **Marchenko**, Konstantin Trofimovich, Cornet. Promoted 5 [17] January 1813 from *Wachtmeister* in the Lifeguard Ulans. Released from service on 6 [18] February 1816 as a lieutenant, due to ill-health.
181. **Frolov**, Cornet. Promoted 5 [17] January 1813 from non-commissioned officer in the Lifeguard Ulans. Retained this rank; dismissed from service on 27 March [8 April] 1814 due to unacceptable behaviour.
182. **Dymsha**, Kazimir Grigorievich, Cornet. Promoted 5 [17] January 1813 from Junker in this regiment. Released from service on 6 [18] February 1816 as a lieutenant with invalid status due to wounds.
183. **Kransfeld**, Ivan Mikhailovich, Cornet. Promoted 5 [17] January 1813 from Junker in this regiment. Released from service on 11 [23] December 1816 as a lieutenant on domestic grounds.
184. **Kupfer**, Karl Ivanovich, Cornet. Promoted 5 [17] January 1813 from Junker in this regiment. Later a major; transferred to the Alexandria Hussars on 22 June [4 July] 1832.
185. **Pavlovich**, Nikolay Fyodorovich, Cornet. Promoted 5 [17] January 1813 from Junker in this regiment. Later a lieutenant; released from service on 16 [28] February 1818 on domestic grounds.
186. **Babst**, Ivan Danilovich, Cornet. Promoted 5 [17] January 1813 from Junker in this regiment. Later a lieutenant; transferred to the Lifeguard Mounted Jägers on 25 April [7 May] 1814.
187. **Berch**, Pyotr Ivanovich, Cornet. Promoted 5 [17] January 1813 from non-commissioned officer in this regiment. Later a lieutenant; released from service on 2 [14] February 1819 as *Stabs-Rittmeister* with uniform due to wounds.
188. **Pepel**, Fyodor Fyodorovich, Cornet. Promoted 5 [17] January 1813 from non-commissioned officer in this regiment. Retained this rank; stricken from the rolls on 20 December 1815 [1 January 1816], killed in action.
189. **Klein**, Fyodor Ivanovich, Cornet. Promoted 5 [17] January 1813 from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment. Retained this rank; released from service on 23 May [4 June] 1816 as a lieutenant on domestic grounds.
190. **Samson von Himmelstern**, Richard Astafievich, Cornet. Promoted 5 [17] January 1813 from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment. Later *Stabs-Rittmeister*; released from service with uniform on 8 [20] January 1816 due to wounds.
191. **Frank**, Karl Ivanovich, Cornet. Promoted 5 [17] January 1813 from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment. Transferred to the Kargopol Dragoons as a lieutenant on 7 [19] February 1815.
192. **Von Zurmühlen**,² Cornet. Promoted 5 [17] January 1813 from Junker in this

2 The complete absence of Service Lists and monthly returns from 1812 to 1815 (and the first ones from 1806 to 1807) in the General Staff Archives makes it impossible to identify the names and patronymics of some officers who served during this period of time. Promotion to officer rank for outstanding service in 1812, 1813 and 1814 was often not mentioned at all in Supreme Orders due to the deaths of these officers on campaign, which is why it is limited to indicating the year of promotion or transfer and the information that could be found. The month and date

- regiment. The exact date of promotion is not known. Retained this rank; stricken from the rolls on 20 December 1815 [1 January 1815], killed in action.
193. **Schilder**, Astafy Andreevich, Cornet. Promoted 5 [17] January 1813 from non-commissioned officer in this regiment. The exact date of promotion is not known. Later a lieutenant; released from service on 9 [21] February 1817 due to ill-health.
 194. **Von Kigenheim**, Cornet. Transferred from Prussian service on 5 [17] January 1813. The exact date of transfer is not known. Retained this rank; transferred to the Sumy Hussars on 26 May [7 June] 1816.
 195. **Beize**, Wilhelm Ivanovich, Cornet. Transferred as a cornet from Prussian service on 5 [17] January 1813. The exact date of transfer is not known. Retained this rank; transferred to the Sumy Hussars on 26 May [7 June] 1816.
 196. **Delwig**, Pyotr Alexeevich, Cornet. Promoted on 5 [17] January 1813 from Junker in this regiment. The exact date of promotion is not known. Released from service as a lieutenant on 16 [28] February 1818 on domestic grounds.
 197. **Trautman**, Yegor, Cornet. Promoted on 5 [17] January 1813 from non-commissioned officer in this regiment. The exact date of promotion is not known. Retained this rank; stricken from the rolls on 20 December 1815 [1 January 1816], killed in action.
 198. **Topelius**, Cornet. Joined 31 January [12 February] 1813. It is not known exactly where he came from or when he was enlisted into the regiment. Retained this rank; stricken from the rolls in 1815, killed in action.
 199. **Loshkarev**, Grigory Sergeevich, *Stabs-Rittmeister*. Selected on 31 January [12 February] 1813 from the Court Councillors of the Department of Mining and Salt Businesses, Ministry of Finance. Later a major; released from service as a lieutenant colonel with uniform on 25 February [9 March] 1825, due to wounds.
 200. **Gdantsev**, Cornet. Selected on 31 January [12 February] 1813 from the Provincial Secretaries of the Court and Stables Staff; but exactly when and where he left the regiment has not been identified.
 201. **Von Münster**, Fyodor Yurievich, Cornet. Selected on 31 January [12 February] 1813 as an Official 13th class from the Administrative Department of the Ministry of Police. Retained this rank; released from service on 17 [29] June 1816 due to ill-health.
 202. **Fermor**, Fyodor Fyodorovich, *Rittmeister*. Transferred on 5 [17] February 1813 as a captain from the Nezhin Dragoons. Released from service as a major with uniform on 28 July [9 August] 1816, due to wounds.
 203. **Von Essen**, Alexander Filipovich, *Flügel-Adjutant*, Lieutenant. Selected on 25 February [9 March] 1813 as an Official 10th class from the State College for Foreign Affairs. Retained this rank; transferred to the Lifeguard Ulans on 2 [14] April 1814.
 204. **Reuß**, Alexander Fyodorovich, Cornet. Promoted on 25 February [9 March] 1813 from Junker in this regiment. Later a lieutenant; dismissed from service on 11 [23] November 1819 for unacceptable behaviour.
 205. **Grönhagen**, Ivan Ivanovich, *Stabs-Rittmeister*. Transferred on 11 [23] March 1813 as a captain in Swedish service. Retained this rank; released from service on 6 [18] February 1816 due to ill-health.
 206. **Vilon**, Cornet. Promoted on 11 [23] March 1813 as a Junker from this regiment.

have been set according to Supreme orders.

- Retained this rank; stricken from the rolls in 1815, killed in action.
207. **Orlov**, Alexander Stepanovich, Cornet. Selected on 7 [19] April 1813 as a Governorate Secretary from the Governing Senate. Transferred to the Kargopol Dragoons as an ensign on 7 [19] April 1815.
 208. **Ratlev**, Cornet. Promoted on 7 [19] April 1813 as a Junker from this regiment. Retained this rank; stricken from the rolls, killed in action.
 209. **Matveev**, Yakov Alexandrovich, Cornet. Selected on 7 [19] April 1813 as an Actuary 14th class in the Commission of State for Salt Supply. Released from service on 8 [20] January 1816 due to ill-health.
 210. **Von Stoffregen**, Cornet. Promoted on 7 [19] April 1813 as a Junker from this regiment. Retained this rank; stricken from the rolls, killed in action.
 211. Baron **Wenkstern**, Rittmeister. Transferred on 7 [19] April 1813 as a captain in Austrian service. Later a major; transferred to the Izyum Hussars on 10 [22] May 1814.
 212. **Skibinsky**, Anton Osipovich, Cornet. Selected on 26 April [8 May] 1813 as a Governorate Secretary from the Provisioning Department of the Ministry of War. Retained this rank; transferred to the Kargopol Dragoons on 7 [19] April 1815.
 213. **Gladkov**, Yakov Grigorievich, Cornet. Selected on 30 April [12 May] 1813 as a retired Collegiate Secretary from the Ministry of the Interior. Retained this rank; transferred to the Irkutsk Hussars on 7 [19] April 1815.
 214. **Von Walch**, Ivan Ivanovich, Cornet. Selected on 4 [16] May 1813 as a Collegiate Registrar from the Department of State Property. Later a *Rittmeister*; released from service on 31 January [12 February] 1829 due to ill-health.
 215. **Panteleev**, Alexey Fyodorovich, Cornet. Transferred on 12 [24] May 1813 as an ensign from the Riga Garrison Battalion. Released from service as a lieutenant on 8 [20] January 1816 due to ill-health.
 216. **Bruzin**, Colonel. Transferred on 16 [28] May 1813 from His Imperial Majesty's Suite in the Quartermasters Department. Stricken from the rolls in 1814, killed in action.
 217. **Khvostov**, *Stabs-Rittmeister*. Selected on 18 [30] May 1813 as *Ober-Gittenverwalter* 8th class from the Department of Mining and Salt Businesses. Retained this rank; transferred to the Chevalier Garde on 10 [22] December 1815.
 218. **Klein**, Fyodor Borisovich, Cornet. Transferred on 21 May [2 June] 1813 from British service. Later *Stabs-Rittmeister*; transferred to the Lifeguard Hussars on 2 [14] May 1817.
 219. **Loshitsky de Bois**, Ivan Ivanovich, *Rittmeister*. Transferred on 1 [13] June 1813 as a captain from Austrian service. Later a major; transferred to the Nizhegorod Dragoons on 7 [19] August 1815.
 220. Baron **Nolken 1st**, Yegor Fyodorovich, Major. Transferred on 12 [24] June 1813 from the Sevs Infantry. Later a lieutenant colonel; stricken from the rolls on 30 October [11 November] 1814, killed in action.
 221. **Brunner**, Ivan Grigorievich, Lieutenant. Transferred on 13 [25] June 1813 from the Russo-German Legion. Released from service as *Stabs-Rittmeister* on 28 January [9 February] 1816 due to wounds.
 222. **Brun**, Pyotr Karlovich, Lieutenant. Selected on 14 [26] June 1813 as a Collegiate Secretary from the Department of the Navy. Retained this rank; transferred to the Kargopol

Dragoons on 7 [19] April 1815.

223. **Persin**, Alexander Petrovich, Cornet. Selected on 3 [15] July 1813 as a Collegiate Secretary in the St. Petersburg *Opolchenie*. Retained this rank; transferred to the Kargopol Dragoons on 7 [19] April 1815.
224. **Novitsky**, Andrey Aleseevich, Cornet. Selected on 3 [15] July 1813 as a Collegiate Secretary in the St. Petersburg *Opolchenie*. Transferred to the Sevsk Infantry on 5 [17] May 1816 as an ensign.
225. **Zyabishev**, Visarion Ivanovich, Cornet. Selected on 3 [15] July 1813 as a Senate Registrar in the St. Petersburg *Opolchenie*. Retained this rank; released from service on 9 [21] January due to ill-health and reassigned to the Civil Service with a promotion.
226. **Von Klotsch**, *Rittmeister*. Transferred on 7 [19] July 1813 as a captain from Saxon service. Retained this rank; transferred to the Akhtyrka Hussars on 8 [20] January 1814.
227. Baron **Driesen**, Fyodor Ivanovich, Lieutenant. Transferred on 10 [22] July 1813 from the Russo-German Legion. Retained this rank; released from service on 1 [13] August 1816 due to ill-health.
228. Prince **Ipsilanty**, Alexander Konstantinovich, *Flügel-Adjutant*, Lieutenant Colonel. Transferred on 12 [24] July 1813 as *Rittmeister* from the Chevalier Garde. Later a colonel; promoted to major general and commander of 2nd Brigade, 1st Hussar Division on 12 [24] December 1817.
229. **Vashchenko**, Ivan Pavlovich, Cornet. Transferred on 15 [27] July 1813 as a *Pyatidesyatnik* [platoon commander] from the Chernygov *Opolchenie*. Later *Stabs-Rittmeister*; released from service on 30 April [12 May] 1820 on domestic grounds.
230. Baron **Firks**, Gustav Fyodorovich, Cornet. Promoted on 22 August [3 September] 1813 from *Portepée-Junker* in this regiment. Later *Stabs-Rittmeister*; released from service with uniform and full salary pension on 6 [18] January 1816, due to wounds.
231. **Fasterd**, Grigoriy Nikolaevich, Lieutenant. Selected on 29 July [10 August] 1813 as a retired cornet from the Lifeguard Horse. Retained this rank; released from service with uniform and invalid status on 6 [18] February 1816, due to wounds.
232. Baron **Rosen**, Roman Romanovich, Cornet. Selected on 29 August [10 September] 1813 as a retired Collegiate Secretary from the Ministry of Police. Transferred to the Kargopol Dragoons as a lieutenant on 7 [19] April 1815.
233. Count **Tolstoy 1st**, Andrey Vasilievich, *Stabs-Rittmeister*. Transferred on 4 [16] September 1813 from the St. Petersburg *Opolchenie*. Released from service on 9 [21] February 1817 due to ill-health.
234. **Von Kleist**, Karl Ivanovich, Lieutenant. Transferred on 4 [16] September 1813 as a lieutenant from Prussian service. Later *Stabs-Rittmeister*; released from service on 6 [18] February 1816, due to wounds.
235. **Kupfer 2nd**, Eduard Ivanovich, Cornet. Promoted on 22 September [4 October] 1813 from Junker in this regiment. Later *Rittmeister*; transferred to the Izyum Hussars on 14 [26] October 1823.
236. **Yenakiev**, Leonty Ignatievich, Cornet. Promoted on 22 September [4 October] 1813 from *Wachtmeister* in this regiment. Released from service as a lieutenant with uniform on 6 [28] February 1816, due to wounds.
237. **Bobryshev**, Akim Yegorovich, Cornet. Promoted on 22 September [4 October] 1813

- from *Wachtmeister* in this regiment. Released from service as a lieutenant on 14 [26] May 1816 due to ill-health.
238. **Klugen**, Karl Yakovlevich, Cornet. Promoted on 22 September [4 October] 1813 from Junker in this regiment. Later *Stabs-Rittmeister*; released from service on 1 [13] March 1822 due to ill-health.
239. **Rüdiger 2nd**, Fyodor Fyodorovich, Cornet. Promoted on 22 September [4 October] 1813 from Junker in this regiment. Released from service on 14 [26] May 1816 as *Stabs-Rittmeister*, due to wounds.
240. **Exe**, Karl Fyodorovich, Cornet. Promoted on 22 September [4 October] 1813 from non-commissioned officer of this regiment. Later *Rittmeister*; released from service as a major with uniform on 21 October [2 November] 1826 on domestic grounds.
241. **Gromkau**, Cornet. Promoted on 22 September [4 October] 1813 from non-commissioned officer of this regiment. Retained this rank; stricken from the rolls on 10 [22] August 1814, killed in action.
242. **Euler**, Pyotr Nikolaevich, Cornet. Transferred on 9 [21] October 1813 as an ensign from the Voronezh Infantry. Retained this rank; dismissed from service on 25 June [7 July] 1818 for unacceptable behaviour.
243. Count **Tolstoy 2nd**, *Rittmeister*. Selected on 9 [21] October 1813 as Collegiate Assessor in the St. Petersburg *Opolchenie*, but exactly when and where he left the regiment has not been found.
244. **Nechaev**, Alexey Petrovich, Cornet. Selected on 9 [21] October 1813 as Senate Registrar from the State Revenue Expedition. Later *Stabs-Rittmeister*; released from service with uniform on 11 [23] April 1826, due to ill-health.
245. **Mailov**, Yevgeny Romanovich, Cornet. Selected on 9 [21] October 1813 as student 14th class from the Academy of Arts. Later *Rittmeister*; transferred to the Lifeguard Hussars on 6 [18] August 1830.
246. Prince **Lobanov-Rostovsky**, Boris Alexandrovich, Cornet. Promoted on 30 November [12 December] 1813 as Junker from the Irkutsk Hussars. Retained this rank; transferred to the Lifeguard Hussars on 21 April [3 May] 1814.
247. **Kononovich**, Stepan Stepanovich, Cornet. Promoted on 30 November [12 December] 1813 from *portepée-junker* of this regiment. Later a lieutenant; transferred to 4th Battalion, 1st *Fuhrstat* [transport] Brigade on 14 [26] November 1819.
248. **Brzezinski**, Cornet. Promoted on 30 November [12 December] 1813 from Junker in this regiment. Retained this rank; stricken from the rolls on 10 [22] September 1814, killed in action.
249. **Gasenko**, Nikita Semyonovich, Cornet. Promoted on 30 November [12 December] 1813 from *Wachtmeister* in this regiment. Retained this rank; where and when he left the regiment is not recorded.
250. **Von Köppen**, Karl Ivanovich, Cornet. Transferred on 1 [13] December 1813 as ensign from the Livland Cossacks. Released from service as a lieutenant on 11 [23] December 1816, due to ill-health.
251. **Von Buddenbrock**, Fyodor Ivanovich, Cornet. Transferred on 1 [13] December 1813 as ensign from the Livland Cossacks. Released from service as a lieutenant on 18 [30] March 1816, due to ill-health.

252. **Von Bötticher**, Martin Alexeevich, Cornet. Transferred on 1 [13] December 1813 as ensign from the Livland Cossacks. Later *Stabs-Rittmeister*; released from service as *Rittmeister* on 15 [27] March 1823, due to ill-health.
253. **Von Mornitz**, Cornet. Transferred on 1 [13] December 1813 as ensign from the Livland Cossacks. Retained this rank; stricken from the rolls on 25 October [6 November] 1816 for long-term absence from the regiment.
254. **Koshka**, Mikhail Mikhailovich, Cornet. Promoted on 1 [13] December 1813 as Junker from this regiment. Released from service as a lieutenant with uniform on 6 [18] February 1816, due to wounds.
255. **Tulubiev**, Nikolay Timofeevich, *Rittmeister*. Transferred on 1 [13] December 1813 from the Siberia Ulans. Later a major; released from service as a lieutenant colonel with uniform on 29 March [10 April] 1816, due to ill-health.
256. **Pleshkov**, Nikolay Nikolaevich, Sub Lieutenant. Selected on 15 [27] December 1813 as a Collegiate Secretary in the St. Petersburg *Opolchenie*. Transferred to the Kargopol Dragoons on 7 [19] April 1815.
257. **König**, Andrey Ivanovich, Cornet. Promoted on 15 [27] December 1813 as non-commissioned officer from 1st Volunteer Cossacks. Released from service as a lieutenant on 16 [28] February 1818, due to ill-health.
258. **Aksyuk**, Semyon Pavlovich, Cornet. Promoted on 15 [27] December 1813 as non-commissioned officer in this regiment. Released from service as a lieutenant with invalid status on 6 [18] February 1816, due to wounds.
259. **Graf Keller 2nd**, Adolf Fyodorovich, Cornet. Promoted on 4 [16] March 1814 as Junker in this regiment. Retained this rank; released from service on 17 [29] June 1814 due to ill-health (later became *Kammer-Junker* [Chamberlain] in the Court of Saxe-Weimar).
260. **Graf Keller 3rd**, Alexander Fyodorovich, Cornet. Promoted on 4 [16] March 1814 as Junker in this regiment. Retained this rank; released from service on 17 [29] June 1814 due to ill-health.
261. **Panyutin**, Ivan Alexandrovich, *Stabs-Rittmeister*. Transferred on 7 [19] March 1814 from the Pavlograd Hussars. Later *Rittmeister*; released from service as a major with uniform on 12 [24] February 1817, due to ill-health.
262. **Penchelsky**, Baltazar Sigismundovich, *Stabs-Rittmeister*. Transferred on 7 [19] March 1814 from the Pavlograd Hussars. Later *Rittmeister*; released from service as a major with invalid status on 12 [24] January 1824, due to wounds.
263. **Golubtsev**, Platon Ivanovich, Cornet. Commissioned on 13 [25] April 1814 from the Page's Corps. Transferred to the Lifeguard Hussars on 13 [25] December 1814.
264. **Delovich**, Cornet. Promoted on 9 [21] July 1814 as a Junker from this regiment. Where and when he left the regiment is not recorded.