APPENDIX OF THE FIRST PART.

A. Ukase of the Emperor of Russia.
B. Negotiation of the Treaty of Alliance between Prussia and France.
C. Treaty of Alliance between Austria and France.
D. Note relating to the defection of Sweden.
E. Correspondence relating to the approach with England.
F. Documents relating to Russia's break with France.
ALEXANDER I, by the grace of God, Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russias, etc. etc

The present situation in Europe demands the adoption of firm and energetic measures and indefatigable vigilance to put our Empire in a position to resist the hostile undertakings of which it might be the object. Our brave and courageous Russian nation has been accustomed to live in peace with all neighboring nations; and when the storm threatened our empire, patriots of all ranks were ready to draw swords in defense of religion and law. The circumstances of the moment imperatively require that our army be increased. The existing forces are already at their post to defend the Empire; their courage is known to the universe! They enjoy the confidence of their Emperor and that of the government. Their fidelity and love of their country will make them invincible, and they will be able to resist very superior forces.

In order to further assure the independence and well-being of the Empire, by measures dictated to us by foresight and our solicitude for the good of our subjects, we order:

That in all the Empire there be raised two recruits out of five hundred men; that this levy will begin to be done in all the governments, two weeks after the receipt of this ukase, and will be completed within the space of a month.

ALEXANDER.
Saint Petersburg, 1 October 1810.
B. NEGOTIATION AND TREATY OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND FRANCE.

I. LETTER FROM M. DE SAINT-MARSAN, FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN BERLIN

To the Minister of Foreign Relations, in Paris.
Berlin, 24 March 1811.

I had the honor to inform Your Excellency that I had reason to believe that the Prussian government wished to form a more intimate liaison with France: I was not mistaken. The Chancellor of State Baron von Hardenberg came to my house and said to me: “The King is very firmly decided never to separate his cause from that of France, and to remain entirely and faithfully attached to the Emperor. I have told you many times that I was not for half measures: His Majesty is absolutely of the same opinion, and his greatest desire would be to bind himself to France in the most intimate way: which would silence all the passions and intrigues, would entirely restore the credit of the government and restore security and confidence throughout the monarchy.”

After leaving me, the Chancellor having gone to the King, returned after three-quarters of an hour, and told me that His Majesty had instructed him to beg me to put under the eyes of the Emperor his keen desire to attach the fate of Prussia irrevocably to France, and to sound out the intentions of His Imperial and Royal Majesty on this subject.

II. EXTRACT FROM A DISPATCH FROM M. DE SAINT-MARSAN

The same.

Berlin, 5 April 1811.

The King and his two ministers eagerly await the outcome overtures made to obtain an alliance with France.

The King's side is taken in a very positive manner; and if the overtures be approved by His Imperial and Royal Majesty, he will attach himself loyally to her, on all occasions, and in such a manner as she may require of him.
III. LETTER FROM THE KING OF PRUSSIA

To Baron von Krusemarck, his minister plenipotentiary in Paris.

The manner in which the Emperor Napoleon was good enough to accept, according to your dispatch of 16 April, the provisional explanations into which I instructed my Chancellor of State to enter with M. de Saint-Marsan, in the event of a rupture between France and Russia, gave me valuable testimony to the friendly and benevolent disposition of this monarch towards me. Deeply touched by these, I was no less charmed to convince myself by his answer, of which the Duke de Bassano was the organ, than the apprehensions of a war between France and Russia, all generally widespread as they were, are devoid of foundation, and that I can only form the most sincere wishes for the uninterrupted duration of the relations of good harmony still subsisting between these powers. Considering myself very much interested in working for the maintenance of such happy relations, in proportion to the means which the personal friendship which reigns between me and the Emperor of Russia seemed to provide me, I have constantly the language of moderation and conciliation. I have often already advised a more unlimited accession to the Continental System; I renew it again in an signed letter which I have just addressed to the Emperor Alexander, and of which I hasten to communicate to you herewith a copy, to carry it immediately and through M. the Duke de Bassano, to the knowledge of H. M. the Emperor of the French.

Whatever the effect of this letter, and whatever course the court of Russia decides on, I do not need to know of it to stop mine. Invariably attached to the system of France, I flatter myself that I have proved myself in this respect. If it were possible that the Emperor Napoleon still had some doubts about my serious intention to contribute, in everything, to the great goal that he proposes, it would have been enough for me, without contradiction, to make them vanish with the rigorous orders by which I have just renewed the absolute prohibition of all commerce and of all communication with England, and of the energetic measures which I have spontaneously taken for the defense of my coasts against the possible attempts of the common enemy; measures the costly execution of which requires the employment of two-thirds of my army. After having thus satisfied, on this point, all the wishes of the Emperor, even before knowing them, and seeing myself reassured by an official statement on the fear of the imminent explosion of a war between France and Russia, I would perhaps feel embarrassed to give, at the present time, more follow-up to the first confidential overtures made, here, to the Comte de Saint-Marsan, if it were not important for me to specify my ideas more clearly on the means of tightening forever, and apart from current political circumstances, the bonds of friendship and union which, to my great satisfaction, already exist between France and me.

I therefore take advantage with pleasure of the interpellation of H. M. the Emperor of the French, to propose to him, for this purpose and for all cases, an offensive and defensive alliance, by virtue of which, in all the wars which would not be foreign to the interests of my monarchy, and where France would be engaged, either in Germany, or on the borders of Prussia, the latter would place at the disposal of France a body of auxiliary troops proportioned to these faculties, and of the force which we would agree even more particularly. On his side, His Imperial Majesty would guarantee the independence and integrity of the present state of the Prussian
possessions and would assure me of his powerful assistance and the necessary aid whenever I should find myself in the position of claiming them; she would, moreover, by her high intervention, bring into this alliance the members of the Confederation of the Rhine and the Duchy of Warsaw.

The Prussian auxiliary troops would only act united in a single corps, led by a senior officer of their nation, and subject to his special orders. This corps would preferably be employed in the defense of Prussia and its frontiers; but it would contribute to the execution of the general plan of operation, and, in this respect, it would be either under the immediate orders of His Majesty the Emperor and King, or under those of the Commander-in-Chief whom His Imperial Majesty would assign to whole army.

In the case of a war, we would agree on what concerns the march and the passage of the troops, according to the need and the circumstances of the moment; but, in the meantime, the French troops, who should enter my States or pass through them, could only march there by the military roads stipulated, and in conformity with the subsisting conventions.

The exhaustion of the resources of Prussia making it impossible for me to meet the expenses that my new engagements would cause me, unless it pleased the Emperor to facilitate me the means of fulfilling them, and these engagements not being able to moreover, to be regarded as solid only insofar as they are founded on complete and mutual confidence, to which I believe I have acquired all rights by my constant deference to His Imperial Majesty, by my invariable attachment to his political system and especially by the offer of my alliance, which, made in the present conjunctures, could no longer allow any of the reasons for umbrage to subsist which dictated some of the articles of the convention of 8 September 1808, I do not intend to give myself up to a vain hope by flattering me:

1. That His Imperial Majesty will have regard to the just demand for the restitution of Glogau, the evacuation of which, according to the terms of the treaties, must take place now that the first half of the contribution has been completely paid. It is not for lack of confidence that I make this request, at the very moment when closer ties will unite, I hope, more particularly my interests with those of the Emperor: it is motivated by the enormous expenses that the upkeep and provisioning of the fortresses on the Oder, and of the foreign garrisons which occupy them, cause me. This charge is so much beyond the forces of Prussia, it is so incompatible with the expense which will result from her new engagements, that His Imperial Majesty could not give me a more signal proof of his benevolent dispositions and his confidence. only by finding a way to relieve my monarchy from this burden;

2. That, in the event that the auxiliary corps should be set up, the Emperor will be good enough to grant me a proportionate remission of the contribution and its entire cessation as soon as the war shall break out in effect, Prussia being absolutely out of power to bear the cost of it, and to pay at the same time such an onerous contribution;

3. Finally, that His Imperial Majesty will no longer insist on the article of the convention of 8 September 1808, which prevents the increase of the Prussian army, an increase obviously
essential as and when I need more of troops, for the agreed purpose and for the defense of my States.

As to the advantages which Prussia, in the event of success, to which she would have contributed by the employment of her forces and her resources, could promise herself, either in terms of territorial acquisitions, or in indemnities of another kind, I rely with confidence on the justice and friendship of my august ally. But there is another point which I would be keen to agree with him in advance: the geography of Prussia being such that part of its territory must necessarily be exposed, if not to become the theater of war, of less to experience all the embarrassments, I would like to assure my family an asylum where they would be sheltered from the inconveniences which would result from it. I flatter myself, therefore, that the Emperor will be good enough not only to consent himself, but also to endeavor wherever necessary, that a part of Silesia, which borders on the Austrian States, be declared neutral for this indeed, so that in case of necessity I can, with my family, fix my stay there during the war.

Such are, in summary, the proposals which His Majesty's invitation urges me to make to him, then the preliminary explanations which have been given here to his Minister, on the part of my Chancellor of State and my Minister for foreign. A summary of them has been communicated to the Comte de Saint-Marsan, which does not prevent you from taking them as the text of a confidential interview which you will have to ask the Duke de Bassano, to whom I leave it to you to read this dispatch. I hope that, informed by him of its contents, His Imperial Majesty will see, in the frankness with which I explain myself on what I wish, or rather on what my position and my needs dictate to me, only a proof incontestable of my boundless confidence, and of my ardent desire to establish my relations with His Imperial Majesty on sure and lasting bases. It only remains for me to hope that, granting them his lofty approval, he will deign to authorize his minister at my court to admit them to the negotiation here opened, that my people will apply themselves from then on to pursue and terminate promptly with him.

Berlin, 14 May 1811.

Signed: FREDERICK-WILLIAM.
And further down:  
VON HARDENBERG, GOLTZ.
IV. LETTER FROM BARON VON HARDENBERG

To Baron von Krusemarck.

Berlin, 30 August 1811.

Sir,

If the reasons for consideration for Russia, which urged the Emperor Napoleon to postpone any explanation of the alliance proposals that the King made during the month of May last, could at that time have seemed plausible to His Majesty, it is not the same today, that the warlike preparations of France against this power have taken on and still take on a more imposing character every day, and that His Imperial Majesty, too great to conceal, does not hide to the court of Petersburg itself the eventual purpose of these measures. The fear of inadvertently inspiring her with umbrage having not caused these to be suspended, how could it happen that it would delay, between France and Prussia, that more intimate union, the object of the will of the King, union which, whether it is only a question of a demonstration tending to ensure the maintenance of tranquility in the North, or whether in fact things unfortunately come to a rupture between the two imperial courts, offers in one or the other alternative of the manifest advantages to France? Such was this reasoning on which the King founded the hope that, now at least, the Emperor Napoleon would deign, in response to our aforesaid overtures, to discuss it with him, and it is partly with a view to bringing them that His Majesty had instructed you to officially make the just request for the evacuation of Glogau.

It is with the greatest pain that we have once again seen this hope disappointed by your dispatches of the 13th and 17th of this month. Valid as are, in more than one respect, the reasons which determined you to postpone the step in question, the King would have preferred that you had strictly followed his orders. If at present he authorizes you to adjourn its execution until a more opportune moment, it is above all because His Majesty flatters himself that this moment will not be long in coming. Following a new interview which I have recently had with the Comte de Saint-Marsan, and in which I gave this Minister a picture as detailed as it is true of the violent situation in Prussia, and of the urgent motives which we have for ardently desiring that the Emperor, taking into consideration the frank and loyal proposals of the King, should finally put an end to the cruel uncertainty in which His Majesty finds himself as to the intentions of France in regard to him. Must I, sir, relate to you the main features of this picture? I would first point out to you, with regard to our finances, that the present state of things, if not remedied, exposes them to complete and inevitable ruin. Thanks to the temporary resources which the introduction of the continental tariff gave us, we were able to pay monthly two million francs in contributions to France up to and including last June; today these resources are exhausted. To the embarrassments which result from the deprivation of those formerly furnished to the State by maritime commerce, by supplying national industry and by procuring an outlet for our productions, are added others resulting from unexpected misfortunes, such as the Königsberg fire and a failed harvest in almost all of our provinces. Notwithstanding this, perhaps it would have been possible for us to continue the aforesaid monthly payments without interruption, if the
considerable advances which we are under the necessity of making to the French government itself did not absorb a large part of the funds therein consecrated. It will be easy for you to judge of this, if you remember that we have already had to pay cash a very large sum for the cost of transporting the colonial goods sold to France, and if you reflect further on the enormous expenses the maintenance of the French and allied troops, both of those which cross the States of the King to go to Danzig, as of those which come unceasingly to increase the already so numerous garrisons of our own fortresses. It counts one million eighty-one thousand five hundred and ninety-three francs to maintain only at Stettin, during the last five months, the troops which are there in addition to the number fixed by our conventions, without counting even table expenses for officers and others. The expense for Glogau amounted, during the same period, to half a million. It is an absolute and well demonstrated impossibility that Prussia, reduced as she is in her revenues, suffice both for such large advances and for the ordinary payment of her contributions, and no doubt the Emperor is too just so as not to deign to consent to her henceforth deducting each month the amount of the others.

But it is not our pecuniary difficulties, however serious they may be, which are the principal object of the King’s solicitude; it is our political situation, of which that of finances is, after all, only a necessary consequence. Everything is in arms around us: on the one hand, the Russian armies line our borders; on the other hand, the attitude of the Warsaw army, supposedly directed against Russia, may also be directed against Prussia; the Saxon army is placed in cantonment, in our vicinity, so as to be able, in two marches, to reach the residence of the King: Danzig itself contains another army. Instead of ten thousand men stipulated by the treaties, France has had twenty-three thousand arrive successively in our three places on the Oder, where their upkeep each month costs the state coffers the exorbitant sum of two one hundred and fifty thousand crowns. At the time of writing, the garrison of Stettin amounts to seventeen thousand five hundred and forty-six men. Imagine, General, how deeply affected His Majesty must be when, in the midst of all this, he learns that there is in these various armies only one opinion, one voice, on the approaching destruction of Prussia! Strong in his confidence in His Imperial Majesty, the King can doubtless personally cast away the suspicions which such rumors arouse; but is he in control of preventing an opinion highly pronounced within his States, by the French generals themselves, from becoming public opinion? Does it depend on him, while where you are nothing is done for the to calm, to stop the disastrous effects of this opinion on the credit of Prussia at home and abroad? Does he dare, in the uncertainty where France leaves him on his views, notwithstanding His Majesty’s repeated offer and constant desire to place all his means at the disposal of the Emperor, on terms on which it would be so easy to get along; dare he, I say, respect the alarms of his people so little as not to take any eventual measure for their defense? Security pushed so far would no doubt be reprehensible; and the Emperor, whose friendship and esteem the King covets above all else, would blame her himself justly. We therefore arm, monsieur, since circumstances imperiously impose the duty to do so on the king, and since it is better, as I said to M. de Saint-Marsan, to die sword in hand than to succumb with opprobrium. But it is for France that we are arming, if she wants a faithful ally, and that, by mutual agreement with us, she sincerely prefers our free assistance to this struggle with which the voice of her warriors threatens us; and which, on the part of the King, could never be anything but that of the last despair.
That, my dear General, is what I explained frankly to M. de Saint-Marsan, giving him at the same time authentic information on the means we have of rendering our alliance useful to his august sovereign. He knows that all our fortresses are or will be in a respectable state of defense; he knows that the signal having been given to us, we would need very little time to put a hundred thousand men on foot. The Comte de Saint-Marsan seemed impressed with the honesty of our declarations and judged them proper to have a favorable effect on the magnanimous spirit of the Emperor. Three days ago he reported to this by post; I thought it was proper not to let you ignore this for your private information; but consider what I tell you of it only as a confidential communication. It does not require you to take any step on your side, since everything that I said in the outpouring of my heart to M. de Saint-Marsan, taking on a diplomatically official character in your mouth, would perhaps be supposed to give a character of threat to overtures which in no way it had, and in which the King earnestly hopes that the Emperor will not for a single moment misunderstand the purity of the intentions which have dictated.

I have the honor, etc.

Signed: VON HARDENBERG.

V. SECOND EXTRACT FROM A DISPATCH FROM M. DE SAINT-MARSAN

To the Minister of Foreign Relations, in Paris.

Berlin, 22 February 1812.

M. von Krusemarck informed his government that he had the greatest hope that the negotiation of the alliance would be happily terminated. M. von Hardenberg and M. Goltz expressed to me yesterday their great satisfaction at the news they had just received.
VI. THIRD EXTRACT FROM A DISPATCH FROM M. DE SAINT-MARSAN

The same.

Berlin, 18 April 1812.

Your Excellency may be assured that His Excellency the King of Prussia and his minister ardently desired the alliance, as a unique means of achieving the preservation of the monarchy, and that they regard it as the anchor of hope for a future happier. It is not a measure of circumstance; M. von Hardenberg judged it as the basis of the policy of Prussia. Talking often with him, I found him firm in this principle.

Prussia's anxieties have never consisted of anything but doubt and the fear of not being able to obtain an alliance. It is also the only weapon that our enemies have been able to use to seek, in time, to lead the King into false steps and to alarm the nation. This doubt has disappeared. The King and the ministers thought only of following the system with loyalty and of supporting the views of the Emperor by all the means in their power. You can judge by the attention and the eagerness that is brought to the smallest details. The nation, which in general has always judged sanely, applauded the plan adopted. I do not mean by this that there are not people who are in a bad mood and who complain about the circumstances, nor that in the event of a setback, the spirit of opposition does not make proselytes: I confine myself to believing that Prussia is as faithful an ally of France as Bavaria and Saxony; perhaps she envisages politically greater advantages in this alliance as these same powers in theirs.
C. TREATY OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND FRANCE, FROM 14 MARCH 1812.

I. TREATY PATENT.

H.M. the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, Mediator of the Swiss Confederation, and H.M. The Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, having at heart to perpetuate friendship and the good understanding which exists between them, and to contribute, by the intimacy and the force of their union, either to the maintenance of peace on the continent, or to the re-establishment of maritime peace; considering that nothing would be more apt to produce these happy results than the conclusion of a treaty of alliance, the object of which would be the safety of their States and possessions, and the guarantee of the principal interests of their respective policies, have for this purpose named for their plenipotentiaries, that is:

H. M. the Emperor of the French, etc., M. Hugues Bernard, Count Maret, Duke of Bassano, etc.

And H. M. the Emperor of Austria, etc., Prince Charles of Schwarzenberg, Duke of Krumau, etc.

Who, having exchanged their respective full powers, have agreed upon the following articles:

ARTICLE 1. There will be, in perpetuity, friendship, union and alliance between H. M. the Emperor of the French, etc., and H. M. the Emperor of Austria, etc. Consequently, the high contracting parties will take the greatest care to maintain the good understanding so happily established between themselves, their respective States and subjects; to avoid anything that might alter it, and to secure their mutual utility, honor and advantage on all occasions.

ARTICLE 2. The two high contracting parties reciprocally guarantee the integrity of their present territories.

ARTICLE 3. As a result of this reciprocal guarantee, the two host contracting parties will always agree to the measures which appear to them most appropriate for the maintenance of peace; and in case the States of either should be threatened with an invasion, they would employ their most effective good offices to prevent it.

But, as these good offices might not have the desired effect, they bind themselves to help each other mutually, in the event that one or the other should come to be attacked or threatened.

ARTICLE 4. The relief stipulated by the preceding article will be composed of thirty thousand men, including twenty-four thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry, constantly maintained in full war gear, and an array of sixty pieces of cannon.

ARTICLE 5. This help will be provided at the first request of the party attacked or threatened. It will be put into operation as soon as possible and at the latest before the expiry of the two months following the request which will have been made.
ARTICLE 6. The two high contracting parties guarantee the integrity of the territory of the Ottoman Porte in Europe.

ARTICLE 7. They also guarantee the principles of the navigation of neutrals, as recognized and consecrated by the Treaty of Utrecht.

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria renews, as much as necessary, the engagement to adhere to the prohibitive system against England during the present maritime war.

ARTICLE 8. The present treaty of alliance cannot be made public, nor communicated to any cabinet, except in concert between the two high parties.

ARTICLE 9. It shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Vienna, within fifteen days, or sooner if possible.

II. SEPARATE AND SECRET ARTICLES.

ARTICLE 1. Austria will not be bound to furnish the help stipulated by article 4 of the patent treaty, in the wars that France would support, either against England, or beyond the Pyrenees.

ARTICLE 2. If war breaks out between France and Russia, Austria will provide the said assistance stipulated by articles 4 and 5 of the treaty of this day. The regiments which are to form it will immediately be put in motion, and quartered so that, from the 1st of May, they can, in less than a fortnight, be assembled on Lemberg.

The said corps of troops will be provided with a double supply of artillery ammunition, as well as the military crews necessary for the transport of twenty days of provisions.

ARTICLE 3. For his part, H. M. the Emperor of the French will make all his arrangements to be able to operate against Russia, at the same time, with all the forces available.

ARTICLE 4. The corps of troops provided by H.M. the Emperor of Austria will be formed into three divisions of infantry and one division of cavalry, commanded by an Austrian general at the choice of H.M. the Emperor of Austria.

He will act on the line that will be prescribed to him by His Majesty the Emperor of the French, and according to his immediate orders.

It cannot be divided, and will always form a distinct and separate corps.

Provision will be made for its subsistence in enemy territory, according to the same method which will be established for the corps of the French army, without changing anything, however, in the regime and in the detailed customs established by the military regulations of Austria for the food of the soldiers. troops.

The trophies and the booty it has taken from the enemy will belong to them.
ARTICLE 5. *In the event that, as a result of the war between France and Russia, the kingdom of Poland should come to be re-established, His Majesty the Emperor of the French will specially guarantee, as he now guarantees to Austria, the possession of Galicia.*

ARTICLE 6. *If, should the case arise, it would suit the Emperor of Austria to cede, in order to be united to the Kingdom of Poland, part of Galicia in exchange for the Illyrian Provinces, H. M. the Emperor of the French s undertake, as of now, to consent to this exchange. The portion of Galicia to be ceded shall be determined on the combined basis of population, extent, and revenue, so that the valuation of the two objects of exchange shall not be settled by the extent of the territory only, but by its real value.*

ARTICLE 7. *In the event of a happy outcome of the war, H. M. the Emperor of the French undertakes to procure for H. M. the Emperor of Austria indemnities and enlargements of territory, which not only compensate for the sacrifices and burdens of the co-operation of His Majesty in the war but be a monument of the intimate and lasting union which exists between the two sovereigns.*

ARTICLE 8. *If, in hatred of the ties and engagements contracted by Austria towards France, Austria should be threatened by Russia, the Emperor of the French will consider this attack as directed against himself and will immediately commence hostilities.*

ARTICLE 9. *The Ottoman Porte will be invited to accede to this treaty of alliance.*

ARTICLE 10. *The above articles will remain secret between the two powers.*

ARTICLE 11. *They shall have the same force as if they were inserted in the treaty of alliance, and they shall be ratified and the ratifications exchanged in the same place and at the same time as those of the said treaty.*

Done and signed in Paris, 14 March 1812.
D. NOTE ON THE DEFECTION OF SWEDEN.

The treaty between Sweden and Russia was concluded on 24 March 1812.

Here are the main provisions:

Reciprocal guarantee of the two States.

Engagements entered into by Sweden to make a diversion, in the event of hostilities with France and her allies, on such point of Germany as may be deemed suitable, with twenty-five to thirty thousand Swedes and twenty thousand Russians.

Promise granted by Russia to guarantee Sweden the reunion or the conquest of Norway, with the aid of a Russian army of thirty-five thousand men.

Denmark will be invited to accede to the alliance, and to the cession of Norway, in return for full and entire indemnity in Germany and the promise of her States. In case of refusal, war will be declared on him.

The King of England will be invited to consent to the treaty, and to guarantee its stipulations.
E. CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE APPROACH MADE BY NAPOLEON WITH ENGLAND.

I. LETTER FROM THE DUKE OF BASSANO

To Lord Castlereagh.
Paris, 17 April 1812.

Sir,

His Majesty the Emperor and King, always animated by the same feelings of moderation and peace, wanted to take another authentic and solemn step to put an end to the misfortunes of war. The grandeur and force of the circumstances in which the world finds itself today compels His Majesty. He authorizes me, sir, to talk to you about his dispositions and his views.

Many changes have taken place in Europe over the past ten years; they were the necessary consequence of the war which had broken out between France and England. Many changes will still occur, and they will result from the same cause. The particular character which the war took on may add to the extent and duration of these results. Exclusive and arbitrary principles can be combated only by opposition without measure and limit, and the system of preservation and resistance must have the same character of universality, perseverance, and vigor.

The Peace of Amiens, if it had been maintained, would have prevented many upheavals. I renew the wish that the experience of the past will not be lost for the future.

His Majesty has often paused before the prospect of the most certain triumphs and has averted his gaze from them to invoke peace. In 1805, assured as he was of the advantages of his position, and whatever confidence he owed to omens which fortune was soon to realize, he made proposals to His Britannic Majesty's government, which were evaded, on the ground that Russia had to be consulted. In 1808 new proposals were made in concert with Russia; England pleaded the necessity of an intervention which could only be the result of the negotiation itself. In 1810, His Majesty, being no longer concealed from himself that the edicts of the British Council of 1807 rendered the conduct of the war incompatible with Holland, authorized indirect overtures which also tended to peace. They had no effect, and new provinces had to be united to the empire.

The present moment brings together all the circumstances of the various times when His Majesty showed the pacific sentiments which he orders me to manifest even today.

The calamities which desolate the Peninsula, and the vast regions of Spanish America must excite the interest of all nations and animate them with equal solicitude to see them cease.

I will express myself, sir, in a way which Your Excellency will find in conformity with the frankness of the step which I am charged to take, and nothing will better show the greatness and the loyalty of it than the precise terms of the language which I am allowed to hold forth. For
what purpose and for what motives would I wrap myself in forms that only suit weakness, which alone has an interest in deceiving?

The integrity of Spain would be guaranteed; France would reconsider any extension on the side of the Pyrenees; the present dynasty would be declared independent, and Spain governed by a national constitution of the Cortes.

The independence and integrity of Portugal would also be guaranteed, and the House of Braganza would rule. The Kingdom of Naples would remain with the King of Naples. The Kingdom of Sicily would be guaranteed to the current House of Sicily.

As a result of these stipulations, Spain, Portugal, and Sicily would be evacuated by French and English troops by land and sea.

As for the other subjects of discussion, they can be negotiated on the basis that each power will keep what the other cannot take from it by war.

Such, sir, are the bases of conciliation and rapprochement offered to H.R.H. the Prince Regent.

H.M. the Emperor and King does not calculate, in this step, either the advantages or the losses that the war, if it is prolonged longer, can presage to his empire. It is determined by the sole consideration of the interests of humanity and the tranquility of peoples; and if this fourth attempt should be without success, France will at least have the consolation of thinking that the blood which could still flow will fall entirely on England.

_I have the honor to be, etc._

Signed: DUKE DE BASSANO.
II. LORD CASTLEREAGH'S REPLY

To the Duke of Bassano.

London, Foreign Office, 23 April 1812.

Sir,

Your Excellency's letter, dated the 17th of this month, has been received and placed before the Prince Regent.

His Royal Highness felt that it owed it to his honor, before authorizing me to enter into an explanation of the opening which Your Excellency transmitted, to fix the precise meaning attached by the Government of France to the following passage, of the letter of Your Excellency: "The present dynasty would be declared independent, and Spain governed by a constitution of the Cortés."

If, as His Royal Highness fears, the meaning of this proposal is that the royal authority of Spain and its government established by the Cortés will be recognized as residing in the brother of the head of the French government, and the Cortés formed under his authority, and not in the legitimate sovereign Ferdinand VII and his heirs, and the extraordinary assembly of Cortés now invested with the power of the government of this kingdom, in his name and under his authority, I am ordered to declare frankly and explicitly to Your Excellency that commitments of good faith do not allow His Royal Highness to receive a peace proposal based on such a basis.

If, however, the expressions above quoted applied to the present government of Spain exercising authority in the name of Ferdinand VII, on the assurance given by Your Excellency, the Prince Regent is prepared to explain himself fully on the base which has been transmitted for consideration by His Royal Highness, his most earnest desire being, in concert with his allies, to contribute to the repose of Europe, and to labor for a peace which may be at once honorable, not only for Great Britain and France, but also for those States with which each of these two powers has relations of friendship.

After having unreservedly stated the feelings of the Prince Regent on a point on which it is so necessary to agree before entering into a subsequent discussion, I will comply with the instructions of His Royal Highnesses, avoiding unnecessary remarks and recriminations on the accessory objects of your letter. I can happily rely, for the justification of the conduct which Great Britain has adopted at the different periods recalled by Your Excellency, to the correspondence which took place then and to the judgments which the world has long passed on it.

As to the peculiar character which the war has unfortunately assumed, and to the exclusive and arbitrary principles which Your Excellency points out as having marked its progress, while denying, so far as the British government is concerned, that these evils are to be attributed to it, I am authorized to write to Your Excellency that he sincerely deplores their existence, as needlessly aggravating the calamities of war, and that his keenest desire, whether at peace or at
war with France, is to see the relations between nations restored to principles liberals and accustomed to earlier times.

I take this opportunity to offer Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

Signed: CASTLEREAGH
F. DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE BREAK BETWEEN FRANCE AND RUSSIA.

I. REPORT BY BARON VON KNESEBECK

To the King of Prussia.

Saint Petersburg, 23 March 1812.

Sire, the remoteness of the place not having made it possible to make my detailed report sooner to Your Majesty, I hasten to discharge my duty by submitting it to you respectfully today.

The day after my arrival in Petersburg, I presented myself to Count Romanzoff to ask him for an audience with His Majesty the Emperor.

I obtained it two days later, on 16 February, and His Majesty addressed me thus:

"What do you have to say to me, Mr. von Knesebeck?"

I thereupon returned your Majesty’s letter to the Emperor, adding that your Majesty had charged me to express to him the wishes which you expressed for the preservation of peace in the North; that he hoped the Emperor would share his sentiments; but, as notwithstanding this, Russia had collected on his frontiers great military forces, which France likewise armed, and augmented his armies in Germany, as well as his garrisons and military apparel in the fortresses on the Oder and Vistula, Your Majesty feared, with reason, that war would break out, if the silence which the two great powers had hitherto maintained were prolonged any longer; that Your Majesty therefore conjured the Emperor not to avoid the explanations which the Emperor Napoleon seemed to wish on his side, and to give sufficient powers to his ambassador in Paris, or to send a person charged expressly to deal with a conciliation of disputes arising between the two courts; that Your Majesty, in expressing these wishes to the Emperor, believed itself authorized to do so, as much by the bonds of friendship which existed between the two sovereigns, as by the interest of his State, which would suffer more than any other from the burden of the war, since it was to be foreseen that Prussia would in any case be the country through which the different armies would pass, if she did not even become the theater of their operations.

The Emperor replied that no one could wish more than he to see peace preserved; that it was true that he had brought his troops closer to the frontiers; but that he had seen himself forced to do so, because France had reinforced herself more and more on the Vistula; that he still held strong garrisons at Danzig, Stettin, Custrin; that he had not restored Glogau to your Majesty, and that he had fortified Thorn, Praga, Modlin; that the assembling of Russian troops was therefore rather the continuation of the armaments of France than a warlike measure on the part of Russia, given that the assembly of a mass of military means could be called with more reason an armament than the gathering of an army which does not cross the borders of its country; that this measure was purely defensive; that he thought he had given sufficient proof of his peaceful intentions to all of Europe, by not raising the Oldenburg affair, by keeping silent about the occupation of Hamburg and Lübeck, and that he would take the same course with regard to the last occupation of Swedish Pomerania; that Russia strictly adhered to the stipulated treaties; that there was
therefore absolutely nothing on his part to explain; but that, to give a new proof of his pacific intentions, he had had the idea of sending a person to Paris, as soon as peace with the Porte had been signed, to carry there still sincere assurances for the preservation of peace, and thereby show that foreign relations had changed nothing in his intentions; but that there was reason to believe that this dispatch would not please the Emperor Napoleon. I ventured to say that I thought I could assure him of the contrary; but that if this dispatch were still to take place, it would doubtless be desirable that His Majesty should order it soon, since two great powers could never remain armed for long one vis-à-vis the other, without the war was the result; that spring was approaching and gave rise to fears that hostilities would have begun before this person had left Petersburg.

A few days later, in a conference I had with the Comte de Romanzoff, this Chancellor returned to what the Emperor had already told me, that there was nothing to explain on the part of Russia, and he added that, as the Oldenburg affair was of too little importance to be able to attract war, he saw no object which could disturb the peace. I took this opportunity to speak of the trade in colonial commodities which is carried on at the moment through the ports of Russia, and to give this Minister the enclosed note, instructing him that, if the sending of a person to Paris, for the arrangement of differences, depended on peace with Turkey, as the Emperor had told me, it was all the more necessary to hope that this peace would soon be made. M. de Romanzoff replied that the Emperor had given new instructions on the arrangement with the Porte, which had recently been issued; that the negotiations had only been suspended; but that the plenipotentiaries of the two powers had remained together, and that he hoped to have soon the news of the conclusion of peace.

In the meantime, the King of Sweden had sent the Count of Löwenhielm to Petersburg: a few days later, the Crown Prince sent there one of his aides-de-camp, the Chevalier Schoukron, with an signed letter from him. According to the rumors that were circulating, Sweden complained strongly of the occupation of Swedish Pomerania, and must even have offered an alliance to Russia, in case of war between that power and France.

In a second audience, the Emperor condescended to speak to me about it, and told me that he had still had occasion, these last few days, to give proof of his desire for the preservation of peace, both by coming under no way the occupation of Swedish Pomerania, than by removing all the offers which Sweden had made to him; but His Majesty does not tell me what these offers consisted of.

On trade, His Majesty tells me that he strictly adhered to the stipulations of the treaties; that there was absolutely no trade, no relation even with the English; that still, in the last council, four vessels, whose papers had not been found in order, had been condemned; that trade under a neutral flag was not considerable; that the cargoes of three or four vessels made a lot of noise, because the little Russian wagons could only load one or two barrels, and that it was possible to meet a whole line of carts (I had mentioned that one met many of them) whose entire load perhaps did not amount to the cargo of a single ship; that one had only to ask the merchants and owners of the Empire what was, to convince himself how much trade was hampered, and how much Russia suffered from it; that to want to deprive her of the rest of the trade with neutrals
was an impossible thing; that a sovereign had duties to fulfill towards his nation, of which he did not should never depart.

As I mentioned that then war might well take place, since the continental system, established to recover the freedom of the seas, was suffering, by the trade which Russia carried on with the Americans, the Emperor replied that it still would not be he who, in this case, would have begun it, since he had contracted no obligation which prevented him from permitting commerce with neutrals; that the nation had rights to claim against him; that the first was existence, and that with the armies he kept on foot, more condescension would show weakness; that already the sending of a person to Paris could no longer be done, and was against his dignity, since the Emperor Napoleon had taken a more threatening position (the news of the gathering of the Saxons at Guben and the march of the Bavarians was arriving); that now, by this step, he would seem to seek to obtain peace, for the sole fear of war.

I replied to this that the situation of Europe demanded that we should at this moment rise above all these petty considerations, and that the magnanimous heart of the Emperor gave the certainty that it would be so; that the preservation of peace was such a great goal that nothing that could lead to it seemed to me below its dignity; that with three hundred thousand men under arms, this step did not seem weak, but a last step for the maintenance of peace, and that the dignity of a great monarch seemed rather to require such a peaceful demonstration that she did not appear to be able to suffer from it; that the disastrous consequences of a war had not escaped His Majesty's wisdom; that, as Minister, I would be permitted to say that it seemed to me that the war did not begin under favorable circumstances for Russia, her left wing being still engaged with the Turks; that the Emperor Napoleon had bases established on the Oder; that Russia, on the contrary, had a great frontier to cover, and no place of consequence, etc.

The Emperor replied that it was true; let him not hide it; that I had forgotten to say that he, personally, was not as great a captain as Napoleon; that he had no general to oppose to him, and that all these considerations, which he had weighed, and which he made no secret of, could therefore convince the world that he did not want war and that he would not would ever be the aggressor; but that in case of attack, he had also prepared everything to make an honest and long resistance, and that he would never begin by showing weakness to the nation, which would be the case now, if he sent a person in Paris to seek peace there; that, moreover, he had nothing to explain; that Prince Kurakin was there, and that it was the duty of an ambassador to hear everything, if the Emperor Napoleon wished to explain himself.

As I made the observation that, after all this, I was at the end of my arguments, and that it only remained for me to ask His Majesty if it would not be contrary to him that, on the part of France, Ambassador Lauriston, or some other person sent to Petersburg, was entrusted with explanations which might lead to a conciliation, the Emperor answered me that it would not be contrary to him, and it seemed to me to read on his face that he would see it with pleasure.

I took therefore, in accordance with this, the resolution to ask for my audience to take my leave. The Emperor granted it to me on the 2nd of this month, and again repeated to me in this audience all that he had already said in the other two, adding only that the clearest proof he had given of his love for the peace might be that he had not attacked last spring; that he had already been, at
that time, as prepared for war as at present, and that he could have advanced to the Elbe and forced Prussia to take his side, without encountering sufficient forces to stop his armies. Although he was not a warrior, this advantage seemed obvious to him; that if he advanced at this moment, he could still gain ground, but that he would not do so, and that I must tell your Majesty *that he would wait for the cannon shot to be fired on the frontiers.*

My departure, after this audience, was postponed for a few more days by the audiences with the empresses, and it was not until the 7th that I left St. Petersburg.

I am not happy enough to report positive results to Your Majesty; but I am not returning without hope for the preservation of peace.

Here is what I dare to think of the state of things:

The Emperor Alexander certainly and sincerely wants peace; apparently the explanations will begin with what M. Chernishev will bring to Petersburg. The course your Majesty has since taken must be of the greatest influence, as much on the resolution of the Emperor Alexander as on the opinion of the nation, and will balance the advantages which, in case of war, would present themselves to Russia, by the part which Sweden was inclined to take. Everything therefore depends on the conditions that France will place on an arrangement. If they are such, that the Emperor may present them to the nation without having to fear reproaches contrary to the dignity of a great sovereign; such that they are believed to be incompatible with the existence of the nation, for, it must be said, this existence is partly due to trade, peace will be preserved; for neither the Emperor, nor the nation, nor even the surroundings of the court, nor anyone wishes or demands war; but the war having begun, we must not conceal it, the struggle will be terrible, and the Russians will fight furiously.

I did not think it necessary to make these reflections to Your Majesty, because only one who has been on the spot can be convinced of this truth. I appeal, on this point, to all those who have been there like me.

The localities will still give great obstacles to overcome. Swamps, large forests, few habitations, no well-groomed highways, no great rivers to favor operations; in general, a sterile country: all that hampers the movements, and will be cause that the large masses will not be able to remain gathered a long time on the same point; it will be necessary to disperse them by body to be able to feed them, and the defensive gives, under such reports, great advantages to the defender, as it creates, with that which attacks, of the obstacles suitable to put, with the companies of the greatest geniuses, insurmountable limits, if the defender adopts a system of devastation by withdrawing to points well chosen in advance, and losing ground wisely, or by defending it step by step.

These advantages are felt in Russia; the ministers talk about them and put them forward, and I believe that this will be the system of war that will be followed, although perhaps it is only fixed on the choice of the general to whom the command in chief of the army will be conferred. army.

I am with the deepest respect, Sir, etc. *Signed: CH. VON KNESEBECK.*
II. LETTER FROM PRINCE KOURAKIN

To the Duke of Bassano.

Paris, 18 (30) April 1812.

Mr. Duke,

Since the interview which I had last Tuesday with Your Excellency, and in which you made me hope that the communications which I made to him verbally, according to the contents of my last instructions, would be admitted as the basis of the arrangements which we have been occupied, I have not been able to find you at your house, nor to obtain from you any new conferences for the discussion of this object and the drawing up of the draft of this convention.

It is impossible for me, Monsieur Duke, to delay any longer rendering an account to the Emperor, my master, of the execution of the orders he has given me. I was verbally acquitted of this to H.M. the Emperor and King, in the private audience His Majesty granted me on Monday. I acquitted myself of it also, and in the same way, towards Your Excellency, in my interviews with her on Friday, Monday and Tuesday. I flattered myself that the sending of a draft convention based on the bases which I had orders to propose, and which, as I hoped, would be agreeable to His Imperial and Royal Majesty, would enable me to immediately prove to H.M. the Emperor my master that I had fulfilled his intentions, and that I had had the good fortune to do so successfully. Deprived for two days of the faculty of seeing Your Excellency, of continuing and finishing, with him, the work so important and so urgent by the circumstances with which we have to deal, for which there is not a single day to losing, and seeing the certainty with which I had flattered myself vanish, that this work would be completed without delay and could lead to the goal it was to have, to prevent still further the unfortunate consequences of the extreme rapprochement where the armies of S. M. the Emperor and King have come from those of H. M. the Emperor my master, it remains for me to provide for my responsibility towards my court, by acquitting myself officially of the communications which I have received orders to make to Your Excellency, and which until now have only been given to him by me orally.

I am ordered to declare to Your Excellency that the preservation of Prussia and her independence from all political ties directed against Russia is indispensable to the interests of His Imperial Majesty. To arrive at a true state of peace with France, there must necessarily be between her and Russia a neutral country, which is not occupied by the troops of either of the two powers; that like all the policy of H.M. the Emperor my master tends only to establish solid and stable relations with France, and that these could not subsist as long as foreign armies continued to reside in such proximity to the borders of France. Russia, the first basis of any negotiation can only be the formal commitment to the complete evacuation of the Prussian States and of all the strongholds of Prussia, whatever the time and the basis of their occupation by the French or allied troops; of a diminution of the garrison of Danzig, of the evacuation of Swedish Pomerania, and of an arrangement with the King of Sweden calculated to reciprocally satisfy the two crowns of France and Sweden.
I must declare that, when the demands above stated are granted on the part of France, as the basis of the arrangement to be concluded, I shall be permitted to promise that this arrangement may also contain, on the part of H.M. emperor my master, the following commitments:

Without deviating from the principles adopted by the Emperor of all the Russias for the commerce of his States and for the admission of neutrals to the ports of his domination, principles which His Majesty could never renounce, he obligates himself, by an effect of his attachment to the alliance formed at Tilsit, in adopting no change in the prohibitive measures established in Russia, and hitherto strictly observed against direct commerce with England: His Majesty is ready, moreover, to agree with H.M. the Emperor of the French and King of Italy, on a system of licenses to be introduced in Russia, following the example of France; of course that it can only be admitted after it has been recognized that it cannot increase, by its effects, the damage already experienced by the commerce of Russia.

H. M. the Emperor of all the Russias will also engage, by this convention, to treat, by a particular arrangement, of certain modifications that France can wish for the advantage of its trade in the customs tariff of Russia of 1810.

Finally, His Majesty will also consent to engage to conclude a treaty of exchange of the Duchy of Oldenburg for a suitable equivalent, which will be proposed by His Majesty the Emperor and King, and in which His Imperial Majesty will declare to withdraw the protest that she was in a position to give in order to reserve the rights of his house to the Duchy of Oldenburg.

Such, Monsieur Duke, is the basis which I have been ordered to present here, and the admission of which, in so far as it regards the evacuation of the Prussian States and Swedish Pomerania, the reduction of the garrison of Danzig on the footing it was on before the 1st of January 1811, and the promise of a negotiation with Sweden, can alone still make possible an arrangement between our two courts. It is with great regret that, despite the interval which has elapsed since I communicated it verbally to your Excellency, I still see myself in complete uncertainty as to the effects that my steps will have, despite the omens favors which I was pleased to derive from the interview which His Imperial and Royal Majesty was good enough to grant me on Monday, and from the assurances which Your Excellency added thereto on his side. I can only repeat to Your Excellency what I have already taken the liberty of bringing myself to the knowledge of His Majesty the Emperor, and what I had the honor of telling you also to yourself, Monsieur le Duc, that if, to my regret, the news reached me that the Comte de Lauriston had left Petersburg, it would be my duty to demand at once that my passports be delivered to me, and to leave also Paris.

May Your Excellency receive, etc.

Signed: ALEX. KOURAKIN.
III. NOTE FROM PRINCE KOURAKIN

The same.

Paris, 25 April (7 May 1812).

Mr. Duke,

Nearly a fortnight has elapsed since I carried out the communications which my last instructions, brought by the Baron de Serdobin, enjoined me to make to Your Excellency, and which I hastened to put before your eyes, two hours after receipt. I had the honor to also bring myself to the knowledge of His Imperial and Royal Majesty, in the audience he granted me on 27 Monday of the same month, the proposals of His Majesty the Emperor my august master, which were the subject of it. The hopes that I had to base on all that His Majesty wanted to tell me, in this audience, of his extreme desire to prevent, by means of conciliation, the rupture which threatens Europe with a new war, make me conceive of the flattering expectation of seeing my approach succeed at the pleasure of His Majesty the Emperor, my master, whose wishes have never been other than those of the preservation of peace and of his alliance with France, and to see the essentially equitable and moderate proposals of which I had just been the organ, to become the basis of a friendly arrangement. I was all the more able to give myself up to this hope, as you yourself, Monsieur Duke, never ceased, in the first interviews which followed my communications, to encourage it by the justice you rendered to their conciliatory spirit, peaceful, and chiefly directed to satisfy H. M. the Emperor Napoleon on all the demands he has hitherto made of Russia. His Majesty the Emperor and King, in the audience of 27 April, by committing myself to discuss immediately with Your Excellency these proposals with which I was charged, had authorized me to foresee the possibility of rendering my master complete to the Emperor, within a short period of time, of the reception given to its offers. Never have more urgent circumstances justified more justly a desire and entreaties to receive a prompt solution: however, Monsieur Duke, I am still waiting for it. My pressing and repeated requests, my daily representations to Your Excellency obtain no other result, on your part, than the refusal to explain further on my proposals, based on the lack of orders, to this effect, of His Imperial and Royal Majesty.

It is impossible, Monsieur Duke, to conceal from oneself the disastrous effects which these delays will definitely bring about. The daily closer proximity of the armies of His Imperial and Royal Majesty and of his allies to the frontiers of the Russian Empire may bring about, at any moment, events after which all hope of preserving peace would be lost, and which perhaps even at this moment have already destroyed this possibility. The only means which could spare Europe the misfortunes which were about to weigh down upon her, was by accepting the conciliatory offers which the Emperor, my master, had charged me to present. Certainly no answer from Your Excellency has let me know that they were accepted, but, up to now, you have never ceased to refuse the explanations that I have asked of you and still ask you, on how these offers are being considered, and on what, in all of my proposals, may not have suited the Emperor.
In the midst of the critical circumstances in which the two empires find themselves, the extension of such delays to the explanations proper to produce a rapprochement, could not be interpreted otherwise than as a determination already taken not to enter into these explanations, and, consequently, that like the choice of war: I am not permitted to hide from Your Excellency that this is how I will envisage the new delays which will be put in to giving me a categorical answer on the communications which I discharged by order of H.M. the Emperor my master. I must therefore warn you, Monsieur Duke, that if, in the conference she has fixed with me for tomorrow morning, I still have the regret of seeing her again without instructions from Her Imperial and Royal Majesty, to answer me on my proposals, and to announce to me that they are accepted without modifications (because Your Excellency knows that I am not permitted to admit any of them), I will see myself, by the departure of H.M. the Emperor and King, announced for the day after tomorrow, and which would no longer allow me to hope for the answer I demand, in the need to consider the lack of this answer as the choice of war, and to then consider my presence in Paris as completely superfluous; and that with deep regret at not having been able to contribute to the maintenance of this peace and this alliance, in the establishment of which the greatest happiness of my life is to have participated five years ago, I shall be compelled, I said, to ask Your Excellency for my passports to leave France. I beg him in advance and very earnestly to obtain the orders of His Imperial and Royal Majesty so that I can then deliver them to me without delay.

Receive, Monsieur Duke, the new assurance of my high consideration.

Signed: ALEX. KOURAKIN.

IV. NOTE FROM THE DUKE OF BASSANO

To Prince Kurakin.

Paris, 9 May 1812.

Mr. Ambassador,

I have received the notes which you did me the honor of sending me on 30 April and 7 May. Before being in a position to answer it, I must ask Your Excellency if you have full powers to settle, conclude and sign an agreement on the differences which have arisen between the two powers, and to request your Excellency, in this case and in accordance with the practice of all firms, to give me prior communication thereof.

I have the honor to offer Your Excellency the new assurances of my highest consideration.

Signed: BASSANO.
Mr. Duke,

I have just received Your Excellency's letter, dated today. He will allow me to show him my great surprise at the questions he puts to me, and which I thought I had entirely prevented by the frankness with which I communicated to him, without reserve, all the instructions I last received from His Imperial Majesty my august master. Your Excellency is aware of the conciliatory proposals which are the object of it, and which indicate in a very positive manner the instant desire of my august master to maintain peace, and his alliance with His Majesty the Emperor Napoleon. I am always ready to agree with him on the form to be given to them, by drafting an agreement which I will sign with him, sub sperati, although without particular and special powers to sign this agreement, the character of which I have the honor of being invested with His Imperial and Royal Majesty is sufficient for me for this purpose; and I can promise Your Excellency, from the perfect knowledge I have of the intentions of the Emperor my master, and from the announcement which has been made to me of a dispatch of special full powers, in case where the bases proposed by me would be accepted by H. M. the Emperor and King, that the arrangement which I shall sign shall be ratified by His Imperial Majesty. I would point out to Your Excellency that even if I had, for this object, from now on the special powers, according to generally accepted usages, the ratification of the two sovereigns would still be necessary before the act could have its full and complete effect. full validity. I have much to regret, in the midst of such urgent circumstances, where any moment may bring about the commencement of hostilities, that the silence which has been kept vis-à-vis me by His Imperial and Royal Majesty's minister during the long space of fifteen days, on the manner in which His Majesty considered the bases which I have been instructed to present to him for these arrangements, has so considerably delayed the possibility of concluding them.

I confess to Your Excellency my astonishment that you thought it necessary to wait for the explanation that I have just given, or rather to confirm to you (since I have already had the honor of detailing very clearly, in my previous interviews, everything that was the subject of today's question) before answering my notes of 30 April and 7 May. Your Excellency does not mention that of May 6*, on which I am no less justified in hoping from him an answer which I also demand. I urge her to send me the three answers as soon as possible. They must contain explanations which are indispensably necessary to me, by the very positive duties imposed on me by the post which I occupy.

Receive, Monsieur Duke, the renewed expression of my high consideration.

Signed: ALEX. KOURAKIN.

*The note of 6 May was related to a particular case, and foreign to the existing political discussions between the two countries.