If Catherine would have believed that her end was so near, it is probable that Paul, whose reign ended in a bloody catastrophe, would not have succeeded her. Never was less tenderness and less trust encountered between a mother and a son. Catherine had constantly kept hers under the most humiliating tutelage, and in the most absolute aloofness from business; she had shown him only the brow of an imperious sovereign, on which nature never impressed the slightest maternal emotion; the Czarina even hated this son and sought to direct the nation's will against the young Grand Duke Alexander, her grandson. All these circumstances and a host of others had long justified the opinion of those who regarded Paul as one of the children of Razumovsky, or some other more obscure favourite.*

*The entirely Tartar figure of Paul I° authorized this conjecture and strengthened all those which a singular fantasy could have permitted.

It must be said, to the praise of Paul I, that, on the part of the Empress, such unseemly feelings towards him never altered the filial respect and deference he had for his mother; whether his soul, astonished, trembled before this other Agrippina, or whether his spirit had been able to rise to that lofty virtue necessary to love those who hate us, he repeatedly rejected guilty insinuations, since they had as their purpose of showing him the way by which his mother had arrived at the throne, still better paved and more practicable for himself; but when at last the attack of apoplexy which carried off the Czarina had freed Paul from such an oppressive motherhood, the humiliations he had been subjected to for thirty years overflowed from his overburdened heart like a torrent. It was a complete upheaval, a revolution which extended from the administration to the external relations and even to the topography of the Empire; and, faithful only to the despotic principles of Catherine, Paul I° imitated her only in her hatred for the French name.

The heir presumptive to the Russian Empire lived a solitary life, far from the court, having for confidant of his sorrows only the wife who shared them; and, since we have chosen to tell the truth, we will add that the future possessors of so much power often lacked what was necessary, while the favorites of the mother dissipated, in prodigality and license, the immense treasures of the State. That is not all: vile agents came to spy on the sadness of young spouses, and to rob them of even the caresses of their children; Paul, at least, loved his relations, and his first care, on ascending the throne, was to grant them full paternal confidence, by giving each of them the command of a regiment of guards.
Paul I suspended the levy of a hundred thousand men which Catherine had ordered, shortly before her death, to make war on France; not that he had any other principles than those of his mother with regard to our revolution, but to ward off the scourge of bankruptcy made imminent by the excessive depreciation of paper money, created by her in order to provide for the state needs. He also broke the treaty of subsidies which was to be negotiated with England.

However, the influence of this power was not long in prevailing and manifesting itself again in St. Petersburg. By means of their trade, the English had long since absorbed the financial resources of Russia; so it was with her gold that they bought her blood. They drew Paul I into this second coalition, which united the North and the South, barbarism, and civilization against France, and which alone lacked the King of Prussia, despite the solicitations of the Petersburg cabinet and the diplomatic skill of the Prince Repnin.

The army which had gathered in Galicia by the orders of Catherine, and at the head of which was old Suvorov, was burning to march against the French, whom their ridiculous fanaticism made them regard as a *vile collection of brigands*, according to the very expressions of the manifesto which he published on this occasion; he received the order to set off and headed by short marches towards Italy. This army, fifty thousand strong, advanced through the ice of winter, preceded by a singular and marvelous reputation, to fight enemies which were totally unknown to them.

Suvorov joined the Austrian army near Verona, commanded by Kray, to whom the obstinate incompetence of Scherer had just procured, once, the glory of vanquishing us. The Austro-Russian army, then eighty thousand strong, joined at Cassano and defeated thirty thousand French, under the orders of Moreau; the Directorate had just entrusted the remnants of Scherer’s army to this skilful captain, whose defeat was only the inevitable consequence of the faults of his predecessor. But at Bassignana, the Russian General Rosenberg paid more dearly for his victory, because the French, under the orders of General Gareau, fought him with equal forces. The shock was obstinate and bloody; but the Russian battalions, thinned out and disconcerted by the superiority of the fire of our artillery and the vivacity of our attacks, were pursued, bayonets in their kidneys, to the edge of the river, where a great part fell and perished. Suvorov, by these two battles, learned to esteem, or at least to respect, French bravery.

Suvorov marched suddenly on Turin, and Moreau made vain efforts to stop him, having only a few thousand soldiers under his command. The prudence of the latter kept him in the entrenched positions which he occupied, until the moment when Macdonald entered Lombardy at the head of thirty-five thousand men. The first battles of this army were victories. Macdonald made himself master of Modena, Parma, Piacenza, and the whole country. These successes, obtained against the allies, forced the Austro-Russian army to return, by forced marches, from the foot of the mountains to the banks of the Trebbia.

Our plot does not permit us to enter into the strategic detail of the day of this name, one of the most memorable which has illustrated our republican wars. Suffice it to say that this bloody battle, in which the French could not win, but where they were not vanquished, having lasted a whole day with the most incredible fury, was renewed the next day. The Russians there showed that discipline and that resignation to death which often made them triumph. Closing their ranks
as the enemy fire cleared them, they twice drove back the French, who recrossed it twice. But the latter, neither by the vivacity of their movements, nor by the brilliant valor of the leaders and the intrepidity of each soldier, could not triumph over this sheepish obstinacy, against which the tactics of the great Frederick had failed.

After this success, Suworov spread proclamations throughout the country, a bizarre mixture of ridiculous bravado and mystical words. It was in the name of the faith and of the orthodox doctrine that this schismatic barbarian invited the Tuscans and the Ligurians to unite with him for the extermination of the French miscreants. Besides, he was only too well served in his wishes. We experienced all the misfortunes that follow bad success; and if Suworov, taking advantage of his boon, had pursued the French, whose absolute lack of all resources made their retreat painful, it is probable that he would have completed, in this campaign, the conquest of Italy, and even that he would have penetrated into the south of France: he preferred to stop at the investment of the strongholds of Piedmont. The French made a last effort to save those who still resisted: it was then that Joubert advanced beyond Novi with a corps of twenty-five thousand men.

Full of confidence, Joubert, against the advice of the other generals, wanted to confront the imposing mass of the united forces of old Suworov and the Austrian Kray. “He's a youngster,” said Suworov, speaking of Joubert; "he's coming to school: let's teach him a lesson." To the misfortune of our arms, fortune wished to justify this bluster. Joubert was beaten and himself fell, stricken with mortal lead, at the moment when, carried away by his impetuous bravery, he rushed at the head of a battalion, crying: "Forward, grenadiers!" But the French avenged the death of their leader. After having leaned against the heights, and firm in their positions, they profited marvelously from their light artillery to make a horrible carnage of the Russians. Suworov had led forty thousand men into Italy: when he collected his remnants to cross the Saint-Gotthard and reunite with Korsakov, there were only twelve thousand men in a condition to follow him into Helvetia. Thus, twenty-eight thousand men, who had come from the distant banks of the Volga to fatten the Lombard plains, paid for the nickname of Italian, with which the old man was then decorated by his master. It was the last of his victories; but he had seen French blood flow, and his vows, like his fame, were also fulfilled. The Czar, no less intoxicated with joy, ordered by an ukase conferring on him the title of prince, that from now on Suworov should be regarded as the greatest of generals ancient and modern.

Paul I was determined by these successes, so dearly purchased, to redouble his efforts against France. "We have resolved," he says in his manifesto, "we and our allies, to destroy the impious government which dominates in France.” Indeed, at the voice of this autocrat, four armies soon rushed from the confines of Asia, to come, by different routes, to subjugate us. Two of the armies passed through Poland, Bohemia, Moravia and southern Germany, and penetrated simultaneously into France, from the east and from the south; the two others, carried by formidable fleets on the opposite seas which embrace Europe, were to reconquer the islands of Greece, Naples, Malta and Holland. The army that marched on the Rhine was more than forty thousand strong from the elite of the Russian troops; this army was chiefly composed of those famous battalions of grenadiers which Potemkin had formed, and which had delivered the bloody assaults of Ochakov and Ismail. The rest were drawn from the army that had just ravaged northern Persia. These last troops, commanded by Korsakov, who must not be confused with an
old favorite of Catherine who bore the same name, had been ordered to act in concert with the Archduke Charles in the general plan of the campaign. At the moment when this army arrived in Germany, Jourdan had just been beaten at Ostrach by the Austrians, and Masséna himself, yielding to the victorious Archduke, had seen himself forced to recross the Limmat. The Austrians, masters of Zurich, were already in the center of Helvetia, stirred up in revolt in their favor, when the Russians, having made their junction with the Austrian Prince, wished on the spot to occupy the outposts and spoke of giving battle. The Archduke, who had already tested the French valor and the talents of Masséna, justly shocked at the presumption with which the Russian general expressed himself on such adversaries, hastened to leave him a free field.

Masséna had Oudinot and Soult under his command; he commanded an army whose front extended from the vicinity of Basle to the foot of Saint-Gotthard; but as General Hotze, with the Swiss, held the whole right of the French army in check, the number of our soldiers who took part in the action was not equal to that of the Russians, especially in the centre, where the latter had united all their forces and where the main action took place.

One should read in the works specially devoted to the history of the wars of the French Revolution the details of this memorable day in Zurich, when Masséna saved France, as Villars had saved it at Denain. The Republicans descended from the plateaus surrounding Zurich into the basin of this city, to attack the Russians, who, themselves ready to give battle, only awaited the order of Suworov. The French crossed the Limmat opposite the Russian battalions, ranged and motionless, like ramparts, on the opposite bank. This passage was so rapid, and the frontal attack so impetuous, that the assailants overthrew and destroyed the enemy's front lines. The Russians, rallied behind their tents, exhausting their pouches and fighting without wanting to surrender, died lined up.

When the destructive fire of our batteries had thinned out this mass of men, the Republican generals, ordering a general attack, marched at a charge against the Russians, whom our cavalry broke through. Then the day was decided and the victory complete. The victors entered Zurich, pursuing the Russians, who had come out to line up and fight again on the plain. Night alone suspended the carnage. However, the Russians rallied again the next morning, and seconded by some fresh troops, attempted to wrest victory from their enemies. Indeed, they made it undecided for a moment; but at last, towards the middle of the day, driven one last time, they were cut to pieces in small platoons. Their fanatical fury refused quarter, and no one surrendered until he was hurt. More than one of them, mortally wounded, was seen to rise before expiring to fire once more at the victorious enemy who was leaping across the plain. Each Russian, on falling, seized the image of his patron saint hanging from his neck, and kissed it piously while reciting some prayer. It was, after the combat, a singular spectacle for our soldiers, to see these relics on the chest or in the hands of their adversaries.

However, Suworov, with his army of Italy, had crossed the Saint-Gotthard, which he descended like a devastating torrent. His rapid march was admired by the French generals. Suworov was already threatening the right of our army when he learned of the rout of Korsakov before Zurich. At this sad news, the old man gave himself up to transports of a fury which was habitual to him; his threats revived the dejected remnants of the vanquished army, which, reinforced by Conde's Corps, composed entirely of French emigrants and mustered at Constance, was not afraid to risk
a new engagement near Diesenhofen. A body of Russian cavalry charged, on the plain, two demi-brigades of infantry without cavalry, commanded by the brave General Lorge. Three times this body, of about three thousand men, repeated its furious charge, and, although broken, always rallied under the terrible fire of grape-shot and musketry which destroyed it. This bloody combat was the last between the Russians and the French.

On learning of Suworov's arrival, Masséna, victor at Zurich, marched to meet the Russian general and stop him. Suworov himself had to think of retirement, while it was still possible. Masséna maneuvered in vain to lure him out of the defiles, in the hope of taking him prisoner, he, the army he commanded, and the young Grand Duke Constantine, who accompanied him; but Suworov withdrew before the enemy, like an old lion who turns round, threatening and terrible, when the hunters press him too closely. He abandoned some baggage, some wounded, and General Mortier, charged with pursuing him into the Muttental, could only attack a few of his battalions, which devoted themselves to saving the rest of the army. Suworov was therefore not personally defeated. No general can boast of having beaten him, and very few have, like him, taken glory to the grave, after having waged war for forty years in succession, either against the most barbarous peoples, or against the most powerful nations by their civilization.

Thus, was destroyed, by the bravery of the Republican warriors, the prestige which remoteness and a vague fame had created in favor of the Russian armies. When the prisoners taken in these various battles entered France, instead of seeing giants of a ferocious aspect, as one expected, the inhabitants of our cities were touched with compassion on finding, among the Russians, men who had with them all physical and moral analogies; but the surprise on the side of the captives was much greater, in seeing themselves the object of an attentive humanity and of vigilant care unknown among them, even for the sick and wounded.

The Russian expedition to Holland (1799) was as disastrous as that of Helvetia. The English used these brave soldiers as moving gabions, to take cover from French artillery and bayonets. After some successes, due solely to the intrepid Russian valor, they were cut to pieces at Castricum by General Brune, and their leader, General Hermann, fell into the power of the enemy, with a large number of prisoners. The Duke of York, commander-in-chief of the Anglo-Russian troops, hastily re-embarked, and this campaign ended in a shameful capitulation for the combined armies of Russia and England.

When the news of these multiplied disasters reached St. Petersburg, anger upset the soul of Paul I. His humiliated pride, the glory of his arms compromised, carried his resentment even to fury. He broke en masse all the officers who were missing from the army, without bothering if they were injured or prisoners. As for the soldiers, he abandoned them as conquered booty, and did not even deign to take steps to exchange them, although his allies had offered to spare him the humiliation of claiming them from France. It is true that he had no French prisoners for this exchange. However, disposed, by the unanimous reports of his generals and the testimony of the Grand Duke Constantine, to impute his reverses to the perfidy or the cowardice of his allies, Paul overwhelmed the ministers of these powers with reproaches, allowing himself the most bloody sarcasm against the coalition, and finally gave up the great quarrel of kings against France with as little measure as he had embraced it.
This catastrophe of the Russian armies, the disgrace of so many distinguished officers, the captivity of others, greatly increased the discontent excited by this bizarre reign, which threatened the empire with approaching decline.

We have said that, from the first moments, Paul I had seemed to be led, in his reforms, solely by hatred of his mother and of the past. Soon, bewildered by this sentiment carried to excess, he gave himself up to deviations which later served his enemies as a pretext to accuse him of folly, and to justify the necessity of his abdication. Naturally humane and just, he gave himself up to acts which bore the character of thoughtful curiosity. Jealous to excess of the preservation of his rights, he exercised, down to the smallest details, an intolerable despotism. Finally, he had exasperated the nobility by threatening their privileges, and his unspeakable conduct towards the powers formerly his allies completed his alienation from the minds of the great. Soon, separated from Europe, from his subjects and his family, given over to abject affections in the maturity of age, he whose youth had been so moral and so austere, the Czar could not save himself from the hate than by falling into discontent.

However, a new revolution had taken place in France, and the prestigious man whom the day of 18 Brumaire had placed alone at the head of the Republican government, conceived the hope of completely detaching the Emperor of Russia from the cause of its allies. After the victory of Marengo, which delivered Italy to our arms and overwhelmed Austria, Paul's indifference to that nation and his esteem for ours showed themselves in his actions as well as in his speeches. Passionate about military glory, he no longer concealed his admiration for the First Consul, whose bust, placed in the palace of the Hermitage, was hailed by him with the name of a great man! English policy, already alarmed by these provisions, became deeply worried when Paul, having concluded a treaty of armed neutrality with Sweden (1800), proclaimed this great principle of maritime freedom, that the neutral flag covers the goods. It was a stipulation detrimental to the supremacy which the British flag had long assumed on the seas. Finally, the Czar, who always joined the effects to the words, immediately put a general embargo on all the English vessels which were in its ports. Denmark and Prussia adhered to this convention; and as at the same moment the peace treaty of Lunéville had just been concluded between France, Austria and the Germanic bodies, England understood that all her influence on the Continent was about to dissipate before the victorious ascendancy of the First Consul. The English ministry of that time, having Pitt as its head, withdrew entirely, so impossible did it seemed to them to reconcile the difficulties presented by the conjunctures.

In the meantime, Napoleon having sent back to their country all the Russian prisoners, without ransom, dressed and equipped anew, such a rare generosity succeeded in winning Paul over to France. Friendly relations were renewed between the two governments, and Saint-James' cabinet soon saw its fears confirmed by the armaments which were being made in the ports of the most eastern part of the Russian Empire, a project which was itself only a part of the vast plan of attack directed against the English power in India, especially more than Paul was about to take a mighty army through Persia. From then on, the death of the Czar was decided upon: the cabinet of Saint-James counted on it, no doubt, since its vessels, led by Nelson, had the boldness to cross the Sound.
The principal members of this conspiracy, hatched by British Machiavellianism, were, first of all, the three Zubovs, General Bennigsen, Tatdiwill, General Uvarov, Colonel Tatarinoff, Prince Werenski, Lord Whitworth, ambassador to St. Petersburg, and finally Count Pahlen, who perhaps deserves the sad honor of being named the first, since he was the principal motor of the crime. The post of governor of St. Petersburg, which he occupied, subjected him more immediately than any other to the minute despotism of the monarch, and exposed him to suspicions which daily rendered his authority and his existence more doubtful. He resolved, in order to preserve both, to give himself a new master, whatever the obstacles.

It is said that the two Grand Dukes were threatened with losing their freedom, and perhaps even having the fate of Alexis Petrovich, when the formed design ended; it is also said that Pahlen was instructed to arrest them, and that at the sight of this order, Alexander, the elder of the two, remained dumb with astonishment, and that his silence was regarded as a tacit constancy at the attempt that he had hitherto been repelled to force his father to abdicate.

Various secret advices had increased Paul's distrust and brought terror to his soul. A host of frivolous circumstances, which always enter into the composition of great events, prevented him from profiting by them.

In his anxiety, sensing the perfidy of Pahlen, Paul had summoned Arakcheev, former governor of Saint Petersburg, who was in the vicinity of the capital: "Come," he wrote to him, "I entrust my throne and my days to your fidelity." Leidner was also called in to command the fortress. The arrival of these two men, generally hated, troubled people's minds, and upset them with continual fears, sinking deeper each day into the dark agitations of revenge.

Finally, the fatal day arrived. On 23 March 1801, the Czar, who at that time was planning a trip to Moscow, calmly occupied himself with the preparations for this departure; he appeared in public with an unusual serenity, so freed was his soul from all suspicion and all anxiety. At eleven o'clock at night, twenty conspirators present themselves at one of the gates of the palace of Saint-Michel: they are refused. They refer to an order from the Emperor himself; and the soldier who guarded this door, too simple to dream of seeing assassins in shining uniforms, lets them enter. They went up in silence to the Emperor's apartments. Argamakoff, one of the Czar's aides-de-camp, presents himself alone to the Cossack who was guarding the antechamber. This one was opposed to his entry, while saying to him: "The emperor rests." -- "The fire is in the city," answers Argamakoff; "I must awaken him." And at these words, he ignores him. The Cossack, seeing the others arriving, shouts: "Treason!" He fell instantly pierced by blows.

Surprised in his sleep, the Czar sprang from his bed, wanted to flee, and missed the secret exit he was looking for; but, seizing a sword, he courageously turned to the conspirators: "What is your purpose?" he asks Zubov, who was the first to come into his sight; "what do those who accompany him want?" "That you cede the throne," answered this one... And he wanted him to read an act of abdication. "What!" interrupted the Emperor, "you whom I have loaded with my benefits!..." "You are no longer our master," interrupted Zubov in his turn; "the nation has given you Alexander as your successor." Paul, indignant, raised his sword; the conspirators stop, astonished at his courage; Bennigsen trembled and shouted to the conspirators: "If you swing, we are all lost!" Revived by this voice, emboldened by the example of Zubov, who dealt the first
blow to his sovereign, they threw themselves on Paul and overwhelmed him; he fell defenseless and begged for their pity: it was in vain; finally to complete their victim, whose shrill cries disturb the silence of the palace, one of the conspirators passed his scarf around the neck of the emperor, and strangled him.
RUSSIA

Foot and Horse Artillery
SEVENTH PERIOD.

RUSSIAN INTERVENTION AND PREPRONERCE
IN THE VARIOUS CONTINENTAL COALITIONS AGAINST FRANCE

(From 1801 to 1812)

Paul's death had had as its first effects the dissolution of the Northern Confederacy against England, and the return of all the influence of that last power of Saint Petersburg's cabinet. The peace treaty which the First Consul then determined to conclude with Great Britain was the continuation of this event. All this had been more or less foreseen by the authors of the crime which placed Alexander I on the throne so prematurely, since the English fleet passed the Sound at the very moment when the Czar succumbed under the blows of his assassins.

In 1803, the war having recommenced between France and England, in defiance of the Treaty of Amiens, which assured the Republic almost all that its armies had conquered, Russia offered its mediation to the two powers. England would not hear of peace until the French had evacuated Hanover; but soon, itself threatened with an attack, it involved Russia in its plans by the Treaty of Petersburg (April 1805).

Austria was attacked both in her domination and in her pride; Francis II, to whom all that remained of his federative superiority was the banal title of emperor for the hereditary States of the House of Austria alone, was not long in acceding to this treaty. Archduke Ferdinand, General Mack, and Archduke John therefore entered the campaign with ninety thousand men, and occupied at once Bavaria, the gorges of the Tyrol, and the banks of the Adige.

Prussia was no less prompt in resuming arms; and the two sovereigns, Alexander and Frederick William, solemnized their treaty of Potsdam by an oath at the tomb of the great Frederick, at the same time that England united with Sweden. All the north of Europe had therefore conspired against Napoleon, who had always thrown his sword at the right time into the scales in which the fate of the vanquished was weighed.

However, fortune continued to lavish its favors on the great Emperor. This campaign began with the capitulation of Ulm, which dishonored General Mack, and ended with the memorable day of Austerlitz, which illustrated the French arms. The Russian army which took part in this battle was commanded by General Kutuzov, and seventy thousand strong; the Austrians had twenty-five thousand. The temporizations of the old Muscovite general served Napoleon to perfection, by giving him time to unite his scattered forces and fall back on the ground which he had marked for a field of battle. Lannes and Soult, Bernadotte and Murat who had not yet become kings, Davout, Oudinot, and all those names which are the pride of our military pomp, resounded in the account of this memorable day, the details of which have become popular among us and perhaps also among the Russians: thirty thousand of their warriors buried in the ice of a lake which broke under their weight, fifteen of their generals taken or fallen on the battlefield, must have sadly engraved the name of Austerlitz in their memory.
Austria, which had provoked the war, was the first to ask for peace. Sovereign of a nation whose pomp does not abound in victories and more accustomed to humiliations than to homage, Francis II was not afraid to come to Napoleon's bivouac to solicit this peace. An armistice was granted; and, as a first condition, the Russians had to evacuate Austrian territory. This peace treaty, known as Pressburg (26 December 1805), by despoiling the Imperial House of Austria, took from its States enough to make two kingdoms: one for the Elector of Bavaria and the other for the Duke of Württemberg.

Russia also pretended to want peace. At the beginning of the following year, she entered into negotiations; signed, through its ambassador, a treaty in Paris; then, under vain pretexts, refused to ratify it: they had only wanted to gain time to reorganize their forces and try to avenge the defeat of Austerlitz.

A fourth coalition had been formed under the veil of this short truce (6 October 1806), and Prussia, abjuring a neutrality which she had been unable to make believe sincere, put, by an immense national contest, two hundred and fifty thousand men on foot. The victory of Jena (14 October) disastrously belied the enthusiasm and bravado of the Prussian nation. Of all the days which, since 1792, have illustrated the French arms, none left less honor to the vanquished, so entire was their defeat and their rout complete. Ten days later, the victors occupied Berlin.

However, the Emperor Alexander hastened to the aid of his unfortunate ally. The French and the Russians met on the banks of the Vistula, and the first, after having occupied Thorn, were successively victorious at Czerniewo, Pultusk, and Golymin. The murderous day of Eylau, but without result (8 February 1807), signaled the return to the campaign. The taking of Danzig (Gdańsk) and the decisive victory of Friedland (14 June) led a few days later to the meeting of the two emperors on the Niemen, then finally to the peace of Tilsit (7 July 1807)*.

*Although our intention, when beginning to write this Summary of the history of Russia, was to push it only until the Treaty of Tilsit, as the editors had announced it in a warning placed in the letter of our work, we thought, after giving it some more thought, that this summary would be more appropriate, and above all more complete, if we extend it to the beginning of 1812, the period at which the misunderstanding between Napoleon and Alexander assumed too serious a character to allow any longer any hope of the duration of peace. By this means, we have been able to avoid recounting in the first chapter of our work, entitled: On the causes which brought about the war between France and Russia, the political facts into which we could not have avoided entering to make known and appreciated the reasons for this great rupture which, a few months later, caused the two most powerful as well as the two bravest nations of Europe to collide.

This treaty was felt less by the difference in position that victory had placed between the two monarchs, than by Napoleon's desire to draw Russia into his continental system: a great European union, which alone could destroy England once and for all. Napoleon sacrificed, to this favorite political plan of his, the accomplishment of a project which would have been at the same time easier, more useful and more noble: the re-establishment of Poland. Only, he changed the destination of a part of this kingdom, so cowardly dismembered, and all that was taken from Prussia served to increase the domination of the King of Saxony, under the qualification of
Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Danzig recovered its former independence, but not its former territory; lastly, Russia, whose intercession saved a part of her States for the King of Prussia, again became a mediator between France and England. In return for these concessions to which victory gave so much grace and appropriateness, Napoleon, far too preoccupied with the interests of his dynasty, that is to say his family, had demanded the formal recognition of his three brothers, Joseph, Louis and Jerome: the first, as King of Naples; the second, as King of Holland, and the third, as King of Westphalia.

The English then redoubled their activity and intrigues to retain some influence in the North. It was by the suggestions of the Cabinet of Saint-James that the young King of Sweden, in defiance of an armistice concluded with Marshal Brune, at the very moment of the negotiations of Tilsit, recommenced the war. In truth, he counted on the assistance of the English; but their cooperation was late enough for Brune to have time to seize Stralsund (20 August 1807), capital of Swedish Pomerania, and a stronghold doubly important for its position and its arsenals. This loss, so considerable for Sweden, was soon followed by the capitulation of the island of Rugen, and the evacuation of all Pomerania by the troops of the King of Sweden. The English, leaving a free rein to the successes of Brune, did not even present themselves to put off for a moment the misfortunes of their most faithful ally; but they attacked Copenhagen, because they had not been able to induce the King of Denmark to follow the perilous example of its neighbor. After three days of bombardment, this capital was burnt down, and the Danish fleet fell into the power of the English (7 September). Such perfidious aggression did more in favor of Napoleon's continental system than his victories and appeals had done. The King of Denmark sequestered all British property in his States, forbade, under the most severe penalties, all relations with England from his subjects, and concluded a treaty of alliance with France. At the same time, Russia showed its indignation at the fire in Copenhagen, by renewing the principle of armed neutrality (20 October).

This declaration of the Emperor Alexander against Great Britain attested that good faith had presided over the engagements entered into by the Czar on the Niemen and seemed to promise a long duration for the Treaty of Tilsit. Alexander annulled all previous conventions between Russia and England, and in particular that of 1801, he declared, moreover, that no communication between the two powers would henceforth take place before Denmark had obtained just reparations, and which was more difficult, before peace had been concluded between France and England. The reasons for dissatisfaction set forth in this piece of Russian diplomacy revealed the resentment of having been duped by English policy. The St. Petersburg cabinet there complained sourly of having hitherto borne the burdens of a combined defensive association solely in the direct and particular interest of Great Britain; finally, to confirm this energetic enunciation of his grievances, the Czar stopped all the English vessels which were in his ports. For its part, Prussia, a humble satellite of the great Northern Empire, was taking similar measures. From this moment, the result of the system of European blockade imagined by Napoleon seemed at last to be realized.

But while the whole of northern Europe was giving way under the ascendancy of this prodigious fortune, the scandalous events of Bayonne (1808) and the heroic constancy of Spain heralded the first days of its decline. Napoleon's somewhat demanding friendship seemed to weigh heavily on all his allies, who had always remained his rivals. Who could say, indeed, all the bitter sacrifices
to which the hearts of these kings were condemned in his alliance? All were just waiting for the moment to take revenge! The Pope himself, either by a communication of divine forecast made him see all that was to result from the great example given by the Spaniards, or that he increased their resentment by the glare of a blow from his hand, Pius VII, we say, issued against Napoleon, against that great purveyor of crowns, to use Lord Byron's expression, a brief intimation of excommunication. It seemed, in fact, that the Holy Father could do some harm to a power which had formerly invoked his sanction, and one might fear him then, since formerly one had believed his intercession necessary. Pius VII reasoning was born on this principle when, claiming territories belonging to the States of the Holy See to form principalities from apostate priests, he appealed to Napoleon himself, as to a consecrated and sworn son, to repair the damage of the Church Catholic. But the consecrated son, whose troops were already occupying the Roman States, only responded to this powerless thunderbolt by tearing from the ecclesiastical territory the legations of Ancona, Urban, Macerata and Camerino, to annex them in the Kingdom of Italy.

The papal legate left Paris, and Napoleon let it be known, through his minister of foreign relations, that if the holy father did not adhere entirely to the plans of his policy, the papal government would cease to exist: "for," said the ministerial note, "to refuse to enter into the views of the Emperor, relative to Italy, which must form, by the most compact union of all its parties, a defensive league against the enemies of France, is to declare war on the emperor himself. Now the first result of war is conquest, and the first result of conquest is is the change of government.” Thus, the Holy Father learned, at his expense, that if the kings are willing to consent to use the spiritual authority of the head of the faithful, when it is a question of surrounding their power of respect for peoples, it is on the condition that this authority will never be exercised or invoked against them, and that they can always decline this divine jurisdiction.

However, Napoleon, as we see, counted little on the sincerity of his allies and on the observance of the treaties imposed on them by his victorious sword. It must also be admitted that the events then taking place were hardly conducive to consolidating their reputation for loyalty. Spain, more than its degraded ally in the person of its princes, Spain calling its children to battle, was an example which should have made him reflect. A manifesto was then published by the leaders whom patriotism had just given to the insurrection of this nation: "If it takes a sacrifice of blood to necessity," it was said in this piece, "better to die on the paternal shores of the Tagus, than going to succumb on the icy banks of the Vistula or the Niemen." These eloquent and somewhat prophetic words struck the ears of the Emperor of Austria and of all the petty German princes, who were only waiting for a favorable opportunity to escape their tutelage.

Austria was preparing solidly for war by raising new militias, and by diplomatic machinations whose constant aim was to dissolve, in Germany, this confederation of secondary States, which existed only with the aid of the protectorate of Napoleon. Meanwhile, his interview with Alexander took place at Erfurt (September 1808); an interview provoked by Napoleon's desire to assure himself of the pacific dispositions of the only rival he had to fear in the North. The two potentates spent several days there in celebrations, surrounded by all the petty sovereigns of Germany. The most perfect agreement, the most frank intimacy seemed to unite these formidable arbiters of the fate of Europe. Napoleon thought he had entwined his rival in the bonds of his adroit policy; however, if it is necessary to rely on the confessions which, since, in his exile, he
allowed to escape, he forgot that the king's promises are sometimes deceptive words, and he was duped by the candor of his august antagonist, as much as by his own illusions.

However, about to leave Erfurt, the two monarchs wrote collectively to the King of England, inviting him to peace in the name of his own interest. The British Ministry replied to these proposals by asking that, if general negotiations were opened, its allies, i.e., Portugal, the Sicily, Sweden, and Spain, then governed by a regency in the name of Ferdinand VII, were admitted and represented there; so that these peaceful overtures with Great Britain had no other result than the exchange of a few diplomatic notes.

Napoleon returned to the South and entered Spain to repair the evil which the check of Baylen (Bailén) had caused there. He seized Madrid; and, from the bosom of this capital, issued a crowd of decrees against all the old tyrannical institutions under which Spain was pleased to vegetate.

France then seemed to have reached the apogee of its power and its glory. Europe, in fact, seeing only two monarchs on the throne, only trembled under two dazzling scepters. Of the two, the heaviest in the balance was that of the South, for Napoleon's wills were current from the Tagus to the Vistula: this enormity of power was perishable by its very excess.

The Fifth Continental Coalition, whose elements had been prepared with darkest activity, broke out by a sudden attack from Austria. This power enumerated, in a manifesto, the multitude of its grievances. Austria could count on subsidies from London, but that was all; also, in spite of the prodigious efforts which she had made to sustain this struggle, her generals were completely beaten at Thann, at Abensberg, at Eckmühl, at Ratisbon, etc., and Vienna was occupied by the French (1809) after a twenty-day campaign.

During the rapid course of these victories, Russia, to be faithful to the treaty of Tilsit, and probably to fulfill the new promises which she had just made at Erfurt, declared war on Austria, and brought an army into Galicia. But this army, lazy in its march, indeterminate in its movements, seemed to have been sent rather to be present at the quarrel and await its issue than to participate in it. Hence Napoleon's first doubts as to the sincerity of his faithful ally, and the first symptoms of a new rupture between the two powers.

The occupation of Vienna, which seemed to be the natural end of the war, was only one event. The time had come when rulers had to learn to sacrifice their metropolises to save their empires. At the time when Marshal Lefebvre had just occupied Innsbruck, the Archduke Charles, having had the talent to attract Napoleon to the islands formed by the Danube below Vienna, made the French pay dearly for the victory of Essling.

The Battle of Raab, won the following month against the Archduke John, who, driven out of the Tyrol, had effected his retreat in Hungary; that of Wagram, against the Archduke Charles, which was more terrible than that of Essling, completed this campaign, in which, by dint of blood, Austria rehabilitated herself from the reverses and continual faults of her generals since the first coalition.
The Armistice of Znaïm (12 July 1809) ensured rather than stopped the successes of the French army; for, at the moment when the Emperor of Austria took the sudden resolution to lay down his arms and to sue for peace, Bohemia was not yet attacked, and could, like warlike Hungary, become a dangerous field of battle for the French people.

By the famous treaty which was, the following month (14 August), signed at Vienna, Austria ceded, either to Napoleon or to the confederation of the Rhine, various cities of Germany and Italy, with their dependencies; it was despoiled, in favor of the Duchy of Warsaw, of all Western Galicia and of the city of Cracow; finally, she abandoned to Russia a territory whose population was estimated at four hundred thousand souls. The Emperor of Austria recognized, moreover, the rights which Napoleon arrogated to himself over the monarchies of the south of Europe, adhered completely to his continental system, and renounced the countries comprised under the name of Illyrian Provinces. All these sacrifices were only the preludes to an even greater sacrifice for the pride of the proud house of Hapsburg, we want to talk about the marriage of the Archduchess of Austria Marie Louise to Napoleon.

As soon as his long-planned divorce from Josephine had been accomplished, all that had been talked of in Europe was the Emperor of the French’s forthcoming marriage. At that time, such was the prestige of this name, that it was to find no opposition in the various courts of Christendom. In traversing the state of the powerful sovereign families, Napoleon had no choice but in the courts of Russia, Austria, or Saxony. Some democratic minds then imagined the possibility of a bourgeois marriage: "Why," they said, "shouldn't he marry the daughter of one of his marshals, of one of his companions in victories?" But to reason thus was to misunderstand the character of Napoleon, who had the pretension, moreover completely justified, of walking hand in hand with the ancient sovereign families.

In Russia there were then three Grand Duchesses: the first, Marie Pavlovna, elder sister of the Emperor Alexander, who later married the Prince of Saxe-Weimar; the second of the name of Catherine Pavlovna, younger sister of the Czar, since Duchess of Holstein-Oldenburg, beautiful and witty; the last, Anne Pavlovna, who was barely fifteen years old. In Austria, there was only one archduchess who was old enough to be married: it was Marie-Louise, eldest daughter of François II. Had Napoleon remembered it since his last stay in Vienna that cannot be said. Finally, the princess who would have seemed the dumbest coming, by her age and her father's devotion to Napoleon, was Marie-Auguste-Antoinette of Saxony, aged twenty-seven. Saxony would certainly have accepted this alliance with enthusiasm; but such is the tendency of people who move forward in life and seek marriage: Napoleon found this royal princess already too old; besides, this house did not seem to him powerful enough, he would have married only a vassal: he had to ally himself on a higher level.

Napoleon therefore had to attempt an approach with the powerful race of the Romanovs. M. de Caulaincourt was still Ambassador to Russia. On 24 November 1810, M. de Champagny, who had become minister of foreign relations, replacing M. de Talleyrand, addressed to this ambassador a dispatch which was only to be deciphered by him. The French Minister recalled, in this long letter, that at the time of the interview between Napoleon and Alexander, at Erfurt, rumors of a divorce having circulated, the latter had told Napoleon that his sister, Princess Anne, was at his disposal. M. de Champagny warned M. de Caulaincourt that it was only with the Czar
that he should open up, and he even prescribed the terms to be used: "Sire," he was to say, "I have reason to think that the Emperor Napoleon, pressed by all France, is preparing for a divorce. Can I tell my master that he can count on your sister? Let your Majesty think about it for a few days, and then give me his frank reply, not as to the French ambassador, but as to a passionate person for the happiness of both families. It is not a formal request that I have the honor to address to the Emperor of all the Russias, it is an outpouring of his intentions that I solicit."

Alexander's personal consent could not be doubted. He testified to this without hesitation as the Duke of Vicence from the first communication made to him by this ambassador, and on 18 December 1809, the Czar again said to him in formal terms: "As for me, that suits me very much, and in my opinion, my sister could do nothing better, for her and for us; but my father gives my mother the free disposal of the hand of her daughters. Her ideas do not always agree either with my wishes or with my policy, nor even with reason. When I spoke to the Emperor, your master, at Erfurt, of the desire of his true friends to have his dynasty established by children, he answered me only vaguely. I therefore did not mention it to him again. Since then, having prepared nothing, I can only answer you today that, if it were up to me, you would have my word at the same time and before leaving my cabin; but I tell you, it's all up to my mother." Now, the Czar had already submitted Napoleon's request to the Empress, who had objected that two of her daughters having died from having been married too young*, she was determined not to marry Princess Anne before she had reached the age of eighteen years.


At certain moments the Empress Dowager seemed disposed to enter into her son's views, and she expressed herself with praise on Napoleon's account: "We are mistaken," she said to M. de Romanzoff, who had been placed in the confidence of the negotiation, "on my opinion with regard to the Emperor of the French; I am a mother and I would like my sons to resemble him: not only as a great captain, but also as a statesman, one does not govern better." But another day, her language was far from being so favorable: "The marriages of sovereigns," she said, "are not things that are done in haste. If Napoleon had frankly wanted this, he would have had to prepare for it a long time; perhaps on his part this union is only a fantasy; then, if he has no children with my daughter, it will be a pretext to repudiate her and send her back to me." Such were the contradictory reflections to which the fluctuating mind of this princess indulged.

Two great prides were therefore present: if the dynastic pride of the Empress Dowager had imagined that her acquiescence in the union of one of her daughters with the head of the French Empire was, for him, a favor the price of which it could make him feel by more or less prolonged delays, the autocratic pride of Napoleon, son of his own works, had to be accepted with alacrity. According to the Empress of Russia, the honor of marrying one of the Grand Duchesses, her daughters, could well impose on Napoleon a wait of one or two years: Napoleon himself did not believe himself made to wait.

As the last letters of the Duke of Vicence had given no hope of a speedy solution, and as it could not suit the Emperor of the French that at St. Petersburg, they allowed themselves, to use his expression, to file a refusal or even an adjournment, his eyes had wandered elsewhere. It
mattered to him that his self-esteem should be saved before it could be compromised; and while Russia temporized, another house, much more ancient, hastened to meet this family engagement. In a word, an Austrian minister had said arrogantly in a salon in Paris that, if Napoleon had sought out his master's eldest daughter, the Archduchess Marie-Louise, Francis II would have been happy to grant her to him without reflection. Immediately a diplomatic agent, M. de La Borde, who was in Vienna, was brought into play. A few days later, it was agreed in a council, at Schönbrunn, that the moment Napoleon's request should be addressed to the Austrian cabinet, they would answer immediately, yes. From this moment the resolution of the Emperor of the French was arrested; the time which had been assigned to the Emperor Alexander having elapsed without any result, Napoleon's preference was for Austria. An imperial message, dated 27 February 1810, announced to the Senate that the Prince of Wagram was going to Vienna, in the capacity of Ambassador Extraordinary, to ask the Emperor Francis for the hand of his daughter. The solemn request was made on 7 March, and the marriage by proxy took place on the 11th. The Prince of Schwarzenberg had been charged with all questions of detail on the matrimonial stipulations; they had not been long so far as the archduchess's dowry was concerned, fixed at 50,000 brand new gold ducats; in return for this sum, she renounced all claim to the succession of the empire of which her father was the head.

This alliance, fatal to France, became the price of the restitution of some territories; but during this illustrious marriage, sinister omens signaled the culminating point from which the fortune of the great man was to fall.

At the beginning of the following year (1811), pursuing with more tenacity his prohibitive action against England, Napoleon had his troops occupy the duchy of Oldenburg, in order to complete the continental blockade along the North Sea. This taking possession furnished a new subject of discontent to the Emperor Alexander, whom Napoleon's recent alliance with Austria had greatly alarmed; but it would be inaccurate to say, as several contemporary historians have written, that the court of Russia was deeply hurt by the marriage of an archduchess of Austria with Napoleon, and by the preference he had granted to the court of Vienna. If the Empress Dowager of Russia had wished to give one of her daughters to the Emperor of the French, the thing would have been easy, since he himself had asked for it; but perhaps the cabinet of St. Petersburg saw with a certain distrust this union of the two Frankish and German races, raised one day to come against the Slavic race; and, from that moment, Alexander and Napoleon had to prepare for a more or less approaching crisis; the personal influence of the Czar put a stop to these rivalries for some time, but at last they were to break out, and no one could have prevented the friction between the two colossi of the East and the West.

Meanwhile, Napoleon's star had begun to fade away in Spain: the resistance of that country triumphed over the bravery of our soldiers and the skill of our generals. Wellington, powerfully seconded by national dispositions, and perhaps by the lack of harmony between our marshals; Wellington, we say, managed to balance the fortune, by seizing Badajoz; Marshal Soult was obliged to evacuate Portugal, and King Joseph, in his turn, abandoned Madrid.

Then began the new hostile demonstrations of Russia, whose troops already occupied the western frontiers of Lithuania. Bernadotte, deserting the cause of him whose fortune had given birth to his own, passed under the banners of the Emperor Alexander, who promised him
Norway. Finally, the Czar was negotiating peace with the Grand Seignior (Sultan), in order to be able, in the terrible struggle which was preparing, to dispose of the numerous troops which he had on the frontiers of Turkey.

However, at the beginning of 1812, Napoleon still seemed to recoil before a dazzling rupture with Russia, and to want to shake off the yoke of the demon which was impelling him to this war. An illustrious writer, whose work has excited to the highest degree all the emotions which attach to the name of Napoleon and the Grand Army, has drawn a striking picture of the agitations to which he was prey when he found himself thus at the watch to play, all at once, so much glory and so much power; such a vast empire, and the most splendid position in which Providence ever placed a man! According to General Comte de Ségur, "his nights were disturbed by the violent shock of his desires and his contrary thoughts; and, during the day, he had constantly on his table a general summary of the state of each power of Europe, capable of enlightening him on the chances of the enterprise which occupied him in spite of himself."

Since the interview at Erfurt, Napoleon had befriended a young Russian officer, of graceful form and elegant speech, the Count Chernishev, aide-de-camp to the Emperor Alexander. This officer, full of distinction, charged with frequent personal messages from his sovereign for Napoleon, traveled from Saint-Petersburg to Paris with prodigious rapidity, and spent an immense amount of money in our capital, where he had become the man of good fortunes: he was torn from the court and the city; but, while he was exchanging the imperial correspondence, he obtained clandestinely, and by not very honorable means, all the documents which could enlighten Russia on the situation of our forces, that is to say, he obtained the real communications of the personnel of the French regiments, the statistics of all the corps of our army, etc. etc.

In the month of March, 1812, M. Chernishev brought new proposals for peace to his sovereign for the last time: Napoleon offered to renounce all his views on Poland, and only asked for the rectification of a few grievances, which was primarily, the ukase of 31 December 1810, which prohibited the base of the continental system; secondly, Alexander's protest against the reunion of the Duchy of Oldenburg; thirdly, the immense armaments which Russia had made; Napoleon then renewed the offer of an indemnity for the Duchy of Oldenburg.

Alexander, responding to these proposals, demanded in his ultimatum the removal of the entirety of Prussia and Swedish Pomerania by French troops, and the diminution of the forces of the garrison of Danzig; he did not refuse the indemnity offered for the Duchy of Oldenburg, and readily agreed to modifications of the ukase of 31 December 1810. Were Napoleon and the Czar in good faith in these transactions? This is what only they, after God, could know. Still, these negotiations were fruitful; they only prove that such a great war lacked a great motive, and that by determining with precision the causes which kindled it between the two sovereigns, none of them can be found in the interest of their peoples; only the pride of the two most powerful monarchs of Europe was at stake!

"This famous war," said Napoleon at Saint Helena, "I didn't want it; I didn't want to fight against the Russians, nor did Alexander want to fight against me; but once we were face to face, circumstances pushed us against each other: fate did the rest!"
END OF SUMMARY OF RUSSIAN HISTORY.