The Battle of Spear’s Farm (Chateauguay), 1813:
A Study of Strategy and Tactics during the War of 1812
By John Pezzola
Battle of Chateauguay, 1813 by Henri Julien (1852 – 1908). Wikimedia Commons
“The Battle of Chateauguay is appreciably enshrined in Canadian history as a virtual David and Goliath encounter.”[1]
On October 26, 1813, a British force consisting of Canadian militia and Mohawk warriors commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Charles de Salaberry defeated an American invasion force led by Major General Wade Hampton at the Battle of Chateauguay. The Battle was part of a campaign to invade Lower Canada and capture Montreal. The victorious Canadians and their First Nation allies held on to their position until their scouts alerted them that the American invasion force had retreated.
Background to the Conflict
Following the debacle of American strategy during the opening stages of the War in 1812, plans were now in the works to begin an offensive against Canada in 1813. The United States Secretary of War John Armstrong started to work on designing plans for a campaign during the fall of 1813. It was unclear at the outset whether an attack should be made on Montreal or Kingston in the heart of Canada and split upper and lower Canada’s supply line and communications. There would be three separate armies involved in the campaign. One American army was at Fort George while the other was at Sackett’s Harbor and would work in conjunction for the main strike against Montreal or Kingston. The third Army on Lake Champlain at Plattsburg was to act as a faint or, if the opportunity presented itself, join the main strike of the two forces moving into the heart of Canada. The goal of the campaign was to capture Montreal, which, if the American Army were victorious, would lead to the fall of British strategic positions on Lake Ontario, leading to the fall of Upper Canada. General James Wilkinson was appointed senior Commander of United States military forces. Wilkinson, as a commander, was quite shady and questionable. A veteran of the American Revolution, Wilkinson was one of a cohort of senior commanders who was up in age. The Secretary for War of the United States, John Armstrong, was adamant in the belief that Kingston should be the ultimate goal of the campaign and wanted to relinquish himself from any blame if the campaign failed by advocating two methods of approach to seize the objective. The objective could be carried by either a direct assault or by an indirect approach which would require movement down the St. Lawrence River towards Montreal. The prize in this venture would be the cutting off of communications and vital supply links. According to John Armstrong, he felt that “at Montreal, however, we find the weaker place, the most minor force to encounter. . . you hold a position that completely severs the enemy’s line of operations and which, while it restrains all below, withers and perishes all above itself.
Nevertheless, Armstrong opted for an assault against Montreal. Major-General James Wilkinson was appointed as the commander of the ambitious campaign. Sackets Harbor on Lake Ontario was selected as the base of operations for the American campaign. It was the month of August 1813 when Major–General Wilkinson began his preparations for the coming campaign. Nevertheless, there was much animosity between the two due to past charges of dereliction of duty being brought upon by Armstrong against Wilkinson, which at this point seem to subside. During the Revolutionary War, Wilkinson was involved in the “Conway Cable ” incident, the goal of which was to focus on the removal of General Washington and replace him with General Horatio Gates. Wilkinson also attempted to assist Spain in trying to aid in the succession of the western part of the United States to Spain; and conspired with Aaron Burr in separating the United States. Unfortunately for Wilkinson, he was in poor health, battling bouts of paroxysms, and was not enthusiastic about being given command of the rather arduous campaign. This prompted Wilkinson to request to be relinquished from command. Armstrong assured Wilkinson that he would be up for the task.[2] There is still much apprehension as to where the focus of the campaign should be; Wilkinson is more in favour of an attack on Kingston, yet despite Armstrong pushing for a campaign against Montreal, he places himself in a position that would not lend himself to blame in the event the campaign is a failure. In all, there is much apprehension and tension between the two concerning whether either campaign will be successful at all. It is obvious that no clear objective is being set and Armstrong prizes himself for being a student of the Art of War who has even authored a work entitled “Hints to Young Generals: The Art of War.” Armstrong’s thesis of concentration and clarity of movement are not being put into practice in the planning of the coming campaign. [3]
Wilkinson’s preparations for the campaign were moving at a snail’s pace. Loading provisions, weapons, and supplies, particularly medical supplies, took an enormous amount of time. Wilkinson’s army was at Sackett’s Harbor for about eighteen to nineteen days. Besides taking an extraordinary period to load, sickness was beginning to plague Wilkinson’s army of seven thousand men. A surgeon serving in Wilkinson’s Army stated that a significant problem with the illness outbreak was the poor provisions being supplied. “The meat was rotten, the whiskey adulterated, the flour so bad that ‘it would kill the best horse in Sackets Harbor.’”[4] Along with Wilkinson’s primary force, there was a secondary force at Burlington, Vermont, under the command of Major-General Wade Hampton and Brigadier–General George Izard as Hampton’s second in command. Hampton was a veteran soldier who saw service under General Thomas Sumter (a guerrilla fighter) during the American War of Independence and with Francis Marion, the “Swamp Fox.” Hampton was fifty – nine years of age when he participated in the invasion of Canada in 1813. Izard was trained as an artillery officer and studied at military schools in England and France.[5]
Along with Hampton was a talented Colonel from Pennsylvania named Robert Purdy, who served with General Antony Wayne during the Fallen Timbers campaign in 1794. The objective of Hampton’s army at Burlington was to traverse through Champlain Valley and, thereby, link up with Wilkinson’s primary force south of Montreal. The hope was that moving such a large force with the two armies linked would most likely force a surrender of Montreal, believing that there weren’t any Canadian/Crown forces large enough in the vicinity to oppose them.[6] Secretary of War John Armstrong assessed the current situation and stated the following,
At Montreal, we find the weaker place, the smallest force to encounter. . . .
you hold a position that completely severs the enemy’s line of operations
and which, while it restrains all below, withers and perishes all above itself.[7]
Governor General Sir George Prevost was aware of Hampton’s Army preparing to campaign in Canada. The military assets near Montreal were to be reinforced with two 24-pound field pieces and elements of the 19th Light Dragoons. Militia units and Royal Marines were also being directed to the defence of Montreal. Personnel were instructed to carry enough provisions and field packs to last two days. Along the Beauharnois Channel, at Coteau-du-Lac, a defensive post was erected to disrupt an invasion force coming down the St. Lawrence River. Assigned to the post were the 2nb Battalion of Beauharnois Sedentary Militia, local Native Americans, and the 103rd Regiment of Foot. The Sedentary militia units in Canada could be called out in an emergency. [8]
General Hampton’s army was now preparing to mass on de Salaberry’s front with about four – thousand U.S. Regulars comprising the 4th, 33rd, and 34th infantry regiments, light infantry companies, and fifteen hundred volunteers who refused to cross into Canada. [9]The Crown forces had to take away parts of their defensive line to shore up other parts of the line that needed reinforcements. The Crown’s military assets in Canada were spread thin. Lieutenant Colonel Charles-Michel d’Irumberry de Salaberry commanded an elite group of volunteers known as Voltigeurs (light infantry). De Salaberry was set upon not allowing the invaders to gain accurate intelligence regarding his disposition or troop strengths. Therefore, de Salaberry constantly redeployed his troops, deceiving the Americans into obtaining accurate numbers and the position of his forces. [10]
Wade Hampton Begins the Invasion
Prevost was somewhat surprised by Hampton’s move to send his army to Plattsburg via Lake Champlain. Prevost thought that Hampton would invade from a more northward direction. Prevost believed that Hampton was planning on joining Wilkinson to attack Kingston. The Prevost immediately moved to organize his defences in Kingston and left behind Sir Roger Sheaffe, who was in command of Montreal. On the nineteenth, Hampton had his Light Corps moving north while having the Navy flank their right. Hampton halted his army at Chazy, New York. Hampton had his men sleep without the cover of tents so that they could be on the move before sunrise.[11] The Crown forces did everything they could to impede Hampton’s movement, such as felled trees and bridges. Hampton had some of his men move ahead of his columns via boat, and they skirmished with Crown forces around Odeltown. De Salaberry could not launch a counterattack and continued to send out patrols and harass the Americans. De Salaberry deployed the 4th Embodied Militia in a joint defensive effort with one – hundred and fifty Voltigeurs. They continued their effort to block the American advance with abatis and used wooden entrenchments to harass their foe. Hampton became aware that De Salaberry would not make his advance easy and was doing a good job of preventing Hampton from gaining accurate intelligence. Along with De Salaberry’s defensive posture and Hampton’s lacking supplies, he held a council of war. He concluded that there was no alternative but to withdraw and approach Montreal via the Chateauguay Valley. [12]
The Americans were withdrawing towards Four Corners at the entrance of the Chateauguay Valley due to a lack of water and supplies. That said, de Salaberry was concerned about the low streams, allowing the Americans to manoeuvre wherever necessary. Hampton’s handling of the supply situation did not pass without scrutiny. Colonel Purdy was concerned that they were far from their logistics base and that they did not have the proper water transports necessary for the artillery and additional supplies to be brought up. It was apparent that the first invasion launched by Hampton had met with failure. By now, de Salaberry’s reconnaissance patrols had revealed that Hampton was retreating from his original route and was moving westward. De Salaberry conducted a twenty–four–hour force march to protect the next possible route of Invasion. Below Sainte Martine along the Chateauguay River, de Salaberry established his headquarters and actively sent out patrols. De Salaberry wanted to ensure an open line of communication was alive along his whole front. [13]
Hampton’s forces wore light summer uniforms when encamped at Four Corners, New York. It was now early fall, damp weather, and supplies were low. De Salaberry knew that Hampton could march westward towards St. Lawrence or northward via the Chateauguay, a shorter route. Morale was low by this point in Hampton’s army, and de Salaberry continued to harass and even conduct raids against the American lines. Armstrong told Hampton, “The position you have taken is better calculated to keep up the enemy’s doubts concerning your real point of attack than any other.” [14]As of October 16, Hampton was now under orders from Secretary Armstrong to advance along the Chateauguay River. Unfortunately for Hampton, around one thousand and five hundred militia refused to cross the border. Hampton decided to use the militiamen the best he could and detailed them to keep the supply route back to Plattsburg secure and their depot at Four Corners. Corporal Richard Bishop of the 29th US Infantry Regiment described the march as the US forces prepared to cross into Canada and the conditions they faced.
We had to take our blankets out of our knapsacks, roll ourselves up in them, and with our knapsacks for a pillow, lie down on the frozen ground, frequently with a storm of hail or sleet driving down upon us; we could not stop to pitch our tent every day. The Indians would often be seen in the woods near us, so we were always compelled to sleep with our guns by our side [15]
Hampton had to send a detachment forward consisting of pioneers to clear any obstacles erected to impede his march. [16]
The American advanced party was put to work according to a volunteer who stated we “cut the trees out of the road the British had felled in, and rebuild the bridges
they had been destroyed. The roads were soft and miry, and often the wheels of the wagons cut up the road so we often had to wade in the river up to our knees,
or above them, logging logs and timber. Such is the work of the poor soldiers on half rations.”[17]
After he crossed the border into Canada, Hampton’s first move was successful. Brigadier General George Izard took a contingent of light infantry and a line regiment to capture an advance piquet at Ormstown. Izard executed a flanking movement and successfully captured a base of operations for Hampton’s forces on the north shore of the Chateauguay.
The piquet was dispersed, and word of the attack was sent to de Salaberry, who dispatched flank companies from the Fifth Battalion Select Embodied Militia, commanded by Captain Levesque de Bartzch, including around two – hundred Sedentary Militia. De Salaberry ordered the detachment to move up the Chateauguay River and prepare a defensive location, as indicated by De Salaberry himself. De Salaberry’s advance force was encamped at their objective and waited until the next day when de Salaberry arrived with two companies of Voltigeurs and Captain Richard Fergusosns light company of Fencibles.[18]De Salaberry took possession of a ravine and put his men to task by erecting defences. De Salaberry’s men spotted a nearby American patrol, indicating how close Hampton’s men were to them. Two days had passed since de Salaberry’s forces began constructing the breastworks. De Salaberry sent forward a detachment under the command of Captain Joseph Longuetin of the Lower Canada Sedentary Militia to build a barrier of abatis (Abbatis: Consist of branches of felled trees laid in a row, with the sharpened tips pointed outwards, towards the enemy.) As de Salaberry prepared his defences, Hampton’s men improved the roads, creating a ford across the river. Also, they were moving forward with the remaining elements of their army and their artillery and supplies. [19]
A piquet of Voltigeurs and some Fencibles accompanied the work party Sedentary Militia. De Salaberry had chosen an ideal site to erect his defences. More than a half dozen gullies crossed the area. Each one had a log breastwork established from the river running into the woods and to the swamp on the right side of the river. This was established when a ravine ran at right angles at a bend in the river. The angles lead to the main road, where a patch of clear land allowed a field of fire. On the northern edge of the ravine, De Salaberry decided to establish his defences. De Salaberry’s position on the right flank consisted of six consecutive fortified positions, creating an in-depth defence. De Salaberry had arranged a piquet post protected by Abbatis in front of the first defensive line. This was established when a ravine ran at right angles at a bend in the river. The angles lead to the main road, where a patch of clear land allowed a field of fire. On the northern edge of the ravine, De Salaberry decided to establish his defences. De Salaberry set up his headquarters at Sainte Martine.
De Salaberry deployed his command as follows: The first breastwork was occupied by a company of light infantry of the Canadian Fencibles under the command of Captain George Ferguson. Captains Jean-Baptiste and Michel-Louis Juchereau Duchesnay also commanded two Canadian Voltigeur companies. There was also a small contingent of First Nations warriors under the command of Captain Joseph Line. Finally, one company of Beauharnois militia was commanded by Captain Joseph-Marie Longuetin. De Salaberry posted a company, Select Embodied Militia, under Captain Charles Daly on the other southeast side of the river. There was also a company of Chasseurs under the command of Joseph-Bernard Bruyere and a second company of Select Embodied of Militia under Capitan de Tonnancour, positioned about two miles south of Daly and Bruyere. De Tonnancour occupied Grant’s Ford, which could be used as a flanking position against De Salaberry’s lines. If Hampton’s forces could flank De Salaberry’s position, he would isolate De Salaberry from his reserves and sever his communications. To provide additional protection, de Salaberry had his men erect a Lunette to prevent a flanking movement further. A Lunette is a fortification with two faces forming a projecting outward angle with two flanks. De Salaberry posted around five hundred ranks and files in his forward lines and about a thousand in reserve. Red George Macdonell commanded the reserve force. Defensive lines were constructed about every three hundred meters, with five defensive lines in succession. The second line was under the joint command of Captains Dominique Debarrtzch and Benjamin I’Ecuyer. The right flank of De Salaberry’s line was primarily situated in a wooded area. The sedentary militia covered the flank under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Louis Chaussegros de Lery. Finally, de Salaberry posted a militia commanded by Captain Philippe Panet to guard the vital Ford. [20]
On the morning of October 25, 1813, Hampton was notified by his scouts that about three hundred and fifty of his de Salaberry Canadians occupied the front line along the main road. Hampton ordered Colonel Robert Purdy, on the opposite side of the river, to conduct a flanking manoeuvre by reaching Grant’s ford and attacking de Salaberry’s rear elements. Purdy’s command consisted of the following forces: 4th, 32nd, and 34th U.S. Infantry Regiments. Once Purdy had moved down to Grant’s ford, he would move in force against de Salaberry’s reserve, at which point Hampton would go ahead and order Izard to launch his attack against de Salaberry’s initial line. Purdy’s guides were unclear about the ground before them; nevertheless, Hampton insisted that the flanking manoeuvre occur. Purdy moved out on the night of the 25th at a snail’s pace. Purdy’s men moved through a hemlock swamp, which impeded their movement.
Hampton was apprehensive about the operation and saw no alternative but to move forward. Purdy was advancing slowly throughout the night and as dawn appeared on the morning of the 26th, Izard was ordered to move forward. Hampton was hoping that Izard would draw the attention of De Salaberry thereby, allowing Purdy to execute his flanking manoeuvre. Around 10:00 a.m., when Izard’s advance was met by skirmishers from the Voltigeurs, the light company of the Canadian Fencibles, and a company of the Sedentary Militia. Following the initial skirmish, Izard deployed the 10th US Infantry numbering about two hundred and fifty rank-and-file into a line. Along with the 10th Infantry, there was also a contingent of Dragoons in which two were killed in the initial skirmish. As the 10th US Infantry moved forward, they were met with a volley of musketry. De Salaberry, having witnessed the action, gave the command to his aide Lieutenant Michael O’Sullivan at the abatis, to commence fire. Izard continued to skirmish but did not press the attack, rendering a lull in the fighting. During this time, the remainder of Izard’s Brigade consisting of the 11th, 29th, and 31st Infantry Regiments, continued to move down a wagon road alongside the river to support the 10th Infantry.[21]
It was about 11:00 a.m. when Purdy’s two lead companies were opposite de Salaberry’s second defensive line and encountered a company of Sedentary militia and First Nations Warriors picket. A firefight ensued between the two forces and a Sergeant of the Fourth US Infantry described the engagement as, ” a furious action” which “was supported with firmness on both sides for about fifteen or twenty minutes, when we charged the enemy and drove them.” [22]This is the furthest that Purdy’s detachment would go and therefore, would never reach the Ford to conduct their flanking movement, having been met by Daly and Brugiere’s contingents. Purdy’s engagement was brisk and both the Canadians and Americans fell back to their initial positions after exchanging a few volleys. Despite some of the Canadians and First Nation warriors falling back, Purdy believed that the safety of his command was threatened by Indians who were lurking throughout the forest. As Purdy’s advanced elements began to pull back, Izard formed his regiments into line from the column and began to advance on the first abatis. It was around 2:00 p.m. Izard and De Salaberry’s first line were exchanging volleys with much of Izard’s command firing high and De Salaberry’s men having the advantage to take their time and aim their shots rendering them more accurate. By this point, all of De Salaberry’s skirmishers had fallen back and De Salaberry ordered Lieutenant-Colonel George MacDonnell to move forward and support the front line and placed a screen of First Nation warriors into the tree line to cover the right flank. Hampton, so no alternative but to withdraw his forces.[23]
In the end, the American forces sustained around twenty-three killed and around sixty wounded and missing as well as sixteen prisoners. Canadian forces numbered about sixteen wounded, four missing, and five killed.[24] Following the engagement, Hampton consulted with his officers in a council of war. It was determined that to press the attack would be futile and to add to the decision-making, the roads were becoming a quagmire due to the autumn rain. Also, Hampton’s supplies were dwindling and therefore, he saw no alternative, but to withdraw his forces to Four Corners. Wilkinson told Hampton that he would be resupplied and renew the attack, but unfortunately for Wilkinson’s force, he was defeated on November 12, 1813, at the Battle of Crysler’s Farm. The advance on Montreal was thereby called off. [25]De Salaberry remained on alert for the next few days, being ever vigilant if the Americans relaunched their attack. Native American scouts eventually informed De Salaberry of the American withdrawal. De Salaberry, with an inferior number, held off around seven thousand five hundred invading Americans.
Appendix A: Field Tactics and Weapons
The battlefields of the War of 1812 resembled, in many cases, a chessboard with armies moving in accordance to tactical manoeuvres of the era. Both the British and American forces often wore elaborate and rather cumbersome uniforms. Militia forces of the era were, at times, outfitted in uniforms that resembled their regular counterparts. The infantry was the primary fighting force at the Battle of Chateauguay. Both sides armed their infantry with flintlock muskets. The American Regular forces were mostly armed with the model 1795 Musket, .69 Calibre. As for the British land forces, they were mostly armed with the British India pattern Musket, .75 Calibre. Both weapons weighed in the area of seventeen pounds and were able to adopt a fourteen to sixteen triangular shaped blade known as a bayonet. [26]
Soldiers on both sides carried a cartridge-box over their right side, which contained 30 – 60 pre-wrapped cartridges each with a measured amount of powder and a soft-lead ball. At times these were issued buck and ball. When given the order to load, soldiers would bite off the tip of the paper cartridge and pour a small amount of powder into the frizzen pan that held the powder that would ignite the powder that would be placed in the barrel. [27] The remainder of the powder, along with the ball and paper wrapping were rammed down the barrel using a metal rod that was fitted under the barrel of the musket and could be removed. When given the command to fire, soldiers would squeeze the trigger allowing the hammer that held a flint to drop and strike the powder in the pan. A resulting flash would then be sent through a touch hole igniting the powder inside the barrel. When firing in volleys, large clouds of smoke would be released, thereby reducing the visibility on the field of battle. [28]The accuracy of these types of weapons ranged from one hundred to one hundred and fifty yards. In terms of firing methods, there were manuals on both sides that originally called for three-rank firing. However, it was determined that two ranks were more effective. If the opportunity presented itself, infantry units would charge an opponent’s line with the bayonet. This often happened after a series of volleys of musket fire had shattered an opponent’s.[29]
When the War of 1812 commenced, the American military force was no more than a constabulary organization, utilizing a number of different field manuals. Most common were William Duane’s 1808 manual, The American Military Library or Compendium of modern tactics Embracing the Discipline, Manoeuvers, and duties of Every Species of Troops and Alexander Smyth’s 1812, Rules and Regulations for the Field Exercise, Manoeuvers and Conduct of the Infantry of the United States. However, the most common manual, particularly among American militia infantry units, was Baron Frederick William von Stueben’s 1794, Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States. As for the British, the two manuals being utilized were Colonel David Dundas 1792, Rules and Regulations for the Manual and Platoon Exercise and Movement for His Majesty’s Troops. There were also subsequent versions that were published in 1807 and 1811.[30]
The most common infantry formation seen on the battlefield was the regiment. Most American regiments consisted of two battalions a total ten companies with sixty-four privates, four corporals, four sergeants, a fifer and a drummer. The British and their Canadian allies deployed regiment’s consisting of two battalions with ten companies. The two flank companies of the British land forces were made up of grenadier and light troops. On paper, United States forces had flank companies as well; however, very few units deployed them. Most of the time, militia or riflemen would be deployed for light or skirmish duty.(https:// www.napoleon.com/mirror/napoleonistyka.atspace.com/infantry_tactics_4.htm#infantrycombatlines2)
Manoeuvring on the battlefield was conducted by mostly the regiment or companies moving in column and then forming into line once they had position on the field. Once in Donald E. Graves. (Red Coats & Grey Jackets: The Battle of Chippawa 5 July 1814 . p. 49.Mike Chappell. Wellington ’s Peninsula Regiments (2) The Light Infantry. London : Osprey Publishing, 2004. p. 15 – 16. John R. Elting. Amateurs To Arms: A Military History of the War of 1812. Chapel Hill , North Carolina : DA Capo Books, 1995. p. 234 – 235. Graves , p. 51. Harold L. Peterson. Round Shot and Rammers. South Bend , Indiana : South Bend Replicas, Inc. p. 54.)the firing line, most units remained stationary in their two-rank formation. In terms of light troops, they played a major role in North America and throughout the Napoleonic wars in general. Traditionally, light formations would move in pairs, using an extended-order formation. The task was to reconnoitre the terrain and enemy line of battle while the rest of the regiment was deploying into battle. As the two sides began to engage each other, the field of battle would begin to fill with blinding smoke that consumed the combatants as they discharged their weapons, the command and control of soldiers was crucial in order to prevent confusion. Flag bearers and musicians played a key role on the battlefield during the nineteenth century. Bearers of both the national and regimental colours would be posted in the centre of the line of battle, along with drummers posted in the rear of the second line or at the right of the line. It was crucial when in battle to identify one’s regiment and to hear various commands given by the regimental drummers, or in the case of the light infantry. buglers.https://www.napolun.com/mirror/napoleonistyka.atspace.com/infantry_tactics_4.htm#infantrycombatlines2
[1] Izard, George. Official Correspondence with the War Department. Philadelphia: Thomas Dobson, 1816. p. 220.
[2]Berton, Pierre. Flames Across the Border: 1813 – 1814. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1981. p. 212-213.Wohler, Patrick. Charles de Salaberry. Soldier of the Empire, Defender Quebec. Toronto: Dundurn, 1984. p. 72. Graves, Donald E. Field of Glory: The Battle of Crysler’s Farm, 1813. Toronto: Robin Brass Studio. p. 16 – 20. Canada 1812 Forged in Fire – Charles de Salaberry (2/6) (youtube.com). Canada 1812 Forged in Fire – Charles de Salaberry (2/6). Retrieved on 8/8/2024.
[3] Berton, Pierre. Flames Across the Border: 1813 – 1814. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1981. p. 212-213.Wohler, Patrick. Charles de Salaberry. Soldier of the Empire, Defender Quebec. Toronto: Dundurn, 1984. p. 72. Graves, Donald E. Field of Glory: The Battle of Crysler’s Farm, 1813. Toronto: Robin Brass Studio. p. 16 – 20.
[4] William Ross Surgeon in, Breton, Berton, Pierre. Flames Across the Border: 1813 – 1814. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1981. p. 214.
[5] Berton, Pierre. Flames Across the Border: 1813 – 1814. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1981. p. 211-215.
[6] Wohler, Patrick. Charles de Salaberry. Soldier of the Empire, Defender Quebec. Toronto: Dundurn, 1984. p. 74.
[7] (Armstrong in Lighthall, p. 7)
[8] Chartrand, Rene. British Forces in North America: 1793 – 1815. London: Osprey Publishing, 1998. p. 46. Breton, p. 211 – 213, Chartrand, 108 – 109, Hampton Congressional Report, 459, Graves, 79 – 81 and Izard in Fredriksen, 218 and Wohler, 74 – 77.
[9] Wohler, Patrick. Charles de Salaberry. Soldier of the Empire, Defender Quebec. Toronto: Dundurn, 1984. p. 84. Berton, Pierre. Flames Across the Border: 1813 – 1814. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1981. p. 214.
[10] Berton, Pierre. Flames Across the Border: 1813 – 1814. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1981. p. 211 – 213.
[11] Chartrand, Rene. British Forces in North America: 1793 – 1815. London: Osprey Publishing, 1998. p. 46. Breton, p. 211 – 213, Chartrand, 108 – 109, Hampton Congressional Report, 459, Graves, 79 – 81 and Izard in Fredriksen, 218 and Wohler, 74 – 77.Izard, George. Official Correspondence with the War Department. Philadelphia: Thomas Dobson, 1816. p. 218. Elting, John R. Amateurs To Arms: A Military History of the War of 1812. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: DA Capo Books, 1995. p. 144-149.
[12] Breton, p. 211 – 213, Chartrand, 108 – 109, Hampton Congressional Report, 459, Graves, 79 – 81 and Izard in Fredriksen, 218 and Wohler, 74 – 77. Izard, George. Official Correspondence with the War Department. Philadelphia: Thomas Dobson, 1816. p. 218. Elting, John R. Amateurs To Arms: A Military History of the War of 1812. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: DA Capo Books, 1995. p. 144-149. Graves, Donald E. Field of Glory: The Battle of Crysler’s Farm, 1813. Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, 1999. p. 79 – 81.
[13] Chartrand, Rene. British Forces in North America: 1793 – 1815. London: Osprey Publishing, 1998. p. 46. Breton, p. 211 – 213, Chartrand, 108 – 109, Hampton Congressional Report, 459, Graves, 79 – 81 and Izard in Fredriksen, 218 and Wohler, 74 – 77.Izard, George. Official Correspondence with the War Department. Philadelphia: Thomas Dobson, 1816. p. 218. Elting, John R. Amateurs To Arms: A Military History of the War of 1812. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: DA Capo Books, 1995. p. 144-149.
[14] Armstrong to Hampton, Congressional Congressional Report, 460 – 462.
[15] Cogswell, A.C. [Eleventh Infantry], “Letters of the War of 1812 in the Champlain Valley,” ed. Wilmond Parker, Vermont Quarterly, 12 (April, 1944), 104 – 124.
Cruikshank, Ernest A., “From Isle au Noix to Chateauguay. A Study of Military Operations of the Frontier of Lower Canada in 1812 and 1813,” Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada, 1 (1914), 25-Bishop Diary.
[16]Chartrand, Rene. British Forces in North America: 1793 – 1815. London: Osprey Publishing, 1998. p. 46. Breton, p. 211 – 213, Chartrand, 108 – 109, Hampton Congressional Report, 459 – 462, Graves, 86 – 89 and Izard in Fredriksen, 219 and Wohler, 77 – 82. Izard, George. Official Correspondence with the War Department. Philadelphia: Thomas Dobson, 1816. p. 218. Elting, John R. Amateurs To Arms: A Military History of the War of 1812. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: DA Capo Books, 1995. p. 148-150.
[17]Fairbanks, Charles. [New Hampshire Volunteers]. “A New Hampshire Volunteer in the War of 1812: The Experiences of Charles Fairbanks,” ed. John C Frederiksen, Historical New Hampshire, 40 (1985), p156 – 157.
[18] Berton, Pierre. Flames Across the Border: 1813 – 1814. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1981. p. 215 – 218.
[19] Hampton Congressional Report, 459 – 462, Graves, 86 – 93 and Izard in Fredriksen, 218 and Wohler, 74 – 77.Izard, George. Official Correspondence with the War Department. Philadelphia: Thomas Dobson, 1816. p. 218. Elting, John R. Amateurs To Arms: A Military History of the War of 1812. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: DA Capo Books, 1995. p. 144-149. Bretonm 216 – 219. Elting, John R. Amateurs To Arms: A Military History of the War of 1812. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: DA Capo Books, 1995. .p. 148 – 150, Graves, 86 – 93.
[20] Hampton Congressional Report, 459 – 462, Graves, 86 – 93 and Izard in Fredriksen, 218 and Wohler, 74 – 77.Izard, George. Official Correspondence with the War Department. Philadelphia: Thomas Dobson, 1816. p. 218. Elting, John R. Amateurs To Arms: A Military History of the War of 1812. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: DA Capo Books, 1995. p. 144-149. Bretonm 218 – 221. Elting, John R. Amateurs To Arms: A Military History of the War of 1812. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: DA Capo Books, 1995. .p. 148 – 150, Graves, 98 – 100. Hampton Congressional Report, 460 – 462, Izard in Fredriksen, 219 – 22, Wohler, 79 – 82, Elting, 148 – 150, Lighthall, 9 – 14.
[21] Graves, 100 – 102, Wholer, 76 – 78, Fryer, 172, Izard, p226 – 228.
[22] Graves, 100 – 102, Wholer, 76 – 78, Fryer, 172, Izard, p226 – 228.
[23] Graves, 100 – 102, Wholer, 76 – 78, Fryer, 172, Izard, p226 – 228.
[24] Wood, WIlliam. p. 397, (1968) [1923]. Select British Documents of the Canadian War of 1812, Volume III. New York: Greenwood Press.
[25] Way, in Zaslow p.66. Elting, p.150.
[26] Donald E. Graves. Red Coats & Grey Jackets: The Battle of Chippawa 5 July 1814 . Toronto : Dundurn Press, 1994. p. 61. Joseph A. Whitehorne. The Battle of Baltimore , 1814. Baltimore , Maryland : The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America , 1997. p. 222.
[27]Donald E. Graves. Red Coats & Grey Jackets: The Battle of Chippawa 5 July 1814 . p. 49.
[28] Philip Haythornthwaite. British Napoleonic Infantry Tactics: 1792 – 1815. London : Osprey publishing, 2008. p. 4.
[29] line.https://www.napolun.com/mirror/napoleonistyka.atspace.com/infantry_tactics_4.htm#infantrycombatlines2.
[30] Donald E. Graves. (Red Coats & Grey Jackets: The Battle of Chippawa 5 July 1814 . p. 49.Mike Chappell. Wellington ’s Peninsula Regiments (2) The Light Infantry. London : Osprey Publishing, 2004. p. 15 – 16. John R. Elting. Amateurs To Arms: A Military History of the War of 1812. Chapel Hill , North Carolina : DA Capo Books, 1995. p. 234 – 235. Graves , p. 51. Harold L. Peterson. Round Shot and Rammers. South Bend , Indana : South Bend Replicas, Inc. p. 54.